Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (81 page)

When our Ambassadors raised the point he made

Triumph and Tragedy

497

difficulties, arguing among other things, that it might affect the prestige of the Lublin Provisional Government. No progress of any kind was made in the talks at Moscow.

Time was on the side of the Russians and their Polish adherents, who were fastening their grip upon the country by all kinds of severe measures, which they did not wish outside observers to see. Every day’s delay was a gain to these hard forces.

I therefore appealed to the President in the hope that we could address Stalin jointly on the highest level. The lengthy correspondence which followed sets forth the situation in Poland, as seen by the British and Americans. At this critical time Roosevelt’s health and strength had faded. In my long telegrams I thought I was talking to my trusted friend and colleague as I had done all these years. I was no longer being fully heard by him. I did not know how ill he was, or I might have felt it cruel to press him. The President’s devoted aides were anxious to keep their knowledge of his condition within the narrowest circle, and various hands drafted in combination the answers which were sent in his name. To these, as his life ebbed, Roosevelt could only give general guidance and approval.

This was an heroic effort. The tendency of the State Department was naturally to avoid bringing matters to a head while the President was physically so frail and to leave the burden on the Ambassadors in Moscow. Harry Hopkins, who might have given personal help, was himself seriously ailing, and frequently absent or uninvited. These were costly weeks for all.

On the very evening when I was speaking in the House of Commons upon the results of our labours at Yalta the first Triumph and Tragedy

498

violation by the Russians both of the spirit and letter of our agreements took place in Rumania. We were all committed by the Declaration on Liberated Europe, so recently signed, to see that both free elections and democratic Governments were established in the countries occupied by Allied armies. On February 27 Vyshinsky, who had appeared in Bucharest without warning on the previous day, demanded an audience of King Michael and insisted that he should dismiss the all-party Government which had been formed after the royal
coup d’état
of August 1944 and had led to the expulsion of the Germans from Rumania.

The young monarch, backed by his Foreign Minister, Visoianu, resisted these demands until the following day.

Vyshinsky called again, and, brushing aside the King’s request at least to be allowed to consult the leaders of the political parties, banged his fist on the table, shouted for an immediate acquiescence, and walked out of the room, slamming the door. At the same time Soviet tanks and troops deployed in the streets of the capital, and on March 2 a Soviet-nominated Administration took office.

I was deeply disturbed by this news, which was to prove a pattern of things to come. The Russians had established the rule of a Communist minority by force and misrepresentation. We were hampered in our protests because Eden and I during our October visit to Moscow had recognised that Russia should have a largely predominant voice in Rumania and Bulgaria while we took the lead in Greece. Stalin had kept very strictly to this understanding during the six weeks fighting against the Communists and E.

L.A.S. in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him.

Peace had now been restored, and, though many difficulties lay before us, I hoped that in a few months we should be able to hold free, unfettered elections, preferably Triumph and Tragedy

499

under British, American, and Russian supervision, and that thereafter a constitution and Government would be erected on the indisputable will of the Greek people.

Stalin was now pursuing the opposite course in the two Black Sea Balkan countries, and one which was absolutely contrary to all democratic ideas. He had subscribed on paper to the principles of Yalta, and now they were being trampled down in Rumania. But if I pressed him too much he might say, “I did not interfere with your action in Greece; why do you not give me the same latitude in Rumania?”

This would lead to comparisons between his aims and ours.

Neither side would convince the other. Having regard to my personal relations with Stalin, I was sure it would be a mistake to embark on such an argument.

Besides this, I was very conscious of the much more important issue of Poland, and I did not want to do anything about Rumania which might harm the prospect of a Polish settlement. Nevertheless I felt we should tell Stalin of our distress at the forceful installation of a Communist minority Government, since this conflicted with the Declaration on Liberated Europe which we had agreed at the Yalta Conference. More especially I was afraid its advent might lead to an indiscriminate purge of anti-Communist Rumanians, who would be accused of Fascism much on the lines of what had been happening in Bulgaria. I therefore suggested to Mr. Roosevelt that Stalin should be asked to ensure that the new Government did not immediately start a purge of all anti-Communists on the ground that they had been encouraged to do so by the Yalta Declaration.

The news from Moscow about Poland was also most disappointing. The Government majorities in Britain bore no relation to the strong undercurrent of opinion among all Triumph and Tragedy

500

parties and classes against Soviet domination of Poland.

Labour men were as keen as Conservatives, and Socialists as keen as Catholics. I had based myself in Parliament on the belief that the Yalta Declaration would be carried out in the letter and the spirit. Once it was seen that we had been deceived and that the well-known Communist technique was being applied behind closed doors in Poland, either directly by the Russians or through their Lublin puppets, a very grave situation in British public opinion would be reached. Just at the time when everything militarily was going so well in Europe and in the Far East there would come an open rift between us and Russia, not at all confined, in Great Britain at any rate, to Government opinion, but running deep down through the masses of the people.

