Ancient Chinese Warfare (76 page)

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Authors: Ralph D. Sawyer

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21
For some evidence of the earlier occupation, see Liu Yi-man, STWMYC, 148-161.
22
Li Min, LSYC 1991:1, 111-120, believes the old capital suffered some sort of disaster, probably flooding, but that conditions there had also been exacerbated by environmental degradation. In contrast, the fertilization practices adopted at Yin-hsü preserved the environment by disposing of human and animal waste. However, for another view see Yang Hsi-chang and T’ang Chi-ken, STWMYC, 248-256.
23
For an overview, see Chu Yen-min, 1999, 100-114. No doubt under the influence of Confucianism, later ages envisioned the shift to Anyang as a manifestation of P’an’s quest to return the people to Virtue, an imaginative view clearly reflected in the
Shang Shu
.
24
See, for example, Tung Ch’i, WW 2006:6, 56-60, 87. Generally speaking, as indicated by discussions in
Mencius
,
Kuan-tzu
, and other pre-Han writings, every significant city was expected to have inner and outer walls, known as
ch’eng
and
kuo
, as well as moats and segregated quarters. (For a brief overview see Liu Ch’ing-chu, WW 1998:3, 49-57.)
25
Liu Ch’ing-chu, KKHP 2006:3, 283, and others believe the moat, in conjunction with the rivers, furnished adequate perimeter protection. However, Li Min, LSYC 1991:1, thinks the moat was intended to reduce the Huan River’s level during floods, thereby sparing Anyang. A small interior ditch apparently intended to protect a sacrificial area, datable to the third phase of Yin-hsü, has also been found at Anyang. Only about 30 to 35 meters in length, it has a maximum width of 2.9 meters and a depth of nearly a meter, but considerably less in some sections. Hardly an effective deterrent, it probably served more as a marker. (See Yin-hsü Hsiao-min-t’un K’ao-ku-tui, KK 2007:1, 37-40.)
26
As argued, for example, by Chang Kuo-shuo, KKWW 2000:1, 42-45.
27
For a complete translation of the
Wu-tzu
, the book attributed to Wu Ch’i, see Sawyer,
Seven Military Classics of Ancient China
. This passage appears in Wu Ch’i’s biography in the
Shih Chi
.
28
For a complete translation, see Crump,
Chan-kuo Ts’e
, 374.
29
“Responding to Change,”
Wu-tzu
, attributed to Wu Ch’i.
30
“Military Combat.”
31
“Maneuvering the Army.”
32
“Configurations of Terrain.”
33
Sun Pin, “Male and Female Cities.” (For a complete translation and discussion of the various configurations, see Sawyer,
Sun Pin Military Methods
.)
34
Yin Chün-k’o, 1994, 114ff.; Li Min, HCCHS 1988:4, 41-48; and Chu Chen, HCCHS 1989:8, 3-10.
35
Something might perhaps be learned from the movement of the Japanese capital from Nara to Kyoto and then the subsequent power shift to Edo where compulsory, burdensome attendance at the shogun’s court proved a significant factor in eroding vassal independence and power.
36
Ch’iao Teng-yün and Chang Yüan, STWMYC, 162-174.
37
Both Li Min HCCHS 1988:4, 46-48, and Chu Chen, HCCHS 1989:8, 7-10, discuss the generally neglected subject of Chao-ko.
38
Despite various claims that writing’s incipient origins can be discerned in Yangshao cultural manifestations such as Ta-wen-k’ou or Pan-p’o, the evidence cited consists mostly of individual symbols that may represent the earliest form of written expression or may simply be clan markers or totemistic symbols. (See, for example, Chang Mao-jung, 2002, 20-23, or Chiang Lin-ch’ang, HCCHS 2006:4 for more recent summaries of the manifestations and interpretations.)
39
For further discussion, see David Keightley,
Sources of Shang History
, 134-146.
40
This exploration of Shang martial activities is heavily indebted to numerous pioneering examinations of oracular inscriptions by Chinese, Japanese, and Western scholars, such as Kuo Mo-jo, Tung Tso-pin, Ch’en Meng-chia, Li Hsüeh-ch’in, Wang Kuo-wei, Shima Kunio, Chang Ping-hsüeh-ping, David Keightley, and Edward L. Shaughnessy. In addition to Tung Tso-pin’s chronologies, our discussion of Shang dynasty martial activities is primarily based on the following important studies: Wang Yü-hsin, “Wu-Ting-ch’i Chan-cheng Pu-ts’u Fen-ch’i te Ch’angshih”; Fan Yü-chou, “Yin-tai Wu Ting Shih-ch’i te Chan-cheng” and “Military Campaign Inscriptions from YH127”; Ch’en Meng-chia, “Wu Ting Shih-tai te Tuo-fang,” “Wu-Ting-hou te Tuo-fang,” and “Yi-Hsin shih-tai Suo-cheng te Jen-fang, Yü-fang”; Lin Hsiao-an, “Yin Wu Ting Ch’en-shu Cheng-fa yü Hsing-chi K’ao”; P’eng Yü-shang,
Yin-hsü Chia-ku Tuan-tai
; and others as individually noted. All these studies, although founded on the same collections of oracle bones (including those in
Chia-ku-wen Ho-chi
, hereafter abbreviated as HJ), tend to selectively emphasize certain aspects of Shang martial activity, resulting in slightly different depictions and divergent conclusions. Citations will indicate which view is being followed, while inscription numbers will signify materials either abstracted from the above because of their particular relevance or developed in the course of our study.
