Amerithrax (19 page)

Masked technicians in closed-front lab coats with cuffed sleeves and several pairs of latex gloves stretched over the sleeves studied the sample in BSL-2 conditions. Visual in- spection of residue inside the bags suggested that they were dealing with an extraordinarily high concentration of
Bacil- lus anthracis
spores that had been processed to a surpris- ingly fine grade. Everyone began to wonder about the level of expertise Amerithrax had brought to bear in the powder’s production.

“In the four years that the special pathogens sample test lab has existed,” said Col. Erik Henchal, chief of the Insti- tute’s diagnostics systems division, “this was the first time we had ever received a real impression that this is something to be very concerned about.”

From BSL-2, the Daschle letter and its pair of surround- ing bags were placed inside a third plastic bag and taken to a more secure BSL-3 lab behind entry door AA3. That night, in a specially sealed room, something strange occurred when John Ezzell, a civilian microbiologist, and his colleagues expectantly gathered around a huge electron microscope. It had fallen to him, as the Army’s consummate anthrax sci- entist, to examine the spores. Though he had been immu- nized against the disease, Ezzell wore a respirator over his nose and mouth as he made his analysis. He removed the aluminum foil from the first sample and attempted to put the two grams of uniformly light tan powder under the mi- croscope.

The microscopic spores magically leaped from the mi- croscope slide. They wafted away weightlessly, climbing up into the laminar-flow hood. The glass safety cabinet was open in front, but under negative air pressure. Whenever the lanky Ezzell tried to weigh a sample, the spores refused to rest on the scale. They would not adhere to sticky tape. The slightest breath of air, arm movement, or tabletop vibration propelled them into the air. As spores flitted about under the hood like gas, Ezzell began to worry about the number of escapees clinging to the top. Soon there would not be enough to analyze. Ezzell was seeing weaponized anthrax for the first time in his life.

He and his team transferred a few spores from the en- velope to a microbial culture dish where they could germi- nate and grow into thriving colonies for genetic analysis. Then they sequestered the bulk of the powder and confined further inspections to the dish samples. To quell the stream of floating spores, they immersed some in special chemical fluid. They embedded others in thin slices of paraffin. Now they could examine and test them without further airborne escapes. Even then, the scientific detectives ran short of spores long before they had completed every test they had

hoped to do. A battery of biological assays followed.

First, electron microscope studies of the paraffin-lodged powder showed that the particles were remarkably small and had finer anthrax particles than the previous letters. They were only 1.5 to 3 microns (0.0015 to 0.003 millimeters) in diameter. Amerithrax had taped the envelope seams and flap shut, presumably to keep spores from leaking out.

Yet investigators found that the porous paper of all the premetered envelopes had extraordinarily large pores. “It had to be one of the most porous materials,” an official said, comparing the cheap paper of the attack envelopes with standard ones. “Whether that was by chance or design, I have no idea.” The pores in the envelopes, up to 50 microns wide, were bigger than the largest Daschle anthrax clusters and could have allowed anthrax to effortlessly escape into the general mails.

Apparently, a very large refining had taken place between mailings. Initial analysis demonstrated the Daschle sample to be remarkably pure—one trillion spores per gram. Un- milled anthrax spores contain debris and these under the microscope were almost entirely purified spores. Purity and small size were a perfect recipe for inhalational anthrax, the dream of every bioterrorist. The unadulterated Daschle an- thrax was characteristic of material made by the optimal

U.S. process patented by Bill Patrick, which did not use milling.

Amerithrax had refined his anthrax into a fine aerosol weapon between September 18 and October 9. Some experts thought the smaller size was only the result of milling by the mail sorters. And the spores sent in September might not be smaller at all, just lesser in quantity and hastily re- fined. They might have been made less effective by contact with moisture, which caused clumping. Others conjectured that Amerithrax had simply used material of different grades.

A biologist assisting in the investigation said the increas- ing potency of anthrax in the letters suggested Amerithrax might be a thief who had stolen several anthrax samples. “Maybe he didn’t pocket one vial but two or three,” he said, “if we’re assuming this was an opportunist.” Between mail-

ings he may have cultured live anthrax germs in some make- shift lab and improved his product. Anthrax spores were notoriously fast growing.

