What Stalin Knew (16 page)

reacted to it.

Matske said that he was overwhelmed by the speed and force with

which the German units had advanced in the Low Countries and France,

throwing the defenders off balance. He cited the use of parachute and air-

borne troops in the capture of the Rotterdam airport and the rapid cross-

ing of the Albert Canal, which prevented the demolition of the bridges.

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63

Matske and Hegendorf commented that the speedy capture of the Liège

fortresses was made possible by the German units’ opportunity to practice

their techniques and test their weaponry in advance. They had used their

flamethrower tanks, for example, on similar fortresses in the Czech fortifi-

cations in the Sudeten area, which had been given up by the Czechs after

the Munich agreement in September 1938. Other equipment included

dive bombers that carried 1,700-kilogram bombs, each fitted out with a

screeching siren that everywhere demoralized the defenders. Matske at-

tributed the Germans’ success to the intensive training their units had

received in preparation for the western campaign; the French, by contrast,

appeared to have slept through the winter.1

Two days after Proskurov sent the first report, he received the second, a

telegram from the Soviet military attaché in Sofia, Colonel Ivan F. Derga-

chev. It forwarded a report from a reliable source on future German plans

(by this time it was already clear that the Wehrmacht was near victory in

France). According to the report, ‘‘the Germans aspired to conclude an

armistice with France. Italy would then threaten France militarily and

peace would result. After a peace agreement, Germany would, within a

month’s time, put its army in order and together with Italy and Japan make

a sudden attack on the USSR. The purpose would be to destroy commu-

nism in the Soviet Union and to create a fascist regime there.’’ The source

vouched for the accuracy of this information and asked that it be sent to

the Soviet government; the report was forwarded to Stalin, Molotov, and

Timoshenko.2 Within four days after its receipt by Proskurov, Italy at-

tacked the French; on June 22 the French concluded an armistice with

Germany and on June 24 with Italy. From German archives we now know

that less than a month later Hitler gave orders to his staff to prepare for an

invasion of the USSR.

There is no archival record of Stalin’s reaction to this second report,

but it and the earlier one are but two examples of the fine military intel-

ligence he received. How did the residencies of Soviet military intelligence

function over the next year in reporting on German plans and actions?

Equally important, how did the RU handle reports when they arrived in

Moscow, how were they disseminated, and what were the reactions of their

recipients? Although normally reports were regularly distributed to Stalin

and other members of the civilian and military leadership, some were

withheld or altered, apparently to conform to Stalin’s conceptions. There

were also occasions when Stalin would react to a report by calling it ‘‘disin-

formation’’ or even by threatening the source. In this chapter and the two

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that follow I will examine which of the RU’s legal and illegal residencies

abroad did the best job of alerting Stalin and the leadership to the German

menace.

First, though, a word about the RU source Gerhard Kegel, or KhVS,

the German commercial specialist in the German embassy in Moscow. In

addition to probably providing the first of Proskurov’s reports, he also

provided highly prized reports on the trade negotiations between Ger-

many and the USSR, which were always rushed to Stalin, Molotov, and

Mikoyan by the RU. On June 21, 1941, Kegel reported that Germany would

attack the USSR on June 22 between 3:00 and 4:00 a.m. There is no indica-

tion that this report had any impact on Stalin, even though he must have

been aware that its source was the same agent who had provided such

detailed accounts of the German position in USSR-German trade negotia-

tions. During the spring of 1941, however, when concern over an impend-

ing invasion was growing, nothing had been heard from KhVS. It was not

until June 11 that he reported that German embassy personnel would be

ready to evacuate Moscow in seven days and that the burning of docu-

ments had already begun. Given his position and access, it does seem

strange that between October 10, 1940 (his last report on trade negotia-

tions), and June 11, 1941, there was no word from him on German prepa-

rations for war.3

Berlin

Of all the RU residencies whose reports are currently available for study,

Berlin had the largest number and was one of the most effective. The resi-

dency was headed by the military attaché, Major General Vasily I. Tupi-

kov (code name Arnold), assisted by the air attaché, Colonel Nikolai D.

Skorniakov (code name Meteor); their assistants were Vasily Ye. Khlopov,

Ivan G. Bazhanov, and Nikolai M. Zaitsev. Zaitsev was responsible for

maintaining contact with the illegal Alta (Ilse Stöbe), who handled source

Ariets.4

A great producer when in Warsaw, Ariets continued in Berlin when he

was assigned to the Information Section of the German Ministry of For-

eign Affairs. On September 29, 1940, he reported that relations between

the USSR and Germany were worsening and that Hitler intended to ‘‘re-

solve problems in the east in the spring of next year [1941].’’ He named as

his source Karl Schnurre, head of the Russian sector of the Foreign Minis-

try’s Economics Department.5

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65

It was Ariets who on December 29, 1940, reported that from ‘‘highly

placed circles’’ he had learned that Hitler had given orders to prepare for

war with the USSR. Specifically, the report said, ‘ War will be declared in

March 1941.’’ In the margin of this report, the new head of RU, Filipp I.

Golikov, wrote, ‘‘Give a copy to the Narkom (Defense Commissar Timo-

shenko) and the chief of the general staff.’’ He added a note to his staff:

‘‘Who are these highly placed military circles? One must elaborate. Con-

cretely, to whom was the order given?’’ He added, ‘‘Demand more intelligi-

ble light on this subject; then order them to check it. Get a telegraphic

response from Meteor in five days and give it to me.’’ The report was dis-

seminated to Stalin in two copies, to Molotov, Timoshenko, and Kiril A.

