Read Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) Online
Authors: Winston S. Churchill
The wheel of the Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies produced bitter fighting around Marche, which lasted till December 26. By then the Germans were exhausted, although at one time they were only four miles from the Meuse and had penetrated over sixty miles. Bad weather and low ground fogs had kept our air forces out of the first week of the battle; but on December 23 flying conditions got better and they intervened with tremendous effect. Heavy bombers attacked railways and centres of movement behind the enemy lines, and tactical air forces played havoc in his forward areas, starving him of reinforcements, fuel, food, and ammunition. Strategic raids on German refineries helped to deny him petrol and slacken the advance.
Baulked of their foremost objective, the Meuse, the Panzers turned savagely on Bastogne. The American 101st Division had been reinforced on December 26 by part of the 4th U.
S. Armoured Division, and though vastly outnumbered held the town grimly for another week. Before the end of December the German High Command must have realised, however unwillingly, that the battle was lost, for Patton’s counter-offensive from Arlon, which started on the 22d, was steadily if slowly progressing over the snow-choked countryside towards Houffalize. The enemy made one last bid, this time in the air. On January 1 they made a violent low-level surprise attack on all our forward airfields. Our
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losses were heavy, though promptly replaced, but the Luftwaffe lost more than they could afford in their final massed attack of the war.
On January 3 Montgomery also launched his northern counter-offensive against Houffalize to join Patton’s attack from the south. I visited the front at this time, and telegraphed to the President:
Prime
Minister
to
6 Jan. 45
President Roosevelt
C.I.G.S. and I have passed the last two days with
Eisenhower and Montgomery, and they both feel the
battle very heavy, but are confident of success. I hope
you understand that, in case any troubles should arise
in the Press, His Majesty’s Government have complete
confidence in General Eisenhower and feel acutely any
attacks made on him.
2. He and Montgomery are very closely knit, and
also Bradley and Patton, and it would be disaster which
broke up this combination, which has in 1944 yielded
us results beyond the dreams of military avarice.
Montgomery said to me today that the breakthrough
would have been most serious to the whole front but for
the solidarity of the Anglo-American Army.
3. Although I regret our divisions only amount to
seventeen and two-thirds, all units are absolutely up to
strength, and we have seven or eight thousand
reinforcements all ready in addition in France awaiting
transfer to their units. The measures we have taken to
bring another 250,000 into or nearer the front line
enable me to say with confidence that at least our
present strength will be maintained throughout the
impending severe campaign.
4. I am deeply impressed with the need of sustaining
the Foot, who bear two-thirds of the losses but are very
often the last to receive reinforcements. More important
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even than the sending over of large new units is the
keeping up of the infantry strength of divisions already
engaged. We are therefore preparing a number of
infantry brigades, including several from the Marines, of
whom the Navy has 80,000. These brigades will
liberate mobile divisions from quasi-static sectors, and
at the same time do the particular work which is needed
in them. Montgomery welcomed this idea most cordially
as regards the Twenty-first Army Group. I gathered
from General Eisenhower that he takes the same view,
and that he is longing for more infantry drafts — i.e.,
rifle and bayonet — to maintain the United States
divisions at their proper establishment.
5. I most cordially congratulate you on the extraordinary gallantry which your troops have shown in all this
battle, particularly at Bastogne and two other places
which Montgomery mentioned to me on his own front,
one at the peak of the salient, where the 1st and 9th
American Divisions fought on and won after extremely
heavy losses, and the other in connection with the 7th
United States Armoured Division, which seems to have
performed the highest acts of soldierly devotion. Also
many troops of the First Army have fought to the end,
holding cross-roads in the area of incursion, which
averted serious perils to the whole armies of the north
at heavy personal sacrifice.
6. As I see there have been criticisms in the
American papers of our troops having been kept out of
the battle, I take this occasion to assure you that they
stand absolutely ready at all times to obey General
Eisenhower’s commands. I believe that the dispositions
which he and Field-Marshal Montgomery under him
have made are entirely in accordance with strict military
requirements, both as regards the employment of
troops in counter-attack and their lateral movement,
having regard to criss-cross communications. I have not
found a trace of discord at the British and American
headquarters; but, Mr. President, there is this brute
fact: we need more fighting troops to make things move.
