What Stalin Knew (29 page)

mately twenty-five kilometers from the border. The troops were drawn up

in formation to meet him.’’ The remainder of the report described arrivals

of new troop trains and the construction of antiaircraft installations,

narrow-gauge railroads, and station facilities with platforms.11 A Janu-

ary 24, 1941, report from Lieutenant General Ivan A. Bogdanov, com-

mander of the border troops of the Belorussian NKVD, summed up the

German troop presence in the Warsaw area as follows: ‘‘An army headquar-

ters in districts along the frontier, headquarters of eight infantry divisions,

a cavalry division (in the Ternopol area), twenty-eight infantry regiments,

seven artillery regiments, three cavalry regiments, a tank regiment, and

two pilot training schools.’’ Bogdanov devoted much attention to the cre-

ation of the new convention for resolving border incidents.12

While learning more about the German forces opposite them, the bor-

der troops continued to apprehend agents dispatched from Abwehr opera-

tions bases in Königsberg, Warsaw, and Cracow. Through careful inter-

rogation of these agents, it was relatively simple to learn their missions.

More important, it was possible to distinguish between those that were

routine peacetime intelligence collection on Soviet defenses and those that

were obviously intended to pave the way for German offensive operations

within the Soviet Union. An excellent example of the latter can be found in

a January 18, 1941, memorandum from Lieutenant General Maslennikov

to State Security Commissar Merkulov. ‘‘Recently a number of incidents

have been noted in which German intelligence organs located in the Gov-

ernment General have given orders to agents sent by them into the USSR

to bring to Germany samples of oil, motor vehicle and aviation gasoline,

and lubricants,’’ the memorandum opened, going on to describe four cases

during December 1940 and January 1941. Two were in the area of the

Ninety-first Border Detachment in Rava-Russkay, Ukrainian SSR, and two

in the area of the Seventeenth Detachment in Brest-Litovsk, Belorussian

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SSR. The agents captured by the Ninety-first Detachment stated that they

were told ‘‘to acquire samples of the fuels and lubricants in use in Soviet

industry and transport facilities.’’ The agents who figured in an arrest on

December 22 were told that ‘‘their samples must be large enough to permit

analysis.’’ Maslennikov commented that ‘‘three of the agents were already

in Moscow, where they had been transferred on orders of Bogdan Z. Kobu-

lov, deputy state security commissar, because of the large amounts of So-

viet currency in their possession.’’ The memorandum ended: ‘‘Claiming

lack of knowledge, the arrested persons were unable to give the reason for

German intelligence interest in our petroleum products and why they were

needed.’’ Merkulov responded with this instruction in the margin: ‘ We

must clarify the reason for these tasks.’’13 Clarify? It must have been ob-

vious to both Maslennikov and Merkulov that the collection of samples

permitted the Germans to determine whether the fuels available in the

USSR would be suitable for use in their vehicles and, if not, what modifica-

tions or additives would be necessary. The use of multiple agent missions

to obtain this information strongly suggested that the Germans planned to

be operating on Soviet territory in the near future. In the atmosphere of

Moscow, however, neither man wished to suggest this in writing, even as a

possibility. They were well aware that Stalin was convinced that the Ger-

mans would not attack the Soviet Union in 1941. Nevertheless, we know

from German accounts of their operations in the first few days of the

invasion that German motorized units prized the Soviet fuel dumps they

captured. The First Panzer Division, low on fuel as a result of its rapid

advance into the Baltic States, must have been overjoyed when it came on

a large, intact fuel depot.14

Maslennikov continued to forward border troops reports on German

troop movements. Perhaps to subtly underscore the threat, he now added

parenthetically the distance from the border of each locality cited in his

reports. On February 23, 1941, he reported ‘‘the departure of two motor-

ized divisions from Cracow (145 kilometers from the border) to the Car-

pathians. On February 4 60 tractor-drawn heavy guns and six field radio

stations arrived in Kholm (28 kilometers from the border). Three trains

arrived in Lublin (45 kilometers from the border), each with 30 platform

cars loaded with armored vehicles and heavy trucks. In the area opposite

the Seventeenth Border Troop Detachment at Brest-Litovsk, German au-

thorities have taken over school buildings to house troops.’’ The report was

disseminated to Beria, Merkulov, and Golikov, the new head of military

intelligence.15 By March, reporting from both border troop units and

THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

131

NKGB agent sources began to be issued by the NKGBs of the respective

union republics. A March 27, 1941, report from the NKGB Belorussian

SSR covered troop movements, use of schools for troop housing, mobili-

zation of reservists in East Prussia, assignment of new recruits to spe-

cific infantry regiments, details on areas of concentration of German units

(many with unit designations and street numbers), and military construc-

tion, including road improvements, new roads, airfields, and fuel storage

dumps. The last section dealt with rumors prevalent in the border areas of

the Belorussian SSR, most of which predicted a German assault on the

USSR. The report was signed by the people’s commissar for state security,

L. F. Tsanava. Merkulov, the recipient, wrote these instructions in the mar-

gin: ‘ To Comrade Fitin: 1. Prepare a summary report of the military infor-

mation for the Defense Commissariat. 2. Inform the Central Committee

and the Council of People’s Commissars that the number of troops on

the border has increased and that this has been reported to Defense.

