Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (93 page)

I gave him your message about Mikolajczyk, with the
text of what Mikolajczyk said. The President asked me
to thank you, and said that it seemed to him that M.

Mikolajczyk’s comments made “very good sense.” The
State Department are, I know, much pleased with this
development….

My impression from the interview is that the new
President is honest and friendly. He is conscious of but
not overwhelmed by his new responsibilities. His
references to you could not have been warmer. I
believe we shall have in him a loyal collaborator, and I
am much heartened by this first conversation.

I replied:

Prime Minister to Mr.

24 Apr. 45.

Eden (Washington)

Much though I should like to see the President
personally, I am reluctant to go to the United States in
the next sixty days. It is very probable that the election
will be on foot here before then This we cannot tell until
we can see more clearly the military results which lie
before us. The most cordial invitation will, I am sure, be
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sent to the President by the King and by His Majesty’s
Government. I should think that ninety days hence
would not be an inconvenient date, as the General
Election will either have taken place or be relegated to
October. This has not yet been settled.

Thus we all resumed our toilsome march under the deep impression of a common loss.

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10

Growing Friction with Russia

President Truman Proposes a Joint Message to
Stalin — My Reply — An Important Declaration by
Mikolajczyk, April
16 —
His Further Statement
about the Curzon Line, April
22 —
Fruitless
Discussion with Molotov at Washington, April
23 —

The Treaty Between the U.S.S.R. and the
Warsaw Poles — My Telegram to Stalin of April
24
and His Reply — Soviet Security and Western
Dictation — A Retrospect — Stalin and Yugoslavia — My Appeal to Stalin of April
29 —

Honour and Self-Interest
—
Bleak Prospect — The
Entrapping of the Sixteen Polish Leaders — A
Forbidding Reply from Stalin, May
5 —
The Dark
Scene in Europe — Urgent Need for a Triple
Meeting.

P
RESIDENT TRUMAN’S first political act which concerned us was to take up the Polish question from the point where it stood when Roosevelt died, only forty-eight hours earlier.

He proposed a joint declaration by us both to Stalin. The document in which this was set forth must of course have been far advanced in preparation by the State Department at the moment when the new President succeeded.

Nevertheless it is remarkable that he felt able so promptly to commit himself to it amid the formalities of assuming office and the funeral of his predecessor.

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He admitted that Stalin’s attitude was not very hopeful but felt we should “have another go” and he accordingly proposed telling Stalin that our Ambassadors in Moscow had agreed without question to the three leaders of the Warsaw Government being invited to Moscow for consultation and assuring him we had never denied they would play a prominent part in forming the new Provisional Government of National Unity. Our Ambassadors were not demanding the right to invite an unlimited number of Poles from abroad and from within Poland. The real issue was whether the Warsaw Government could veto individual candidates for consultation, and in our opinion the Yalta Agreement did not entitle them to do so.

Mr. Truman then suggested asking Stalin to agree to the following plan:

(1)

Bierut,

Osubka-Morawski,

Rola-Zymierski,

Bishop Sapieha, one representative Polish leader not
connected with the existing Warsaw Government to be
proposed by Stalin, and Mikolajczyk, Grabski, and
Stanczyk from London should be at once invited to
Moscow.

(2) Once the invitations were issued the Warsaw
representatives could arrive first if desired.

(3) The Polish leaders should then suggest others
from within Poland or abroad who might be brought in
for consultation, so that all major Polish groups would
be represented in the discussions.

(4) Until the Polish leaders were consulted we could
not bind ourselves about the composition of the new
Government of National Unity, and did not consider the
Yugoslav precedent applied to Poland.

I replied immediately to this important proposal.

Prime

Minister

to

15 Apr. 45

President Truman

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576

It gave me great pleasure to receive your message
No. 1, and I am thankful indeed for the expressions of
friendship and comradeship which it contains. I
reciprocate these most cordially.

2. I have just read the draft joint message which you
propose we should send to Stalin. In principle I am in
complete agreement with its terms, but there is one
important point which Mr. Eden will put before you, and
as you and he will be able to discuss the text together
any points of details can, I am sure, be adjusted. I will
consult the Cabinet on Monday if the final draft reaches
me by then, and I hope we may despatch the message
with our joint authority on that very day, as I strongly
agree with you that our reply is of high urgency.

