A Stillness at Appomattox (95 page)

When
they
were
left
to
themselves
the
men
in
this
particular
sector
faithfully
observed
the
rules
of
their
informal
truce. There
was
a
day
when
some
recently
conscripted
Southerner was
assigned
to
duty
down
here,
and
being
full
of
the
ideas his
officers
had
drummed
into
him
he
leveled
his
musket
and fired
at
the
first
Yankee
he
saw.
The
other
Federals
jumped into
their
holes
and
prepared
to
shoot
back,
but
the
Confederates
called
out:
"Don't
shoot—you'll
see
how
we
fix
him." Thereafter,
for
the
rest
of
the
day,
the
ardent
Southern
recruit
was
seen
pacing
back
and
forth
along
the
firing
line ignominiously
shouldering
a
fence
rail,
and
the
supposed enemies
lounged
on
the
grass,
went
for
water,
exchanged
gossip,
and
kept
a
wary
eye
open
for
officers.
⁴

But
this
was
the
exception.
Along
most
of
the
line
the
two armies
were
playing
for
keeps,
and
it
was
considered
certain death
to
expose
oneself
for
more
than
a
moment.
Men
cooked, ate,
and
slept
in
the
earth,
and
when
mortars
were
fired
they ran
for
the
bombproofs,
although
they
soon
discovered
that most
of
these
did
not
offer
much
protection
against
a
direct hit
by
a
shell
of
large
caliber.
On
one
part
of
the
line
certain Pennsylvania
soldiers—time-expired
members
of
the
famous Bucktails,
mostly,
who
had
re-enlisted
in
another
regiment when
the
Bucktails
were
paid
off—found
that
it
was
higlily amusing
to
fire
ramrods
at
the
enemy,
because
of
the
peculiar whirring
noise
and
erratic
flight
of
these
iron
arrows.
Many men
had
been
killed
in
this
sector
and
there
were
discarded rifles
all
over
the
place,
so
the
supply
of
surplus
ramrods
was large
and
some
of
the
Pennsylvanians
got
so
they
could
actually
hit
people
with
them.
The
fun
was
mostly
in
the
noise, however,
for
the
ramrods
would
go
"whirling
end
over
end, and
every
way,
whipping
out
of
the
air
a
multitude
of
sharp screeches
and
cutting
sounds."
⁵

In
some
regiments
men
were
under
orders
to
fire
a
certain number
of
rounds
per
day,
regardless.
The
more
conscientious would
try
to
find
a
good
target
before
firing,
but
many
of
the men
simply
thrust
their
weapons
over
the
parapet
and
fired at
random.
⁶

There
did
not
seem
to
be
any
especial
reason
why
this could
not
go
on
forever.
Not
even
the
major
generals
supposed
any
longer
that
Petersburg
could
be
taken
by
assault, and
it
had
become
equally
obvious
that
whatever
else
an army
under
Grant
might
do,
it
was
not
going
to
retreat.
The strategy
by
which
Grant
had
hoped
to
apply
pressure
elsewhere
so
as
to
compel
Lee
to
retreat
had
fizzled
out,
so
there was
nothing
for
the
Army
of
the
Potomac
to
do
but
stay where
it
was,
stand
the
hammering,
and
hope
for
the
best.

Sheridan
and
his
cavalry
had
got
nowhere
with
the
plan
to team
up
with
Hunter's
forces
at
Charlottesville.
Wade
Hampton
had
gone
in
hot
pursuit
with
Confederate
cavalry,
and
he and
Sheridan
collided
near
Trevilian
Station
on
the
Virginia Central
Railroad
and
had
a
desperate
fight.
Each
general
said afterward
that
he
had
beaten
the
other,
but
Sheridan
had gone
no
farther
west.
He
said
this
was
because
he
had
learned that
Hunter
was
nowhere
near
Charlottesville
and
never would
be,
so
that
it
was
useless
to
go
on.
However
that
might have
been,
Sheridan
rode
north
and
east
in
a
wide
circle
and got
back
into
the
Union
lines.

Hunter
had
tried
to
go
to
Lynchburg
instead
of
to
Charlottesville,
and
he
had
bumped
into
a
strong
Confederate force
led
by
the
redoubtable
Jubal
Early.
Hunter
conceived that
he
did
not
have
enough
ammunition
to
carry
him
through a
serious
battle;
conceived
also,
it
may
be,
that
Early
and
his men
were
pretty
tough;
conceived
finally
that
he
had
best
retreat,
and
did
so,
fleeing
across
the
mountains
into
West
Virginia,
taking
his
command
entirely
out
of
the
war
for
several weeks
and
nullifying
this
particular
part
of
Grant's
strategy as
neatly
as
Lee
himself
could
have
wished.
His
departure left
the
Shenandoah
Valley
wide
open,
and
Early
promptly began
to
march
down
the
valley
toward
the
Potomac,
taking
a
leaf
from
the
Stonewall
Jackson
book
of
two
years
earlier.
⁷