Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (18 page)

General Clark’s Fifth U.S. Army took the coastal roads towards Pisa, while our Eighth Army followed up astride the Tiber, heading for Lake Trasimene. The pace was hot.

Prime

Minister

to

9 June 44

General Alexander

All our information here goes to reinforce your
estimate of the ruin you have wrought on the German
armies in Italy. Your whole advance is splendid, and I
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hope the remnants of what were once the German
armies will be collected.

Alexander hoped greatly that the “Anvil” plan to land in the south of France would be put aside and that he would be allowed to keep intact his battle-trained troops, now flushed with victory. If so, he was confident of breaking through the Apennines into the valley of the Po and beyond within a few months. He failed by a very narrow margin, as this story will show, and it seems certain that but for the deprivations and demands of “Anvil” the campaign in Italy could have been over by Christmas.

In any case there was hard fighting ahead. Nineteen German divisions had been involved in the battles of May and early June. Three of them had ceased to exist; most of the others were gravely stricken and hurrying northward in confused retreat. But Kesselring was a good general, with a competent staff. His problem was to delay our advance until he had reorganised his troops and occupied his next prepared position, the so-called Gothic Line, which ran from the west coast beyond Pisa, curved along the mountains north of Florence, and then struck off to the Adriatic at Pesaro.
1
The Germans had been working on this line for more than a year, but it was still unfinished. Kesselring had to fight for time to complete and man it and to receive the eight divisions which were being sent him from Northern Europe, the Balkans, Germany, and Russia.

After ten days of pursuit German resistance began to stiffen, and the Eighth Army had a hard fight to overcome a strong position on the famous shores of Lake Trasimene. It was not till June 28 that the enemy were ejected and fell back on Arezzo. On the west coast American troops of the Fifth Army took Cecina, not without difficulty, on July 1, and on their right the French Corps, also under General Clark’s Triumph and Tragedy

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command, reached Siena soon afterwards. The enemy made a corresponding withdrawal on the Adriatic coast, enabling the Polish Corps swiftly to occupy Pescara and drive on towards Ancona. At this time too a French colonial division, transhipped from Corsica, took Elba, with two thousand prisoners, after a couple of days’ sharp fighting, in which they received strong naval and air support.

In early July, as a result of the discussions which had been proceeding with the United States, Alexander was ordered to detach forces, amounting finally to seven divisions, for

“Anvil.” The Fifth Army alone was thereby reduced from nearly 250,000 men to 153,000. Despite this blow Alexander persevered with vigour in his pursuit and plan.

The Germans, re-formed and rebuilt to the equivalent of fourteen full divisions, faced him on a line from Rosignano to Arezzo, and thence to the Adriatic south of Ancona. This was one of a succession of covering positions which the enemy were to hold with increasing obstinacy to stop us reaching their Gothic Line. Arezzo fell to the British on July 16, after heavy air and artillery bombardment. On the 18th the Americans reached the river Arno east of Pisa, and the next day entered the port of Leghorn, while the Poles, who had been pressing hard along the Adriatic shore, took Ancona. These two ports, though severely damaged, eased the strain on our now much-extended line of communications. In the last week of the month further advances gave the Americans the whole line of the Arno from Empoli to Pisa. The Eighth Army cleared all the mountain country south of Florence, and the New Zealanders, breaking into the defence, forced the enemy to withdraw through the city, where they destroyed behind them all the bridges except the venerable but inadequate Ponte Vecchio.

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In less than two months the Allied armies had advanced over 250 miles. After the first fortnight it had been hard going all the way, with many vexatious supply problems.

The Germans had their share of these. All their rearward communications ran across the wide river Po on a score of road and rail bridges. Towards the end of July these were incessantly attacked by the Allied air forces, and every one of them was cut, although, thanks to the skill of Kesselring’s engineers, some supplies still got through.

I now decided to go myself to Italy, where many questions could be more easily settled on the spot than by correspondence. It would be a great advantage to see the commanders and the troops from whom so much was being demanded, after so much had been taken. The

“Anvil” operation was about to be launched. Alexander, though sorely weakened, was preparing his armies for a further offensive. I was anxious to meet Tito, who could easily come to Italy from the island of Vis, where we were still protecting him. M. Papandreou and some of his colleagues could come from Cairo, and plans could be made to help them back to Athens when the Germans departed. Finally there was the Italian political tangle of which Rome was now the centre. On July 30 I telegraphed to General Wilson at Caserta:

Prime

Minister

to

30 July 44

General Wilson

I am hoping, if the [“doodle-bug”] bombardment here
does not flare up unduly, to come to Italy for ten days or
a fortnight, starting August 6 or 7. It would be a pity for
me to miss Tito, with whom I am quite prepared to
discuss political matters of all kinds. Could you

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therefore stage your meeting with him so that he will be
at Caserta at dates including 8th or 9th?

