Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (40 page)

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The arrangements which I had made with the President in the summer to divide our responsibilities for looking after particular countries affected by the movements of the armies had tided us over the three months for which our agreement ran. But as the autumn drew on everything in Eastern Europe became more intense. I felt the need of another personal meeting with Stalin, whom I had not seen since Teheran, and with whom, in spite of the Warsaw tragedy, I felt new links since the successful opening of

“Overlord.” The Russian armies were now pressing heavily upon the Balkan scene, and Rumania and Bulgaria were in their power. As the victory of the Grand Alliance became only a matter of time it was natural that Russian ambitions should grow. Communism raised its head behind the thundering Russian battle-front. Russia was the Deliverer, and Communism the gospel she brought.

I had never felt that our relations with Rumania and Bulgaria in the past called for any special sacrifices from us.

But the fate of Poland and Greece struck us keenly. For Poland we had entered the war; for Greece we had made painful efforts. Both their Governments had taken refuge in London, and we considered ourselves responsible for their restoration to their own country, if that was what their peoples really wished. In the main these feelings were shared by the United States, but they were very slow in realising the upsurge of Communist influence, which slid on before, as well as followed, the onward march of the mighty armies directed from the Kremlin. I hoped to take advantage of the better relations with the Soviets to reach satisfactory solutions of these new problems opening between East and West.

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Besides these grave issues which affected the whole of Central Europe, the questions of World Organisation were now thrusting themselves upon all our minds. A lengthy conference had been held at Dumbarton Oaks, in Washington, between August and October, at which the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and China had produced the now familiar scheme for keeping the peace of the world. They proposed that all peace-loving States should join a new organisation called the United Nations.

This would consist of a General Assembly and a Security Council. The Assembly would discuss and consider how to promote and preserve world peace and advise the Security Council what to do about it. Each State would belong to the Assembly and have a vote, but the Assembly could only recommend and pass declarations; it could take no executive action. The Security Council would investigate any disputes between the United Nations, and in effect settle them by force if they could not be settled in peace.

This was very different from the League of Nations. Under the new scheme the Assembly could discuss and recommend; the Council alone could act. The discretion of the Council was unfettered by definitions of “aggression”

and rules about when force could be used and when sanctions could be applied.

There had been much discussion about who should belong to the Council and how its members should use its great authority. Eventually it had been settled that the “Big Three”

and China should be permanent members, joined by France in due course, and that the Assembly should elect six more States to sit on it for two years at a time. There remained the question of votes. Every member of the Assembly should have a vote, but the Assembly could only deliberate and make recommendations, and in this there was little substance. It had been much more difficult to

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settle the method of voting in the Security Council. The discussions had revealed many differences between the three great Allies which will appear as the account proceeds. The Kremlin had no intention of joining an international body on which they would be out-voted by a host of small Powers, who, though they could not influence the course of the war, would certainly claim equal status in the victory. I felt sure we could only reach good decisions with Russia while we had the comradeship of a common foe as a bond. Hitler and Hitlerism were doomed; but after Hitler what?

General Smuts’ meditations at his farm in the veldt led him along the same paths of thought, and during the conference he had telegraphed to me:

Field-Marshal

20 Sept. 44

Smuts

to

Prime

Minister

The crisis arising from the deadlock with Russia in
World Organisation talks fills me with deep concern,
and in any case comes at a most unfortunate moment
before the final end of the war. In this, as in other
cases, we are, I fear, being hurried at breakneck pace
into

momentous

decisions.

Telecommunications,

international aviation, etc., all tell the same tale. As the
consequences of this impasse may however be
particularly calamitous here, I may be excused for
sending a warning note.

The Soviet attitude struck me at first as absurd and
their contention as one not to be conceded by other
Great Powers, and likely to be turned down by smaller
Powers also. But second thoughts have inclined the
other way. I assume that Molotov sincerely states the
Soviet attitude, and that it is correctly interpreted by
Cadogan and Clark Kerr as one which involves the
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honour and standing of Russia among her Allies. She
questions whether she is trusted and treated as an
equal or whether she is still the pariah and outcast. A
misunderstanding here amounts to more than a mere
difference. It may, by touching Russian amour propre
and inducing an inferiority complex, poison European
relations, with far-reaching results. Knowing her power,
Russia may become more grasping than ever. Her
reaction and sense of power are shown by the lack of
any attempt on her part to discover a solution. What will
be her future relations with countries such as Germany
and Japan, even France, not to mention lesser
countries? Should a World Organisation be formed
which does not include Russia she will become the
power centre of another group. We shall then be
heading towards a third World War. If the United
Nations do not set up such an organisation they will
stand stultified before history. This creates a very grave
dilemma, and we must at all costs avoid the position
into which we may be drifting.

