A Secret Life (35 page)

Read A Secret Life Online

Authors: Benjamin Weiser

Tags: #History, #Europe, #Germany, #World, #True Crime, #Espionage

BOOK: A Secret Life
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Kuklinski folded his letter repeatedly, wrapped it inside cellophane, and taped it shut. Snow had been falling for several hours, and Kuklinski began a wandering drive through the city. At about 10:00 P.M. he reached the designated site beneath the streetlight on the Wislostrada and skidded the car into the curb. He got out and dropped the package on the ground.
 
 
 
 
That morning on his way to work, Ted Gilbertson spotted the chalk mark. Knowing that any message from Gull would be critical, he checked the list of dead-drop sites in Warsaw Station. He was not pleased to see that the Wislostrada was next on the list. The four-lane highway lacked a shoulder, and there was nowhere to park. With the streetlights on and the trees bare, the site was too exposed for a wintertime exchange. The Wislostrada had been envisaged for summer use, when an officer could park elsewhere and approach on foot. But the CIA had depleted suitable operational sites with Gull faster than expected.
 
That night, Gilbertson left work at the usual time, around 5:00 P.M., and headed home. There, he waved courteously to the militiamen who stood nearby, guarding the Iranian Embassy and the American ambassador’s residence. Divorced and single, Gilbertson ate his habitual meager supper, peanut butter on bread and a beer. Around 8:00 P.M., he put on a tan parka and went outside again. He drove into the city center and began his own journey to be certain he was not being followed. Gilbertson had let his hair grow longer so that it would cover a small earpiece he wore to monitor the scratchy sounds of SB officers communicating on their radios. He also listened for SB transmissions on the FM band of his car radio. Despite his precautions, he felt conspicuous. With the snow falling fast, it seemed that only the diplomats and police were out on the empty streets.
 
As the gleaming lights of the Wislostrada loomed in the distance, Gilbertson drove slowly, passing a boat club, the park, and the monument for fallen heroes. A police car passed in the opposite direction and disappeared. Gilbertson kept his defroster on high to melt the snow on his windshield. As he made the final turn onto the boulevard, he began counting lampposts, knowing where he had to stop.
 
He had timed his arrival for about 10:30 P.M., estimating that the snow would be no more than a few inches deep. But as he approached the site, Gilbertson was dismayed to see a snowplow chugging ahead of him, sweeping mounds of snow off the street and onto the curb, where the package was supposed to be. Gilbertson realized that whatever he was searching for―an old yogurt container, a glove, a piece of crumpled foil―would be almost impossible to find. As the spot came into view, Gilbertson, as Kuklinski had before him, braked and skidded into the snowbank as if he had lost control. Seeing no cars approaching, he pushed open the door and stepped outside. His boots sank into the snow. He nervously checked his watch: 10:32 P.M. He walked around to the other side of the car and pretended to fiddle with something on the windshield. Then he knelt down and began to search under the streetlamp, pushing clumps of snow to the side as he dug. Soon he had made a hole about a foot deep and had found nothing. He plunged his arms deeper into the snow.
 
Five minutes passed. The snow was soaking through Gilbertson’s pants, and his chest was matted with sweat. He scooped up clumps of snow, crushing them between his fingers, while watching for passing cars. W
here is it?
he muttered, swearing under his breath. He continued to dig, beginning to despair. Finally, he felt something crinkle in his grasp and pulled out a snow-covered cellophane package. He got back into his Fiat, skidded out of the snowbank, and began to drive down the Wislostrada. Suddenly he thought,
I’d better make sure.
Steering awkwardly with his knees, he fumbled with the package until he could unwrap it and found the tightly folded sheets inside. He recognized Gull’s distinctive handwriting. Exhilarated, he wanted to drive to the embassy and cable Washington immediately, but he returned home and poured a glass of vodka. He turned off the lights and slipped into bed with a Polish-English dictionary and the letter attached to a clipboard. As a sharp wind rattled the windowpane and the snow continued to fall, Gilbertson pulled a large wool blanket over his head, switched on a flashlight, and began to translate the message.
 
Gilbertson took several hours to prepare a rough summary of the text, then placed the letter under his pillow. The next morning, he arrived at the embassy at about nine o’clock and reported immediately to Station Chief Tom Ryan. Ambassador Francis J. Meehan would be briefed. Another officer used a Selectric typewriter to type the Polish text of the message, along with a rough translation, onto a special form. A communications officer then scanned the form and cabled it to Langley. It was not yet dawn in Washington. The cable asked that the CIA officer for the Polish desk be summoned from home immediately. Less than two hours later, a cable was sent to Warsaw Station:
 
 
Report is of critical importance and due [to] your prompt handling, translated version was in the hands of DDO and DCI [Director of Central Intelligence] by opening of business. It will be disseminated to the President and his closest advisers this morning. . . .
 
Please stress to ambassador that, within the Department, only Secretary of State will receive report.
 
 
 
At Langley, a summary was prepared of Kuklinski’s message, which was to be hand-carried to the White House. It said:
 
 
The following information was received from a long-time reliable source who has proven access to it. The date of the information is 4 December.
 
Moscow has developed a plan for intervention in Poland which was delivered to the Polish General Staff and agreed to by Polish military leaders. The intervention is to take place under the pretext of joint Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak exercises in Poland. Readiness to cross the Polish frontiers was set for 8 December.
 
 
 
The memo recounted Gull’s description of the invasion plans, reconnaissance missions, live-fire exercises, and blockades of Polish cities. Some sentences were lifted almost verbatim from Kuklinski’s message. “The political decision to intervene was evidently taken some time ago, and there appears to have been no resistance to it from Party Leader Kania and Polish Defense Minister Jaruzelski,” the memo said.
 
