What Stalin Knew (30 page)

May 16 the Germans sent over a group of four armed agents charged with

reporting on targets in Drogobych Oblast. According to Khomenko, ‘‘One

of the agents arrested had the mission of delivering to German intelligence

samples of gasoline and kerosene produced in the Western oblasts of the

Ukrainian SSR.’’ It would appear, then, that the Germans were continuing

to collect petroleum samples.

On May 30 Maslennikov sent Merkulov the results of the debrief-

ing of four Wehrmacht deserters. Their testimony provided additional

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THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

background on Wehrmacht deployment and force structure. While the

report noted some weaknesses in German morale, it concluded with the

comment: ‘‘In the event of a war between the USSR and Germany, the

majority of soldiers are convinced that the Germany will be victorious.’’ A

copy went personally to Marshal Zhukov.25

Soviet border troops had been working diligently to provide informa-

tion on the growing German menace since the summer of 1940. Some

academic analysts in the Russian Federation, critical of the performance

of Soviet intelligence in this pre–June 1941 period, have pointed out that it

was not until May 24, 1941, that the Chief Directorate of Border Troops of

the NKVD declared: ‘‘Concentrations of troops and work on the construc-

tion of military installations in the border zones of neighboring states

demand of us knowledge of every detail. At the present time, intelligence

must be organized by us in such a way that every incident, no matter how

insignificant it may seem, is noted and kept under continuing observa-

tion.’’ Considering the flood of information obtained from border troop

operations well before and immediately after the issuance of this directive,

the delay may have resulted as much from Soviet bureaucracy as from the

reluctance within Beria’s NKVD to issue an order that obviously took the

German threat seriously.26

In the first week of June 1941, it appeared that Beria was beginning to

accept the warnings of a German attack as reality. On June 2 Sergei A.

Goglidze, a longtime colleague of Beria’s and the special representative of

the Central Committee and Soviet government in the Moldavian SSR, re-

ported the latest from the Soviet-Romanian border area: the commander

of a Romanian border unit had ‘‘received orders from General Antonescu

to clear the mines from all roads, bridges, and sectors close to the border.

These were mines that had been laid in 1940–41. At present all bridges

have been cleared of mines and they are now starting to clear them in the

sector along the Prut River.’’ Goglidze added that ‘‘among Romanian of-

ficers there is talk of military operations by German and Romanian forces

beginning on June 8. For this purpose, large troop units have been moved

up to the border. This movement has been confirmed by two sources.’’

Furthermore, ‘‘the Romanian Ministry of the Interior has ordered local

authorities to prepare their offices for evacuation to the Romanian inte-

rior.’’ The message conveyed by the removal of the mines from roads and

bridges leading to Soviet territory seemed clear. The Germans intended to

use these facilities in their invasion of the USSR.

The same day, Beria reported to the Central Committee and the Coun-

THE BORDER TROOPS KNEW

135

cil of People’s Commissars (in other words, to Stalin) on order of battle

information from border troop detachments. Noteworthy was the identi-

fication of two army groups and two armies, one the sixteenth and the

other an army commanded by General Reichenau, in eastern Poland. Also

included was the movement of the Thirty-fifth Infantry Division from Bul-

garia to East Prussia, the presence of Hitler—accompanied by Göring and

Admiral Erich Raeder—at maneuvers by German naval forces in the Baltic

Sea, and the inspection of the Soviet border by German general officers on

May 11 and 18. The most alarming part of the report was the presence ‘‘at

many points close to the frontier of pontoons, canvas, and pneumatic

boats. The largest quantities were found along the axes of the approach to

Brest and Lvov.’’ No one could seriously argue that this equipment would

be left, exposed to the weather, until sometime in 1942 when Stalin be-

lieved that Hitler might finally attack the USSR.

Beria followed up on June 5 with a similar report: ‘‘On May 20 the

headquarters of two infantry divisions, the 313th and the 314th, Marshal

Göring’s personal regiment, and the headquarters of a tank unit were iden-

tified in Bialo-Podliaska, 40 kilometers west of Brest.’’ In an area ‘‘33 kilo-

meters northwest of Brest, pontoons and parts for 20 wooden bridges were

stored.’’ This section on the Soviet-German border contained additional

order of battle information and word that, as of May 20, Luftwaffe units

were active at some of the airfields constructed near the border. The sec-

tion on the Soviet-Romanian border reported that ‘‘parts of two German

divisions coming from Greece and Germany have been deployed along the

border. . . . 250 aircraft were seen at the airfield at Buzey, 100 kilometers

northeast of Bucharest.’’ Also, ‘‘as of June 1–5, the Romanian general staff

ordered all military personnel on leave and all reservists up to 40 years of

age to report to their units.’’ The report was sent to Stalin with a notation

that the general staff had been informed.

While still reporting on Wehrmacht movements and activities (includ-

ing the first cases of German infantry opening fire on border troops pa-

trols), Major General Khomenko and the Ukrainian border troop district

became embroiled in a controversy with the Soviet general staff that re-

flected the atmosphere of caution at the top military command levels in

Moscow. On June 9 Khomenko reported that the chiefs of Red Army for-

tified districts had received orders to occupy forward defense positions.