After a fairly promising start Molotov was now refusing to accept any interpretation of the Crimea proposals except his own extremely rigid and narrow one. He was attempting to bar practically all our candidates for the consultations, was taking the line that he must base himself on the views of Bierut and his gang, and had withdrawn his offer to let us send observers to Poland. He clearly wanted to make a farce of consulting the “non-Lublin” Poles — which meant that the new Government of Poland would be merely the existing one dressed up to look more respectable to the ignorant — and also wanted to stop us seeing the liquidations and deportations and all the manoeuvres of setting up a totalitarian régime before elections were held and even before a new Government was installed. If we did not get things right the world would soon see that Mr.

Roosevelt and I had underwritten a fraudulent prospectus when we put our signatures to the Crimea settlement.

I was in any case pledged to Parliament to tell them if a new Polish Government could not be set up in the spirit of Triumph and Tragedy

501

Yalta. I was sure the only way to stop Molotov’s tactics was to send a personal message to Stalin, and make clear what were the essential things we must have if I was to avoid having to tell Parliament we had failed. Far more than Poland was involved. This was the test case between us and the Russians of the meaning of such terms as democracy, sovereignty, independence, representative Government, and free and unfettered elections. On March 8

I therefore urged these views on the President and proposed that I should send Stalin a message on the lines set out below, and I hoped that he would send a similar one containing the same minimum requirements.

The message which I wished to send Stalin was as follows:

… I am bound to tell you that I should have to make
a statement of our failure to Parliament if the Commission in Moscow were not in the end able to agree on
the following basis:

(a)
M. Molotov appears to be contending that the
terms of the Crimea communiqué established for the
present Warsaw Administration an absolute right of
prior consultation on all points. In the English text the
passage of the communiqué in question, which was an
American draft, cannot bear this interpretation. M.

Molotov’s construction therefore cannot be accepted.

(b)
All Poles nominated by any of the three
Governments shall be accepted for the consultations
unless ruled out by unanimous decision of the
Commission, and every effort made to produce them
before the Commission at the earliest possible moment.

The Commission should ensure to the Poles invited
facilities for communicating with other Poles whom they
wish to consult, whether in Poland or outside, and the
right to suggest to the Commission the names of other
Poles who should be invited to its proceedings. All
Poles appearing before the Commission would
naturally enjoy complete freedom of movement and of
communication among themselves while in Moscow,
and would be at liberty to depart whither they chose
Triumph and Tragedy

502

upon the conclusion of the consultations. M. Molotov
has raised objections to inviting M. Mikolajczyk, but his
presence would certainly be vital.

(c)
The Poles invited for consultations should
discuss among themselves with a view to reaching
agreement upon the composition of a Government truly
representative of the various sections of Polish opinion
present before the Commission. The discussions
should also cover the question of the exercise of the
Presidential functions. The Commission should preside
over these discussions in an impartial arbitral capacity.

(d)
Pending the conclusion of the Commission’s
discussions, the Soviet Government should use its
utmost influence to prevent the Warsaw Administration
from taking any further legal or administrative action of
a fundamental character affecting social, constitutional,
economic, or political conditions in Poland.

(e)
The Soviet Government should make arrangements to enable British and American observers to visit
Poland and report upon conditions there in accordance
with the offer spontaneously made by M. Molotov at an
earlier stage in the Commission’s discussions.

We must not let Poland become a source of
disagreement and misunderstanding between our two
peoples. For this reason I am sure you will understand
how important it is for us to reach an early settlement
on the basis of the Yalta decision, and it is because I
am confident that you will do your utmost to bring this
about that I am now telegraphing to you.

Two days later I telegraphed again to Roosevelt:
Prime Minister to

10 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

The Lublin Poles may well answer that their
Government can alone ensure “the maximum amount
of political tranquillity inside,” that they already
represent the great mass of the “democratic forces in
Poland,” and that they cannot join hands with émigré
traitors to Poland or Fascist collaborationists and
landlords, and so on, according to the usual technique.

Triumph and Tragedy

503

Meanwhile we shall not be allowed inside the
country or have any means of informing ourselves upon
the position. It suits the Soviets very well to have a long
period of delay, so that the process of liquidation of
elements unfavourable to them or their puppets may
run its full course. This would be furthered by our
opening out now into proposals of a very undefined
character for a political truce between these Polish
parties (whose hatreds would eat into live steel) in the
spirit and intent of the Crimea decision, and might well
imply the abandonment of all clear-cut requests, such
as those suggested in my last telegram to you.

Therefore I should find it very difficult to join in this
project of a political truce.

I have already mentioned to you that the feeling
here is very strong. Four Ministers have abstained from
the divisions and two have already resigned. I beg
therefore that you will give full consideration to my
previous telegram.