Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (86 page)

In fact she went, and was received with the utmost goodwill. Meanwhile I carefully watched the progress of the negotiations to make sure the Soviets suffered no unfair exclusion.

Prime Minister to

30 Mar. 45

Foreign Secretary

Have we not told the Russians that the only purpose
of the contacts in Switzerland is to arrange a meeting at

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our military headquarters in Italy, where military
questions will be discussed in the presence, if they
wish, of a Russian representative, and that if at any
moment political affairs are trenched upon the whole
matter can be referred to the three Governments? It
looks as if the Swiss conversations may go beyond
that, if indeed they have not already gone beyond it.

We have decided to ignore the insulting telegrams
which Molotov has sent. This however does not relieve
us from our obligation as Allies on any matter which
might involve peace negotiations.

Pray consider this and let me know whether any
further information should be conveyed.

On April 5 I received from the President the startling text of his interchanges with Stalin. These were the telegrams:
Marshal

Stalin

to

3 Apr. 45

President Roosevelt

I have received your message on the question of
negotiations in Berne. You are absolutely right that, in
connection with the affair regarding negotiations of the
Anglo-American command with the German command
somewhere in Berne or some other place, there “has
developed an atmosphere of fear and distrust
deserving regrets.”

You insist that there have been no negotiations yet.

It may be assumed that you have not yet been fully
informed. As regards my military colleagues, they, on
the basis of data which they have on hand, do not have
any doubts that the negotiations have taken place, and
that they have ended in an agreement with the
Germans, on the basis of which the German commander on the Western Front, Marshal Kesselring, has
agreed to open the front and permit the Anglo-American troops to advance to the east, and the Anglo-Americans have promised in return to ease for the
Germans the peace terms.

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530

I think that my colleagues are close to the truth.

Otherwise one could not have understood the fact that
the Anglo-Americans have refused to admit to Berne
representatives of the Soviet command for participation
in the negotiations with the Germans.

I also cannot understand the silence of the British,
who have allowed you to correspond with me on this
unpleasant matter, and they themselves remain silent,
although it is known that the initiative in this whole affair
with the negotiations in Berne belongs to the British.

I understand that there are certain advantages for
the Anglo-American troops as a result of these
separate negotiations in Berne or some other place,
since the Anglo-American troops get the possibility to
advance into the heart of Germany almost without
resistance on the part of the Germans, but why was it
necessary to conceal this from the Russians, and why
were your Allies, the Russians, not notified?

As a result of this at the present moment the
Germans on the Western Front in fact have ceased the
war against England and the United States. At the
same time the Germans continue the war with Russia,
the Ally of England and the United States. It is
understandable that such a situation can in no way
serve the cause of preservation of the strengthening of
trust between our countries.

I have already written to you in my previous
message, and consider it necessary to repeat it here,
that I personally and my colleagues would never have
made such a risky step, being aware that a momentary
advantage, no matter what it would be, is fading before
the principal advantage of the preservation and
strengthening of the trust among the Allies.

This accusation angered the President deeply. His strength did not allow him to draft his own reply. General Marshall framed the following answer, with Roosevelt’s approval. It certainly did not lack vigour.

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President

Roosevelt

5 Apr. 45

to Marshal Stalin

I have received with astonishment your message of
April 3 containing an allegation that arrangements
which were made between Field-Marshal Alexander
and Kesselring at Berne “permitted the Anglo-American
troops to advance to the east, and the Anglo-Americans
promised in return to ease for the Germans the peace
terms.”

In my previous messages to you in regard to the
attempts made in Berne to arrange a conference to
discuss a surrender of the German Army in Italy I have
told you that (i) no negotiations were held in Berne; (ii)
that the meeting had no political implications whatever;
(iii) that in any surrender of the enemy Army in Italy
there could be no violation of our agreed principle of
unconditional surrender; (iv) that Soviet officers would
be welcomed at any meeting that might be arranged to
discuss surrender.

For the advantage of our common war effort against
Germany, which today gives excellent promise of an
early success in a disintegration of the German armies,
I must continue to assume that you have the same high
confidence in my truthfulness and reliability that I have
always had in yours.

I have also a full appreciation of the effect your
gallant Army has had in making possible a crossing of
the Rhine by the forces under General Eisenhower, and
the effect that your forces will have hereafter on the
eventual collapse of the German resistance to our
combined attacks.