Meretskov, chief of the general staff. It seemed clear that Golikov was

unaware of Ariets’s record or his access.6

On January 4, 1941, Ariets confirmed that ‘‘he had this information

from a friend in the military; moreover, it was based not on rumors but on

a special order of Hitler that was especially secret and known to only a few

people.’’ On February 28, 1941, Ariets followed up with a more detailed

report on preparations for war against the USSR: ‘‘People involved in the

project confirm that war with Russia has definitely been decided on for

this year [1941].’’ Three army groups had been formed under Marshals von

Bock, von Rundstedt, and von Leeb, prepared to advance on Leningrad,

Moscow, and Kiev. ‘‘The beginning of the attack is provisionally set for

May 20. To all appearances, an enveloping attack is planned in the Pinsk

area with a force of 120 German divisions. Preparatory measures have

resulted in the assignment of Russian-speaking officers and noncommis-

sioned officers to various headquarters. In addition, armored trains are

being constructed with wide gauges as in Russia.’’ From a person close to

Göring, Ariets heard that ‘‘Hitler intends to bring in around three million

slaves from Russia in order to improve his industrial capacity.’’7

Ariets’s information was reasonably accurate. Given his record, it

should have established a solid base within the RU Information Depart-

ment for evaluating reports from other sources on German preparations for

an invasion. Unfortunately for the Soviets, Golikov was new and the depart-

ment had a series of other new chiefs during the period of Ariets’s reporting.

The result was that it apparently never received adequate consideration.

Vasily I. Tupikov arrived in Berlin in December 1940 to serve as mili-

tary attaché and legal resident. At the end of April 1941, after observing

conditions in Berlin and reviewing reports from residency sources, includ-

ing Ariets, he addressed an unusual letter to Golikov. ‘‘If it turns out that in

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this presentation of my conclusions I am forcing my way through an open

door, that will not discourage me,’’ he wrote. ‘‘If I am mistaken in them and

you correct me, I will be very grateful.’’ His initial conclusions were: ‘‘1. In

current German plans for waging war, the USSR figures as the next enemy.

2. The conflict will definitely take place this year.’’ Golikov disseminated

the letter to all addressees, including Chief of the General Staff Georgy K.

Zhukov, but omitted Tupikov’s conclusion.

In an attachment giving the deployment of the German army as of

April 25, 1941, Tupikov asserted that the strength of German forces in the

west was being reduced while that in the east along the border with the

USSR was increasing. These conclusions of the RU’s senior man in Berlin

reinforced the reporting of Ariets. Golikov did not respond to the letter

personally but directed Colonel A. M. Kuznetsov, chief of the First [West-

ern] Department: ‘‘In your next dispatch to Tupikov, it will be necessary to

answer this letter.’’8

Tupikov did not stop. On May 9 he sent a report to Zhukov and Defense

Commissar Timoshenko describing a plan for possible operations of the

German army against the USSR. ‘‘Defeat of the Red Army,’’ he said, ‘‘will be

completed in one or one and a half months with arrival of the German

army on the meridian of Moscow.’’9

Because GRU would not permit access to its archives, we cannot know

what other reports were produced by RU Berlin nor do we know the con-

tents of the correspondence between the RU in Moscow and its Berlin

group. Nevertheless, from Ariets’s reporting and the position taken by Tupi-

kov in April 1941, it seems clear that this residency had few doubts con-

cerning German intentions. As for Tupikov himself, he was made chief of

staff of the Southwest Front upon his return from Berlin and died in the

defense of Kiev in the summer of 1941.

Helsinki

The RU legal resident in Helsinki was Colonel Ivan V. Smirnov (code

name Ostvald); his assistant was Major M. D. Yermolov. We have only

two reports from this residency, dated June 15 and June 17, 1941. They

were both based on personal observation and made clear that German

troops were arriving in significant numbers. One, from RU source Brand,

stated that Finland had begun to mobilize and was evacuating women and

children from large cities.10 The reports were confirmed by a June 18 tele-

gram, found in Federal Security Service (FSB) archives, from the Japanese

RESIDENCIES IN WESTERN EUROPE

67

ambassador in Helsinki to the Japanese ambassador in Moscow informing

him of general mobilization that included the calling up of women for

work in medical units and food preparation. Defensive installations were

going up on the eastern borders, the telegram added, and antiaircraft artil-

lery was being deployed in Helsinki.11

London

For some reason, no intelligence reports from the RU residency in London

were ever included in the RU material given to academician Aleksandr N.

Yakovlev for inclusion in
1941 god.
Nor is there any reference to London in

the two-volume work on the GRU by A. Kolpakidi and D. Prokhorov,
Impe-

ria GRU.
This despite the fact that the London RU residency was one of

the largest and most productive of RU stations abroad before and during

World War II.12

The resident and military attaché up until August 1940 was Major

General Ivan I. Cherny, who was replaced by Colonel Ivan A. Skliarov

(code name Brion).13 An important moment for the residency came in

March 1939, when the Germans occupied Prague and the Czechoslovak

government ceased to exist. The British intelligence service, MI-6, orga-

nized the escape from Prague of Colonel Frantisek Moravec, head of Czech

military intelligence, along with some of his best people and his files.

Shortly after their arrival in London they met with the Soviet military

attaché, Major General Cherny, and arrangements were made for official

liaison. This was later taken up by Cherny’s successor, Skliarov. At some

point, Moravec was allegedly recruited by Semen D. Kremer and given