Ancient Chinese Warfare (81 page)

9
Suggested by Meng Shih-k’ai, 103-104.

10
For example,
Chia-pien
3939 records an attack on Yü-fang, 3940, one on the Jen-fang.

11
Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 98.

12
Nei-pien
284.

13
Nei-pien
104.

14
Nei-pien
433.

15
For the masks interred with military figures, see Ch’ai Shao-ming, KK 1992:12, 1111- 1120.

16
For example, the tomb of a high-ranking military commander dated to the third period at Yin-hsü contains a remarkable number of weapons. Of 394 objects, 288 are bronze, the majority being weapons, including three
yüeh
(axes) and 118
ko
(dagger-axes). There are also four jade
yüeh
and 902 arrowheads (Yang Hsi-chang and Liu Yi-man, KK 1991:5, 390-391). Even victims of the Chou conquest, despite being quickly interred near Anyang, were accompanied by ritual bronze objects. (Tu Chin-p’eng, KK 2007:6, 76-89).

17
Ch’en Ch’ao-yün, HCCHS 2004:6, 30-36.

18
Ch’en Ch’ao-yün, 30-36, especially 35.

19
For example, see Lei Yüan-sheng and Chi Te-yüan’s historical overview, CKSYC 1993:4, 3-19; Li Hsin-ta,
Wu-kuan Chih-tu
; or Wang Kuei-min, LSYC 1986:4, 107-119.

20
Even the
Ssu-ma Fa
envisioned the civil and martial having been strictly segregated in earlier times: “In antiquity the form and spirit governing civilian affairs would not be found in the military realm; those appropriate to the military realm would not be found in the civilian sphere. Thus virtue and righteousness did not transgress inappropriate realms” (“Obligations of the Son of Heaven”).

21
See, for example, Yang Sheng-nan, CKSYC 1991:4, 47-59. Visibly granting rewards would become a much-practiced means of stimulating martial effort. (For example, see “Stimulating the Officers” in the
Wu-tzu
.)

22
“Obligations of the Son of Heaven.”

23
The Greek attitude, especially unwillingness to act in the face of bad omens and prior to the receipt of favorable oracles, is clearly seen throughout
Xenophon
, to the point that Xenophon refused to allow the starving troops to search for provisions for several days.

24
Liu Yi-man, KK 2002:3, 70-72, has suggested that military command and the accompanying titles were hereditarily associated with various clans; certain inscriptions and excavation results appear to at least partially confirm his view. For example, a prominent Chü clan ancestor performed important military functions in Wu Ting’s era, was deputed to pursue the Kung-fang (HJ6341) and others, and was ordered to instruct 300 archers (HJ5772). (See Ho Ching-ch’eng, KK 2008:11, 62; for an example of a commander from a clan related by marriage, see Wang Yung-p’o, HCCHS 1992:4, 31-40.)

25
“P’an Keng, Hsia.” To the extent that the
Shang Shu
preserves any vestiges of Shang military organization, greater accuracy might be expected for later titles.

26
One sequence shows the Shang receiving intelligence of a Kung-fang incursion, reporting it to the ancestors, holding a meeting, and then appointing Chih Yu as the campaign commander in the temple. (See Li Hsin-ta,
Wu-kuan Chih-tu,
21-22.)

27
“Appointing the General,” which follows two other chapters on the requisite characteristics for generals, an important topic in Warring States military writings. (Essentially the same ceremony is preserved in the “Ping Lüeh” section of the eclectic
Huai-nan-tzu
.) From the Shang onward, if not earlier, the ancestral temple was the site for undertaking military assessments, any decision to engage in military activities being reached before the ancestors.

28
Wang Kuei-min, LSYC 1986:4, 107-119.

29
For a list see Chang Ping-ch’üan, 1988, 439-440. Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 508-517, has collated numerous inscriptions with military titles; a (somewhat unsatisfactory) overview may also be found in the volumes of
Chung-kuo Chün-shih Chih-tu-shih
.

30
The Hsia reputedly had an officer in charge of the arrows and quivers, so the
fu
might well have undertaken some sort of responsibility as an armorer for the archers. However, a later term for “bow case,”
t’ao
, eventually came to designate “secret plans” as in the
Liu-t’ao
or
Six Secret Teachings
, and to the extent that tactics were formulated, may have already referred to a planning officer. (In addition to
fu
and
tuo fu
,
fu
appears in conjunction with
ya
, “commander,” being generally interpreted as referring to two officials but also possibly to the commander of
fu
. The
tuo fu
is recorded as being assigned defensive responsibilities.)

31
Ch’en Meng-chia’s brief overview (1988, 509-511) lists the relevant inscriptions.

32
However, Ko Sheng-hua, HCCHS 1992:11, 13-18, and others believe the Shang’s administrative structure included the post of
ssu-ma
, which was responsible not only for the proto-bureaucracy that oversaw military affairs and impositions, but also for the population registers and control of the general populace, making the administrator a sort of minister of state security. Beneath the
ssu-ma
would have been the
tuo ma
and the
ya
and
ta
(or great)
ya
, with the
ya
actually being subordinate to the
tuo ma
.

33
For a summary of relevant inscriptions see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 514.

34
Meng Shih-k’ai, LSYC 1990:4, 103-104.

35
For discussion and extensive inscriptional examples, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 511-514.

36
See Ch’en Meng-chia, 511-512. Ch’en stresses that “
tuo she wei
” should be understood as “
tuo she, tou wei
” or two separate officials, but in many cases it appears that the
tuo she
is being ordered to exercise a protective function, “
wei
” (similar to the use of “
shu
”), rather than two officials being jointly tasked with some effort. (
Tuo she
can also mean the “many archers” [that is, all the archers], especially in a battlefield context.)

