Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (53 page)

Therefore I feel that if you are unable to come yourself
before February I am bound to ask you whether you
could not send your Chiefs of Staff over here as soon
as practicable, where they would be close to your main
armies and to General Eisenhower and where the
whole stormy scene can be calmly and patiently studied
with a view to action as closely concerted as that which
signalised our campaigns of 1944.

Though sympathetic, Mr. Roosevelt did not appear to share my anxieties.

President Roosevelt

10 Dec. 44

to Prime Minister

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…. Perhaps I am not close enough to the picture to
feel as disappointed about the war situation as you are,
and perhaps also because six months ago I was not as
optimistic as you were on the time element.

On the European front I always felt that the
occupation of Germany up to the left bank of the Rhine
would be a very stiff job. Because in the old days I
bicycled over most of the Rhine terrain, I have never
been as optimistic as to the ease of getting across the
Rhine with our joint armies as many of the commanding
officers have been.

However, our agreed broad strategy is developing
according to plan. You and I are now in the position of
Commanders-in-Chief who have prepared their plans,
issued their orders, and committed their resources to
battle according to those plans and orders. For the time
being, even if a little behind schedule, it seems to me
the prosecution and outcome of the battles lie with our
field commanders, in whom I have every confidence.

We must remember that the winter season is bringing
great difficulties, but our ground and air forces are day
by day chewing up the enemy’s dwindling manpower
and resources, and our supply flow is much improved
with the opening of Antwerp. General Eisenhower
estimates that on the Western front line he is inflicting
losses in excess of the enemy’s capability to form new
units. I still cannot see clearly just when, but soon a
decisive break in our favour is bound to come.

As to the Italian front, Alexander’s forces are doing
their bit in keeping those German divisions in Italy, and
we must remember that the Germans are really free to
withdraw to the line of the Alps if they so decide.

The same thing applies to their troops in the
Balkans. I have never believed that we had the power
to capture any large German forces in the Balkans
without assistance by the Russians.

On the Russian front we must also give full
allowance to the vile weather, and the Russians seem
to be doing their bit at the present time. This of course
you know more about than I do.

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The Far Eastern situation is of course on a
somewhat different footing, and I am not at all happy
about it.

From the long-range point of view, other than the
measures Wedemeyer is now taking, we can do very
little to prepare China to conduct a worth-while defence,
but Japan is suffering losses in men and ships and
materials in the Pacific area that are many times
greater than ours, and they too cannot keep this up.

Even the Almighty is helping. This magnificent
earthquake and tidal wave is a proof.

The time between now and spring, when the freeze
is over, will develop many things. We shall know a lot
more than we know now.

My Chiefs of Staff are now devoting all of their
abilities and energies in directing their organisations
toward carrying out the plans we have made and in
supporting our forces throughout the world. Practically
all of these forces are, for the time being, committed.

That is why I do not feel that my Chiefs should leave
their posts at this time, since no requirement exists for
broad strategic decisions to guide our field commanders….

A heavy blow now impended. Within six days a crisis burst upon us. The Allied decision to strike hard from Aachen in the north as well as through Alsace in the south had left our centre very weak. In the Ardennes sector a single corps, the VIIIth American, of four divisions, held a front of seventy-five miles. The risk was foreseen and deliberately accepted, but the consequences were grave and might have been graver. By a remarkable feat the enemy gathered about seventy divisions on their Western Front, of which fifteen were armoured. Many were under strength and needed rest and re-equipment, but one formation, the Sixth Panzer Army, was known to be strong and in good fettle. This potential spear-head had been carefully watched while it lay Triumph and Tragedy

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in reserve east of Aachen. When the fighting on that front died down in early December it vanished for a while from the ken of our Intelligence, and bad flying weather hindered our efforts to trace it. Eisenhower suspected that something was afoot, though its scope and violence came as a surprise.