Moreover, it is important to strike the note of our unity
of outlook and of action at the earliest moment.

3. Meanwhile Eden will no doubt discuss with you
our impressions of what is actually happening in
Moscow and Warsaw. As I see it, the Lublin Government are feeling the strong sentiment of the Polish
nation, which, though not unfriendly to Russia, is
fiercely resolved on independence, and views with
increasing disfavour a Polish Provisional Government
which is in the main a Soviet puppet. They are
endeavouring, in accord with the Soviet Government, to
form a Government more broad-based than the present
one by the addition of Polish personalities (including
perhaps Witos) whom they have in their power, but
whose aid they seek and need. This is a step in the
right direction, but would not satisfy our requirements or
the decisions of the Crimea Conference.

4. Eden saw Mikolajczyk before his departure, and
Mikolajczyk promised to make the declaration desired
of him in Stalin’s private introductory telegram to me
dated April 7, which I repeated to President Roosevelt…. I hope to have this afternoon the form of his
declaration, which he will publish in his own Polish
paper here next Thursday. This, if satisfactory, can be
telegraphed to Stalin on Monday, either simultaneously
with or as part of our joint message, and if it is not
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satisfactory I will wrestle with him to make it so, and
thereafter repeat to you.

Mr. Eden, who was then in Washington, cabled to me next day that he did not consider that we could agree to the first of the President’s proposals about invitations to the Polish leaders to come to Moscow for consultations. It was essential that representatives from within Poland should comprise men who really carried weight and could speak on behalf of the Polish parties. We had to have the right to nominate Poles from inside Poland, and could not leave the choice solely to the Russians. Unless the Poles from inside were truly representative he doubted whether Mikolajczyk and his friends would join in the consultations.

The joint message was sent on the 15th in a slightly amended form. Meanwhile I obtained the following declaration from M. Mikolajczyk, whom I saw at Chequers:
M. Mikolajczyk to

16 Apr. 45

Prime Minister

1. I consider close and lasting friendship with Russia
is the keystone of future Polish policy, within the wider
friendship of the United Nations.

2. To remove all doubt as to my attitude, I wish to
declare that I accept the Crimea decision in regard to
the future of Poland, its sovereign independent
position, and the formation of a Provisional Government
representative of National Unity.

3. I support the decision arrived at in the Crimea that
a conference of leading Polish personalities be called
with a view to constituting a Government of National
Unity, as widely and fairly representative of the Polish
people as possible, and one which will command
recognition by the three major Powers.

On receiving this Stalin wrote me:

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578

Marshal

Stalin

to

17 Apr. 45

Prime Minister

Mikolajczyk’s statement represents of course a great
step forward, but it is not clear whether Mikolajczyk also
accepts that part of the decisions of the Crimea
Conference which deals with the eastern frontiers of
Poland. I should be glad, first, to receive a full text of
Mikolajczyk’s statement, and, secondly, to receive from
Mikolajczyk an explanation as to whether he also
accepts that part of the decisions of the Crimea
Conference on Poland which deals with the eastern
frontiers of Poland.

I therefore sent him on the 22d a public statement by M.

Mikolajczyk which had appeared in his newspaper. “There is no doubt,” I cabled, “about the answer which he gives in his last sentence to the question you put to me, namely, that he accepts the Curzon Line, including the Lvov cession to the Soviets. I hope this will be satisfactory to you.”

Mikolaiczyk’s statement ran as follows:
On the demand of Russia the three Great Powers
have declared themselves in favour of establishing
Poland’s eastern frontier on the Curzon Line with the
possibility of small rectifications. My own point of view
was that at least Lvov and the oil district should be left
to Poland. Considering however first that in this respect
there is an absolute demand on the Soviet side and
secondly that the existence side by side of our two
nations is dependent on the fulfilment of this condition,
we Poles are obliged to ask ourselves whether in the
name of the so-called integrity of our republic we are to
reject it and thereby jeopardise the whole body of our
country’s interests. The answer to this question must be

“No.”

As I got no answer to this it may be assumed that the Dictator was for the moment content. Other points were

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open. Mr. Eden telegraphed from Washington that he and Stettinius agreed that we should renew our demand for the entry of observers into Poland, and that we should once more press the Soviet Government to hold up their negotiations for a treaty with the Lublin Poles. But shortly after deciding this news arrived that the treaty had been concluded.