Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (90 page)

forces and the German power of resisting. I had never
lost sight of the great importance of the drive to the
northernmost coast, although your telegram did
introduce a new idea respecting the political importance
of the early attainment of particular objectives. I clearly
see your point in this matter. The only difference
between your suggestions and my plan is one of
timing…. In order to assure the success of each of my
planned efforts, I concentrate first in the Centre to gain
the position I need. As it looks to me now, the next
move thereafter should be to have Montgomery cross
the Elbe, reinforced as necessary by American troops,
and reach at least a line including Lübeck on the coast.

If German resistance from now on should progressively
and definitely crumble you can see that there would be
little if any difference in time between gaining central
position and crossing the Elbe. On the other hand, if
resistance tends to stiffen at all I can see that it is vitally
necessary that I concentrate for each effort, and do not
allow myself to be dispersed by attempting to do all
these projects at once.

Quite naturally, if at any moment collapse should
suddenly come about everywhere along the front we
would rush forward, and Lübeck and Berlin would be
included in our important targets.

And I answered:

Prime

Minister

to

2 Apr. 45

General Eisenhower

Thank you again for your most kind telegram…. I am
however all the more impressed with the importance of
entering Berlin, which may well be open to us, by the
reply from Moscow to you, which in paragraph 3 says,

“Berlin has lost its former strategic importance.” This
should be read in the light of what I mentioned of the
political aspects. I deem it highly important that we
should shake hands with the Russians as far to the
east as possible….

4. The arrival of your additional information has
largely allayed the anxieties of our Staffs, and they
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554

have telegraphed in this sense to their opposite
numbers in Washington. You will, I am sure, make
allowance for the fact that we had heard nothing at all
about this either officially or from our Deputy
2
until we
saw your telegram to Stalin, and this telegram made
them think that very large changes were proposed.

5. I regard all this business as smoothing itself down
quite satisfactorily, though some correspondence is still
proceeding between our Chiefs of Staff Committees.

6. Again my congratulations on the great developments. Much may happen in the West before the date
of Stalin’s main offensive.

I felt it my duty to end this correspondence between friends.

Prime

Minister

to

5 Apr. 45

President Roosevelt

I still think it was a pity that Eisenhower’s telegram
was sent to Stalin without anything being said to our
Chiefs of Staff or to our Deputy, Air Chief Marshal
Tedder, or to our Commander-in-Chief, Field-Marshal
Montgomery. The changes in the main plan have now
turned out to be very much less than we at first
supposed. My personal relations with General
Eisenhower are of the most friendly character. I regard
the matter as closed, and to prove my sincerity I will
use one of my very few Latin quotations: Amantium irae
amoris integratio est.

These discussions had not of course been allowed to hamper our military advance, and indeed it was at about this time that one noteworthy step in the liberation of Europe was accomplished. We had received many terrible accounts of the plight of the Dutch in “Fortress Holland,”

and the First Canadian Army had been charged with their rescue. Its IId Corps accordingly drove the enemy from the Wilhelmshaven peninsula and Northeast Holland, while the Ist Canadian Corps captured Arnhem and swung west towards Amsterdam. Then their advance was halted south Triumph and Tragedy

555

of the Zuider Zee. The German commander refused to surrender his forces so long as the German armies were still fighting elsewhere. If we were to turn all this low-lying, partly flooded area into a battlefield the sufferings of the civilians would be unbearably increased. I addressed myself to the President.

Prime

Minister

to

10 Apr. 45

President Roosevelt

The plight of the civil population in Occupied Holland
is desperate. Between two and three million people are
facing starvation. We believe that large numbers are
dying daily, and the situation must deteriorate rapidly
now that communications between Germany and
Holland are virtually cut. I fear we may soon be in the
presence of a tragedy.

2. Eisenhower has plans prepared for bringing relief
to the civil population when Western Holland is
liberated, and we have accumulated the stocks for this
purpose in suitable proximity. But if we wait until
Holland has been liberated this help may come too late.

There is need for action to bring immediate help, on a
far larger scale than is offered by the Swedish relief
scheme.

3. I therefore ask you to join me in giving notice to
the German Government through the Swiss Government, as the Protecting Power, to the following effect. It
is the responsibility of the German Government to
sustain the civil population in those parts of Holland
which remain in German occupation. As they have
failed to discharge that responsibility, we are prepared
to send food and medical supplies for distribution to the
civil population through the agency of the International
Red Cross. We are ready to increase the limited
supplies that are already being sent from Sweden, and
also to send in further supplies, by sea or direct from
areas under military control of the Allies, subject to the
necessary safe-conducts being arranged. We invite the
German Government to accord the facilities to enable
this to be done.

