Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (49 page)

When this was over I laid a wreath beneath the statue of Triumph and Tragedy

301

Clemenceau, who was much in my thoughts on this moving occasion.

De Gaulle entertained me at a large luncheon at the Ministry of War, and made a most flattering speech about my war services. But many problems had still to be settled.

On the night of the 12th after dinner at the Embassy I left with General de Gaulle for Besançon. The General was anxious for me to see the attack on a considerable scale which was planned for the French Army under General de Lattre de Tassigny. All the arrangements for the journey in a luxurious special train were most carefully made and we arrived in plenty of time for the battle. We were to go to an observation point in the mountains, but owing to bitter cold and deep snow the roads were impassable and the whole operation had to be delayed. I passed the day driving with de Gaulle and we found plenty to talk about in a long and severe excursion inspecting troops at intervals. The programme continued long after dark. The French soldiers seemed in the highest spirits. They marched past in great style and sang famous songs with moving enthusiasm. My personal party, my daughter Mary, and my naval aide, Tommy, feared that I should have another go of pneumonia since we were out at least ten hours in terrible weather. But all went well and in the train the dinner was pleasant and interesting. I was struck by the awe and even apprehension which half a dozen high Generals showed to de Gaulle in spite of the fact that he had only one star on his uniform and they had lots.

During the night our train divided. De Gaulle returned to Paris and our half went on to Rheims arriving next morning when I went to Ike’s Headquarters. In the afternoon I flew back to Northolt.

Triumph and Tragedy

302

On my return to London I sent the President a report. A copy was also passed to Stalin.

Prime Minister to

15 Nov. 44

President Roosevelt

… Thank you for your kind wishes about the Paris-de Gaulle trip. I certainly had a wonderful reception
from about half a million French in the Champs
Elysées, and also from the partly Opposition Centre at
the Hôtel de Ville. I re-established friendly private
relations with de Gaulle.

I see statements being put out in the French Press
and other quarters that all sorts of things were decided
by us in Paris. You may be sure that our discussions
about important things took place solely on an ad
referendum basis to the three Great Powers, and of
course especially to you, who have by far the largest
forces in France. Eden and I had a two hours’ talk with
de Gaulle and two or three of his people after luncheon
on the 11th. De Gaulle asked a number of questions
which made me feel how very little they were informed
about anything that had been decided or was taking
place. He is of course anxious to obtain full modern
equipment for eight more divisions, which can only be
supplied by you. S.H.A.E.F. reasonably contends that
these will not be ready for the defeat of Germany in the
field and that shipping must be devoted to the upkeep
of the actual forces that will win the battles of the winter
and spring. I reinforced this argument.

At the same time I sympathise with the French wish
to take over more of the line, to have the best share
they can in the fighting or what is left of it — and there
may be plenty — and not to have to go into Germany
as a so-called conqueror who has not fought. I
remarked that this was a sentimental point which ought
nevertheless to receive consideration. The important
thing for France was to have an Army prepared for the
task which it would actually have to discharge, namely,
Triumph and Tragedy

303

their obligation first to maintain a peaceful and orderly
country behind the front of our armies, and secondly to
assist in the holding down of parts of Germany later on.

On this second point the French pressed very
strongly to have a share in the occupation of Germany,
not merely as sub-participation under British or
American command, but as a French command. I
expressed my sympathy with this, knowing well that
there will be a time not many years distant when the
American armies will go home and when the British will
have great difficulty in maintaining large forces
overseas, so contrary to our mode of life and
disproportionate to our resources, and I urged them to
study the type of army fitted for that purpose, which is
totally different in form from the organisation by
divisions required to break the resistance of a modern
war-hardened enemy army. They were impressed by
this argument, but nevertheless pressed their view.

I see a Reuter message, emanating no doubt
unofficially from Paris, that it was agreed France should
be assigned certain areas — the Ruhr, the Rhineland,
etc — for their troops to garrison. There is no truth in
this, and it is obvious that nothing of this kind can be
settled on such a subject except in agreement with you.

