Unthinkable (63 page)

Yet to listen to the two sides, this would appear to be the choice we have before us.

So I want to put in a plea that we set aside the hysteria—the not-inconceivable but exceptionally unlikely claims bandied about by partisans of both sides to play on our worst fears. In the realm of policy, there is always uncertainty. When nuclear weapons are involved, that uncertainty can quickly turn to fear. Yet despite that lingering uncertainty, the only responsible thing we can do is to make decisions based on what is likely, not on the possibilities that fear can conjure. If we learn nothing else from the Cold War, it should be that allowing highly unlikely but catastrophically bad scenarios to drive our planning, spending, and decision-making was ruinously wasteful and dangerously distorted policy in ways that made us all less safe rather than more.

Few countries have practiced strategies of containment and deterrence as deliberately, as skillfully, and as successfully as the United States. Historically, a great many cases of containment when practiced by other countries have ended in war. Think of the French efforts to contain Germany after 1870: the outcome was the two world wars. Not successful by anyone's standards, but certainly not for France. British efforts to contain France itself under Louis XIV and Napoleon succeeded, but produced war after war (which may have been unavoidable in the pre-nuclear era). Britain did an admirable job containing Russia in the eighteenth century (what they referred to as “the Great Game”), but it isn't clear just how necessary it was for them to do so. Of all the containment regimes the United States practiced during the twentieth century—against the USSR, China, North Korea after 1953, Cuba, Vietnam after 1975, Iran, Nicaragua, Libya, and Iraq—only the last resulted in a war. Every other
containment strategy succeeded in preventing war, the conquest of additional territory, and any other meaningful increase in the power of the target state. Most of the states on that list are now our friends and staunch trading partners, in no small part because of the success of containment. It seems we are good at containment.

Yet we hate it. We hate it because it is ambiguous—a situation that is not war, but not peace, either. We hate it because it is protracted, leaving us in this state of limbo for decades in most cases. We hate it because it is not tough enough for conservatives and not compassionate enough for liberals. We hate it because it seems passive—even though most of the containment strategies we employed were actually pretty aggressive—and we are a people who admire action. We hate it because it gets monotonous, even though that is often the measure of its success. Perhaps it is related to why so few Americans enjoy soccer? Any sport in which a draw is something to be celebrated turns us off. Maybe any strategy that promises only perpetual draws, or just 1–0 victories, can't win our hearts, either.

In the case of containing a nuclear Iran, there are reasons to be concerned about containment. It entails some not insignificant costs and some real risks. But there are also real reasons to be concerned about air strikes, both whether they will work and what they will get us into. Because of the unpredictability of conflict, going to war always means opening Pandora's box. Sometimes we may be ready for what flies out. Sometimes we may prevent anything truly bad from escaping. But there are too many instances throughout history of war releasing furies that were never imagined. And with Iran our uncertainties are greater than almost anywhere else, except maybe North Korea. Making allowances for the uncertainty that pervades Iran must be a critical element of our decisions about how to deal with it.

We need also to remember the lessons of Iraq. With Iraq we felt just as certain about Saddam's WMD activities, perhaps even more so than we are today about Iran. Almost no one believed that Saddam had not reconstituted his WMD programs, at least to some extent, and those who did were castigated as deranged. And yet, we were wrong. Terribly wrong.
And that should make us more humble and more careful when contemplating our actions toward Iran.

We can all wish that we had better options. That some perfect strategy will appear before us and save us from the choices we have left. The time for that is long past. We can only choose the best from among the detritus.

Let us hope that we can persuade Iran to negotiate a halt to its nuclear program. Nothing would be better, even if it will be far from perfect. If that fails, let us try to help the people of Iran to change their circumstances and in so doing, change ours.

If all else fails we will face the fork in the road between war and containment. Neither is a good path. Neither may get us to our destination.

Yet choose we must. Unless circumstances change dramatically, I will choose the path of containment. It feels better, safer to me. If our nation chooses the path of war, may we walk it with greater care than in our last few forays and in the full understanding of its costs and risks. Perhaps the outcome will be better, but at least we will not have to say we did not know.

The more books I write, the more I value the help I receive in writing them. This book was yet another step on that road. I have a lot of thank-yous to offer, but little way to express the full measure of my gratitude.

I will start by saying that, as always, in writing this book I have stood on the shoulders of giants. Shaul Bakhash once again lent me his prodigious knowledge of Iran, his endless good sense, and his patience wading through an early draft of this book and helping me to turn it into something easier on both the eyes and the facts. My dear friend Ray Takeyh did the same, helpfully pointing out where both my facts and my opinions were wrong, and occasionally offering up some of the gems of wisdom that only he can dig up about the Islamic Republic. The remarkable Karim Sadjadpour was another who slogged through the manuscript and by his labors made it far better than it was. I never cease to envy Karim both his insights into Iran and his wonderful turns of phrase, a number of which I have used in the preceding pages. I am especially grateful to another friend, Reuel Gerecht, who also reviewed the manuscript. Reuel is not only an astute observer of Iran; he is a committed advocate of bombing. In some ways, his points were most useful of all in seeing the weaknesses in my own arguments about how best to deal with Iran. Finally, Cliff Kupchan somehow found time to go over the section of the book on containment with a fine-tooth comb. Cliff is another expert whose scholarship and policy sense I have always admired, and his lengthy comments only reinforced my respect. He saved me from a number of pitfalls and I am very thankful to him for doing so.

