Authors: Benjamin Weiser
Tags: #History, #Europe, #Germany, #World, #True Crime, #Espionage
A Secret Life (34 page)
In November, the KOK met to discuss the plans and a separate set of directives from the Interior Ministry. During the meeting, Interior Minister Miroslaw Milewski took a hard line, indicating that his goal was nothing less than the broad internment of activists, the establishment of special courts to punish violators of the crackdown, and the suspension of all civil rights. Milewski said he wanted direct assistance from the army in confronting striking workers. Kuklinski and some of his colleagues on the General Staff said Milewski’s proposal was unacceptable.
The KOK reached no final decision on the plans, but recommended that the Defense and Interior Ministries work with other civilian ministries that controlled the country’s communications, power, and transportation. The KOK concluded―correctly, in Kuklinski’s view―that imposing martial law inevitably would lead to Soviet armed intervention.
During a meeting of senior officers in Skalski’s office, Kuklinski said the army should resist Soviet intervention, and he suggested the Polish government not broadcast news, such as reports of sabotage by the Polish opposition, that could give Moscow a pretext to invade. But there was little support for his position.
On November 25, the CIA sent President Carter another “Alert” memorandum, stating, “The Polish leadership is facing the gravest challenge to its authority since the strikes on the Baltic Coast ended in August,” adding that “the present situation moves us closer to coercive measures by the regime or possibly a Soviet military invasion.”
Three days later, Robert M. Gates, the new national intelligence officer responsible for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, wrote to Turner that “the situation in Poland is intolerable to the Soviet Union.” Even without new demands by Solidarity, Gates said, “I believe the Soviets cannot and will not settle for the status quo.”
Inside the CIA’s Soviet Division, there was concern that in the event of an invasion or martial law, Kuklinski would be unable to drive freely about Warsaw, which would make it much harder for him to communicate with the agency. The CIA’s technical experts had been working on a project known as Discus, a sophisticated communications device that would allow Kuklinski to transmit short encrypted text messages to Warsaw Station. It was almost ready for deployment.
The agency, meanwhile, prepared a special note for Kuklinski. The information he had provided on the development of martial-law plans “was of outstanding intelligence significance,” it said. “We limited the dissemination to the President and several select members of the Department of Defense.”
The agency posed several follow-up questions: Where had the martial-law plans originated? Who, besides the officers working on the plans, were aware of them? Was there any dissent? Did Moscow know about the plans? Was it aware of the attitudes of Polish soldiers that might affect Soviet planning with respect to possible intervention?
“We do not want you to even attempt to answer them if you cannot do so securely,” the CIA wrote.
On Saturday, November 29, as Kuklinski was preparing to leave with the rest of the Polish delegation to the defense ministers committee meeting in Bucharest, he learned that two officers―Colonel Franciszek Puchala, who led the combat-readiness department, and General Tadeusz Hupalowski, the first deputy chief of staff―were being sent urgently and confidentially to Moscow. From quiet discussions with his superiors, Kuklinski gleaned that their trip was related to Moscow’s preparations for an invasion. The rest of that day and on Sunday, Kuklinski picked up more information, although some of it was impossible to verify. One rumor was that Defense Minister Jaruzelski, in talks with the Soviets, was resisting Moscow’s plans. Jaruzelski was said to be upset that Moscow wanted Polish troops to remain in their barracks as the invasion began, and that East German troops would be included in the intervention.
To Kuklinski, it seemed unlikely that Jaruzelski could summon the courage to resist the Soviets. Jaruzelski had recently taken to closeting himself in his office, locking his doors and even shutting out his closest advisers. He was said to be so paralyzed by the crisis that he was not even going to attend the meeting of defense ministers in Bucharest and was sending General Eugeniusz Molczyk, a pro-Soviet hard-liner, instead.
Kuklinski had been assigned to write the speeches that Jaruzelski (now Molczyk) would be delivering at the meeting, and he decided to visit Jaruzelski, on the pretense that he needed approval of the speech drafts. If he sensed that Jaruzelski really was objecting to Moscow’s plans, Kuklinski could try to reinforce his resistance and even suggest Jaruzelski quietly enlist the United States in a diplomatic solution. It was a highly risky, even desperate step. Kuklinski had his driver take him to Jaruzelski’s compound on Klonowa Street. When he arrived, a guard who knew Kuklinski told him, “The minister is not in his office.” The guard smiled, and as he left, Kuklinski suspected that Jaruzelski was indeed behind the closed door, but was not seeing anybody.
At the airport the next morning, December 1, as Kuklinski waited for the plane to Bucharest, he encountered Hupalowski and Puchala, the two General Staff officers being sent on the secret mission to Moscow. He took Puchala aside and quizzed him. Puchala said he had been asked to bring back certain documents from the Soviet General Staff, although he was uncertain about the details. Both men agreed to talk again when they returned.
The bad weather over Eastern Europe continued to prevent U.S. spy satellites from tracking Soviet troop movements. But the East German-Polish border had been closed, and there was evidence that Soviet troops on the Polish border were on higher stages of alert. On December 2, Turner sent President Carter another “Alert” memo.
“I believe the Soviets are readying their forces for military intervention in Poland,” Turner said in a cover note. “We do not know, however, whether they have made a decision to intervene, or are still attempting to find a political solution.”
Brzezinski, meanwhile, urged Carter to send Brezhnev an unambiguous warning against intervention. At noon on Wednesday, December 3, Brzezinski met with Turner, Muskie, and Brown. All agreed the president should issue public and private warnings to Moscow. Brzezinski dictated the draft of the private warning that would be sent under President Carter’s name on the “hot line,” the special link between the White House and the Kremlin. The United States did not wish to exploit the events in Poland, the message said, nor did it seek to threaten the Soviet Union’s legitimate security interests in that region.
