A Stillness at Appomattox (151 page)

For
a
few
days
the
army
rested
in
this
camp.
Early
was not
far
away,
but
his
army
had
been
beaten
twice
in
the
past month
and
his
cavalry
had
been
thoroughly
routed
within the
week,
and
the
Yankees
seem
to
have
assumed
that
there was
not
much
fight
left
in
him—a
risky
assumption
to
make where
Jubal
Early
was
concerned,
for
he
was
as
pugnacious
a
man
as
ever
wore
Rebel
gray.
And
since
there
was
a
three-way
disagreement
between
Grant,
Sheridan,
and
the
War Department
as
to
what
Sheridan
ought
to
do
next,
Sheridan suspended
the
order
transferring
the
VI
Corps
to
Petersburg, put
Wright
in
temporary
command
of
the
army,
and
went off
to
Washington
for
consultation.
The
situation
of
the
rival armies
seemed
stable,
and
nothing
much
was
apt
to
happen in
his
absence.
¹²

Actually,
the
situation
was
highly
unstable,
principally
because
the
destroying
Yankee
host
had
done
its
job
so
thoroughly.
Early
had
perhaps
15,000
men
with
him,
and
the one
thing
these
men
could
not
do
was
stay
where
they
were. The
Valley
had
been
so
completely
devastated
that
they could
get
no
supplies
of
any
kind
from
the
surrounding
country.
Every
mouthful
of
food
for
man
and
beast
had
to
come up
by
wagon
train,
via
Staunton
and
Waynesboro,
and
it was
a
hard
pull
for
the
worn-out
Confederate
transportation system.
Early
could
either
leave
the
Valley
altogether,
ceding
the
whole
territory
to
the
Yankees
for
the
rest
of
the
war —or
he
could
attack.

To
attack
an
army
whose
combat
strength
was
twice
his own
would
be,
of
course,
to
take
fantastic
risks.
But
the
Confederate
situation
was
desperate,
and
if
fantastic
risks
were not
taken
the
war
was
as
good
as
lost.
Early
appears
to
have figured
that
Sheridan's
force
was
not
quite
as
solid
as
it
looked anyway.
The
VI
Corps
was
very
good,
but
Confederate
intelligence
put
a
much
lower
estimate
on
the
other
two
corps. Also,
a
good
part
of
Sheridan's
strength
was
in
his
cavalry, which
did
not
ordinarily
cut
much
of
a
figure
in
an
infantry battle.
Altogether,
the
odds
could
be
worse.

In
addition,
there
were
two
other
encouraging
factors.
One was
the
obvious
fact
that
nobody
on
the
Federal
side
had
any notion
that
the
Confederates
might
take
the
offensive.
The other
was
the
position
of
the
Union
army.

Cedar
Creek
came
down
from
the
northwest
to
join
the north
fork
of
the
Shenandoah
River,
and
the
chain
of
hills just
behind
the
creek,
on
which
the
Federals
were
camped, ran
from
northwest
to
southeast.
The
VI
Corps
was
on
the Federal
right,
roughly
a
mile
from
where
the
Valley
Pike crossed
the
creek
and
climbed
through
the
higher
ground. Next
to
it,
north
and
west
of
the
pike,
was
the
XIX
Corps. Southeast
of
the
turnpike,
anchoring
the
Union
left,
was

Crook's
corps.
It
was
in
a
good
position
to
knock
down
any force
which
tried
to
come
up
along
the
main
highway,
but there
was
open
ground
nearly
a
mile
wide
between
its
own left
and
the
point
where
creek
and
river
met.
Since
the
river just
there
lay
in
what
looked
like
an
impassable
gorge,
it seemed
unlikely
that
the
Confederates
would
be
able
to
get across
and
make
any
trouble
for
this
exposed
flank.

Unlikely,
except
to
soldiers
who
had
to
take
fantastic
risks anyway—the
desperate,
fifty-to-one
sort
of
gamble
that
led Washington
to
take
his
army
across
the
Delaware
to
attack the
Hessian
camp
at
Trenton.
To
Jubal
Early
the
exposed Federal
left
looked
like
opportunity.
He
studied
the
ground carefully,
and
it
seemed
that
an
army
corps
could
be
led along
that
impassable
gorge
if
the
man
who
led
it
was thoroughly
familiar
with
the
layout
and
did
not
mind
marching
his
entire
command
within
400
yards
of
the
Yankee
picket line.
¹⁸

To
lessen
the
risk,
Early
sent
his
cavalry
and
part
of
his
infantry
to
the
west,
thrusting
them
forward
as
if
he
planned to
attack
the
Yankee
right
flank.
He
put
some
more
men
in place
where
Wright's
and
Emory's
men
could
see
them,
and he
organized
a
third
column
to
stand
by
for
an
advance
directly
along
the
turnpike.
Then,
with
everything
ready,
he had
General
John
B.
Gordon
take
his
army
corps
down
into the
gorge
to
get
in
behind
the
Federal
left
and
open
the
attack.
It
meant
an
all-night
hike,
much
of
it
in
single
file,
and the
men
left
canteens,
cooking
utensils,
and
everything
except weapons
and
ammunition
in
camp
so
that
no
rattling
or clanking
of
equipment
would
give
them
away.