Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (109 page)

672

been distracted from world events by the General Election, were not troubled by these affairs.

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15

The Chasm Opens

The Soviet Menace — Pressures and Policies in
Washington — The Need for a Conference with
Stalin
—
My “Iron Curtain” Telegram of May
12 —

ITake Steps to Preserve the Military Strength of
the Western Democracies — A Visit from Mr.

Joseph E. Davies, May
26 —
“Ganging-Up”— My
Minute of May
27
and the President’s Friendly
Reply — Stalin Suggests a Meeting in Berlin —

Harry Hopkins goes to Moscow — His Efforts to
Break the Deadlock over Poland
—
Britain and the
United States Recognise a New Polish Provisional
Government, July
5.

A
PPREHENSION FOR THE FUTURE and many perplexities had filled my mind as I moved about among the cheering crowds of Londoners in their hour of well-won rejoicing after all they had gone through. The Hitler peril, with its ordeals and privations, seemed to most of them to have vanished in a blaze of glory. The tremendous foe they had fought for more than five years had surrendered unconditionally. All that remained for the three victorious Powers was to make a just and durable peace, guarded by a World Instrument, to bring the soldiers home to their longing loved ones, and to enter upon a Golden Age of prosperity and progress. No more, and surely, thought their peoples, no less.

However, there was another side to the picture. Japan was still unconquered. The atomic bomb was still unborn. The

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world was in confusion. The main bond of common danger which had united the Great Allies had vanished overnight.

The Soviet menace, to my eyes, had already replaced the Nazi foe. But no comradeship against it existed. At home the foundations of national unity, upon which the war-time Government had stood so firmly, were also gone. Our strength, which had overcome so many storms, would no longer continue in the sunshine. How then could we reach that final settlement which alone could reward the toils and sufferings of the struggle? I could not rid my mind of the fear that the victorious armies of democracy would soon disperse, and that the real and hardest test still lay before us. I had seen it all before. I remembered that other joy-day nearly thirty years before, when I had driven with my wife from the Ministry of Munitions through similar multitudes convulsed with enthusiasm to Downing Street to congratulate the Prime Minister. Then, as at this time, I understood the world situation as a whole. But then at least there was no mighty army that we need fear.

My prime thought was a meeting of the three great Powers and I hoped that President Truman would come through London on the way. As will be seen very different ideas were being pressed upon the new President from influential quarters in Washington. The sort of mood and outlook which had been noticed at Yalta had been strengthened.

The United States, it was argued, must be careful not to let herself be drawn into any antagonism with Soviet Russia.

This, it was thought, would stimulate British ambition and would make a new gulf in Europe. The right policy should, on the other hand, be for the United States to stand between Britain and Russia as a friendly mediator, or even arbiter, trying to reduce their differences about Poland or Triumph and Tragedy

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Austria and make things settle down into a quiet and happy peace, enabling American forces to be concentrated against Japan. These pressures must have been very strong upon Truman. His natural instinct, as his historic actions have shown, may well have been different. I could not of course measure the forces at work in the brain centre of our closest Ally, though I was soon conscious of them. I could only feel the vast manifestation of Soviet and Russian imperialism rolling forward over helpless lands.

Obviously the first aim must be a conference with Stalin.

Within three days of the German surrender I cabled the President:

Prime

Minister

to

11 May 45

President Truman

I think we should offer an invitation jointly or
severally at the same moment to Stalin to meet us at
some agreed unshattered town in Germany for a
Tripartite Meeting in July, We should not rendezvous at
any place within the present Russian military zone.

Twice running we have come to meet him. They are
concerned about us on account of our civilisation and
various instrumentalities. But this will be greatly
diminished when our armies are dispersed.