“I want you to know that our only interest,” the message said, “is in the preservation of peace in Central Europe, in the context of which the Polish government and Polish people can resolve their internal difficulties. At the same time, I have to state our relationship would be most adversely affected if force was used to impose a solution upon the Polish nation.”
The hot-line message was transmitted to Moscow, and at 4:21 P.M., Washington received confirmation of its receipt. President Carter issued a public warning that “foreign military intervention in Poland would have most negative consequences for East-West relations in general and U.S.-Soviet relations in particular.”
Meanwhile, that same Wednesday morning, after the conclusion of meetings of the Defense Ministers Committee, Kuklinski was at the Bucharest airport preparing to fly back to Warsaw. Typically, the Warsaw Pact delegations left airports in the order of the Russian alphabet, which placed Poland after Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany. But that day, Kulikov told the Polish delegates that they should leave first, saying, “You have serious business at home.”
At the Warsaw military airport, as the returning Polish delegation was being greeted, Kuklinski was approached by General Waclaw Szklarski, his direct superior, who briefed him on the events of the past few days. Szklarski confirmed what Kuklinski had feared: A Soviet invasion was imminent. Hupalowski and Puchala had returned from Moscow with documents showing the intervention was to be carried out under the guise of a military exercise called “Soyuz 80.” Szklarski offered many details, including the number of divisions and countries involved. He said the General Staff had analyzed the plans and was convinced that Moscow had misread the situation, and that an invasion would be counterproductive. The previous day, Siwicki, encouraged by his deputies, had tried to persuade Jaruzelski to renew talks with Moscow aimed at forestalling intervention and to say that Poland was prepared to impose martial law.
But Jaruzelski refused even to entertain any such discussions, Szklarski said. He insisted that Kuklinski keep the information confidential.
When Kuklinski arrived at the General Staff that night, he found Puchala and asked him what had occurred in Moscow. Puchala was evasive at first, then began to laugh nervously. Kuklinski confronted him, reminding him angrily that they had agreed to exchange information. Kuklinski made it clear that he already knew many details.
Puchala said that Hupalowski had met privately with Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet General Staff, while Puchala had been relegated to meetings with lesser officers, who were developing Soyuz 80 as a cover for the action. No one used the word “invasion,” Puchala said, only “exercise.”
Kuklinski had his driver take him home and then drove his own car to a mailbox, where he drew a half circle in white chalk to signal that he would be leaving a message the following night, December 4.
The night of the exchange, Kuklinski printed a message to the CIA, filling both sides of one sheet of paper and one side of another.
“
Bardzo pilne
,” he began. “Very urgent.”
Bardzo pilne
,” he began. “Very urgent.”
Dear Friends,On the instruction of Defense Minister Jaruzelski, Gen.Hupalowski and Col. Puchala agreed in the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces in Moscow to a plan for introducing (under the pretext of exercises) the troops of the Soviet Army, the Army of East Germany and the Czech Army to Poland. From prepared plans which were presented to them for viewing and partial copying, it is apparent that three armies consisting of 15 Soviet Army divisions, one army comprised of two Czech divisions and the staff of one army and one division from East Germany are to be sent to Poland. Altogether, the group of intervening forces in the first phase will consist of eighteen divisions. An additional four divisions are to be attached to the armies of Czechoslovakia and East Germany (the Polish 5th and 11th Armored and the 4th and 12th Mechanized Divisions). Readiness to cross the Polish borders has been set for 8 December.At the present time, representatives of the “fraternal armies” in civilian disguise are carrying out reconnaissance of marching routes, training areas and regions of future actions. The Czechs and East Germans are to operate in the Western part of the country, while the Central and eastern parts of Poland fall to the troops of the Soviet Army.The operational scenario for the intervention foresees a regroupment of troops into all main training areas of the Polish forces and the conduct of live-fire exercises there, and then, contingent on how the situation develops, the blockading of all larger and industrial cities in Poland. From laconic and imprecise statements of highly placed military figures, it appears that the political decision on this matter was made much earlier and the leadership (Kania and Jaruzelski) was not put under pressure at the present time.General Siwicki under pressure of his deputies has attempted to influence the Minister of Defense in the direction of opposing the endeavors of the allies, but that terribly trembling servant of Moscow has not even permitted discussion of this topic. At yesterday’s extraordinary meeting of the Military Council, the Minster of Defense presented assignments to military districts and branches of services commanders. The leadership of the General Staff is hurriedly working out details of implementing the plans for intervention.
Prodded by Siwicki and General Molczyk, Jaruzelski had approved “working out an alternative plan for using solely Polish forces to ‘secure internal security.’” Jaruzelski would personally present the plan to the “allies” in Moscow on Sunday, December 7, and ask that the introduction of Warsaw Pact forces be postponed “until the actions of Poland’s own forces have proven ineffective.” Kuklinski offered an excoriating picture of Jaruzelski, suggesting he was only appearing to resist Moscow’s invasion and was presenting the alternative plan because of pressure from others. Writing with great emotion, Kuklinski said that Jaruzelski was “unworthy of the name Pole” and called him “the greatest coward in this land.”
His partial buckling under pressure from Siwicki and Molczyk can only have the aim of throwing a smoke screen up against the judgment of those who could some day accuse [him] of national treason. . . .In conclusion, with bitterness, I must report that as much as a small group of generals and officers of the Polish Armed Forces privy to the planning of the intervention are dispirited and crushed, there hasn’t even been thought of military opposition by Polish forces to the military action of the Warsaw Pact. There are even statements that the very presence of such a large force on Polish territory can lead to increased calm.
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