Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (118 page)

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In face of these dangers, which were soon to become acute, Mountbatten decided on the single, fully supported operation by the Fourteenth Army, commanded by General Slim, against the main enemy body west of Mandalay, and a subsequent advance on Rangoon, which, he was advised, could be reached by April 15. At the same time he ordered the XVth Corps in the Arakan to enlarge the air bases at Akyab and on Ramree Island, and extend its hold along the coast, and over the only two passes leading towards the lower Irrawaddy. Despite a large reduction in its supplying aircraft, the corps completed its task, and stopped a Japanese division from joining the decisive battle farther east.

Events here moved swiftly. The 19th Division had already seized bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy about forty miles north of Mandalay, and throughout February they beat off a series of fierce counter-attacks. On February 12 the 20th Division crossed the river lower down and to the west of Mandalay. For a fortnight they had a hard fight to hold their gains, but by then they were joined by the 2d British Division. This convinced the Japanese High Command that a decisive battle was imminent, and they sent heavy reinforcements. They did not believe that a serious flank attack was also possible, and even dispatched to Siam a division they could ill spare. This however was precisely the stroke which General Slim had prepared. On February 13

the 7th Division crossed the Irrawaddy south of Pakokku and formed a bridgehead. The enemy thought this was a mere diversion, but he was soon to be better informed. On the 21st two motorised brigades of the 17th Division and a brigade of tanks, having crossed the river, broke out from

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the bridgehead, and by the 28th they reached Meiktila.

Here was the principal administrative centre of the Japanese main front, a nodal point of their communications and the focus of several airfields. It was strongly defended, and the enemy sent two divisions post-haste to aid the garrison, but they were held at a distance until reinforcements came to our 17th Division, its airborne brigade, and the 5th Division. After a week of bitter fighting the town was in our hands, and all attempts to recapture it were repulsed. The Japanese admit losing five thousand dead and as many wounded in a battle which their Commander-in-Chief has since described as “the master-stroke of Allied strategy.”

Far off to the northeast General Sultan was also on the move. His American “Mars” Brigade, three Chinese divisions, and the 36th British Division had opened the road to China at the end of January and advanced southward.

By mid-March they reached the road from Lashio to Mandalay. But Chiang Kai-shek now imposed a halt. He would not allow his Chinese divisions to continue. He had already demanded the American Brigade, all the Chinese divisions, and the U.S. air squadrons which sustained them, so that he could build up an army in China and free the rice-producing areas from the Japanese. He suggested that General Slim would halt his advance when Mandalay was taken. This was precisely what Mountbatten had feared when he made his plans a month before. But Chiang Kai-shek insisted on removing his ground forces, and the Japanese were able to take two of their three divisions from this front and march them against our Fourteenth Army.

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There remained the American aircraft. On March 30 I urged General Marshall to let them stay.

Prime Minister to

30 Mar. 45

Field-Marshal Wilson

(Washington)

Please convey orally and unofficially to General
Marshall the following views which I hold:
As General Marshall will remember from our talks at
Quebec, we greatly disliked the prospect of a large-scale campaign in the jungles of Burma, and I have
always had other ideas myself. But the United States
Chiefs of Staff attached the greatest importance to this
campaign against the Japanese, and especially to the
opening of the Burma Road. We therefore threw
ourselves into the campaign with the utmost vigour.

Although the prolongation of the German war has
withheld from Mountbatten the three British-Indian
divisions on which all his hopes were built, he has
succeeded far beyond our hopes…. The very
considerable battle upon such difficult communications
which is now being fought with the main Japanese
army in Burma is important not only for Burma and as a
preliminary to the capture of Rangoon, but plays its part
in the general wearing down of the military and
particularly of the air-power of Japan. Moreover, once
Rangoon is taken the powerful forces which we have
on foot there will be set free for further operations in
1946, and even earlier, in combination with the general
American onslaught…. I feel therefore entitled to
appeal to General Marshall’s sense of what is fair and
right between us, in which I have the highest
confidence, that he do all in his power to let Mountbatten have the comparatively small additional support
which his air force now requires to enable the decisive
battle now raging in Burma to be won….