Maslennikov passed this information on to the general staff. On June 10

Zhukov sent this message to the Military Council of the Kiev Special Mili-

tary District (KOVO): ‘‘The chief of border troops of the NKVD, Ukrainian

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SSR, reported that the chiefs of fortified districts have received orders to

occupy forward positions. For a report to the defense commissar, inform

us of the basis for the order to the fortified districts of Kiev Special Mili-

tary District to occupy forward positions. Such action could provoke the

Germans into an armed confrontation fraught with all sorts of conse-

quences. Revoke this order immediately and report who, specifically, gave

such an unauthorized order.’’ This was followed on June 11 by a telegram

from Zhukov to the commanding general, KOVO: ‘‘The defense commissar

[Timoshenko] has ordered: 1. The zone of forward defenses will not be

occupied by field or fortified district forces without a special order. Guard-

ing of the installations will be accomplished by a system of sentries and

patrols. 2. The orders given by you on occupying forward positions are to

be immediately canceled. Check the execution of this order and report by

June 16, 1941.’’ It would appear that the order had been issued by Colonel

General Mikhail P. Kirponos, commanding the KOVO. Given the quan-

tities of intelligence available to him from the border troop detachments in

his area on the German forces opposing the KOVO, the order made sense.

The action by Timoshenko and Zhukov must have been initiated at the

request of Stalin, whose strategy was to avoid any actions that might ‘‘pro-

voke’’ the Germans. Kirponos was to die in battle attempting to lead his

forces out of a German encirclement in September 1941.

On June 12, an outpost of the Ninety-second Border Troop Detachment

at Peremyshl reported ‘‘a field telephone cable on the Soviet side of the river

San that appeared to have emerged from the river. The troops then detected

a cable with four leads running into the water at the shoreline on the

German side.’’ On the Soviet side the four leads went in four directions:

‘‘One went 400 meters and was connected with our telephone line; the

second ran for 200 meters and was fastened to the rail of a railroad track;

the third paralleled the second and was also fastened to a rail; the fourth, 80

meters in length, went to our barbed wire fence. There were also footprints

leading to the water line.’’27 The incident was reported by Lieutenant Gen-

eral Maslennikov and, according to him, was resolved by the border in-

stitute, with the Soviet side represented by Colonel Yakov O. Ageichik, chief

of staff of the Ninety-second Detachment. The representatives agreed that

the cable ran from the German side to the Soviet side. There is no informa-

tion on any further action. This case, like those of the petroleum samples,

the machinery for adapting Western railcars to the Soviet gauge, and the

camouflaged river-crossing equipment, should have made it absolutely

clear that the Germans intended to invade in the very near future.

∞∂

C H A P T E R

Proskurov Is Fired

In July 1940, a little less than a year before the

German invasion, Stalin dismissed Ivan I. Proskurov as his military intel-

ligence chief, replacing him with a man who had no intelligence experi-

ence. Stalin’s reasons have never been officially revealed and he probably

never committed them to paper in any detail. Nevertheless, several mo-

tives seem plausible.

Among the grounds Stalin certainly had was his resentment and anger

at Proskurov for his behavior at the April 1940 conference on the lessons of

the Finnish war. It didn’t take long for the story of the clash between Stalin

and Proskurov to get back to RU headquarters. One officer related:

At one of the meetings of the Politburo and the Military Council,

the problems of the Soviet-Finnish war were discussed. The unpre-

paredness of our army, the enormous losses, the disgraceful tramp-

ing around for two months in front of the Mannerheim Line, and

much else had become known to the people as a whole. Abroad they

spoke of [these problems] in a loud voice. Stalin and his coterie had

to save face. The Politburo and Military Council meeting was dedi-

cated to ensuring that this was somehow done. After a stormy debate

they decided that the reason for all our misfortunes in the Soviet-

Finnish war was the poor work of Intelligence. . . . To dump every-

thing on Intelligence was not a very original device. No government,

not a single minister of defense or commander in chief, would ever

admit his guilt in the event of a defeat.

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PROSKUROV IS FIRED

In this Stalin was also not very original. He decided to use Intel-

ligence and Lieutenant General Proskurov personally to get himself

out of the situation. Proskurov, however, would not accept the ac-

cusations directed against him. He knew that the troops had all the

necessary information on the Mannerheim Line, that the reason for

the failure lay elsewhere, and he boldly argued with Stalin, naming

the real reasons for the failure.1

Proskurov’s performance at the April conference was in keeping with

his behavior throughout his military career. One of his subordinates, Lieu-

tenant Colonel Maria I. Poliakova, who had served in the RU since 1932,

recalled that, after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, Sta-

lin and the Defense Commissariat became even more critical of RU report-

ing than usual. On one occasion Proskurov returned from a visit to the gen-

eral staff in a bad mood, exclaiming, ‘‘What do they take us for—fools? How

could this be disinformation?’’ He continued to express himself openly and

forcefully whenever the occasion required.2 Once, in May 1940, at a meet-

ing with the deputy defense commissar, Proskurov declared, ‘‘No matter

how painful it is, I must say that no other army has such disorderliness and

a low level of discipline as ours.’’3

Later that month he addressed a commission of the Defense Commis-

sariat and the Central Committee on the effects of repression. His remarks

were as forthright as ever: ‘‘The past two years have been a period of repres-

sion of alien and hostile elements in agent directorates and intelligence

organs. During these years organs of the NKVD have arrested more than

two hundred persons, replacing the entire leadership, including chiefs of

departments. During the period when I was in command in the central

apparatus alone and its subordinate units, 365 persons were dismissed for

political and various other reasons. Three hundred twenty-six new persons

were hired, the majority of whom were without intelligence training.’’4

Stalin would have found it difficult in any case to work with a subordi-

nate as regularly outspoken as Proskurov, but he must have been furious at