The Germans had indeed a major plan. Rundstedt assembled two Panzer armies, the Fifth and Sixth, and the Seventh Army, a total of ten Panzer and fourteen infantry divisions. This great force, led by its armour, was intended to break through our weak centre in the Ardennes to the river Meuse, swing north and northwest, cut the Allied line in two, seize the port of Antwerp, and sever the life-line of our northern armies. This bold bid was planned by Hitler, who would brook no changes in it on the part of his doubting generals. In its support the remnants of the German Air Force were assembled for a final effort, while paratroops, saboteurs, and agents in Allied uniforms were all given parts to play.

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The attack began on December 16 under a heavy artillery barrage. At its northern flank the Sixth Panzer Army ran into the right of the First U.S. Army in the act of advancing Triumph and Tragedy

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towards the Roer dams. After a swaying battle the enemy were held. Farther south the Germans broke through on a narrow front, but the determined defence of St. Vith, where the 7th U.S. Armoured Division specially distinguished itself, hindered them for several critical days. The Sixth Panzer Army launched a new spear-head to strike west and then northward at the Meuse above Liége. The Fifth Panzer Army meanwhile drove through the centre of the VIIIth U.S.

Corps, by-passed St. Vith and Bastogne, and penetrated deeply to Marche and towards the Meuse at Dinant.

Although the time and weight of the attack surprised the Allied High Command its importance and purpose were quickly recognised. They resolved to strengthen the

“shoulders” of the break-through, hold the Meuse crossing both east and south of Namur, and mass mobile troops to crush the salient from north to south. Eisenhower acted speedily. He stopped all Allied attacks in progress and brought up four American divisions from reserve, and six more from the south. Two airborne divisions, one of them the 6th British, came from England. North of the salient the British XXXth Corps, of four divisions, which had just come out of the line on the river Roer, was concentrated between Liége and Louvain behind the American First and Ninth Armies. These latter threw in all their reserves to extend a defensive flank westward from Malmédy.

By severing the front of General Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group the Germans had made it impossible for him to exercise effective command from his headquarters in Luxembourg over his two armies north of the bulge.

General Eisenhower therefore very wisely placed Montgomery in temporary command of all Allied troops in the north, while Bradley retained the Third U.S. Army and was charged with holding and counterattacking the enemy

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from the south. Corresponding arrangements were made for the tactical air forces.

I telegraphed to Smuts.

Prime Minister to

22 Dec. 44

Field-Marshal Smuts

Montgomery and also we here in England have, as
you are aware, pressed for several months for the
emphasis of the advance to the north of the Ruhr, and
have on repeated occasions urged that our strength did
not enable us to undertake two major offensives such
as the one against Cologne and that across the Saar.

In spite of appalling weather conditions our friends,
however, pushed on confidently, and were very much
spread from north to south when the enemy began his
counter-stroke. I spoke to Eisenhower on the telephone
during the afternoon of the 20th and suggested that he
give to Montgomery the whole command north of the
break through, and to Omar Bradley everything south of
the breakthrough, keeping control himself of the
concerted operation. He replied that he had issued
orders exactly on these lines in the morning. Montgomery now in fact has under his command eighteen
American divisions plus his Twenty-First Army Group
comprising about sixteen divisions. He is forming
substantial reserves and is assuming entire charge of
the battle in the area of his command. He should be
able to intervene heavily. There is nothing so far to
suggest that the Germans have the power to mount a
full-scale offensive against the Twenty-First Army
Group’s main front.

2. Matters are not by any means so clear south of
the gap. The Americans are putting up stubborn
resistance but there is a good deal of disorganisation.

Naturally an army has been gathered from the Metz
region to march north under Patton. The position of the
enemy does not strike me as good. As usual I am
optimistic; the tortoise has thrust his head out very far.

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Three of our reinforcing divisions lined the Meuse south of Namur. Bradley concentrated a corps at Arlon and sent the American 101st Airborne Division to secure the important road junctions at Bastogne. The German armour swung north of Bastogne and sought to break their way northwestward, leaving their infantry to capture the town.

The 101st, with some armoured units, were isolated, and for a week beat off all attacks.