Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (47 page)

Mikolajczyk proposed that each of the five Polish
parties should be represented, he having four out of the
five of their best men, whom he would pick from
personalities not obnoxious to Stalin.

2. Later, at my request, Stalin saw Mikolajczyk and
had an hour and a half’s very friendly talk. Stalin
promised to help him, and Mikolajczyk promised to form
and conduct a Government thoroughly friendly to the
Russians. He explained his plan, but Stalin made it
clear that the Lublin Poles must have the majority.

3. After the Kremlin dinner we put it bluntly to Stalin
that unless Mikolajczyk had fifty-fifty plus himself the
Western World would not be convinced that the
transaction was bona fide and would not believe that an
independent Polish Government had been set up.

Triumph and Tragedy

290

Stalin at first replied he would be content with fifty-fifty,
but rapidly corrected himself to a worse figure.

Meanwhile Eden took the same line with Molotov, who
seemed more comprehending. I do not think the
composition of the Government will prove an
insuperable obstacle if all else is settled. Mikolajczyk
had previously explained to me that there might be one
announcement to save the prestige of the Lublin
Government and a different arrangement among the
Poles behind the scenes.

4. Apart from the above, Mikolajczyk is going to urge
upon his London colleagues the Curzon Line, including
Lvov, for the Russians. I am hopeful that even in the
next fortnight we may get a settlement. It so I will cable
you the exact form so that you can say whether you
want it published or delayed.

5. On major war criminals U.J. took an unexpectedly
ultra-respectable line. There must be no executions
without trial; otherwise the world would say we were
afraid to try them. I pointed out the difficulties in
international law, but he replied if there were no trials
there must be no death sentences, but only lifelong
confinements.

6. We also discussed informally the future partition
of Germany. U.J. wants Poland, Czecho, and Hungary
to form a realm of independent, anti-Nazi, pro-Russian
States, the first two of which might join together.

Contrary to his previously expressed view, he would be
glad to see Vienna the capital of a federation of South
German States, including Austria, Bavaria, Württem-berg, and Baden. As you know, the idea of Vienna
becoming the capital of a large Danubian federation
has always been attractive to me, though I should
prefer to add Hungary, to which U.J. is strongly
opposed.

7. As to Prussia, U.J. wished the Ruhr and the Saar
detached and put out of action and probably under
international control, and a seextractLetterTextte State
formed in the Rhineland. He would also like the
internationalisation of the Kiel Canal. I am not opposed
to this line of thought. However, you may be sure that
Triumph and Tragedy

291

we came to no fixed conclusions pending the triple
meeting.

8. I was delighted to hear from U.J. that you had
suggested a triple meeting towards the end of
November at a Black Sea port. I think this a very fine
idea, and hope you will let me know about it in due
course. I will come anywhere you two desire.

9. U.J. also raised formally the Montreux Convention, wishing for modification for the free passage of
Russian warships. We did not contest this in principle.

Revision is clearly necessary, as Japan is a signatory
and Inönü missed his market last December. We left it
that detailed proposals should be made from the
Russian side. He said they would be moderate.

10. About recognising the present French Administration as the Provisional Government of France, I will
consult the Cabinet on my return. Opinion of United
Kingdom is very strongly for immediate recognition. De
Gaulle is no longer sole master, but is better harnessed
than ever before. I still think that when Eisenhower
proclaims a large zone of the interior for France it would
not be possible to delay this limited form of recognition.

Undoubtedly de Gaulle has the majority of the French
nation behind him, and the French Government need
support against potential anarchy in large areas. I will
however cable you again from London. I am now in the
air above Alamein of Blessed Memory. Kindest regards.

The President replied:

President Roosevelt

22 Oct. 44

to Prime Minister

I am delighted to learn of your success at Moscow in
making progress toward a compromise solution of the
Polish problem.

When and if a solution is arrived at I should like to
be consulted as to the advisability from this point of
view of delaying its publication for about two weeks.

You will understand.

Everything is going well here at the present time.

Triumph and Tragedy

292

Your statement of the present attitude of Uncle J.

towards war criminals, the future of Germany, and
Montreux Convention is most interesting. We should
discuss these matters, together with our Pacific war
effort, at the forthcoming three-party meeting.

