Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (96 page)

2. I am unable to share your views on the subject of
Greece in the passage where you suggest that the
three Powers should supervise elections. Such
supervision in relation to the people of an Allied State
could not be regarded otherwise than as an insult to
that people and a flagrant interference with its internal
life. Such supervision is unnecessary in relation to the
former satellite States which have subsequently
declared war on Germany and joined the Allies, as has
been shown by the experience of the elections which
have taken place, for instance, in Finland; here
elections have been held without any outside
intervention and have led to constructive results.

Your remarks concerning Belgium and Poland as
theatres of war and corridors of communication are
entirely unjustified. It is a question of Poland’s peculiar
position as a neighbour State of the Soviet Union which
demands that the future Polish Government should
actively strive for friendly relations between Poland and
the Soviet Union, which is likewise in the interest of all
other peace-loving nations. This is a further argument
for following the example of Yugoslavia. The United
Nations are concerned that there should be a firm and
lasting friendship between the Soviet Union and
Poland. Consequently we cannot be satisfied that
persons should be associated with the formation of the
future Polish Government who, as you express it, “are
not fundamentally anti-Soviet,” or that only those
persons should be excluded from participation in this
work who are in your opinion “extremely unfriendly
towards Russia.” Neither of these criteria can satisfy us.

We insist, and shall insist, that there should be brought
into consultation on the formation of the future Polish
Government only those persons who have actively
shown a friendly attitude towards the Soviet Union and
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who are honestly and sincerely prepared to co-operate
with the Soviet State.

3. I must comment especially on [another] point of
your message, in which you mention difficulties arising
as a result of rumours of the arrest of fifteen Poles, of
deportations and so forth.

As to this, I can inform you that the group of Poles to
which you refer consists not of fifteen but of sixteen
persons, and is headed by the well-known Polish
general Okulicki. In view of his especially odious
character the British Information Service is careful to be
silent on the subject of this Polish general, who

“disappeared” together with the fifteen other Poles who
are said to have done likewise. But we do not propose
to be silent on this subject. This party of sixteen
individuals headed by General Okulicki was arrested by
the military authorities on the Soviet front and is
undergoing investigation in Moscow. General Okulicki’s
group, and especially the General himself, are accused
of planning and carrying out diversionary acts in the
rear of the Red Army which resulted in the loss of over
100 fighters and officers of that Army, and are also
accused of maintaining illegal wireless transmitting
stations in the rear of our troops, which is contrary to
law. All or some of them, according to the results of the
investigation, will be handed over for trial. This is the
manner in which it is necessary for the Red Army to
defend its troops and its rear from diversionists and
disturbers of order.

The British Information Service is disseminating
rumours of the murder or shooting of Poles in Sidice.

These statements of the British Information Service are
complete fabrications, and have evidently been
suggested to it by agents of Arciszewski.
2

4. It appears from your message that you are not
prepared to regard the Polish Provisional Government
as the foundation of the future Government of National
Unity, and that you are not prepared to accord it its
rightful position in that Government. I must say frankly
that such an attitude excludes the possibility of an
agreed solution of the Polish question.

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I repeated this forbidding message to President Truman, with the following comment:

Prime

Minister

to

6 May 45

President Truman

It seems to me that matters can hardly be carried
further by correspondence, and that as soon as
possible there should be a meeting of the three heads
of Governments. Meanwhile we should hold firmly to
the existing position obtained or being obtained by our
armies in Yugoslavia, in Austria, in Czechoslovakia, on
the main central United States front, and on the British
front, reaching up to Lübeck, including Denmark.
3
There
will be plenty to occupy both armies in collecting the
prisoners during the next few days, and we hope that
the V.E. celebration will also occupy the public mind at
home. Thereafter I feel that we must most earnestly
consider our attitude towards the Soviets and show
them how much we have to offer or withhold.

Stalin had however already sent a copy to the President.

