Read Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) Online
Authors: Winston S. Churchill
Triumph and Tragedy
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hours. Their orders were to secure Trieste, the anchorage at Pola, and the lines of communication between Italy and Austria. In linking up with regular Yugoslav troops great care was to be used to avoid armed clashes.
At the same time Alexander telegraphed to Tito informing him of his plans. “They are similar,” he said, “to those we discussed at Belgrade…. I presume that any of your forces which may be in the area affected by my operations will come under my command, as you suggested during our recent discussions in Belgrade, and that you will now issue orders to that effect.”
To me he reported:
Field-Marshal
1 May 45
Alexander to Prime
Minister
Tito’s regular forces are now fighting in Trieste, and
have already occupied most of Istria. I am quite certain
that he will not withdraw his troops if ordered to do so
unless the Russians tell him to.
If I am ordered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to
occupy the whole of Venezia Giulia by force if
necessary, we shall certainly be committed to a fight
with the Yugoslav Army, who will have at least the
moral backing of the Russians. Before we are
committed I think it as well to consider the feelings of
our own troops in this matter. They have a profound
admiration for Tito’s Partisan Army, and a great
sympathy for them in their struggle for freedom. We
must be very careful therefore before we ask them to
turn away from the common enemy to fight an Ally. Of
course I should not presume to gauge the reaction of
our people at home, whom you know so well.
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Tito’s troops had in fact entered Trieste on April 30 in the hope not only of securing the city and the surrounding area, but also of obtaining the surrender of the German garrison of seven thousand men with all its equipment. It was not until the afternoon of the following day that the Yugoslav forces made contact with the advance guard of the 2d New Zealand Division just west of Monfalcone. On May 2
General Freyberg and his New Zealand troops entered Trieste, took the surrender of the German garrison, and occupied the dock areas.
On May 5 Alexander telegraphed:
Field-Marshal
5 May 45
Alexander to Prime
Minister
Tito … now finds himself in a much stronger military
position than he foresaw when I was in Belgrade, and
wants to cash in on it. Then he hoped to step into
Trieste when finally I stepped out. Now he wants to be
installed there and only allow me user’s right.
We must bear in mind that since our meeting he has
been to Moscow. I believe he will hold to our original
agreement if he can be assured that when I no longer
require Trieste as a base for my forces in Austria he will
be allowed to incorporate it in his New Yugoslavia.
The last sentence of Alexander’s message made it necessary for me to make our political view clear.
Prime Minister to Field-
6 May 45
Marshal Alexander
I like all your correspondence with Tito. I am very
glad you got into Trieste, Gorizia, and Monfalcone in
time to put your foot in the door. Tito, backed by
Russia, will push hard, but I do not think that they will
dare attack you in your present position. Unless you
can make a satisfactory working arrangement with Tito,
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the argument must be taken up by the Governments.
There is no question of your making any agreement
with him about incorporating Istria, or any part of the
pre-war Italy, in his “New Yugoslavia.” The destiny of
this part of the world is reserved for the peace table,
and you should certainly make him aware of this.
1
I added:
6 May 45
In order to avoid leading Tito or the Yugoslav
commanders into any temptation, it would be wise to
have a solid mass of troops in this area, with a great
superiority of modern weapons and frequent demonstrations of the Air Force, as far as possible without hurting
your advance in the direction of Vienna, which I am
sure you are pressing with all possible speed.
I suppose you have cleared the approaches to
Trieste so that you can soon have some strong naval
forces there. Strength is safety and peace.
You have no doubt seen our telegrams of complaint
on the way we are being treated [by the Russians]
about Vienna. You are clearly entitled to advance as far
and as fast as you can into former enemy territory until
you form contact with the Russian or Yugoslav forces,
when the same method of friendly recognition should
be adopted as has proved a success on the Western
Front.
A week later, on May 12, after the great events had happened in the Western theatre, there arrived from President Truman a most welcome and strong message.
He said he was becoming increasingly concerned at Tito’s actions in Venezia Giulia. Tito seemed to have no intention of abandoning the territory or letting this ancient problem await a general postwar settlement. We must now decide, said the President, whether to uphold the fundamental Triumph and Tragedy
656
principles of territorial settlement by orderly process against force, intimidation, or blackmail. If Tito succeeded he would probably claim parts of South Austria, Hungary, and Greece. Although the stability of Italy and her relations with Russia might be at stake, the present issue was not a question of taking sides in a dispute between Italy and Yugoslavia or becoming involved in Balkan politics, but of deciding whether Britain and America were going to allow their Allies to engage in uncontrolled land-grabbing or tactics which were all too reminiscent of Hitler and Japan.