37
See Hu Hou-hsüan and Hu Chen-yü, 2003, 107-115. (The character for
shih,
with a person signifier on the left, would subsequently mean “ambassador.”)

38
Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 516. (Relevant inscriptions will be found on 515-517.)

39
Hsiao Nan,
Ku-wen-tzu Yen-chiu,
1981, 130, claims they always commanded the
chung
when they were called to action.

40
See Hsiao Nan, 124, or Li Hsüeh-ch’in, CHSYC 2006:4, 3-7, citing
T’un-nan
2320.

41
See Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 517, who classifies the
yin
under internal or
nei-fu
officials.

42
Ch’ien-pien
7.1.4. Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 30, believes each
tsu
was led by a
yin
.

43
Ch’ien-pien
5.8.2.

44
See Chu Yen-min, CKSYC, 2005:3, 3-13. Throughout history the right flank has tended to be stronger because piercing and crushing weapons are invariably wielded by the right arm.

45
HJ33006 and
Ts’ui
597.

46
Contrary to Yang Sheng-nan, 1982, 358. (His discussion of
shih
will be found on pages 341-362.)

47
For an overview, see Chin Hsiang-heng’s classic
Ts’ung Chia-ku Pu-ts’u Yen-chiu Yin Shang Chün-lü-chung chih Wang-tsu San-hang San-shih,
1974, 10-16.

48
Numerous strips such as HJ36450, HJ36454, HJ34715, HJ34716, HJ34718, HJ41748, and HJ41750 inquire about the army not being startled or disturbed during the night.

49
Li Hsin-ta,
Wu-kuan Chih-tu
, 1997, 20; Yang Sheng-nan, 1982, 362, attributes the inscription to their reigns, but others (rather unsatisfactorily) claim it dates to Wu Ting’s era. Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 15-16, claims that the Shang never exceeded three armies; Hsiao Nan, 1981, 124, 128, concludes that the army didn’t really attain its final form until Wen Ting’s era; Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 31, believes that this represents the first creation of the
shih
and that the
shih
displaced the clan forces.

50
For example, Hsiao Nan (124) confidently ascribes the strip creating the three armies to Wen Ting’s era.

51
Chao Kuang-hsien, HCCHS 1986:2, 32, asserts that Wu Ting only had a central army.

52
Liu Chao, 1989, 70-72. Note should be taken of Liu Chao’s characterization of the Shang army as largely an imperial bodyguard or defensive force closely tied to the king and his assertion that armies associated with cities performed protective functions, especially at night. However, he also notes that the army occasionally acted as a forward campaign force, something like the elite
hu-pen
(“tiger warriors”) of later fame. (Somewhat surprisingly, Liu also cites examples of reconnaissance activity [HJ5605] that would seem to have been intended to initiate so-called
meeting engagements.) In his understanding the army was limited to a (paltry) 100 men, and three components—left, right, and center—were fielded.

53
For example, see Li Hsin-ta, 1997, 20. Hsiao Nan (1981, 128-129) argues for 10,000.

54
Throughout subsequent history Chinese military units were generally organized in multiples of five, ranging from a squad of five through an army of 12,500. However, there were exceptions when a decade-based structure prevailed and a chariot-centered squad of fifteen may have served as a fundamental building block. The Shang seems to have intermixed units based on three and ten, making the reconstruction of the contingents problematic. For example, in an army consisting of 3,000 troops, each of the three component
lü
should number 1,000 men. However, apportioning the 1,000 among three
ta hang
results in the odd number of 333 each, further segmentation yielding the unlikely number of 111 for the
hang
. Although not impossible if the officers or chariot components somehow account for the odd eleven, these figures blatantly contradict the envisioned ideal of 100. Similarly, if the
shih
came to number 10,000 at the end of the dynasty, a
lü
would have to be 3,333. Reconstructing upward rather than downward doesn’t really resolve the problem. For example, if the
hang
is 100 and
ta hang
300, then three
ta hang
comprise a
lü
of 900 and three
lü
an army of only 2,700, far short of the normal levy of 3,000. The problem becomes even more complex if the army were already chariot based, despite the appeal that assigning a ten-man squad to each chariot might have. Three hundred chariots would result in an army of 3,000, but require ignoring the 900 members manning the chariot.

55
Discussions of the
lü
maybe found in Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 6-8, and Hsiao Nan, 1981, 125-128. The “10,000-man levy” derives from a variant reading of a famous Fu Hao/Ch’iang battle inscription, but according to the
Chou Li
’s reconstruction (as apportioned under the “Hsiao Ssu-t’u”) and the number specified by the
Shuo Wen
, it would have been 500 in the Chou. However, Hsiao Nan sets it at 1,000.

56
Hsiao Nan, 130.

57
T’un-nan
2350.

58
Li Hsin-ta,
Wu-kuan Chih-tu
.

59
Not everyone agrees that the king’s
lü
constituted the middle or that the “right
lu
” occurs in the inscriptions. (See, for example, Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 7-8.)

60
See Liu Chao, 1989, 74.

61
Liu Chao, 75ff.

62
Chao Kuang-hsien (31) claims that the three
shih
displaced the
tsu
on the battlefield.

63
According to the
Tso Chuan
, Ting Kung fourth year, the Shang consisted of six or seven clans.

64
See Chin Hsiang-heng, 1974, 2ff.

65
Shen Ch’ang-yün, HCCHS 1998:4, 23-28, believes this even happened with the various clan forces, including the king’s.

66
This exercise in hypocrisy is recorded in the
Tso Chuan
, