A World at Arms (233 page)

51
Note the report of the German naval Attaché in Tokyo of 5 Jan. 1945, in “Magic Far East Summary,” No. 296 of 10 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 296, f. 8.

52
General Harry Schmidt actually commanded the 5th Amphibious Corps; Smith was brought in to provide a parallel position to Admiral Kelly Turner, the naval director of the assault. As the text makes clear, I am not entirely convinced by the defense of the navy on the bombardment issue in Morison,
US Naval Operations,
14: 72–74.

53
The account of the Iwo landing in Ise1ey and Crowl,
The U.S. Marines,
chap. 10, remains most useful. See also Costello,
Pacific War,
pp. 539–47; Craven and Cate,
Army Air Forces,
5: chap. 19; George W. Garrand and Truman R. Stobridge,
History of u.s. Marine Corps Operations in World War II
(Washington: GPO, 1971), 4: 443–738. The warships could, however, come in close because of the steep drop-off.

54
Edmund L. Castillo,
The Seabees of World War II
(New York: Random House, 1963);
Building the Navy’s Bases in World War II: History of the Bureau of Yards and Docks and the Civil Engineer Corps, 1940–1946,
2 vols. (Washington: GPO, 1947).

55
On the air–sea rescue program, see Craven and Cate,
Army Air Forces, 5: 598–607.

56
“Magic Far East Summary,” No. 405, 29 Apr. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 405.

57
See Craven and Cate, 5: 144, 609ff.

58
Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
pp. 75–76, and the sources cited there.

59
The report of 29 Mar. 1945 is quoted in “Magic Far East Summary,” No. 378, 2 Apr. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 378.

60
The report of 20 Apr. 1945 is quoted in “Magic Far East Summary,” No. 402, 26 Apr. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 402.

61
Craven and Cate,
Army Air Forces,s:
614–27, survey the initial fire raids and their impact.

62
Forrestal memorandum for Roosevelt, 2 Jan. 1945, FDRL, Map Room Box 162, Naval Aide, General A2-3. The summaries of radio intelligence in the Pacific were soon after sent regularly to the British; see NA, RG 457, SRNS-I060, f. 3.

63
For “Olympic” and “Coronet” planning, see James,
The Years of MacArthur,
pp. 765–71; Matloff,
Strategic Planning
1943–1944, pp. 535–37; Thorne,
Allies of a Kind,
chap. 25; K. Jack Bauer, “Die amerikanischen Plane für eine Landung in Japan,”
Marine-Rundschau
59 (1962), 140–47. A portion of the “Olympic” plan is printed as Appendix A in Paul Manning,
Hirohito: The War Years
(New York: Dodd Mead, 1986). See also Marc Gallicchio, “After Nagasaki: General Marshall’s Plan for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan,”
Prologue
23 (winter 1991) 396–404. One version of MacArthur’s plan for “Coronet” omitted the 10th Army but assumed vastly greater Allied participation than was in fact anticipated Games, pp. 770–71).

64
On the planning for British Commonwealth troop participation in “Coronet,” see Brooke
Diary, 9 Apr. 1945, Liddell Hart Centre, Alanbrooke Papers; Ismay to Gairdner, 29 June 1945, PRO, CAB 127/51; Chiefs of Staff 4S 423(0), “British Participation in the War

65
BAS Washington to War Office, “GO 872,” 12 June 1945, PRO, WO 106/3463. On the issue of the boundary between the theaters of Mountbatten and MacArthur, see Mountbatten to Ismay, 19 Mar. 1945, CAB 127/26. Thorne appears to me to exaggerate the friction.

66
See Combined Chiefs of Staff, “679/1, Redeployment of United States and British Forces after the Defeat of Germany,” 2 Apr. 1945, PRO, CAB 119/165, A later and more detailed schedule is in Marshall to Wilson, 16 May 1945, CAB 106/329.

67
F 2146/630/23, PRO, FO 371/46453.

68
On the internal British debates over strategy in the final stages of the war in the Pacific, see Ehrman,
Grand Strategy,
6: chap. 8; a summary in Bryant, 2: 350–54, with excerpts from the Brooke diary reflecting the impact of the forthcoming parliamentary election on the campaign in Southeast Asia. Documents in PRO, PREM 3/160/3–7.

69
James,
The Years of MacArthur,
pp. 763–65, summarizes the evidence. In later years MacArthur simply lied about his position at the time. In 1955 the U.S. Department of Defense publisl:ed a collection of the military recommendations in “The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945." See also Forrest C. Pogue,
George C. Marshall
, Vol. 4,
Statesman
1945–1959 (New York: Penguin, 1987): 15–16.

70
David M. Glantz,
August Storm: The Soviet
1945
Strategic Offensive in Manchuria
(Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, 1983), pp. 1–3. Based primarily on published Soviet sources, this is currently the best account of the campaign in Manchuria.