Yugoslav occupation of Trieste would have more far-reaching consequences than the immediate territory involved. We should insist, he urged, on Field-Marshal Alexander obtaining complete and exclusive control of Trieste and Pola, the line of communication through Gorizia and Monfalcone, and of a big enough area to the east to ensure proper administration. Mr. Truman said we should be prepared to consider any necessary steps to effect Tito’s withdrawal.
He also added a draft message for our ambassadors to deliver to Belgrade.
He suggested informing Stalin of our plans in accordance with the Yalta agreement and concluded as follows: “If we stand firm on this issue, as we are doing on Poland, we can hope to avoid a host of other similar encroachments.”
I need not say how relieved I was to receive this invaluable support from my new companion.
Prime
Minister
to
12 May 45
President Truman
I agree with every word you say, and will work with
all my strength on the line you propose…. If the
situation is handled firmly before our strength is
dispersed Europe may be saved from another blood-Triumph and Tragedy
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bath. Otherwise the whole fruits of our victory may be
cast away and none of the purposes of World
Organisation to prevent territorial aggression and future
wars will be attained.
I trust that a standstill order can be given on the
movements of the American armies and Air Forces
from Europe [to the Far East], at any rate for a few
weeks. We will also conform in our demobilisation.
Even if this standstill order should become known it
would do nothing but good….
In accordance with your suggestion, I am instructing
our Ambassador at Belgrade to address Tito on the
lines which you have set forth, and to keep in step with
your Ambassador at every stage, whether in oral
representations or the delivery of identical or parallel
notes or of a joint note.
I hastened to tell the good news to Alexander.
Prime
Minister
to
12 May 45
Field-Marshal
Alexander
You will have seen the most robust and encouraging
telegram I have just received from the President about
Tito. I have assured him that we shall support his
policy, and instructions are being given to Stevenson at
Belgrade to take identical action with the American
Ambassador there. Of the eighteen divisions concerned, you could, I should think, count on all. The six
British and British-Indian divisions are under Imperial
orders. I should think it likely that the Brazilian division
would act with the seven Americans. I should imagine
there is nothing the two Poles [Polish divisions] would
like better. The fact that Great Britain and the United
States are acting together should make the matter
clearly comprehensible to the troops.
You must indeed rejoice at the prospects of so much
help being given by our great Allies and by the new
President. This action if pursued with firmness may well
prevent a renewal of the World War. I recognise of
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course that it affects every theatre, and so, I am sure,
does President Truman.
It seems probable that a somewhat violent internal reaction at Washington followed the new President’s bold telegram to me. The argument “Don’t let us get tied up in Europe”
had always been formidable. It had undoubtedly led to the Second World War through the ruin of the League of Nations by the withdrawal of the United States. It was now to play almost as deadly a part at a moment when the future hung in the balance. There was also at this time the desire to finish off Japan by concentrating all available and suitable forces in the Far East. This was supported by the powerful school which had from the beginning set the Far East before Europe. My suggestion of a “standstill” or a
“standfast” order seems to have raised this issue abruptly in the President’s circle. At any rate, his replies seemed couched in a somewhat different mood to that expressed in his telegram about Trieste.
On May 14 he said he preferred to see what happened before considering a continued though temporary occupation of the Soviet Zone in Germany by the Western Allies. As for the Yugoslavs Mr. Truman declared that we should await reports about our messages to Belgrade before deciding what forces to use if our troops were attacked. Unless Tito did attack it was impossible to involve the United States in another war. Two days later he declared he was unable and unwilling to involve his country in a war with the Yugoslavs unless they attacked us, in which case we would be justified in using Allied troops to throw them back far enough to stop any further aggression.
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Meanwhile the local situation around Trieste sharpened. At first Alexander would have been content if Tito had put his fighting and administrative troops under Allied command, at any rate in the areas where we were operating, though of course we would rather they withdrew completely. But Yugoslav posts and sentries were restricting our movements. Their behaviour, both in Austria and Venezia Giulia, made a bad impression on the Allied troops, both United States and British. Our men were obliged to look on without power to intervene at actions which offended their sense of justice, and felt that they were condoning wrong-doing. “As a result,” cabled Alexander, “feeling against Yugoslavia is now strong, and is getting stronger. It is now certain that any solution by which we shared an area with Yugoslav troops or Partisans or permitted Yugoslav administration to function would not work.”