A History of the Roman World (76 page)

2
T
HE SYRO-MACEDONIAN PACT
. The attempt of D. Magie (
JRS
, 1939, 32 ff.) to reject this pact as a fabrication of Rhodian propaganda, designed to frighten Rome, which deceived both Rome and Polybius, is not very convincing. It has been revived by R. M. Errington (
Athenaeum
, 1971, 336 ff. and
The Dawn of Empire
(1971), ch. x). In any case the report of the pact, whether it was fact or fiction, will have had the same effect on the Senate and have played the same part in precipitating Roman intervention. The pact is accepted by H. H. Schmitt,
Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Antiochus des Grossen
(1964), ch. iv (this book deals with various aspects of Antiochus’ reign, but not primarily with his relations with Rome).

3
C
HIOS AND LADE
. On the chronology of events see Walbank,
Polybius
, ii, 497 ff.

4
T
HE AETOLIAN EMBASSY
. Appian (
Mac.
, 4, 2) places the embassy in 201–200 when the Senate would have welcomed it. This is to be corrected to 202 (rather than rejected as an annalistic invention, as proposed by E. Badian,
Latomus
, 1958, 208 ff.). De Sanctis (
SR
, IV, i, 39) places the embassy before Zama, when the Senate would naturally wish to avoid eastern complications; Holleaux (
CAH
, viii, 152, n. 1) places it after Zama, in which case Philip may have derived an unwarranted hope from the Senate’s attitude. See also Livy, xxxi, 29, 4, on which see J. Briscoe,
Livy
, xxxi–xxxiii (1973), 130; he dates it to 201, but before the Rhodian and Attalid embassies.

5
T
HE PEOPLE AND WAR
, Livy (xxxi, 6 f.) places the consuls’ proposal for the declaration of war at the beginning of the consular year and then recounts a second appeal which resulted in the declaration. Mommsen pointed out that the latter occurred in the summer of 200, not in March. But the assumption that the two appeals were made in quick succession makes it difficult to explain the sudden change in the people’s feelings. De Sanctis (
SR
, IV, i, 32 n.) rightly separates the two appeals, placing one in March (as Livy), the other in midsummer (as chronology demands). See A. H. McDonald and F. W. Walbank,
JRS
, 1937, 187 ff.; E. Bickermann,
Rev. Phil.
, 1935, 171 ff. and
Cl. Ph.
, 1945, 139 f.; J. P. V. D. Balsdon,
JRS
, 1954, 37 ff. J. W. Rich,
Declaring War in the Roman Republic
(Collection Latomus, vol. 149, 1976), 73 ff. and 107 ff., sticking closer to Livy, argues that only a short interval (a month or so?) intervened between the two meetings and that there was no direct link between the war vote and the embassy to Macedon: the instructions given to the
legati
were to inform the Greeks and Philip that the Senate had passed a
senatus consultum
which set out the terms on which it was ready to remain at peace with Philip. The formal
indictio belli
was therefore not delivered by Lepidus to Philip at Abydus, but was conveyed to a Macedonian post in Illyria after Galba had crossed the Adriatic. This view, like all others (!), involves difficulties. For the question of the state of the calendar in 200
BC
see Rich, 75, n. 58.

6
A
N EMBASSY TO EGYPT
. Livy (xxxi, 2 and 18) says the embassy went in the summer of 201 to Egypt to report the defeat of Hannibal and to ask the king to remain friendly to Rome if she should be forced to fight Philip. Chronology demands that the embassy started in 200; hence an annalistic error is generally assumed, e.g. by De Sanctis (
SR
, IV, i, 23) and Holleaux (
CAH
, viii, 161, n. 1). The latter remarks: ‘It is to be observed that Hannibal’s defeat happened a year before’. But it is also to be observed that the peace was only officially concluded in that year (201). May there not be a confused reference
in Livy to an earlier embassy sent in 201 by the Senate (on the pretext of announcing Hannibal’s defeat) to ascertain the attitude of the Great Powers to one another? If the personnel of the two embassies was the same, confusion would easily arise.