71
Ibid., pp. 73–79.

72
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Russo-Japanese Relations,” 18 June 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-078, f. 3, 2 July 1945, SRH-079, f. 10–1 I, 21 July 1945, SRH-085, f. 18; Japanese naval Attaché Bern to Tokyo No. 131 of 25 June 1945, SRNA 5035. The British Minister in Stockholm reported on May 12 that the Swedish Minister to Tokyo who had just returned from Japan “was immensely impressed during his journey across Siberia by the endless stream of railway transport containing troops and all kinds of war material which was rolling eastwards” (Mallet to London No. 862 of 12 May 1945, F 2874/630/23, PRO, FO 371/46453). A U.S. naval intelligence assessment of Sino-Soviet relations was so gutted in the declassification process as to suggest American reading of some Soviet radio traffic at that time (Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Sino-Soviet Relations,” 1 June 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-077).

73
See the report of the Japanese Consul in Vladivostok No. 233 of 21 June 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 103772. The other side of this was the repudiation by the Soviet Union of its prior promise to allow the United States bases for its strategic air force against Japan, a promise on the basis of which supply deliveries had already been made. This episode may eventually be illuminated by new evidence from the Soviet side; in the meantime, see Deane’s reports N 22050 and 22261 of 16 Dec. 1944 and 4 Jan. 1945, FDRL, Map Room Box 33, MR 310, Japan I, Russian Participation in the War against.

74
Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Russo-Japanese Relations,” 2 July 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-079, f. 10; Tokyo to Moscow No. 827 of 24 June 1945, SRD] 103857; Gordon,
Brothers against the Raj,
pp. 517–18, 538–41.

75
The Soviet note is printed in
New York Times,
6 Apr. 1945. For the Japanese-Soviet negotiations
preceding
the denunciation, see the American intercepts of relevant Japanese
messages in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 79936–45, 82775–76, 80397–408, 82389–90, 82442–8244247, 81973–76, 84170–71, 85256–60, 85277–96, 86131–32, 87156–57, 88455–56, 90116–21, 90592–95, 90516, 90827, 91558, 91813–15, 114209–18, 91944–49, 92124, 92704–5, 94826-29, 95665–68, 95640, 95691–93, 96515–21, 96535; Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Notes on the Crimea (Yalta) Conference,” 23 Mar. 1945, SRH-070, and “Abrogation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact,” 23 Apr. 1945, SRH-07I.

76
On Japanese-Soviet relations
after
the abrogation, see the American intercepts of Japanese messages in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 96557–61, 97356–58, 96662, 96655–61, 96767–70,96813–14, 96821, 96824–27, 98648–49, 98730–33, 112408, 100037–38, 101457–67, 101598–604, 102417–25, 103946–47, 104593–600, 105372–73, 105315, 105374, 105386; Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Russo-Japanese Relations,” 18June 1945, SRH-078, 2 July 1945, SRH-079, 14 July 1945, SRH-084.

77
Tokyo, Vice-Chief, Gen. Staff Circular 442 of 27 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 15777–80, to the military Attaché Berlin No. 203 of 8 Mar. 1945, SRA 18003, to military Attaché Lisbon, 12 Apr. 1945, SRA 17069–70.

78
See Lisbon to Tokyo No. 25 of 24 Jan. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 88708–17; Japanese military Attaché Lisbon to Tokyo No. 326 of 24 Jan. 1945, SRA 15712–13; Tokyo to Macao No. 30 of 27 Apr. 1945, SRDJ 99087; Pacific Strategic Intelligence Center, “Japanese-Portuguese Relations and the ‘Macao Problem’,” 23 May 1945, SRH-076.

79
See the Tokyo circulars to the military Attachés in Europe of 19 Jan. and 29 Mar. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 15554–60, SRA 16930–32. Cf. Japanese naval Attaché Stockholm to Tokyo No. 298 of 5 June 1945, SRNA 4943–44; Japanese naval Attaché Bern to Tokyo No. 124 of 13 June 1945, SRNA 4989–90 (I believe that a study of the work of the Japanese naval Attaché in Switzerland would make interesting reading).

80
Tokyo Circulars 852 and 870 to Berlin, 6 and 12 Dec. 1944, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 81500–3, 82283–86; a survey of the Mar. 1945 coup in Kiyoko Kurusu Nitz, “Japanese Policy towards French Indo-China during the Second World War: The Road to
Meigo Sukusen
(9 March 1945),”
Journal of SEAsian Studies
14 (1983), 328–350;
Lebra,Japanese-Trained Annies,
pp. 134–39. On Japanese planning for the coup already in 1944, see SRDJ 61784–88, 61777–79. For the broader context of the coup, see Stein Tonneson,
The Vietnamese Revolution of
1945:
Roosevelt, Ho Chi Minh and de Gaulle in a World at War
(Newbury Park, Ca.: Sage, 1991).