41
Claims have been made that anywhere from 90 significant cities or states to a maximum of 800 place-names (cited by Li Hsüeh-ch’in, HCCHS 2005:5, 3-7) can be identified.
42
For an early report on two bronze Yin-hsü foundries, see SHYCS,
Yin-hsü Fa-chüeh Pao-kao 1958-1961
.
43
The ratio of prisoners to casualties is sometimes astounding. For example, according to
Hsü-ts’un hsia
915, in a campaign against the Wei, twenty-four prisoners and a clan leader (who was later sacrificed) were captured, but an astonishing 1,570 were slain. Various weapons and other items were also seized, including two chariots. (For an analysis of this inscription see Wang Yü-hsin, CKSYC 1980:1, 106.)
CHAPTER 9
1
Among many, see Chang P’ei-yü, KKWW 1999:4, 62-65. The dates 1239-1181 and 1250- 1192 BCE are based on eclipse calculations; the PRC dating project has stipulated 1250-1192;
and
Cambridge History of Ancient China
begins its chronology with an end date of 1189 (1198- 1181 is clearly too short for his many accomplishments). Many of the warfare inscriptions are found among HJ 6057-7771.
2
The nature of these entities—extended clans, tribes, chiefdoms, or proto-states—remains unclear. (For a characterization see T’ung Chu-ch’en, KK 1991:11, 1003-1018, 1031; for a survey of the peripheral proto-states see Lu Lien-ch’eng, CKKTS 1995:4,30-56.)
3
This is the scheme adopted by historians such as Meng Shih-k’ai, Lin Hsiao-an, Fan Yü-chou, and P’eng Yü-shang. It should be differentiated from Tung Tso-pin’s five-era periodization of Anyang oracle bones, whether as originally formulated or subsequently modified, and Wang Yü-hsin’s somewhat nebulous two-part division. (For a discussion of periodization see Keightley,
Sources of Shang History
, 91-100.)
4
Ch’en Hsü, HSLWC, 246.
5
The “rabbit” rather than “earth” people, who were a major threat in the second period.
6
Apart from those noted in the discussion below, see Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 201.
7
According to Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 297-298.
8
Ch’en Meng-chia, 296-297. (For relevant inscriptions, see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 333.)
9
For inscriptions (including HJ6993 and HJ6991) see Lin Hsiao-an, 229, and Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 196.
10
For inscriptions (including
Hsü Ts’un
1, 609, and HJ6983), see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 491, or Lin Hsiao-an, 230.
11
Yi
4693.
12
For a study of the concept of space in the Shang, see David N. Keightley,
The Ancestral Landscape.
13
Accounts of the campaign may be found in Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 186-191; Luo K’un’s
Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih-shih
, 1991, 173-177; Liu Yü-t’ang, HCCHS 2001:4, 59-60; and Liu Huan, CKSYC 2002:4, 3-9, with additional references to the “south” listed in Chang Ping-ch’üan, 316. As usual, readings and interpretations vary, and the pronunciation of the proto-states is highly tentative.
14
The formation of alliances is implied by oracular references to the
nan pang fang
or “southern allied states” (
Chia
2902, HJ20576), and this repression of the rebellious generally derived from
Shih Ching
commentators (Ch’en Hsü, HSWHLC, 243).
15
“Li shih yü nan” (
duo
2.62), meaning “to take responsibility/handle affairs in the south,” is understood as evidence that the king personally supervised the campaign, perhaps even the battle action. He also performed prognostications en route and in the south. Ch’üeh’s participation shows the conflict cannot have been too early in the king’s first period, because he was originally an enemy who subsequently became a trusted ally.
16
HJ5504.
17
HJ20576, possibly HJ19946.
18
Not the same state as the “Ghost” state.
19
HJ19946 and HJ20576 convey a sense of urgency because the king is inquiring whether his generals will suffer harm while repeatedly asking if they will receive blessings for the effort—in other words, if the time is right for an action that the king has already decided upon.
20
HJ6667.
