What Stalin Knew (34 page)

sekretno
), which were signed by the chief of the RU and disseminated to a

list of recipients established by Stalin that apparently included, apart from

Stalin himself, Molotov, Malenkov, Beria, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, and the

chief of the general staff (Meretskov until February 1, 1941, then Zhukov).

In addition to publishing disseminations, the Information Department

maintained close contact with the general staff. For example, an officer of

the Operational Directorate of the general staff, Lieutenant Colonel S. I.

Guneev, was specially designated to maintain contact with the RU, visiting

at least once each week, receiving the latest information, and entering it on

his maps. He would then brief the chief of the general staff and, afterward,

officers of the Operational Directorate. Officers from other directorates of

the general staff could also visit the RU for information updates.22

As of June 15, 1940, the RU counted seven infantry divisions and two

cavalry regiments in East Prussia and twenty infantry divisions and four

cavalry regiments in former Poland. On July 4, the RU agents and those

of the Intelligence Departments of the Western and Kiev Special Mili-

tary Districts detected 860 troop trains moving from the west to East Prus-

sia, former Poland, and Austria. Given these movements, German troop

strength in these areas was believed to be thirteen infantry divisions (two

motorized), two tank brigades, and up to 3,000 naval infantry in East

Prussia; twenty-eight infantry divisions, one tank regiment, an unidenti-

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fied tank unit, and five cavalry divisions in former Poland; and twelve to

thirteen infantry divisions in Austria.

One summary listed fifty-three to fifty-four divisions as of July 16.

NKVD Foreign Intelligence also reported ‘‘seven infantry divisions in the

Warsaw area. The movements from west to east are continuing.’’ The sum-

mary cited the foreign press and the German military attaché in Moscow

as saying that these movements were occasioned by German units return-

ing to their former barracks areas.23

On July 20, 1940, the RU sent a summary of ‘‘Events in the West,’’

signed by Golikov, to Defense Commissar Timoshenko. Its stated purpose

was to note increases in German troop strength in East Prussia and former

Poland after the movement of troops from the west. Despite varying esti-

mates of troop strength, the increases were impressive and clearly a warn-

ing that the German buildup constituted a threat to the Soviet Union.

On December 10 the RU issued a special report on the appearance in

Romania of a group of sixteen to seventeen German divisions under Gen-

eral Johannes Blaskowitz and on German intentions to create a new group

in the protectorate (former Czechoslovakia). The report predicted that the

Germans would resolve the Balkans problem in the early spring. Another

special report, dated December 14, described German plans for mobi-

lization of reservists between the ages of twenty and forty who had been

deferred for reasons such as work in the defense industry, illness, and

wounds not fully healed. The number of mobilized divisions would come

to 300,000 men. In the second half of November, the report asserted, the

Germans began the creation of three to five tank divisions, three to five air

divisions, and a significant number of antiaircraft units. The new units

were equipped with captured weapons.24

The German section of a special report, also dated December 14, on

‘‘Mobilization Measures of Contiguous Capitalist Countries’’ stated that the

German high command was doing everything it could to increase the

strength of its present eight-million-man army. Beginning in October 1940,

a supplemental mobilization had netted 1.5 million men, of whom 750,000

went to the army and the rest to defense industries. In January 1941 men

between the ages of forty and forty-five were to be called, along with those

recovering from wounds. There was also information on the creation of

twenty-five infantry, five tank, and five motorized divisions, to be com-

pleted by March 1, 1941.25

A lengthy March 11, 1941, special report on the ‘‘Direction of Devel-

opment of the German Armed Forces and Changes in Their Condition’’

GOLIKOV AND OPERATION SEA LION

155

was signed by Golikov but must have been prepared by the RU Military-

Technical and Economic Department. Its section on increases in strength

assessed the number of divisions as of September 1940 at about 228, of

which fifteen to seventeen were tank divisions and eight to ten motorized.

During the winter of 1940–41, twenty-five new infantry divisions, five new

tank divisions, and five new motorized divisions were created. In addition,

five of the existing infantry divisions were reorganized as motorized divi-

sions. Thus, as of March 1 the number of divisions in the German army

reached 263, of which 221 were infantry, 22 tank, and 20 motorized.

A chart in the report also indicated that as of September 1, 1940, a total

of 102 divisions were deployed in the ‘ West’’ (not further defined), seventy-

two in the ‘‘East,’’ twenty-two in the ‘‘Southeast,’’ and thirty in the reserve.

As of March 1, 1941, the number of divisions in the ‘ West’’ were reduced to

ninety-two, those in the ‘‘East’’ to sixty-one, while those in the ‘‘Southeast’’

had risen to sixty-two. The number carried in the reserves fell to thirteen.

Thirty-five newly created divisions were noted in the second section of the

chart but not located. These numbers and locations reinforced Stalin’s

view that England remained Hitler’s primary concern; that is why in 1940

45 percent of all German divisions were located in the ‘‘West’’ and why in

1941 40 percent were still located there. As for the ‘‘Southeast,’’ the number

of divisions deployed there rose by forty-two. This increase probably con-

firmed Stalin’s conviction that the main German axis of attack would be

south of the Pripet Marshes and into Ukraine. He was, of course, wrong.