All I said to de Gaulle on this was that we had made a
division of Germany into Russian, British, and United
States spheres; roughly, the Russians had the east, the
British the north, and the Americans the south. I further
said that, speaking for His Majesty’s Government, the
less we had of it the better we should be pleased, and
that we should certainly favour the French taking over
as large a part as their capacity allowed, but that all this
must be settled at an inter-Allied table. I could of course
issue something which would be a disclaimer of any
loose statements made by Reuter, but you may not
think this necessary in view of the obvious facts. I am
telegraphing to U.J. in the same sense. We did not
attempt to settle anything finally or make definite
agreements.

It is evident however that there are a number of
questions which press for decision at a level higher
than that of the High Commands, without which
Triumph and Tragedy

304

decisions no clear guidance can be given. Here is
another reason why we should have a triple meeting if
U.J. will not come, or a quadruple meeting if he will. In
the latter case the French would be in on some
subjects and out on others. One must always realise
that before five years are out a French army must be
made to take on the main task of holding down
Germany. The main question of discussion between
Eden and Bidault was Syria, which was troublesome,
lengthy, and inconclusive, but primarily our worry.

I thought I would give you this account at once in
case of further tendentious statements being put out in
the Press.

I thought very well of Bidault. He looks like a
younger Reynaud, especially in speech and smiling. He
made a very favourable impression on all of us, and
there is no doubt that he has a strong share in the
power. Giraud was at the banquet, and apparently quite
content. What a change in fortune since Casablanca!

Generally I felt in the presence of an organised
Government, broadly based and of rapidly growing
strength, and I am certain that we should be most
unwise to do anything to weaken it in the eyes of
France at this difficult, critical time. I had a considerable
feeling of stability in spite of Communist threats, and
that we could safely take them [the French] more into
our confidence. I hope you will not consider that I am
putting on French clothes when I say this. Let me know
your thoughts. I will cable you later about the meeting….

I also exchanged warm messages with General de Gaulle.

Prime Minister to

16 Nov. 44

General de Gaulle

Now that I am back home, let me express to Your
Excellency and to your colleagues of the French
Government my profound appreciation of the splendid
hospitality and innumerable kindnesses and courtesies
shown me and my friends during the memorable days
which I have just spent in France. I shall always recall
as one of the proudest and most moving occasions of

Triumph and Tragedy

305

my life the wonderful reception which the people of
Paris gave to their British guests on this our first visit to
your capital after its liberation. I was also most grateful
for the opportunity of seeing for myself something of the
ardour and high quality of French troops, which are
completing the liberation of their native soil under the
skilful leadership of General de Lattre de Tassigny. The
welcome extended to us was indeed a happy augury
for that continued friendship between our two countries
essential to the safety and to the future peace of
Europe.

General de Gaulle to

20 Nov. 44

Prime Minister

Je vous remercie au nom du Gouvernement de
votre message. La France, sa capitale, et son Armée,
ont été heureuses d’acclamer dans votre personne non
seulement le Premier Ministre d’un grand pays qui leur
est cher, mais encore le glorieux combattant qui a
maintenu la coalition dans la guerre aux jours les plus
sombres et lui vaut ainsi la victoire. Laissez-moi vous
dire combien j’ai été personnellement heureux de vous
revoir.

Prime Minister to

25 Nov. 44

General de Gaulle

(Paris)

If you think well, please give the following message
from me to de Lattre:

I send all my congratulations on the brilliant exploits
of your young Army. It must be wonderful to be a
Frenchman twenty years old with good weapons in his
hands and France to avenge and save.

On November 20 Stalin sent a friendly reply to my telegram of November 15.

Triumph and Tragedy

306

Marshal Stalin to

20 Nov. 44

Prime Minister

Thank you for your information about your conversations with de Gaulle. I have acquainted myself with your
communication with interest. I have nothing against
your proposal about a possible meeting between us
three and the French, provided the President also
agrees with this, but it is necessary first to settle
definitely about the time and place of the meeting
between us three.

General de Gaulle expressed recently his wish to
come to Moscow to establish contact with the leaders
of the Soviet Government. We replied agreeing to this.