At 9:10 A.M. on Friday, December 5, Brzezinski received a phone call from Turner, who told him that a reliable source had said “18 Soviet divisions will enter Poland Monday morning.”
 
About five minutes later, Brzezinski went to see President Carter, who was scheduled to go to Camp David for the weekend. The president said he would return on Sunday morning to lead a special session of the National Security Council on the crisis.
 
On Saturday, at 4:00 P.M., Brzezinski and Turner briefed senior White House advisers on the new information. “Stan Turner gave us his assessment,” Brzezinski later wrote in his diary. “It is the Agency conclusion that the Soviets will be ready to go within 48 hours.” Turner also reported that the Poles would “crack down heavily on Solidarity” and that “there will be bloodshed.”
 
Carter met with Brzezinski, Turner, Muskie, and Brown in the Cabinet Room on Sunday morning, December 7. Brzezinski said he believed Polish security forces would begin rounding up Solidarity leaders late that night, when the activists would least expect it, as a way of eliminating any possibility of organized resistance. Soviet troops would enter the country throughout the night and early Monday morning, catching the country off guard.
 
Carter agreed that the White House should immediately issue a public statement, which would deny Moscow the element of surprise and alert the Poles to the threat.
 
“Preparations for a possible Soviet intervention in Poland appear to have been completed,” the president’s statement said. “It is our hope that no such intervention will take place.” There would be “very adverse consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations of a Soviet military intervention in Poland.”
 
Separate messages were sent to the leaders of Germany, France, Britain, Canada, Italy, Australia, and Japan as well as to the U.N. secretary-general. Brzezinski briefed the press and congressional leaders and passed word to Polish dissidents so that they could hide. He also spoke for ten minutes by phone with Pope John Paul II, a Pole and the former bishop of Krakow.
 
Brzezinski and other administration advisers waited tensely for news throughout the night and into Monday morning. Soviet troops did not cross the border.
 
 
 
 
After leaving the package in the snow, Kuklinski continued to gather intelligence about Moscow’s plans. One colonel told him a delegation of East German generals was traveling through western Pomerania, the area near Poland’s German border. Another described a similar group of Czech generals traveling in the Silesian military district, near the Czech border. A Polish general reported he was to meet several Soviet generals in eastern Poland. A fourth officer said he had just returned from Minsk, where he had accompanied a number of Soviet generals inspecting airfields in central Poland.
 
General Szklarski told Kuklinski that Jaruzelski had ordered the General Staff to put aside all other work and begin preparations for “internal peace,” as Jaruzelski had described the martial-law crackdown.
 
On Monday, December 8, General Skalski called Kuklinski and other top aides into his office and said Jaruzelski and Kania had flown to Moscow over the weekend to present Jaruzelski’s alternative plan to liquidate Solidarity.
 
Skalski gave a briefing about what Jaruzelski had said. Jaruzelski had been convinced that Moscow was now persuaded that Poland had to solve its own problems. “Our country, in view of its importance within the Warsaw Pact, cannot allow itself to be devoured by the enemy,” Jaruzelski said. “We ourselves, with the moral, political, and economic support of our allies, will resolve the difficulties.”
 
Jaruzelski also said he believed that a new wave of young soldiers, who not long ago had participated in the Solidarity strikes and more recently had been drafted into the army, “have been exposed to military discipline.” One of the main tasks, Jaruzelski said, was to isolate “the Solidarity leaders from the main body of workers, bringing their hypocrisy to light. The period of humiliating the government will be brought to a close. The law will restrain the outbreak of strikes. . . . A stricter course is needed.”
 
Jaruzelski added: “The No. 1 matter for the armed forces is to maintain high combat readiness, political and moral unity, and fitness for political combat. The most critical period has passed. We are being hit, but we are not defeated. The Polish Armed Forces are in good condition. This is the result of good work in the past years.” Jaruzelski was proposing the liquidation of Solidarity as an alternative to a Soviet invasion.
 
Jaruzelski had admonished Siwicki to treat his description of the summit as confidential and summarize it in only the most general terms for the lower ranks.
 
 
 
 
On that same Monday, December 8, Warsaw Station received a cable from Langley saying that the “weekend’s high meetings here, and subsequent White House statements on Polish situation, were prompted by report from Gull.” The CIA said it was preparing a note for Kuklinski expressing its appreciation for his work.
 
Warsaw Station cabled headquarters: “It is difficult to find words to adequately thank Gull for his efforts, dedication, and sense of duty.”
 
 
 
Over the next two weeks, Kuklinski, battling exhaustion and a severe cold, fell ill with the flu. Still, he showed up at work, collecting and photographing new documents, trying to keep abreast of the latest news. On December 14, one week before the next exchange, he started a long letter to the CIA, offering more details about the plans for invasion and the debate within the General Staff over what the Polish Army would do if ordered to help put down Solidarity. Kuklinski believed Polish troops would resist:
 
 
In the final analysis, nevertheless, the troops will not permit a massacre of the nation. They will choose death rather than to live in disgrace on their knees. . . . It would seem that both the Soviet leadership and the traitors from the Polish United Workers Party, with Jaruzelski in the forefront, are aware of this. And the fact that, in the planned intervention, it is proposed to deploy five armies, which will be commanded by Russians, Czechs, and Germans, with the Poles being excluded, testifies to this emphatically. . . .
 
It is not possible to exaggerate the value of sharp U.S.A. reactions to threats made to Poland. Many Poles are well aware of this, but especially those who may have been called up to defend the nation, and are not in position to fulfill this most sacred obligation because of the power of the enemy, and also because of the duplicity contributed to it by our own traitors.
 
 

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