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556

4. In present circumstances I think that the German
Government might well accede to this request. If
however they should refuse I propose that we should at
this stage warn the German commander in Holland and
all the troops under his command that by resisting our
attempt to bring relief to the civil population in this area
they brand themselves as murderers before the world,
and we shall hold them responsible with their lives for
the fate which overtakes the people of Holland. Full
publicity would be given to this warning, so as to bring it
home to all German troops stationed in Holland.

5. We must avert this tragedy if we can. But, if we
cannot, we must at least make it clear to the world on
whose shoulders the responsibility lies.

6. The terms of the communication to be made to
the German Government through the Protecting Power
are being drafted and will be sent to you tomorrow. In
the meantime I hope that you will feel able to agree in
principle.

This was generally agreed, and parleys began with Seyss-Inquart, the Nazi High Commissioner. It was arranged that we should halt our westward advance. On his part he would stop further flooding, cease all repressive measures against the inhabitants, and help to bring in relief supplies. We had accumulated large quantities of these, and all means were used, by land, sea, and air, to deliver them speedily. This was certainly the best possible arrangement. The Dutch nation has since most gracefully acknowledged by word and deed the help we were so proud to give them after their bravely borne afflictions.

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9

The Climax: Roosevelt’s Death

Death of President Roosevelt at the Supreme
Climax of the War — Universal Regret — My
Tribute in Parliament — I am Restrained from
Attending the Funeral — Memorial Service in St.

Paul’s — First Contacts with President Truman —

An Informative Message from Lord Halifax — My
Telegram to Stalin, April
14 —
Eden’s Telegrams
from Washington, April
15
and
16.

P
RESIDENT ROOSEVELT died suddenly on Thursday, April 12, at Warm Springs, Georgia. He was sixty-three. In the afternoon, while he was having his portrait painted, he suddenly collapsed, and died the same evening without regaining consciousness.

Preceding chapters have shown how the problems of impending victory rivalled in their perplexity the worst perils of war. Indeed, it may be said that Roosevelt died at the supreme climax of the war, and at the moment when his authority was most needed to guide the policy of the United States. When I received these tidings early in the morning of Friday, the 13th, I felt as if I had been struck a physical blow. My relations with this shining personality had played so large a part in the long, terrible years we had worked together. Now they had come to an end, and I was overpowered by a sense of deep and irreparable loss. I went down to the House of Commons, which met at eleven Triumph and Tragedy

558

o’clock, and in a few sentences proposed that we should pay our respects to the memory of our great friend by immediately adjourning. This unprecedented step on the occasion of the death of the head of a foreign State was in accordance with the unanimous wish of the Members, who filed slowly out of the chamber after a sitting which had lasted only eight minutes.

All the nations paid their tributes in one form or another to Roosevelt’s memory. Black-bordered flags were hung in Moscow, and the Soviet, when it met, stood in silence. The Japanese Premier expressed “profound sympathy” to the Americans in the loss of their leader, to whom he assigned the responsibility for “the American advantageous position today.” The German radio said, in contrast, “Roosevelt will go down in history as the man at whose instigation the present war spread into a Second World War, and as the President who finally succeeded in bringing his greatest opponent, the Bolshevik Soviet Union, to power.”

In my message to Mrs. Roosevelt I said:
Prime

Minister

to

13 Apr. 45

Mrs. Roosevelt

Accept my most profound sympathy in your grievous
loss, which is also the loss of the British nation and of
the cause of freedom in every land. I feel so deeply for
you all. As for myself, I have lost a dear and cherished
friendship which was forged in the fire of war. I trust you
may find consolation in the magnitude of his work and
the glory of his name.

And to Harry Hopkins, who had been my precious link on so many occasions:

Prime

Minister

to

13 Apr. 45

Harry Hopkins

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559

I understand how deep your feelings of grief must
be. I feel with you that we have lost one of our greatest
friends and one of the most valiant champions of the
causes for which we fight. I feel a very painful personal
loss, quite apart from the ties of public action which
bound us so closely together. I had a true affection for
Franklin.

When Parliament met on Tuesday, April 17, I moved an address to the King conveying to His Majesty the deep sorrow of the House and their profound sympathy with Mrs.

Roosevelt and with the Government and people of the United States. It is customary for the leaders of all parties to speak in support of such a motion, but there developed a spontaneous feeling that it should be left to me alone to speak for the Commons. I cannot find today words which I prefer to those I uttered in the emotion of this melancholy event.