Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (45 page)

However, besides the institutional question there
exists in all these countries the ideological issue
between totalitarian forms of government and those we
call free enterprise controlled by universal suffrage. We
are very glad that you have declared yourselves
against trying to change by force or by Communist
propaganda the established systems in the various
Balkan countries. Let them work out their own fortunes
during the years that lie ahead. One thing however we
cannot allow — Fascism or Nazism in any of their
forms, which give to the toiling masses neither the
securities offered by your system nor those offered by
ours, but, on the contrary, lead to the build-up of
tyrannies at home and aggression abroad. In principle I
feel that Great Britain and Russia should feel easy
about the internal government of these countries, and
not worry about them or interfere with them once
conditions of tranquillity have been restored after this
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terrible blood-bath which they, and indeed we, have all
been through.

It is from this point of view that I have sought to
adumbrate the degrees of interest which each of us
takes in these countries with the full assent of the other,
and subject to the approval of the United States, which
may go far away for a long time and then come back
again unexpectedly with gigantic strength.

In writing to you, with your experience and wisdom, I
do not need to go through a lot of arguments. Hitler has
tried to exploit the fear of an aggressive, proselytising
Communism which exists throughout Western Europe,
and he is being decisively beaten to the ground. But, as
you know well, this fear exists in every country,
because, whatever the merits of our different systems,
no country wishes to go through the bloody revolution
which will certainly be necessary in nearly every case
before so drastic a change could be made in the life,
habits, and outlook of their society. We feel we were
right in interpreting your dissolution of the Comintern as
a decision by the Soviet Government not to interfere in
the internal political affairs of other countries. The more
this can be established in people’s minds the smoother
everything will go. We, on the other hand, and I am
sure the United States as well, have Governments
which stand on very broad bases, where privilege and
class are under continual scrutiny and correction. We
have the feeling that, viewed from afar and on a grand
scale, the differences between our systems will tend to
get smaller, and the great common ground which we
share of making life richer and happier for the mass of
the people is growing every year. Probably if there were
peace for fifty years the differences which now might
cause such grave troubles to the world would become
matters for academic discussion.

At this point, Mr. Stalin, I want to impress upon you
the great desire there is in the heart of Britain for a
long, stable friendship and co-operation between our
two countries, and that with the United States we shall
be able to keep the world engine on the rails.

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To my colleagues at home I sent the following:
Prime

Minister

to

12 Oct. 44

Colleagues in London

The system of percentage is not intended to
prescribe the numbers sitting on commissions for the
different Balkan countries, but rather to express the
interest and sentiment with which the British and Soviet
Governments approach the problems of these
countries, and so that they might reveal their minds to
each other in some way that could be comprehended. It
is not intended to be more than a guide, and of course
in no way commits the United States, nor does it
attempt to set up a rigid system of spheres of interest. It
may however help the United States to see how their
two principal Allies feel about these regions when the
picture is presented as a whole.

2. Thus it is seen that quite naturally Soviet Russia
has vital interests in the countries bordering on the
Black Sea, by one of whom, Rumania, she has been
most wantonly attacked with twenty-six divisions, and
with the other of whom, Bulgaria, she has ancient ties.

Great Britain feels it right to show particular respect to
Russian views about these two countries, and to the
Soviet desire to take the lead in a practical way in
guiding them in the name of the common cause.

3. Similarly, Great Britain has a long tradition of
friendship with Greece, and a direct interest as a
Mediterranean Power in her future. In this war Great
Britain lost 30,000 men in trying to resist the German-Italian invasion of Greece, and wishes to play a leading
part in guiding Greece out of her present troubles,
maintaining that close agreement with the United
States which has hitherto characterised Anglo-American policy in this quarter. Here it is understood
that Great Britain will take the lead in a military sense
and try to help the existing Royal Greek Government to
establish itself in Athens upon as broad and united a
basis as possible. Soviet Russia would be ready to
concede this position and function to Great Britain in
the same sort of way as Britain would recognise the

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intimate relationship between Russia and Rumania.

This would prevent in Greece the growth of hostile
factions waging civil war upon each other and involving
the British and Russian Governments in vexatious
arguments and conflict of policy.