Mindful of these dangers, the small Powers should
be prepared to make a concession to Russia’s amour
propre, and on this issue should not demand theoretical
equality of status. Such a demand, if pressed, may
carry with it for smaller Powers the most devastating
results. It would be most unwise in dealing with
questions which involve power and security to raise
theoretical issues of sovereign equality, and it is for the
United States of America and the United Kingdom to
use their influence in favour of common sense and
safety first rather than the small countries’ status.

On the merits the principle of unanimity among the
Great Powers has much to recommend it, at least for
the years immediately following on this war. If this
principle proves unworkable in practice the situation
could subsequently be reviewed when mutual
confidence has been established and a more workable
basis laid down. A clash at the present juncture should
be avoided at all costs. In the event of unanimity for the
Powers being adopted, even including their voting on
questions directly concerning their interests, the result
will require that the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom
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should exert all their influence to get Russia to act
moderately and sensibly and not to flout world opinion.

And in this it is likely that they will be largely successful.

Should Russia prove intransigent it may be necessary
for the Organisation to act, but the blame will attach to
her. The principle of unanimity will at the worst only
have the effect of a veto, of stopping action where it
may be wise, or even necessary. Its effect will be
negative; it will retard action. But it will also render it
impossible for Russia to embark on courses not
approved of by the U.S.A. and the United Kingdom.

A brake like unanimity may not be so bad a thing to
have where people are drunk with new-won power. I do
not defend it; I dislike it; but I do not consider it at
present so bad an instrument that on this issue the
future of world peace and security should be sacrificed.

The talks have so far been conducted on an official
advisory level, although there may no doubt have been
intervention on a higher level. Before definite decisions
are reached on the highest level the whole situation
should, I think, be most carefully reviewed in all its far-reaching implications, and the Great Powers should
endeavour to find some modus vivendi, even if only of a
temporary character, which would prevent a catastrophe of the first magnitude. Where so much is at stake
for the future we simply must agree, and cannot afford
to differ.

And further:

Field-Marshal

26 Sept. 44

Smuts

to

Prime

Minister

May the results of your arduous labours in Canada
justify your efforts…. My warm congratulations on your
and Mrs. Churchill’s safe return.

While the campaign in Italy again has gone much
slower than was anticipated, and the approaching rainy
season may even further upset your hopes in that area,
Alexander could still press on and maintain our prestige
in the Balkan area. In spite of all the help Tito has
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obtained only from us, he has not behaved loyally to us.

I fear that our interests will suffer by his supremacy in
Yugoslavia.

What is happening in Greece seems still worse.

There the E.A.M. is obtaining control, unfortunately
largely with our help. I hope this may still be prevented
from the point of view of our great Mediterranean
interests, as well as those of the suffering people of
Greece, and that our loyal Greek friends may be
heartened by positive action on our part. Papandreou is
rapidly coming under the power of the E.A.M. elements,
who no doubt rely on Soviet backing. You will, I hope,
find time to discuss with the King of Greece the best
means of safeguarding our and Greek vital interests.

The shape of the future Mediterranean setup is rapidly
developing, and in a way not favourable to us.

I do not say this in any spirit of hostility to Russia. It
is upon close co-operation between the Big Three that
our best hope rests for the near future, and my advice
given in the impasse at Dumbarton Oaks is a proof of
that. But the more firmly Russia can establish herself in
the saddle now the farther she will ride in the future and
the more precarious our holdfast will become. Our
position in the Mediterranean and in Western Europe
must be strengthened rather than weakened. In neither
of these areas we may have the support of Russia. or
even of de Gaullist France. From this standpoint the
future dispositions as regards Germany assume an
importance for us which may be far greater than and
very different from that which they appear to have at
present. A new situation will be created for us in Europe
and the world by the elimination of Germany through
this war. This calls for a searching reconsideration of
our entire foreign policy for the future. While a World
Organisation is necessary, it is equally essential that
our Commonwealth and Empire should emerge from
this ordeal as strong and influential as possible, making
us an equal partner in every sense for the other Big
Two.