While the Conference at San Francisco was agreeably planning the foundations of a future free, civilised, and united world, and while the rejoicings in our victory over Hitler and the Nazi tyranny transported the peoples of the Grand Alliance, my mind was oppressed with the new and even greater peril which was swiftly unfolding itself to my gaze. There was also at a lower level the worry about a General Election, which, whatever its result, must divide the nation and weaken its expression in this period when all that we had gained in a righteous war might be cast away.

It seemed above all vital that Stalin, Truman, and I should meet together at the earliest moment, and that nothing should delay us. On May 4 I drew the European scene as I Triumph and Tragedy

593

saw it for Mr. Eden, who was at the San Francisco Conference, in daily touch with Stettinius and Molotov, and soon to revisit the President at Washington.

Prime

Minister

to

4 May 45

Foreign

Secretary

(San Francisco)

I consider that the Polish deadlock can now
probably only be resolved at a conference between the
three heads of Governments in some unshattered town
in Germany, if such can be found. This should take
place at latest at the beginning of July. I propose to
telegraph a suggestion to President Truman about his
visit here and the further indispensable meeting of the
three major Powers.

2. The Polish problem may be easier to settle when
set in relation to the now numerous outstanding
questions of the utmost gravity which require urgent
settlement with the Russians. I fear terrible things have
happened during the Russian advance through
Germany to the Elbe. The proposed withdrawal of the
United States Army to the occupational lines which
were arranged with the Russians and Americans in
Quebec, and which were marked in yellow on the maps
we studied there, would mean the tide of Russian
domination sweeping forward 120 miles on a front of
300 or 400 miles. This would be an event which, if it
occurred, would be one of the most melancholy in
history. After it was over and the territory occupied by
the Russians, Poland would be completely engulfed
and buried deep in Russian-occupied lands. What
would in fact be the Russian frontier would run from the
North Cape in Norway, along the Finnish-Swedish
frontier, across the Baltic to a point just east of Lübeck,
along the at present agreed line of occupation and
along the frontier between Bavaria to Czechoslovakia
to the frontiers of Austria, which is nominally to be in
quadruple occupation, and half-way across that country
to the Isonzo river, behind which Tito and Russia will
claim everything to the east. Thus the territories under
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594

Russian control would include the Baltic provinces, all
of Germany to the occupational line, all Czechoslovakia, a large part of Austria, the whole of Yugoslavia,
Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, until Greece in her
present tottering condition is reached. It would include
all the great capitals of Middle Europe, including Berlin,
Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia. The
position of Turkey and Constantinople will certainly
come immediately into discussion.

3. This constitutes an event in the history of Europe
to which there has been no parallel, and which has not
been faced by the Allies in their long and hazardous
struggle. The Russian demands on Germany for
reparations alone will be such as to enable her to
prolong the occupation almost indefinitely, at any rate
for many years, during which time Poland will sink with
many other States into the vast zone of Russian-controlled Europe, not necessarily economically
Sovietised, but police-governed.

4. It is just about time that these formidable issues
were examined between the principal Powers as a
whole. We have several powerful bargaining counters
on our side, the use of which might make for a peaceful
agreement. First, the Allies ought not to retreat from
their present positions to the occupational line until we
are satisfied about Poland, and also about the
temporary character of the Russian occupation of
Germany, and the conditions to be established in the
Russianised or Russian-controlled countries in the
Danube valley, particularly Austria and Czechoslovakia,
and the Balkans.
4
Secondly, we may be able to please
them about the exits from the Black Sea and the Baltic
as part of a general settlement. All these matters can
only be settled before the United States armies in
Europe are weakened. If they are not settled before the
United States armies withdraw from Europe and the
Western World folds up its war machines there are no
prospects of a satisfactory solution and very little of
preventing a third World War. It is to this early and
speedy show-down and settlement with Russia that we
must now turn our hopes. Meanwhile I am against
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weakening our claim against Russia on behalf of
Poland in any way. I think it should stand where it was
put in the telegrams from the President and me.

“Nothing,” I added the next day, “can save us from the great catastrophe but a meeting and a show-down as early as possible at some point in Germany which is under American and British control and affords reasonable accommodation.”