The Institute’s tests for antibiotic sensitivity indicated the anthrax bugs were not resistant to standard antibiotics. Cipro, doxycycline, and amoxicillin (a form of penicillin) were effective against them. Presently, the FDA indicated that Cipro, penicillin G procaine, and doxycycline were ef- fective against inhalational anthrax. They had also approved tetracycline, minocycline, oxytetracycline, demeclocycline, and penicillin G potassium for clinically ill patients with anthrax infection.

Tests confirmed the Daschle anthrax belonged to the Ames strain, the most common strain, but then so did all of the terrorism-related specimens they had been able to re- trieve. The anthrax letters contained 7 to 10 grams of ma- terial, of which 2 to 3 grams were pure weaponized spores. Seventy-five percent was noninfectious material and con- tained particles used for weaponization.

But the Institute’s experts uncovered a new additive in the Daschle sample, a chemical coating to increase shelf life and potency and prevent clumping. Another lab with a spe- cial device could tell them what that substance was. The Armed Forces Institute of Pathology in Northwest Washing- ton’s energy-dispersive X-ray spectroscope could detect the presence of extremely tiny quantities of chemicals. The re- sults might tell them who was involved in the anthrax mail- ings.

The FBI also decided to helicopter a sample of the Das- chle anthrax for additional testing to the Hazardous Material Research Center at the Battelle Memorial Institute in West Jefferson, Ohio. Battelle, a military contractor, was near Co- lumbus, the site of an avalanche of anthrax hoax letters. Battelle did bioweapons research with the Ames strain of anthrax for the CIA and the military. They also did secret work for the Pentagon and other government agencies. Their analysis of the purity and size of the Daschle sample would differ dramatically from that of the Institute, causing great consternation at an FBI that was unused to dealing with scientists.

Meanwhile, mailworker Norma Wallace’s coworker, Jyotsna Patel, became ill. She suffered from intermittent fe- ver with chills, dry cough with chest discomfort, shortness of breath, muscle ache, and fatigue. Later on Monday, she developed “head stuffiness,” nausea, and vomiting. She be- came mildly confused and no one had any idea why.

The next day, Tuesday, October 16, Peter Jahrling, senior Institute scientist, was up before dawn to study the Daschle sample. After him, Tom Geisber began analyzing “a heap of dry particles,” a corner of the envelope, and the two test tubes delivered by the FBI. Elsewhere, the nation was buzz- ing about anthrax discovered in the Hart Senate Office Building and in a House office mailroom. Rumors spread that Daschle’s letter had also contained a little Star of David like the one sent to AMI in Florida. Anyone who had been in and around the Hart Building or on the fifth or sixth floor of the southeast corridor when the Daschle letter was opened was considered exposed. Exposed meant they had come into contact with spores, the dormant bacteria with capsules around them, but did not yet have the disease.

Biologically, the spores sent to NBC, AMI, and Daschle were indistinguishable from each other. “Physically, the spores sent to Daschle,” said Dr. Richard Spertzel, “are in very small particles and readily dispersible into the air,” al- lowing the twenty-two Senate staffers and Capitol police to inhale them. It didn’t help that the woman who opened the anthrax letter panicked, tossing it into a trash can and re- leasing spores into the air.

Tuesday morning when 625 staffers arrived at the Hart Building, they discovered the entrance to the southeast cor- ridor blocked by a police barricade. Twelve Senate offices had been closed. Workers were lined up for nasal swabs and three-day supplies of Cipro. Dr. John Eisold, the Capitol’s attending doctor, and his technicians, culled from the D.C. Department of Health, New York, and the CDC, conducted the swabbing and analysis. Anyone who tested positive would have their antibiotic regimen increased to sixty days. Initially, there were twenty-two positive results. As the morning waned, the limited supplies of Cipro and even cot- ton swabs ran out four times, but were replenished. Capitol

Hill workers received Cipro, but the Hamilton postal work- ers didn’t. Cross-contamination of the mail, according to experts, was impossible.