7
A
THENS AND ROME: CEPHISODORUS
. The influence of Athens on Roman policy has been variously assessed. The view of E. Bickermann (
Rev. Phil.
, 1936, 59 ff., 161 ff.; cf. also D. Magie,
Roman Rule in Asia Minor
(1950), 744 ff.) that the Peace of Phoenice was a
koine eirene
which included Athens and that therefore Philip’s subsequent attack on Athens involved Rome in a legal obligation to aid Athens since Rome had guaranteed the security of all the signatories, has been rejected by J. A. O. Larsen (
Cl. Phil.
, 1937, 15 ff.) and by McDonald and Walbank (
JRS
, 1937, 180 ff.). The view in the Livian tradition (e.g. Livy, xxxi, i, 10) that Athens appealed directly to Rome for help
before
the summer of 200 (which De Sanctis attempted to defend against the criticism of Holleaux) may be rejected: see F.W. Walbank,
Philip V
, 311 ff. In any case such an appeal would not have affected the legal aspect of Roman diplomacy, though it might have influenced Roman sentiment. Further light, however, has been thrown upon an Athenian appeal
during
the summer of 200 by the publication of a decree in honour of the Athenian statesman and ambassador, Cephisodorus (see B. D. Meritt,
Hesperia
, 1936, 419 ff. and A. H. McDonald,
JRS
1937, 198.; cf. Pausanias, i, 36, 5). If Cephisodorus reached Rome just before the second meeting of the Comitia (McDonald, who originally placed the arrival after, now agrees that it was before: contrast
JRS
, 1963, 189 with
JRS
, 1937, 198), his appeal, while not affecting the legal aspect of Rome’s procedure, would have afforded the Senate an additional argument with which to persuade the people to declare war; at the same time it would help to explain the impression which the Athenian appeal made on the later annalistic tradition.

8
S
OCII ET AMICI
. On these see Matthaei,
Cl. Qu.
, 1907, 182 ff.; A. Heuss, ‘Die Volkerrechtlichen Grundlagen der römischen Aussenpolitik in republikanischer Zeit’,
Klio
, Beiheft 31 (1933); T. Frank,
Roman Imperialism
(1914), 147 ff., 160, n. 19 and
Cl. Phil.
, iv, 122; W. Dahlheim,
Struktur und Entwicklung des röm. Volkerrechts im dr. und zweit. Jahrhund. v. Chr.
(1968), 248 ff. E. Badian (
Foreign Clientelae
(1958), 69), however, thinks that the term
socius et amicus
may be older than the second century, and stresses (68) the growing influence of the concept of
clientela
on the earlier idea of
amicitia
‘until the Romans could no longer imagine the co-existence of genuinely equal states: her
amici
could only be her clients’. Rome was gradually extending her diplomatic categories.
    For the view that Pergamum was an ally, not merely an
amicus
of Rome see J. A. O. Larsen,
Cl. Phil.
, 1937, 17. The early history of Rome’s relations with Rhodes is uncertain: Polybius (xxx, 5, 6) notes that in 167
BC
they had been in political association for nearly 140 years, i.e. since
c.
306. Holleaux, however, argued that Polybius’ text should be emended to ‘40’ and that relations began only at the end of the third century. This view is criticized at length by H. H. Schmitt,
Rom und Rhodos
(1957; on which cf. A. H. McDonald,
JRS
, 1958, 184 ff. and P. M. Fraser,
Cl. Rev.
, 1959, 64 ff.). Even if formal
amicitia
had not existed since 306, some friendly contacts may have been made before
c.
200, but certainly there was no treaty (
foedus
), while
amicitia
, as Heuss has shown, should be interpreted in a looser way than Holleaux had postulated. The relations of Rome and Rhodes in the second century are also examined by E. S. Gruen,
Cl. Qu.
, 1978, 58 ff.

9
M
ILITARY IMPERIALISM
. This was the view of Wilamowitz and of De Sanctis (
SR
, IV, i, 26) who made Scipio Africanus the prime mover. It has been revived more recently by E. Will (
Hist. pol. du monde hellen.
, ii, 116 ff.), who however makes Sulpicius Galba, not Scipio, the villain. But see T. Frank,
Roman Imperialism
, ch. xiv and
Amer. Hist. Review
, 1912/13, xviii, 233 ff. and De Sanctis, 26, n. 58.

10 P
HILHELLENIC POLITICS
. See G. Colin,
Rome et la Grèce de 200 à 146 av. J. C.
(1905); T. Frank,
Roman Imperialism
, ch. viii. Criticism by Holleaux,
CAH
, viii, 158 f.; E. Badian,
Titus Quinctius Flamininus
(1970).