On leaving after this profoundly interesting fortnight, in which we got closer to our Soviet Allies than ever before —

or since — I had written to Stalin:

Prime

Minister

to

20 Oct. 44

Marshal Stalin

Eden and I have come away from the Soviet Union
refreshed and fortified by the discussions which we had
with you, Marshal Stalin, and with your colleagues. This
memorable meeting in Moscow has shown that there
are no matters that cannot be adjusted between us
when we meet together in frank and intimate discussion. Russian hospitality, which is renowned, excelled
itself on the occasion of our visit. Both in Moscow and
in the Crimea, where we spent some enjoyable hours,
there was the highest consideration for the comfort of
myself and our mission. I am most grateful to you and
to all those who were responsible for these arrangements. May we soon meet again.

Triumph and Tragedy

293

16

Paris

Need for a Representative Administration in
France — General de Gaulle’s National Committee — My Speech to the House of Commons of
September
28
— My Telegram to the President of
October
14
— The Committee of National
Liberation Becomes the Provisional Government
of France, October
20
— I Fly to Paris, November
10
— The Procession in the Champs Elysées,
November 11 — My Telegram to the President
and to Stalin, November
15
— The French Army
and the Occupation o f Germany — Stalin’s
Telegram of November
20
— Rumours of a
Western “Bloc”— A Trip to the Vosges — My
Telegram to Stalin of November
25
— The Winter
Battle in the West — General de Gaulle’s Visit to
Moscow — Stalin’s Telegrams to me of December
2
and December
3
— My Reply, December
5
—

Correspondence with the President—Signature of
the Franco-Soviet Pact, December
10
— Question
o f an Anglo-French Treaty — My Minute to Mr.

Eden of December
31.

A
S OUR ARMIES MOVED eastward and southward it became increasingly urgent to set up a unified and broadly representative Administration in France. We were anxious not to impose a ready-made Committee from abroad, and we tried first to gauge the feelings of the people themselves Triumph and Tragedy

294

as the liberation progressed. I had long pondered this problem, and as early as July 10 had minuted to Mr. Eden:
Prime

Minister

to

10 July 44

Foreign Secretary

Surely it would be most unwise of us to make up our
minds on this [proposal to ask the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.

R. to join with us in recognising the French Committee
of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of
France] until the result of the President’s honeymoon
with de Gaulle is made known. Clearly we shall have to
go as far as the United States go, and after their
decision is declared we may press them to go farther.

Should the President make a volte-face and come to
terms with de Gaulle we shall have a very good case to
present to Parliament, showing how foolish it would
have been to have had a premature debate which
might have spoiled all this happy kissing.

Five weeks later the break-out from Normandy had been accomplished and Patton was at the gates of Paris, but I was still averse to taking any decisive steps and minuted again:

Prime Minister to

18 Aug. 44

Foreign Secretary

I should deprecate taking any decisions about
France till we can see more clearly what emerges from
the smoke of battle. Should the great success of our
operations secure the liberation of the West and South
of France, including Paris, as may easily be the case,
there will be a large area from which a real Provisional
Government might be drawn instead of one being
composed entirely of the French National Liberation
Committee, whose interest in seizing the title-deeds of
France is obvious.

I therefore strongly deprecate commitments of any
kind at this stage to the French National Committee
beyond those which have already been agreed to. One
does not know at all what may happen, and it is as well
Triumph and Tragedy

295

to keep our hands free. I think a broader basis should
be established before we commit ourselves.

Throughout the following weeks we watched the rallying of the Maquis and of public opinion to General de Gaulle’s National Committee. Hitherto, by force of circumstances, it could not be a body representative of France as a whole, but by the end of September progress had been made, and on the 28th I said in my review of the war to the House of Commons:

Naturally, that body has new elements, especially
among those who formed the Maquis and Resistance
Movements, and among those who raised the glorious
revolt in Paris, which reminded us of the famous days
of the Revolution, when France and Paris struck a blow
that opened the path broadly for all the nations of the
world. Naturally, we, and, I believe, the United States
and the Soviet Union, are most anxious to see emerge
an entity which can truly be said to speak in the name
of the people of France — the whole people of France.