4. Coming to the case of Yugoslavia, the numerical
symbol 50-50 is intended to be the foundation of joint
action and an agreed policy between the two Powers
now closely involved, so as to favour the creation of a
united Yugoslavia after all elements there have been
joined together to the utmost in driving out the Nazi
invaders. It is intended to prevent, for instance, armed
strife between Croats and Slovenes on the one side
and powerful and numerous elements in Serbia on the
other, and also to produce a joint and friendly policy
towards Marshal Tito, while ensuring that weapons
furnished to him are used against the common Nazi foe
rather than for internal purposes. Such a policy,
pursued in common by Britain and Soviet Russia,
without any thought of special advantages to
themselves, would be of real benefit.

5. As it is the Soviet armies which are obtaining
control of Hungary, it would be natural that a major
share of influence should rest with them, subject of
course to agreement with Great Britain and probably
the United States, who, though not actually operating in
Hungary, must view it as a Central European and not a
Balkan State.

6. It must be emphasised that this broad disclosure
of Soviet and British feelings in the countries mentioned
above is only an interim guide for the immediate wartime future, and will be surveyed by the Great Powers
when they meet at the armistice or peace table to make
a general settlement of Europe.

At five o’clock on the evening of October 13 we had our meeting at the Soviet Government Hospitality House, known as Spiridonovka, to hear Mikolajczyk and his colleagues put their case. These talks were held as a

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preparation for a further meeting at which the British and American delegations would meet the Lublin Poles. I pressed Mikolajczyk hard to consider two things, namely,
de facto
acceptance of the Curzon Line, with interchange of population and a friendly discussion with the Lublin Polish Committee so that a united Poland might be established.

Changes, I said, would take place, but it would be best if unity were established now, at this closing period of the war, and I asked the Poles to consider the matter carefully that night. Mr. Eden and I would be at their disposal. It was essential for them to make contact with the Polish Committee and to accept the Curzon Line as a working arrangement, subject to discussion at the Peace Conference.

At ten o’clock the same evening we met the so-called Polish National Committee. It was soon plain that the Lublin Poles were mere pawns of Russia. They had learned and rehearsed their part so carefully that even their masters evidently felt they were overdoing it. For instance, M. Bierut, the leader, spoke in these terms: “We are here to demand on behalf of Poland that Lvov shall belong to Russia. This is the will of the Polish people.” When this had been translated from Polish into English and Russian I looked at Stalin and saw an understanding twinkle in his expressive eyes, as much as to say, “What about that for our Soviet teaching!” The lengthy contribution of another Lublin leader, Osubka-Morawski, was equally depressing. Mr. Eden formed the worst opinion of the three Lublin Poles.

The whole conference lasted over six hours, but the achievement was small.

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On the 14th there was a Command Performance at the Bolshoi Theatre — first a ballet, then opera, and finally some splendid dancing and singing by the Red Army choir.

Stalin and I occupied the Royal Box, and we had a rapturous ovation from the entire audience. After the theatre we had a most interesting and successful military discussion at the Kremlin. Stalin had with him Molotov and General Antonov. Harriman brought General Deane. I had Brooke, Ismay, and General Burrows, head of our Military Mission in Moscow.

We began by telling them our future intentions in Northwest Europe, Italy, and Burma. Deane followed with a statement about the campaign in the Pacific, and gave an outline of the sort of help which would be particularly valuable from the Soviets, once they were at war with Japan. General Antonov then made a very frank statement about the situation on the Eastern Front, the difficulties which confronted Russian armies, and their plans for the future.

Stalin intervened from time to time to emphasise points of special significance, and concluded by assuring us that the Russian armies would press vigorously and continuously into Germany and that we need not have the slightest anxiety that the Germans would be able to withdraw any troops from their Eastern Front.

There was no doubt whatever that the Soviets intended to enter the war against Japan as soon after the defeat of Germany as they could collect the necessary forces and supplies in the Far East. Stalin would not commit himself definitely to a date. He spoke of a period of “several months” after the German defeat. We got the impression that this might be interpreted as about three or four. The Russians agreed to an immediate start in building up stocks of food and fuel in their Far Eastern oilfields, and to let the