2. I do not know at the moment when our General
Election will be, but I do not see any reason why it
should influence your movements or mine where public
duty calls. If you will entertain the idea of coming over
here in the early days of July, His Majesty will send you
the most cordial invitation and you will have a great
reception from the British nation. I would have
suggested the middle of June but for your reference to
your Fiscal Year (June 30) because I feel that every
minute counts. Thereafter we might move to the
rendezvous fixed in Germany and have the grave
discussions on which the immediate future of the world
depends. I should of course bring with me representatives of both Parties in our State and both would use
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exactly the same language about foreign affairs as we
are closely agreed. Therefore I urge your coming here
in the earliest days of July and that we leave together
to meet U.J. at wherever is the best point outside
Russian-occupied territory to which he can be induced
to come. Meanwhile I earnestly hope that the American
front will not recede from the now agreed tactical lines.
1

3. I doubt very much whether any enticements will
get a proposal for a Tripartite Meeting out of Stalin. But
I think he would respond to an invitation. If not, what
are we to do?

4. I rejoice that your present intention is to adhere to
our rightful interpretation of the Yalta Agreements and
to stand firmly on our present announced attitude
towards all the questions at issue. Mr. President, in
these next two months the gravest matters in the world
will be decided. May I add that I have derived a great
feeling of confidence from the correspondence we have
interchanged.

5. We are drawing up as you desire a list of subjects
for discussion among us three which will take a few
days but will be forwarded to you immediately.

He replied at once that he would rather have Stalin propose the meeting and he hoped our ambassadors would induce him to suggest it. Mr. Truman then declared that he and I ought to go to the meeting separately so as to avoid any suspicion of “ganging up.” When the Conference ended, he hoped to visit England if his duties in America permitted.

I did not fail to notice the difference of view which this telegram conveyed, but I accepted the procedure the President proposed.

Prime

Minister

to

13 May 45

President Truman

F.D.R. promised me he would visit England before
he went to France or, as it has now become, Germany.

We should feel disappointed if you did not come to us.

But having regard to the gravity of the next few months
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no question of ceremonial should intervene with the
organised sequence of events. Therefore I am for the
Conference of the Three as soon as possible and
wherever possible.

2. In this case I consider that we should try to bring
the meeting off some time in June, and I hope your
fiscal year will not delay it. We greatly hope you will
come to England later.

3. I agree that our Ambassadors should do their
utmost to induce Stalin to propose the meeting, and
instructions will be given accordingly by us. I doubt very
much whether he will accede. Time is on his side if he
digs in while we melt away.

4. I look forward to your meeting with Eden.

In these same days I also sent what may be called the “Iron Curtain” telegram to President Truman. Of all the public documents I have written on this issue I would rather be judged by this.

Prime

Minister

to

12 May 45

President Truman

I am profoundly concerned about the European
situation. I learn that half the American Air Force in
Europe has already begun to move to the Pacific
theatre. The newspapers are full of the great movements of the American armies out of Europe. Our
armies also are, under previous arrangements, likely to
undergo a marked reduction. The Canadian Army will
certainly leave. The French are weak and difficult to
deal with. Anyone can see that in a very short space of
time our armed power on the Continent will have
vanished, except for moderate forces to hold down
Germany.

2. Meanwhile what is to happen about Russia? I
have always worked for friendship with Russia, but, like
you, I feel deep anxiety because of their misinterpreta-tion of the Yalta decisions, their attitude towards
Poland, their overwhelming influence in the Balkans,
excepting Greece, the difficulties they make about
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Vienna, the combination of Russian power and the
territories under their control or occupied, coupled with
the Communist technique in so many other countries,
and above all their power to maintain very large armies
in the field for a long time. What will be the position in a
year or two, when the British and American Armies
have melted and the French has not yet been formed
on any major scale, when we may have a handful of
divisions, mostly French, and when Russia may choose
to keep two or three hundred on active service?

3. An iron curtain is drawn down upon their front. We
do not know what is going on behind. There seems little
doubt that the whole of the regions east of the line
Lübeck-Trieste-Corfu will soon be completely in their
hands. To this must be added the further enormous
area conquered by the American armies between
Eisenach and the Elbe, which will, I suppose, in a few
weeks be occupied, when the Americans retreat, by the
Russian power. All kinds of arrangements will have to
be made by General Eisenhower to prevent another
immense flight of the German population westward as
this enormous Muscovite advance into the centre of
Europe takes place. And then the curtain will descend
again to a very large extent, if not entirely. Thus a
broad band of many hundreds of miles of Russian-occupied territory will isolate us from Poland.