21
The severity of his illness so perturbed the king that he felt compelled to offer sacrifice for his recovery.
22
According to Liu Huan, CKSYC 2002:4, 8. (Liu, 6-7, generally derives more sweeping conclusions than other analysts, including that the king retained extensive control over his field troops and engaged in public relations or propaganda pronouncements.)
23
See P’eng Ming-han, CKSYC 1995:3, 101-108. (P’eng suggests that there were two Hu peoples, the Hu in the main Shang domain and a separate Hu-fang, but fails to substantiate his claim.)
24
The term
t’u
(seen in HJ6667) is generally understood as meaning something like “punitively attack” but might merely signify going out to resist them or manifest awesome power. (The Chü is a tributary of the Han River.)
25
P’eng Ming-han understands these three as “war spirits,” but they need not be so.
26
As claimed by P’eng Ming-han, CKSYC 1995:3, 101.
27
Although massive battles would not be unknown, Chinese military writers noted that the later (horse-mounted) steppe peoples avoided fixed confrontations. However, it would be erroneous to project similar combat tendencies back onto the essentially sedentary steppe peoples of the Shang period.
28
Our account basically follows Fan Yü-chou’s dating and campaign chronology, 1991, 205- 207. (Lin Hsiao-an, 236-239, dates it to Wu Ting’s first period and Wang Yü-hsin also places it early.) Early Hsüan participation in Shang theocracy argues for the correctness of Fan’s dating. (See also P’eng Yü-shang, 1994, 97-103, who similarly assigns it to the king’s middle period.) The Hsüan were apparently located to the west of the Shang; Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 276, suggests they may have dwelled in Kuei-fang territory.
29
HJ9705. Reconstructions of the campaign may be found in Fan Yü-chou, Vol. 3, 205-206, and BSOAS 539; Lin Hsiao-an, 236-238; and
Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih,
165-166.
30
Ping-pien
307.
31
HJ6937. The problem raised by Lin having damaged the Hsüan in the seventh month (requiring that the Hsüan and T’an be contiguous states) can be resolved if these are inquiries, not necessarily events, and he may have been sent against the Hsüan rather than the T’an, or the reverse.
32
See HJ6924-6939.
33
Ping-pien
249, cited by Fan Yü-chou, BSOAS, 539.
34
Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 205, argues that
Ping-pien
307, which asks whether the king should attack the T’an in the sixth month or go west, shows that the T’an were located in the west. However, the inscription seems to be posing paired alternatives: Should the king campaign in the east, attacking the T’an, or devote his efforts to resolving problems in the west?
35
HJ6942, querying whether the T’an will harm the Ts’ao.
36
For this view see
Hsia Shang Hsi-Chou Chün-shih Shih
, 165-166.
37
Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988 298, 276. (Ch’en Meng-chia provides a useful iteration of the main commanders on 275-276, but for a summary of the most important inscriptions see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 492; Lin Hsiao-an, 236-239; and Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 155-158.)
38
Lin Hsiao-an, 237, interprets the simultaneous incursions of the T’an, Hsüan, and Jung as evidence of deliberate, coordinated action.
39
Ping
306; Lin Hsiao-an, 237.
40
See, for example, HJ6958, which asks whether Ch’üeh will “pummel” the Hsüan.
41
HJ6946.
42
HJ6959;
Yi
4380, 4919, 5163, and 5193.
43
Yi
4693.
44
For example, see HJ9947, HJ6939, HJ6947, HJ6948, HJ6952, HJ6954, HJ6958, HJ6959, HJ20383.
45
Attested by HJ20393.
46
HJ6205, HJ6567, HJ6240; Fan Yü-chou, 1991, 205 and 207; Wang Yü-hsin, 1991, 157. The Hsüan are recorded as frequently sending in scapula for divination, once in the staggering amount of 1,000. (See Fan, 205-206.)
47
Reconstructions are provided by Edward L. Shaughnessy in “Micro-periodization,” 58- 82, and Fan Yü-chou in “Military Campaign Inscriptions,” 1989, 535-48, and
Yin-tai Wu Ting,
1991, 202-205. Several inquiries fortuitously include confirmation of the results. (Inscription summaries will also be found in Chang Ping-ch’üan, 491-492, and Ch’en Meng-chia, 287-288.
Also see page 72 and note 28 of “Micro-periodization” for Shaughnessy’s determination of the campaign date as 1211-1210 BCE.) Significant differences exist between Shaughnessy’s reconstruction (which is essentially followed here, apart from transcribing the state name as P’ei instead of Pu), based on the adroit employment of an intercalary month, and that offered by Fan Yü-chou in his two articles (1989 and 2006). In fact, the divergences illustrate the difficulty of assembling highly disparate pronouncements into a coherent patchwork of probable events.

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