That afternoon Senator John McCain called his staff into his office to calm them. Standing behind the leather chair in front of his desk, he began by joking. “Because of every- thing that’s happened,” he said, “I’ve decided to put Joe Donohue in charge of any disaster. We’re going to call him Commander Joe. Joe, you can go over to my place and pick up a uniform.” There was laughter all around since the youthful Donohue was an office favorite. Then McCain be- came more serious.

“If anyone sees anything suspicious in the mail, report it to an authority, call the Capitol police,” he said. “It’s OK to be afraid, but we need to channel that fear and be aware of our surroundings.” The senators had been briefed and a separate emergency response team in the Capitol was on top of the anthrax, so they were in a safer place than others. “These are strange times,” he said. “I appreciate the hard work everyone’s doing.”

Senator McCain made his way to the Dirksen Building, where his Commerce Committee staff kept their offices, having been moved there after control of the Senate passed to the Democrats. McCain was unaware that the Dirksen Building was exposed to anthrax too.

“Stop snoring. Get up!” McCain said as he entered the staff’s offices, joking along the same lines he had with his other staff members to keep spirits up. He gestured toward a tiny, dark-haired woman, Pia Pialorsi, press secretary for the committee’s minority. “I just want everyone to know Pia’s going to be in charge,” said McCain.

FBI Director Mueller spoke to the press at the National Press Office in Washington, D.C. “This afternoon,” he said, “I want to spend a few moments at the outset talking about the anthrax issue. As most of you know, the FBI is inves- tigating anthrax exposures and suspected anthrax exposures in Florida, in New York, here in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere around the country where such exposures have been reported. Every threat is taken seriously. Every threat receives a full response. We have no choice but to assume

that each reported instance is an actual biothreat. And while organized terrorism has not been ruled out, so far we have found no direct link to organized terrorism.” And this was true. Al Qaeda and Iraq headed the list of suspects in these early days, but no one could link them to the anthrax mail- ings.

“There are, however, certain similarities between letters sent to NBC in New York and to Senator Daschle’s office here in Washington,” Mueller continued. “We’re now test- ing, analyzing, and comparing powders from these letters to each other and to what we know from Florida. And I should point out that the tests are being done under the auspices of the CDC. Since October 1, the FBI has responded to more than 2,300 incidents or suspected incidents involving an- thrax or other dangerous agents. And as all of you know, an overwhelming majority of these incidents have been false alarms or practical jokes...

“However, I want to reiterate the comments of the At- torney General. Hoaxes, pranks, and threats involving chem- ical or biological agents are serious crimes and warrant a serious response. They will be investigated thoroughly and vigorously by special agents of the FBI, by the postal au- thorities, by local authorities, and by other law enforcement. As the indictment discussed today makes clear, individuals who attempt to prey on people’s fears or even to pull a prank will pay a price. In addition to the price that they are paying, they should know that they are squandering millions of dol- lars in public health and law enforcement resources, re- sources that could be better spent in responding to actual terrorist acts. More importantly, they are taking manpower and time away from individuals who could be ensuring that there are no future terrorist acts.

“As incidents arise, we are working closely with... city and state public health officials, and with a host of federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities. FBI investiga- tors and specially trained scientists, public safety officers, and hazardous materials response experts are being called upon as needed, whether they be at the federal government level or the state or the local level. We are making a con- certed and coordinated effort to keep state and local law

enforcement authorities informed and involved. Quite ob- viously, their skills and expertise are top notch, and we need their help.”

More than ten thousand Hill staffers were put on anti- biotics after the Daschle letter tested positive, a move that almost certainly saved many lives. “Everybody in that room [the Daschle office] would have died without treatment,” said one CDC official. Sixty people in the Hart Office Build- ing were within breathing distance of the powder. Thirty- one Senate staff members initially tested positive for anthrax exposure, but no one had contracted the disease. The cleanup went on as government offices were shuttered and workers sent for testing. Furnishings, drywall, and carpets were ripped out. Computers were carted away from the large Daschle suites.