Dated 28.03.’’ Sudoplatov noted: ‘‘Sent to Timoshenko under No. 809/m of

31.03.41.’’ The delay in forwarding the report demonstrates that no real

sense of urgency existed at the top levels of the organizations involved.16

April saw a great increase in reporting. The chief of border troops in

the Ukrainian SSR signed six individual reports. Lieutenant General Mas-

lennikov sent Beria five. Also, as evidence of increasing concern and ten-

sion, reports from subordinate border troops and NKGB offices were in-

corporated into special reporting by union republic and national NKGB

commissariats. On April 9 Pavel Ia. Meshik, head of the Ukrainian SSR

NKGB, signed a special report on German troop movements that began:

‘‘According to our information from various sources, from the beginning

of 1941 and particularly recently, the German command has been carrying

out a large-scale movement of troops from Germany to the territory of the

Government General and then to the borders of the USSR.’’17 On April 10

the Foreign Intelligence Directorate of the USSR NKGB sent a summary

report to the RU ‘‘on the concentration of German troops.’’ According to

the directorate, ‘‘information from agent sources and statements by border

crossers have established that the concentration of units of the German

army on the border of the Soviet Union is continuing. At the same time,

there is accelerated construction of defensive positions, airfields, strategic

branch rail lines, highways, and dirt roads.’’ This low-key statement could

be open to many interpretations.18

A somewhat more dramatic and revealing report came to Fitin on

April 12 from the NKGB Ukrainian SSR. It was based in large part on the

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debriefing of a former junior officer in the Polish army who had also served

abroad as a vice consul. According to him, ‘‘the transfer of large German

units, the movement of munitions, and the completion of airfield con-

struction on the Soviet frontier began in January 1941 and expanded in-

tensively in April. In the beginning of February 1941 the so-called French

Southern Army, which had been located in the southern part of Poland,

was moved by rail to the river San in the direction of Peremyshl and

deployed about forty kilometers from the USSR border. The tanks and

mobile river-crossing pontoon bridges of this army moved independently.

In the first half of March, the so-called Northeast Ninth Army, which had

been brought from France to the Cracow area, spent two days there and

was then sent by rail to Lublin. In the second half of March, fresh troops

from Germany, mostly Bavarians, arrived in Sanok and Krosno.’’ This

broader picture of German troop movements was followed by local detail

confirming much of the other reporting received in April.19

The tone sharpened a bit later in April. Meshik addressed a report to

the personal attention of Nikita S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the

Ukrainian Communist Party, that said: ‘‘Agent reporting and debriefing of

border crossers establishes that the Germans are intensively preparing for

war with the USSR, for which purpose they are concentrating troops on

our borders, building roads and fortifications, and bringing in munitions.’’

Much of the rest of the report was a plea to Khrushchev to allow him to

take measures against Ukrainian nationalists to prevent them from be-

coming ‘‘a fifth column’’ in wartime. Using VCh, an encrypted speech sys-

tem, Meshik sent virtually this same message to Merkulov by telephone on

April 20.20

Despite the growing concern evident in the reports of the first months

of 1941, there was still no urgency in disseminating them at the top level of

the regime. A special report sent from the Ukrainian SSR NKGB to Mer-

kulov at NKGB USSR on April 16 bears the marginal notation: ‘‘Sent to

Golikov . . . on April 20, 1941.’’ The dilatory distribution of reports may well

have been the result of shoddy bureaucratic practices, but it may also have

reflected a reluctance on the part of all involved to be accused of provoking

a war.21 Still, even Lavrenty P. Beria could not continue to ignore the re-

ports flowing into his office. On April 23 he signed and sent a report to the

Central Committee VKP(b), the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK),

and the Defense Commissariat (NKO) summarizing German troop move-

ments between April 1 and April 19 in East Prussia and the Government

General. ‘‘In these areas,’’ the report said, ‘‘the arriving troops consisted

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133

of a large headquarters, three motorized divisions, six infantry divisions,

up to twenty-one infantry regiments, two motorized regiments, nine to

ten artillery regiments, seven tank and four engineer battalions, a motor-

cycle battalion, two companies of bicyclists, and more than 500 motor

vehicles.’’22

Reporting by border troop units and summaries by their higher head-

quarters during May reflected the same patterns observed in April, albeit

in greater scope and intensity. Of the twenty reports examined for this

period, the majority were from the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR. Most

dealt with activities opposite border troop detachments stationed in the

areas from Brest-Litovsk in the Belorussian SSR to Chernovitsy in the

Ukrainian SSR. Report after report described the constant arrival of new

German troops, munitions, and other supplies. Most of these movements

were conducted at night. There were also signs of greater boldness. Ger-

man officers now observed Soviet concentrations openly through field

glasses and photographed them from positions just hundreds of meters

away. The German authorities placed greater restrictions on civilians, pro-

hibiting them from using the railroads, for example. All schools were now

closed and occupied by German troops. In several areas, troops were re-

portedly confiscating cattle, grain, and other agricultural products and

shipping them to Germany. Maslennikov reported that for the first time

German authorities were stopping or delaying Soviet trains bound for

Germany. They even stopped some with exports, which were provided for

under Soviet-German trade agreements. Most of these incidents probably

occurred because there were military activities under way that the Ger-

mans did not want the Soviet train crews to see.23

On May 15 Major General Vasily A. Khomenko, chief of border troops,

Ukrainian SSR district, reported an increase in agents dispatched by hos-

tile services.24 Maslennikov reported that between May 10 and May 16

border troop detachments captured seven agents trained and dispatched

by an intelligence organ of the German high command in Berlin. On