I have complete confidence in General Eisenhower,
and know that he certainly would inform me before
entering into any agreement with the Germans. He is
instructed to demand, and will demand, unconditional
surrender of enemy troops that may be defeated on his
front. Our advances on the Western Front are due to
military action. Their speed has been attributable mainly
to the terrific impact of our air-power, resulting in
destruction of German communications, and to the fact
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that Eisenhower was able to cripple the bulk of the
German forces on the Western Front while they were
still west of the Rhine.

I am certain that there were no negotiations in Berne
at any time, and I feel that your information to that
effect must have come from German sources, which
have made persistent efforts to create dissension
between us in order to escape in some measure
responsibility for their war crimes. If that was Wolff’s
purpose in Berne your message proves that he has had
some success.

With a confidence in your belief in my personal
reliability and in my determination to bring about
together with you an unconditional surrender of the
Nazis, it is astonishing that a belief seems to have
reached the Soviet Government that I have entered into
an agreement with the enemy without first obtaining
your full agreement.

Finally I would say this: it would be one of the great
tragedies of history if at the very moment of the victory
now within our grasp such distrust, such lack of faith,
should prejudice the entire undertaking after the
colossal losses of life, material, and treasure involved.

Frankly, I cannot avoid a feeling of bitter resentment
toward your informers, whoever they are, for such vile
misrepresentations of my actions or those of my trusted
subordinates.

I was deeply struck by this last sentence, which I print in italics. I felt that although Mr. Roosevelt did not draft the whole message he might well have added this final stroke himself. It looked like an addition or summing up, and it seemed like Roosevelt himself in anger.

I wrote at once to the President:

Prime

Minister

to

5 Apr. 45

President Roosevelt

I am astounded that Stalin should have addressed
to you a message so insulting to the honour of the
United States and also of Great Britain. His Majesty’s
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533

Government cordially associate themselves with your
reply, and the War Cabinet have instructed me to send
to Stalin the message in my immediately following….

Next day I addressed Stalin myself.

Prime

Minister

to

6 Apr. 45

Marshal Stalin

The President has sent me his correspondence with
you about the contacts made in Switzerland between a
British and an American officer on Field-Marshal
Alexander’s staff and a German general named Wolff
relating to possible surrender of Kesselring’s army in
Northern Italy. I therefore deem it right to send you a
precise summary of the action of His Majesty’s
Government. As soon as we learned of these contacts
we immediately informed the Soviet Government on
March 12, and we and the United States Government
have faithfully reported to you everything that has taken
place. The sole and only business mentioned or
referred to in any way in Switzerland was to test the
credentials of the German emissary and try to arrange
a meeting between a nominee of Kesselring’s with
Field-Marshal Alexander at his headquarters or some
convenient point in Northern Italy. There were no
negotiations in Switzerland even for a military surrender
of Kesselring’s army. Still less did any political-military
plot, as alleged in your telegram to the President, enter
into our thoughts, which are not, as suggested, of so
dishonourable a character.

2. Your representatives were immediately invited to
the meeting we attempted to arrange in Italy. Had it
taken place and had your representatives come, they
could have heard every word that passed.

3. We consider that Field-Marshal Alexander has full
right to accept the surrender of the German army of
twenty-five divisions on his front in Italy, and to discuss
such matters with German envoys who have the power
to settle the terms of capitulation. Nevertheless we took
especial care to invite your representatives to this
purely military discussion at his headquarters should it
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534

take place. In fact however nothing resulted from any
contacts in Switzerland. Our officers returned from
Switzerland without having succeeded in fixing a
rendezvous in Italy for Kesselring’s emissaries to come
to. Of all this the Soviet Government have been fully
informed step by step by Field-Marshal Alexander or by
Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, as well as through United
States channels. I repeat that no negotiations of any
kind were entered into or even touched upon, formally
or informally, in Switzerland.

4. There is however a possibility that the whole of
this request to parley by the German General Wolff was
one of those attempts which are made by the enemy
with the object of sowing distrust between Allies. Field-Marshal Alexander made this point in a telegram sent
on March 11, in which he remarks, “Please note that
two of the leading figures are S.S. and Himmler men,
which makes me very suspicious.” This telegram was
repeated to the British Ambassador in Moscow on
March 12 for communication to the Soviet Government.