7. I have a feeling this is a time for an intense new
impulse, both of friendship and exertion, to be drawn
from our bosoms and to the last scrap of our resources.
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Do not hesitate to tell me of anything you think we can
do.
At this time Eisenhower and his staff were of course acutely anxious to know whether the Russians could do anything from their side to take off some of the pressure against us in the West. All efforts through the liaison officers in Moscow had failed to obtain any reply from their opposite numbers. In order to put the case to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff in the most effective manner Eisenhower had sent his Deputy, Air Marshal Tedder, with a special mission. They were considerably delayed by the weather. As soon as I heard of this I said to Eisenhower, “You may find many delays on the staff level, but I expect Stalin would tell me if I asked him. Shall I try?” He asked me to do so, and I therefore sent the following message:
Prime
Minister
to
6 Jan. 45
Marshal Stalin
The battle in the west is very heavy and at any time
large decisions may be called for from the Supreme
Command. You know yourself from your own
experience how very anxious the position is when a
very broad front has to be defended after the temporary
loss of the initiative. It is Eisenhower’s great desire and
need to know in outline what you plan to do, as this
obviously affects all his and our major decisions. Our
envoy, Air Chief Marshal Tedder, was last night
reported weather-bound in Cairo. His journey has been
much delayed through no fault of yours. In case he has
not reached you yet, I shall be grateful if you can tell
me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive
on the Vistula front, or elsewhere during January, with
any other points you may care to mention. I shall not
pass this most secret information to anyone except
Field-Marshal Brooke and General Eisenhower, and
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only under the conditions of the utmost secrecy. I
regard the matter as urgent.
When one considers how serious was the decision asked for and how many people were involved, it is remarkable that the answer should have been sent me the very next day.
Marshal
Stalin
to
7 Jan. 45
Prime Minister
I received your message of January 6, 1945, on the
evening of January 7.
Unfortunately Air Marshal Tedder has not yet arrived
in Moscow.
It is most important that we should be able to take
advantage of our supremacy over the Germans in
artillery and in the air. This demands clear flying
weather and an absence of low mists, which hinder
aimed artillery fire. We are preparing an offensive, but
the weather is at present unfavourable. Nevertheless,
taking into account the position of our Allies on the
Western Front, G.H.Q. of the Supreme Command has
decided to accelerate the completion of our preparation, and, regardless of the weather, to commence
large-scale offensive operations against the Germans
along the whole Central Front not later than the second
half of January. You may rest assured that we shall do
everything possible to render assistance to the glorious
forces of our Allies.
Prime
Minister
to
9 Jan. 45
Marshal Stalin
I am most grateful to you for your thrilling message. I
have sent it over to General Eisenhower for his eyes
only. May all good fortune rest upon your noble venture.
2. The battle in the West goes not too badly. There
is a good chance of the Huns being crushed out of their
salient with very heavy losses. It is preponderantly an
American battle, and their troops have fought
splendidly, with heavy losses. We are both shoving
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everything in we can. The news you give me will be a
great encouragement to General Eisenhower, because
it gives him the assurance that the German reinforcements will have to be split between both our flaming
fronts. The battle in the West will be continuous,
according to the generals responsible for fighting it.
I quote this interchange as a good example of the speed at which business could be done at the summit of the Alliance, and also because it was a fine deed of the Russians and their chief to hasten their vast offensive, no doubt at a heavy cost in life. Eisenhower was very pleased indeed at the news I was able to send him. He asked however for any reinforcements that could be sent. Nearly three weeks beforehand, on December 22, another 250,000 men had been called to the colours in the United Kingdom, and for the first time in our long struggle the British Government sought powers to compel the women of our fighting services to serve abroad. Not much compulsion was needed. The keenest zeal prevailed. But these drastic measures took time to mature, and although we could make good our autumn losses in the field and keep up a full supply of material, we had little left in hand. The Americans for their part in addition to 60,000 infantry reinforcements, prepared to send nine fresh divisions from the United States.