Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (82 page)

The President assured me on March 11 that our objects were identical, namely to stop the Lublin Poles persecuting their political opponents and vice versa. The only difference between us, he claimed, was on tactics. I wanted the demand to be put squarely to the Soviet Government as such, whereas he felt we had a much better chance of success by proposing a general political truce. At Yalta Stalin made quite a point of the terrorist activities of the underground forces of the London Polish Government against the Red Army and the Lublin Poles. Whether this was true was beside the point, it was what the Soviet Government maintained. But if we merely demanded that the Lublin Poles alone be forced to stop persecuting their political opponents, Stalin would be certain to refuse. We might also be charged with trying to halt the land reforms, and the Lublin Poles might claim that they and they alone defended the peasants against the landlords.

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Mr. Roosevelt agreed about sending in observers; but he preferred to wait until our Ambassadors appealed to Molotov before either of us approached Stalin personally. “I feel,” he telegraphed, “that our personal intervention would best be withheld until every other possibility of bringing the Soviet Government into line has been exhausted. I very much hope therefore that you will not send a message to Uncle Joe at this juncture, especially as I feel that certain parts of your proposed text might produce a reaction quite contrary to your intent. We must of course keep in close touch on this question.”

As I knew there was a deadlock in Moscow it was only with much reluctance that I deferred to the President’s wish, but we could make no progress without American aid, and if we got out of step the doom of Poland was sealed. A month had passed since Yalta and no progress of any kind had occurred. Time was all on the side of Lublin, who were no doubt at work to establish their authority in such a way as to make it impregnable.

On March 13 I accordingly agreed to defer addressing Stalin directly for the time being; but I begged Mr. Roosevelt to allow our Ambassadors to raise the points set forth in my proposed message. I was convinced that unless we could induce the Russians to agree to these fundamental matters of procedure all our work at Yalta would have been in vain.

When the discussions following Yalta began at Moscow we had a perfectly simple object, namely, to bring together for consultation representative Poles from inside Poland and elsewhere and to promote the formation of a new, reorganised Polish Government sufficiently representative of all Poland for us to recognise it. A test case of progress would have been to have invited Mikolaiczyk and two or three of his friends who had resigned from the London Triumph and Tragedy

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Polish Government because they realised that a good understanding must be reached with Russia.

I feared that Mr. Roosevelt’s instructions to his Ambassador would lead to little if any progress on all this, as the only definite suggestion they contained was for a truce between the Polish parties. Here we should enter ground of great disadvantage to us both. The Russians would almost at once claim that the truce was being broken by the anti-Lublin Poles, and that Lublin therefore could not be held to it. I had little doubt that some of the supporters of the Polish Government in London, and more particularly the extreme Right Wing underground force, the so-called N.S.Z., might give the Russians and Lublin ground for this contention. As we were not allowed to enter the country to see what the truth was we should be at the mercy of assertions. After a fortnight or so of negotiations about the truce we should be further back than in the days before Yalta, when the President and I agreed that anyhow Mikolajczyk should be invited.

I set this forth in a personal telegram, and concluded:
Prime Minister to

13 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

At Yalta also we agreed to take the Russian view of
the frontier line. Poland has lost her frontier. Is she now
to lose her freedom? That is the question which will
undoubtedly have to be fought out in Parliament and in
public here. I do not wish to reveal a divergence
between the British and the United States Governments, but it would certainly be necessary for me to
make it clear that we are in presence of a great failure
and an utter breakdown of what was settled at Yalta,
but that we British have not the necessary strength to
carry the matter further and that the limits of our
capacity to act have been reached. The moment that
Molotov sees that he has beaten us away from the
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whole process of consultations among Poles to form a
new Government, he will know that we will put up with
anything. On the other hand, I believe that combined
dogged pressure and persistence along the lines on
which we have been working and of my proposed draft
message to Stalin would very likely succeed.

This produced a strongly argued reply, which had no doubt been the work of the State Department since my long telegram of March 8 had been received in Washington.

President Roosevelt

16 Mar. 45

to Prime Minister

I cannot but be concerned at the views you
expressed in your message of the 13th. I do not
understand what you mean by a divergence between
our Governments on the Polish negotiations. From our
side there is certainly no evidence of any divergence of
policy. We have been merely discussing the most
effective tactics, and I cannot agree that we are
confronted with a breakdown of the Yalta agreement
until we have made the effort to overcome the
obstacles incurred in the negotiations at Moscow. I also
find puzzling your statement that the only definite
suggestion in our instructions to [Ambassador]

Harriman is for a political truce in Poland. Those
instructions, of which you have a copy, not only set
forth our understanding of the Yalta agreement, but
they make the definite point that the Commission itself
should agree on the list of Poles to be invited for
consultation, and that no one of the three groups from
which the reorganised Government is to emerge can
dictate which individuals from the other two groups
ought to be invited to Moscow…. Our chief purpose …

remains, without giving ground, to get the negotiations
moving again, and tackle first of all the point on which
they had come to a standstill. I cannot urge upon you
too strongly the vital importance of agreeing without
further delay on instructions to our Ambassadors so
that the negotiations may resume…. With this in mind I
have examined the points which you propose to submit
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to Stalin in your message of March 8,
1
and have the
following comments to make:

We are in agreement on point (a) that the Warsaw
Administration is not entitled to an absolute right of prior
consultation on all points, and this is covered in our
instructions to Harriman.

