Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (107 page)

On May 19 I replied to the President.

Prime

Minister

to

19 May 45

President Truman

I hope you will not mind my putting to you, with great
respect, the need for some further consideration of the
words “a war with the Yugoslavs,” and secondly “attack
us.” I do not envisage a war with the Yugoslavs, and,
short of war, I do not consider Ambassadors should be
withdrawn. It is at critical junctures that Ambassadors
should be on the spot. Meanwhile Tito’s answer has
arrived, and is completely negative. We clearly cannot
leave matters in this state, and immediate action will
now be necessary. Otherwise we shall merely appear
to have been bluffing, and will in fact be bluffed out.

I think we should prevent the rough handling of our
front-line troops, or infiltrations ostensibly peaceful but
contrary to the directions of the Allied commanders and
on a scale to endanger the position of our forces where
they now stand. For instance, supposing they take up
positions all round a British or American unit until they
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have it at their mercy, are we to wait till they open fire
before asking them to move back beyond the lines you
have indicated as desirable? I am sure this is not what
you mean, but it is just the sort of incident which I think
may arise….

In these conditions I should not consider action by
Alexander to ensure the proper functioning of his
Military Government as constituting “a war with the
Yugoslavs.” But I certainly think that pressure should be
put upon them to quit Trieste and Pola and return to the
lines marked out, and that this pressure should be
regarded as in the nature of frontier incidents rather
than as principal diplomatic decisions. I cannot allow
our own troops to be knocked about and mishandled
inside the zone which we both consider they are
entitled to occupy, on the basis that they are in no
circumstances to open fire. A great many of the
Yugoslavs have been filtering back today over the
Isonzo, and their truculent attitude is already somewhat
abated. I rest myself on your telegram to me of May 12.

On May 21 Mr. Truman said he agreed we could not leave matters as they were. We should reject Tito’s answer and reinforce our troops at once so that the Yugoslavs should have no doubts about our intentions. He proposed that Eisenhower and Alexander should make a show of force by land and air, and time it to coincide with our rejection of Tito’s demands. The President thought that a heavy demonstration might bring Tito to his senses, but if hostilities began he doubted if they could be treated as frontier incidents.

He accordingly sent me the text of appropriate instructions for Alexander and Eisenhower, but he ended his telegram with a revealing sentence: “I must not have any avoidable interference with the redeployment of American forces to the Pacific.”

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Prime

Minister

to

21 May 45

President Truman

I am in entire agreement with the message you are
issuing to Alexander and Eisenhower and our Chiefs of
Staff will notify yours accordingly so that Combined
Chiefs of Staff can give the necessary directions. To
save time I am notifying Field-Marshal Alexander
privately.

2. I think there is a very good chance that, if our
deployment is formidable, a solution may be reached
without fighting. Our firm attitude in this matter will I
believe be of value in our discussions with Stalin. It
seems to me that the need for our Triple Meeting at the
earliest moment is very great. There will probably be a
General Election Campaign here during June, but as all
Parties are agreed on foreign policy it need not make
any postponement necessary. Could you give me any
idea of the date and place which would be suitable, so
that we can make our several requests to Stalin. I have
a fear he may play for time in order to remain all
powerful in Europe when our forces have melted….

General Morgan, Alexander’s Chief of Staff, eventually agreed with the Yugoslavs upon a line of demarcation around Trieste.

It was not until a month had passed of increasing friction with the Soviets and with Tito that Stalin himself addressed me on the Yugoslav problem.

Marshal Stalin to

21 June 45

Prime Minister

Notwithstanding the fact that the Yugoslav
Government accepted the proposal of the American
and British Governments with regard to the Istria-Trieste region, the conversations in Trieste seem to
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have reached a deadlock. This is principally to be
explained by the fact that the representatives of the
Allied Command in the Mediterranean are unwilling to
take account even of the minimum wishes of the
Yugoslavs. Yet the Yugoslavs earned the merit of
liberating this territory from the German invaders, and in
that territory moreover the Yugoslav population is in a
majority. This position cannot be regarded as
satisfactory from the point of view of the Allies.