Turning from the Iran experts to the strategic experts, I am grateful for the help of three other people who gave me more good comments and criticisms than I had any right to expect. Here I need to start with Richard K. Betts and Michael E. O'Hanlon. Dick Betts is rightly a giant in the field of security studies. His expertise, his experience, and his knowledge of the scholarly and policy debates over containment, deterrence, the Cold War, and the entire panoply of security issues were extraordinarily helpful—as were his occasionally biting comments about the early manuscript. Michael O'Hanlon is one of the finest men I know and one of the best things about Washington, D.C. I am deeply grateful to him for correcting me, calling me out, and pushing me on a range of topics, large and small, in this book. I have always been grateful to Mike for his friendship, but now I can add to that his hard work and terrific observations about this book. Matt Kroenig, a smart young scholar who has made the best case for war with Iran I have yet seen, was generous enough to review the sections on an Israeli and American strike on Iran and made any number of great points that made me stop and think about what I really believed and why.

Then there is Garrett Mitchell, the perspicacious author of “The Mitchell Report.” Whenever I write a book I like to give it to someone I consider a smart, knowledgeable “non-expert” on the subject. Someone with enough familiarity to know if I am making sense, without being so steeped in the subject as to lose sight of what the majority of readers would be looking for. I hit the jackpot with Garry Mitchell, who generously agreed to serve in that role for this book, but undoubtedly did not realize just how generous he was being when he agreed to it. If this book makes any sense at all, it is thanks to his voluminous comments on everything from typos to the central argument and structure of the book. I could not have asked for more helpful criticism and I cannot imagine how I can repay him for it.

Several of my colleagues at the Saban Center took the time to read part or all of the manuscript and they also have my sincere thanks. First among them is Dan Byman, my alter ego. Dan went over the various containment chapters, along with the conclusions, to help me nail down this important but difficult section of the argument. As always, Dan was terrific, pointing out both what he thought I was doing right and what I was doing wrong—without any of Reuel's glee or Dick's exasperation. I cannot imagine writing a book without Dan to help me think it through and I only hope that I never have to try. Bruce Riedel and Mike Doran also have my gratitude for offering a number of important critiques based on their own areas of expertise, and for making sure I stayed on the right track throughout. Another colleague I would like to thank is Natan Sachs, a terrific young scholar whom I am proud to claim as my last hire when I was director of the Saban Center. Natan went over the chapter on an Israeli strike, lending
me his knowledge of Israeli politics and security to make sure that I did not say anything too ridiculous about the subject—and fortunately catching several potential gaffes.

Many other friends and colleagues helped along the way. Bob McNally, Gal Luft, Raad Alkadiri, and the team at PIRA Energy all helped me to get a handle on the energy markets and their relationship to the many different issues touching upon America's Iran policy. My remarkable friend Tim Naftali stepped in with some critical points on the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Khrushchev's thinking about nuclear weapons. Jonathan Pollack, my colleague at Brookings, carried me through the thickets of Chinese security and North Korean foreign policy at several key junctures. Likewise, my old friend Daryl Press threw me a lifeline on various nuclear force structure issues, a topic on which he has been doing a lot of innovative thinking recently.

Much of the most important material in this book is the product of hours upon hours of interviews with some of the smartest and most well-versed people involved in this issue. Unfortunately, nearly all are government (or former government) officials from the United States, Israel, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, France, Great Britain, China, Iran, and other countries who agreed to discuss this delicate matter with me on different occasions over the years. Because of the sensitivities involved, very few felt comfortable being quoted by name. Most were unwilling to be acknowledged in any way, but they have my genuine thanks nonetheless. Their thoughts were critical to helping me understand the many different perspectives that make up the puzzle of the Iranian nuclear impasse.

I have also been blessed with some wonderful benefactors. As always, first and foremost comes Haim Saban, the founder of the Saban Center at Brookings. When I began work on this book I was the director of the Saban Center, although I stepped down in 2012, in part to concentrate more fully on its writing. Both while I was director and since, Haim has been nothing but a pleasure. I am deeply grateful to him and to his wife, Cheryl, not just for their generosity but for their friendship over the years—and for allowing me to step down so that I could concentrate on this book! My gratitude is increased by the fact that I doubt Haim is going to like the conclusions I reach in this book. But I know that he wouldn't have it any other way and no one could ask for more from a patron.

While I am thanking those who have supported me, I would like to add my gratitude to those who supported me with my supporters: Sadie Jonath, Elisa Glazer, and Peggy Knudson, of the Brookings Foreign Policy Development office. They have thankless but essential tasks and I hope that they know how much I appreciated all of their hard work on my behalf. Especially Sadie, with whom I have been through so many donor wars that I am amazed we are not
both shell-shocked. She just keeps smiling and keeps going, and I have always cherished her for both.

This will be the last book that I write with the help of my longtime research assistant, Iren Sargsyan. As always, I am enormously appreciative of her Herculean labors on my behalf, both on this book and for so many other projects during the years she has been with me. Iren has outgrown this role and I cannot wait to see her blossom professionally in the years ahead. But she will always have my gratitude for the time she gave me, and I will miss her. She will always be the standard against which her successors will be measured.