I cannot believe that Molotov will accept the
proposal contained in point (b), that any Pole can be
invited unless all three members of the Commission
object, and I am opposed to putting forward such a
suggestion at this time, as it would in my view almost
certainly leave us in a stalemate, which would only
redound to the benefit of the Lublin Poles. I also think
the demand for freedom of movement and communication would arouse needless discussion at this stage in
the negotiations.

On point (c) we are agreed that the Poles invited for
consultation should discuss the composition of the
Government among themselves, with the Commission
presiding in an impartial arbitral capacity so far as
possible. Harriman has already been instructed to this
effect, but feels, and I agree, that this might be pressed
later.

I have covered your point (d) [about stopping any
major changes in Poland] in my previous message, and
continue to feel that our approach would be better
calculated to achieve the desired result. With reference
to point (e) [sending in observers], you will recall that
this had been agreed to by Molotov, who took fright
when Clark Kerr revealed that you were thinking of a
large special mission. I am willing to include in Averell’s
instructions the wording you propose in point (e).

Please let me know urgently whether you agree that
in the light of the foregoing considerations our
Ambassadors may proceed with their instructions….

To this I rejoined:

Prime Minister to

16 Mar. 45

President Roosevelt

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I am most relieved that you do not feel that there is
any fundamental divergence between us, and I agree
that our differences are only about tactics. You know, I
am sure, that our great desire is to keep in step with
you, and we realise how hopeless the position would
become for Poland if it were ever seen that we were
not in full accord….

3. Halifax will explain to you in detail our views upon
the various points the inclusion of which I still consider
essential. I welcome your agreement on point (a) [that
the Warsaw Government is not entitled to prior
consultation on all points]. With regard to point (b)

[inviting Poles for consultation], what happens if
Molotov vetoes every one of our suggestions? And,
secondly, what is the use of anyone being invited who
has no freedom of movement and communications?

We had in fact not understood that Molotov had
disputed this latter point when it was raised with him
earlier, but Mikolajczyk has made it a condition of going
to Moscow, and I gravely doubt whether we could
persuade him to leave unless we had some definite
assurance to convey to him. Equally it is in order to
reassure the anti-Lublin Poles whom we want to see
invited that I should like to come to an agreement with
Molotov in regard to the character of the discussions
and the Commission’s arbitral capacity (my point (c)). If
you feel strongly against mentioning the matter of the
Presidential functions at this stage I will give way,
although it is a matter of great practical importance
which the Poles must not be debarred from discussing.

As regards point (d) [asking the Soviet Government to
prevent the Warsaw Administration from making any
more fundamental changes in Poland], I fear I cannot
agree that your truce plan would achieve the desired
result. How can we guarantee that nothing will be said
or done in Poland or by the Polish Government’s
supporters here which the Russians could not parade
as a breach of the truce? I fear that the truce plan will
lead us into interminable delays and a dead end in
which some at least of the blame may well be earned
by the London Polish Government. I fear therefore that
it is impossible for us to endorse your truce proposal,
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for we think it actively dangerous. I beg you once more
most earnestly to consider whether you cannot accept

[a revised proposal for halting major changes in
Poland]. This would give us something on which to
base the work of our observers [point (e)], on which I
am very glad to see that we are in agreement.

4. At present all entry into Poland is barred to our
representatives. An impenetrable veil has been drawn
across the scene. This extends even to the liaison
officers, British and American, who were to help in
bringing out our rescued prisoners of war. According to
our information, the American officers as well as the
British who had already reached Lublin have been
requested to clear out. There is no doubt in my mind
that the Soviets fear very much our seeing what is
going on in Poland. It may be that, apart from the
Poles, they are being very rough with the Germans.

Whatever the reason, we are not to be allowed to see.

This is not a position that could be defended by us.

Although I had no exact information about the President’s state of health I had the feeling that, except for occasional flashes of courage and insight, the telegrams he was sending us were not his own. I therefore sent him a message in a personal vein to ease the uphill march of official business.

Prime Minister to

18 Mar. 45