In my desire not to make matters worse, I have
hitherto not drawn attention in our correspondence to
the behavior of Field-Marshal Alexander; but now it is
time to emphasise that I cannot accept the supercilious
tone with regard to the Yugoslavs which Field-Marshal
Alexander has occasionally adopted in these
conversations. It is absolutely unacceptable that Field-Marshal Alexander in an official and public message
allowed himself to compare Marshal Tito with Hitler and
Mussolini. Such a comparison is unjustified and
offensive to Yugoslavia.

The Soviet Government also found unexpected the
tone of ultimatum in the declaration which the Anglo-American representatives presented to the Yugoslav
Government on June 2. How is it possible with such
methods to secure solid and positive results?

All this compels me to draw your attention to the
situation which has developed.

As before, I hope that with regard to Trieste-Istria
legitimate Yugoslav interests will be satisfied, especially
since on the main question the Yugoslavs have met the
Allies halfway.

I replied:

Prime Minister to

23 June 45

Marshal Stalin

I thank you for your message of June 21. Our joint
idea at the Kremlin in October was that the Yugoslav
business should work out around 50–50 Russian and
British influence. In fact it is at present more like 90–10,
and even in that poor 10 we have been subjected to
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violent pressure by Marshal Tito. So violent was this
pressure that the United States and His Majesty’s
Government had to put in motion many hundreds of
thousands of troops in order to prevent themselves
from being attacked by Marshal Tito.

2. Great cruelties have been inflicted by the
Yugoslavs on the Italians in this part of the world,
particularly in Trieste and Fiume, and generally they
have shown a disposition to grasp all the territory into
which their light forces have penetrated. The movement
of these light forces could not have been made unless
you for your part had made immense and welcome
advances from the east and in the north, and unless
Field-Marshal Alexander had held twenty-seven enemy
divisions on his front in Italy and finally reduced them to
surrender. I do not consider that it can be said that
Marshal Tito has conquered all this territory. It has been
conquered by the movements of far greater forces both
in the west and in the east which compelled the
strategic retreat of the Germans from the Balkans.

3. At any rate, we have reached an agreement
which it is proposed to enforce. We think that any
permanent territorial changes should be settled at the
peace table, and Marshal Tito is in no way prejudiced
by accepting the present line which we demand until
that meeting takes place. In the interval we can talk all
these matters over together at Berlin.

4. The actual wording of Field-Marshal Alexander’s
telegram has been largely taken from the President’s
draft. We do not see why we should be pushed about
everywhere, especially by people we have helped, and
helped before you were able to make any contact with
them. Therefore I do not see any reason to make
excuses for Field-Marshal Alexander, although I was
not aware that he was going to draft his telegram
exactly in this way.

5. It seems to me that a Russianised frontier running
from Lübeck through Eisenach to Trieste and down to
Albania is a matter which requires a very great deal of
argument conducted between good friends.

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6. These are just the things we have to talk over
together at our meeting, which is not long now.

Here for the time being in these pages we may leave the problem of Tito and Trieste.

In the uneasy interlude between the German surrender and the Tripartite Conference in Berlin General de Gaulle was also determined to assert the position of France both in Syria, where he ran counter to the policy we had consistently pursued of Syrian independence, and in Italy, where he affronted the United States.

As early as February 27 I had stated our policy in plain terms to the House of Commons:

I must make clear, once and for all, the position of
His Majesty’s Government in respect of Syria and the
Lebanon, and in relation to our French Allies. That
position is governed by the statements made in 1941,
in which the independence of these Levant states was
definitely declared by Great Britain and France. At that
time, and ever since, His Majesty’s Government have
made it clear that they would never seek to supplant
French influence by British influence in the Levant
States. We are determined also to respect the
independence of these States and to use our best
endeavours to preserve a special position for France, in
view of the many cultural and historic connections
which France has so long established with Syria. We
hope that it may be possible for the French to preserve
that special position. We trust that these States will be
firmly established by the authority of the world
organisation, and that French privilege will also be
recognised.