The main German thrust came north of the Pripet.26

The March 11 report also stated that the number of German military

aircraft had nearly doubled since October 1, 1940, to 10,980. Here again

Stalin’s fixation with England is reflected. Whereas in October 1940, the

Luftwaffe carried 4,000 aircraft in the ‘ West,’’ by March 1, 1941, the num-

ber had reached 8,030. According to the March 11 report, there were only

700 German aircraft on the Soviet border on March 1, the same number as

in September 1940. The remainder of the March 11 study discussed im-

provements and modernization of aircraft, tanks, and antitank and long-

range artillery. It also concluded that the Germans had the capability to

employ chemical weapons, having acquired new chemical shells from cap-

tured Czech stocks and possessing ample protective gear for their own

troops. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this primarily technical

report is its comment on a German program for the construction of for-

tifications paralleling the Soviet frontier with the Government General.

This work began soon after the Polish defeat and the fixing of the new

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border in 1939. The report found that ‘‘despite the intensive character of

the work on fortifications . . . all are still under construction and will take at

least a year to complete.’’27

On March 20, 1941, Golikov signed a document entitled ‘‘Opinions on

the Organizational Measures and Variations of Combat Actions of the Ger-

man Army against the USSR,’’ which he distributed to the defense com-

missar, the Council of People’s Commissars (SNK), and the Central Com-

mittee of the VKP(b). Unlike the special reports from the RU that he

signed, this study was a
doklad,
a formal publication that was supposed to

represent all the information available on a specific subject. Unfortunately,

the document is highly slanted. It began: ‘
The majority of agent reports

concerning the possibility of war with the USSR in the spring of 1941 come

from Anglo-American sources, the goal of which at present is without a doubt

to worsen relations between the USSR and Germany.
’ Golikov underscored

this and other sentences (shown in italics), apparently to appeal to Sta-

lin’s suspicious, conspiratorial nature and his conviction that the Anglo-

Americans wished either to provoke a conflict between Germany and the

USSR or to make common cause with Hitler to destroy the ‘‘first socialist

state.’’ The report went on: ‘
Recently, English, American, and other sources

speak of the preparations for an alleged German invasion of the Soviet

Union.
Of all the statements received by us recently, the following deserve

attention.’’ The report then set forth sixteen numbered paragraphs con-

taining a variety of hearsay remarks and rumors from foreign military

attachés, journalists, and the foreign press. There are one or two that

vaguely resemble statements from NKGB sources Korsikanets and Star-

shina, such as, ‘‘Göring allegedly has agreed to make peace with England

and attack the USSR.’’ Eleven items sound the theme ‘‘Germany will attack

the USSR after a quick victory over England.’’ Only two reflect an Ameri-

can source, the American minister in Bucharest, who is quoted as saying,

‘‘If the Germans don’t have success in England, they will be compelled to

carry out their old plans for the seizure of Ukraine and the Caucasus.’’ He

also cites the Romanian foreign minister as trying to persuade him ‘‘to

have President Roosevelt introduce a plan for peace between the USSR

and Germany.’’ There is no way to tell where these and other quotations in

the report came from.28

The report presented three possible versions of a German invasion of

the USSR. The first was the one contained in the anonymous letter the

report says Dekanozov received on December 15, 1940. (Dekanozov actu-

ally received the letter on December 5, 1940.) One blow would come from

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157

Lublin, along the Pripet, to Kiev; the second from Romania, between Jassy

and Bukovina, along the Teterev River; and the third from East Prussia to

Memel, Villing, the Berezina River, and then along the Dniepr River to

Kiev. The letter writer’s version of a German attack bore no resemblance to

the actual Barbarossa plan.

The second version was taken from a December 1940 document pro-

duced by the Kiev Special Military District giving the deployment plans

for the Southwest Front in 1940. It described Germany’s hoped-for inva-

sion of the Ukraine, an action that would take place only after Germany

has won its struggle with England: ‘‘There would be attacks along three

axes: (a) from East Prussia into the Baltic States, . . . with Finland joining

Germany to recover lost territory; (b) through Galicia and Volyn, with

Germans supported by Ukrainians and Romanian troops also seeking to

recover lost territory.’’ This version concluded with the statement ‘‘In the

other sector, secondary attacks will be carried out for the purpose of clear-

ing the remaining territory.’’

The third version was that provided by Ariets via Alta on February 28,

1941. It called for the creation of three army groups under Marshals von

Bock, von Rundstedt, and von Leeb and directed at Leningrad, Moscow,

and Kiev. ‘‘The beginning of the attack,’’ he reported, ‘‘is provisionally set

for May 20.’’ When the invasion actually came, von Leeb commanded

Army Group North (Leningrad), von Bock Army Group Center (Moscow),

and von Rundstedt Army Group South (Kiev).

Golikov’s report went on:

Apart from these documents, according to information from other

sources, it is known that the plan for attacking the USSR will consist

of the following:

a. After the victory over England, Germany, attacking the USSR,

proposes to deliver blows from two flanks: an envelopment from the

North (they have in mind Finland) and from the Balkan peninsula.

[Leaving aside the proviso ‘‘after the victory over England,’’ this

statement bears no resemblance to Barbarossa as Ariets described it

and the Wehrmacht executed it.]

b. The director of a German commercial firm declares that the inva-

sion of the USSR will occur from Romania. For this the Germans

will build a
highway from the protectorate
[former Czechoslovakia]

through Slovakia and Hungary in order to move troops to the Soviet

frontier.
Hungary and Romania have permitted Germany to use all

their railroads for the movement of troops and have also permitted

her to build new airfields, bases for motorized units, and warehouses

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