And on August 4 to General Alexander:
Prime

Minister

to

4 Aug. 44

General Alexander

I thought it would be better for us to make our plans

[for my visit] together when I arrive. Mind you do not let
me get in your way. I do not want a heavy programme,
nor to engage myself to see anybody except you,
Wilson, and Tito. I have no doubt I shall find plenty to
do when I am on the spot.

The days were so crowded with Cabinet business that my dates receded. On August 9 I telegraphed to Mr. Duff Cooper that I hoped to arrive at the Maison Blanche airfield, outside Algiers, about 6.30 A.M. on Friday, August 11, and would stay there for about three hours on my way to Naples. I added, “You may tell de Gaulle in case he wishes to see me at your house or the Admiral’s villa. The visit is quite informal.”

We arrived punctually. Duff Cooper met me, and took me to his house, which his wife had made most comfortable. He told me he had conveyed my invitation or suggestion to de Gaulle, and that the General had refused. He did not wish to intrude upon the repose I should need at this brief halt on my journey. I thought this needlessly haughty, considering all the business we had in hand and what I could have told him. He was however still offended by what had happened at “Overlord,” and thought this was a good chance of marking his displeasure. I did not in fact see him again for several months.

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I reached Naples that afternoon, and was installed in the palatial though somewhat dilapidated Villa Rivalta, with a glorious view of Vesuvius and the bay. Here General Wilson explained to me that all arrangements had been made for a conference next morning with Tito and Subaši, the new Yugoslav Prime Minister of King Peter’s Government in London. They had already arrived in Naples, and would dine with us the next night.

On the morning of August 12 Marshal Tito came up to the villa. He wore a magnificent gold and blue uniform which was very tight under the collar and singularly unsuited to the blazing heat. The uniform had been given him by the Russians, and, as I was afterwards informed, the gold lace came from the United States. I joined him on the terrace of the villa, accompanied by Brigadier Maclean and an interpreter.

I suggested that the Marshal might first like to see General Wilson’s War Room, and we moved inside. The Marshal, who was attended by two ferocious-looking bodyguards, each carrying automatic pistols, wanted to bring them with him in case of treachery on our part. He was dissuaded from this with some difficulty, and proposed to bring them to guard him at dinner instead.

I led the way into a large room, where maps of the battle-fronts covered the walls. I began by displaying the Allied front in Normandy and indicating our broad strategic moves against the German armies in the west. I pointed out Hitler’s obstinacy in refusing to yield an inch of territory, how numerous divisions were locked up in Norway and in the Baltic provinces, and said that his correct strategy would be to withdraw his troops from the Balkans and concentrate them on the main battle-fronts. Allied pressure in Italy and the Russian advance from the east might force him to go, Triumph and Tragedy

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but we must reckon on the possibility of his staying. As I talked I pointed on the map to the Istrian peninsula, and asked Tito where, if we were able to reach it from the east coast of Italy, his forces could be sent to co-operate with us.

I explained that it would help if a small port could be opened on the Yugoslav coast so that we could send in war material by sea. In June and July we had sent nearly two thousand tons of stores to his forces by air, but could do much more if we had a port. Tito said that although German opposition had intensified lately, and Yugoslav losses increased, he was able to raise considerable forces in Croatia and Slovenia, and he would certainly favour an operation against the Istrian peninsula, in which Yugoslav forces would join.

We now moved into a small sitting-room, and I began to question him about his relations with the Royal Yugoslav Government. He said that violent fighting still continued between the Partisans and Mihailovi, whose power rested on German and Bulgar help. Reconciliation was unlikely. I replied that we had no desire to intervene in internal Yugoslav affairs, but wanted his country to be strong, united, and independent. Dr. Subaši was very loyal to this idea. Moreover, we ought not to let the King down. Tito said that he understood our obligation towards King Peter, but was not able to do anything about it until after the war, when the Yugoslav people themselves would decide.

I then turned to the future, and suggested that the right solution for Yugoslavia would be a democratic system based on the peasantry, and perhaps some gradual measure of agrarian reform where the holdings were too small. Tito assured me that, as he had stated publicly, he had no desire to introduce the Communist system into Yugoslavia, if only because most European countries after the war would probably be living under a democratic