11
F
EAR OF PHILIP AND/OR ANTIOCHUS
. It has often been said, e.g. by Mommsen, that Rome’s desire for quiet neighbours was a cause of the war, yet Mommsen himself admits that Philip was not a real danger to Rome. However, others have judged differently: thus R. M. Errington (
The Dawn of Empire
(1971), ch. x and
Athenaeum
1971, 338 ff.), who rejects the Syro-Macedonian pact, has emphasized alleged activity of Philip against some Illyrian territory and supposes that senatorial distrust or fear of Philip was the basic cause of the war.
    The relevance of Illyria is doubtful. At the conference of Nicaea in November 198 Flamininus ordered Philip to ‘hand over to the Romans those parts of Illyria of which he had become possessed since the Peace of Epirus’, i.e the Peace of Phoenice in 205 (Polybius, xvii, 1, 14; cf. Livy, xxxii, 33, 3). These places probably did not include the territory of the Parthini nor were they within the Roman protectorate (as Briscoe,
Livy, xxxi–xxxiii
, 54 f. argues). Rather, they will have been lands which had no previous connection with Rome (cf. Walbank,
Polybius
, ii, 551). There is no reference to encroachment in Illyria in the Roman ultimatum to Philip in 200, while attempts to find references to such places in the annalistic tradition are not conclusive (e.g. they need not (
pace
Briscoe, loc. cit.) be among the
socii
in Livy, xxx, 26, 2; cf. xxx, 42, 5; xxxi, 1, 9). The importance of Illyria in general has also been stressed by Badian: senators who knew Greece would realize that ‘Illyria would only be safe when Macedon had been humbled’ (
Foreign Clientelae
(1958), 66). Rome’s ultimatum was designed to this end, which could be achieved either peacefully if Philip accepted or by war if Philip rejected it. Without legal justification Rome extended her traditional practice, took her new Greek ‘friends’ under her protection, and delivered the ultimatum on their behalf, but in order to serve her own purpose which was conditioned by fear and hatred of Philip.
    Others prefer to stress fear of Antiochus (in combination with Philip) and accept the attractive theory of Holleaux, expounded in
Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au iii e siècle avant J.-C.
(
273–205
) (1921) and in
CAH
, viii, 156 ff. (Holleaux’s papers are collected in
Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecques
, vols i–v (1938–57); see especially vol. iv,
Rome, la Macédoine et l’Orient grecque
). Holleaux argued that the effective cause of the war was the Senate’s sudden realization of this joint threat which was revealed when the Pergamene and Rhodian envoys reported the kings’ pact at Rome. Philip’s action in rebuilding his fleet (on this threat see G. T. Griffith,
Cambr. Hist. J.
, 1935), with which he had gained Caria and the Rhodian Peraea and defeated the Rhodians at Lade, might well seem a direct threat to Rome, now that he was backed by Antiochus, and the possibility of a Syro-Macedonian invasion of Italy might appear foreshadowed. A. Passerini (
Athenaeum
, 1931, 542 ff.), who attempted to refute Holleaux’s theory, with less plausibility maintained that the Rhodian embassy emphasized the danger of Philip’s supposed intrigues with Carthage. The suddenness with which the Senate changed from an abrupt refusal of the good opportunity to intervene in Greece offered by the Aetolian embassy of 202 to an almost feverish effort to precipitate war two years later suggests the emergence of a critical new factor, and that is best explained as knowledge of the pact and fear of its implication.
    The Romans will have had a further grievance against Philip,
if
he had allowed Macedonian troops to support Hannibal in the battle of Zama as recorded by Livy (e.g. xxx, 33, 5; xxxi, 1, 9). These men however do not appear in Livy’s description of the battle itself, nor in that by Polybius (e.g. at xv, 11, 1). The tradition is supported by J. P. V. D. Balsdon,
JRS
, 1954, 34 f. and by J. Briscoe,
Livy xxxi–xxxiii
(1973), 55: Balsdon
suggests that the
Macedonum legio
were mercenaries who were present in Carthage in 202 but did not take part in the battle. However, the story is likely to have been invented by Roman annalists who wanted to show that Rome’s hostile attitude to Philip in 201 was justified on account of his earlier alleged support of Hannibal.

12
C
AUSES OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR
. Many suggested causes have been discussed above, but three recent general surveys may be mentioned here: B. Ferro,
Le origini della II guerra macedonica
(1960; on which see A. H. McDonald,
JRS
, 1963, 187 ff.); J. Briscoe,
Commentary on Livy xxxi–xxxiii
(1973), 36 ff. and R. Werner,
ANRW
, I, i, 501 ff. (with some preliminary discussion of imperialism in general; cf. L. Raditsa, ibid., 564 ff.); Briscoe naturally concentrates on the Livian tradition concerning Rome and Macedon in the years 205–200, which was severely attacked by Holleaux but has more recently found a champion in J. P. V. D. Balsdon (
JRS
, 1954, 30 ff.) who argues for its general reliability, but E. Badian (
Foreign Clientelae
, 62 ff.) has not been persuaded in general. Despite some weaknesses in it, Holleaux’s thesis is regarded as still the most satisfactory by F. W. Walbank in a valuable survey, ‘Polybius and Rome’s Eastern Policy’,
JRS
, 1963, 1 ff. In general Polybius, as expounded by Walbank, regarded Roman imperialism as the result of ‘natural’ ambition, sharing the common Greek idea that it is a natural tendency of imperial states to expand. This, combined with his belief in the intrusive activity of Tyche (Fortune, Chance, Providence?) sometimes led him to conclusions which conflicted with his rational analysis of motives and causes; when conflict arises we should follow Polybius’ detailed analyses rather than be misled by his superimposition of a general pattern which may be further from the truth. Cf. Walbank,
Polybius
(1972), 164 ff. and ‘Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio’,
JRS
, 1965, 1 ff.