81
The Circular No. 442 of the Vice Chief of the General Staff of 27 Jan. 1945 is in NA, RG 457, SRA 15777–80.

82
Vice Chief of the General Staff Circular No. 208 of 8 Mar. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRA 16716–20.

83
See NA, RG 457, SRH-089; “Magic Far East Summary,” No. 252 of 15 June 1945, f. 3; SRH-066, f. 4–5.

84
Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
pp. 81–82.

85
Williams and Wallace,
Unit
731, pp. 124–27; Webber,
Silent Siege.
The balloon attacks did force the closing down of the Hanford plutonium plant for three days in March (Webber, pp. 278–80), but the B-29s destroyed the plants where the balloons were made. The Japanese appear to have halted the project in April in part because they had received no reports on its effect, something due largely to censorship in the United States and Canada.

86
Stephan,
Hawaii under the Rising Sun,
p. 169.

87
Potter,
Bull Halsey,
pp. 345–46; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
14: 332–33.

88
More details are given later in this chapter. See also NA, RG 457, SRH-I03. There is very extensive material in the
Ugaki Diary.
For American counter-preparations, see Holmes,
Undersea Viaory,
p. 467.

89
On the technical aspects of these projects, see Richard O’Neill,
Suicide Squads: Axis and Allied Special Attack Weapons of World War II
(London: Salamander Books, 1981). A reliable scholarly study of the whole topic remains to be written. There is an interesting British report of May 1946, A.I.2(g) Report No. 2389, “Oka (Baka): The Japanese Suicide Aircraft,” PRO, AIR
20/8775.
For references in the
Ugaki Diary
to the ohka, see pp. 547, 558–59, 582, 609, 636–37.

90
On the Cabinet crisis, see Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
pp. 76–81; Butow,
Japan’s Decision,
chap. 3. Interesting, but filled with special pleading, is Leon V. Seagal,
Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of war Tennination in the United States and Japan
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1988).

91
See Kase (Bern) to Tokyo Nos. 450 of 27 Apr., 579 of 14 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 99090–2, 100258–71.

92
Tokyo Circulars 490 of 15 May, 493 of 17 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 100076, 100271–72.

93
On the Stockholm rumors, see the exchanges in NA, RG 457, SRDJ 103550–53, 103821, 105267–68, 105405–6; for the efforts of Dulles to arrange a Japanese surrender through Japanese naval channels, see the documents in SRNA 4961–63,5092–94,5131, 5142–514243, 5145–46, 5186, 5208; Butow,
Japan’s Decision
, chap. 5. Martin S. Quigley,
Peace without Hiroshima: Secret Action at the Vatican in the Spring of 1945
(London, Md.: Madison Books, 1991). On the role of Friedrich Wilhelm Hack or Hauck, see Butow, pp. 104–9; John W.M. Chapman, “A Dance on Eggs: Intelligence and the Anti-Comintern,” JCH 22 (1987), 333–72.

94
Note Pacific Strategic Intelligence Section, “Japanese Reaction to German Defeat,” 21 May 1945, NA, RG 457, SRH-075, f. 14.

95
See
Kido Diary,
8 June 1945, pp. 434–36. President Truman’s statement that unconditional surrender did not mean wiping out the Japanese people was interpreted as propaganda to weaken the Japanese home front; Tokyo Circular 557 of 20 June 1945, NA, RG 457, SRDJ 103616–17.

96
Shillony,
Wartime Japan,
pp. 82–83. A survey of the internal situation during the last year of war in Alvin D. Coox,
Japan: The Final Agony
(New York: Ballantine, 1970).

97
On the Okinawa battle, see Costello,
Pacific War,
chap. 33; Morison,
US Naval Operations,
14: Part 2; Roy E. Appleman et a I.,
Okinawa: The Last Battle
(Washington: GPO, 1948); James and William Belote,
Typhoon of Steel: The Battle for Okinawa
(New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Marder,
Old Friends, New Enemies,
2: 428–29, 439ff; Thomas M. Huber,
Japan’s Battle of Okinawa, April-June
1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Combat Studies Institute, Washington: GPO, 1990). A brilliant but terrifying account from the perspective of a marine in the fighting is in part 2 of Sledge,
With the Old Breed.

98
Robert N. Colwell, “Intelligence and the Okinawa Battle,”
Naval War College Review 38, No.2 (1985), 86–87.

99
Note German naval Attaché Tokyo to Berlin report of 20 April 1945, quoted in “Magic Far East Summary,” No. 402, 26 Apr. 1945, NA, RG 457, SRS 402, f, 1–2.