General Marshall assured us that no planes would be taken away until Rangoon was captured or June 1 was reached, whichever happened first. This sharpened the urgency. If

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we could not seize Rangoon by June 1 and the transport planes were then reduced the Fourteenth Army would have to make a long retreat until they could be supplied mostly by land. The whole campaign would have failed.

The conjoint battles of Mandalay and Meiktila raged through March. The 19th Division broke out of its bridgeheads, fought down the east bank of the Irrawaddy, and entered Mandalay on March 9. The Japanese resisted strongly.

Mandalay Hill, 780 feet above the surrounding country, was taken in two days, but the massive walls of Fort Dufferin were impenetrable to ordinary missiles. Finally a breach was made with 2000-pound bombs, and on March 20 the enemy fled.

The rest of the XXXIIId Corps meanwhile fought on to Meiktila. They met great opposition, as the Japanese Commander-in-Chief, in spite of the intervention of the 17th Division behind his front, showed no signs as yet of withdrawing, and the armies were well matched. General Slim had six divisions and two armoured brigades, against over eight, under-strength, Japanese divisions and a division of the “Indian National Army.”
2
But at the end of the month the enemy gave up the struggle and began to fall back down the main road to Toungoo and Rangoon, and through the mountains to the east. After many weeks of battle our supplies were badly strained, but the enemy’s must have been much worse. Long-sustained attacks by the Strategical Air Force on communications and rear installations and constant harrying of their retiring troops by the tactical air forces produced a crisis in their affairs.

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There was also a crisis in our own affairs. The battles had lasted much longer than we expected. General Sultan was now halted on the Lashio road, and the advent of two Japanese divisions which had opposed him aggravated the delay. There was now no prospect of the Fourteenth Army reaching Rangoon by mid-April, and it was very doubtful if they could get there before the monsoon. Mountbatten accordingly decided to make an amphibious assault on the town after all. This would have to be much smaller than had been anticipated, and the attack on Puket Island would have to be cancelled. Even so the attack could not be launched before the first week in May, and by then it might be too late.

General Slim meanwhile resolved that the IVth Corps should pursue the enemy down the road and railway, while the XXXIIId Corps worked their way down the Irrawaddy. He was determined not only to reach Rangoon, but to draw a double net down Southern Burma and trap the enemy within it. The 7th and 20th Divisions accordingly drove down the river with overlapping thrusts and reached Prome on May 2. After a stiff fight with the remnants of three Japanese divisions at Pyawbe the advance went even more swiftly along the road and the railway. The troops were on half-rations to enable them to carry more petrol. An armoured column, and the mechanised brigades of the 5th and 17th Divisions, leapfrogging over each other, reached Toungoo on April 22. The airfields here were badly needed to further the air supply on which all depended, and also to bring the fighters of 221 Group R.A.F. within range of Rangoon. The next bound was to Pegu, whose capture would close the enemy’s southernmost escape route from Lower Burma. Our advanced troops reached it on April 29.

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That afternoon torrential rain fell, heralding an early monsoon. Forward air-strips were out of action; tanks and vehicles could not move off the roads. The Japanese mustered every possible man to hold the town and the bridges over the river. On May 2 the 17th Division finally broke through, and, hoping to be first in Rangoon, prepared themselves to advance the few remaining miles.

But May 2 was also the D-Day of the amphibious assault.

For two days beforehand Allied heavy bombers attacked the defences at Elephant Point, which barred the entrance to Rangoon River. On May 1 a parachute battalion dropped on the defenders and the channel was opened for minesweeping. Next day ships of the 26th Division, supported by 224 Group R.A.F., reached the river-mouth. A Mosquito aircraft flew over Rangoon and saw no signs of the enemy.

The crew landed at a near-by airfield, walked into the city, and were greeted by a number of our prisoners of war. In the belief that an amphibious attack was no longer likely, the Japanese garrison had departed some days before to hold Pegu. That afternoon the monsoon broke in all its violence, and Rangoon fell with only a few hours to spare.

This amphibious force soon joined the 17th Division at Pegu and the 20th Division at Prome. Many thousands of Japanese were trapped, and during the next three months great numbers perished in attempts to escape eastward.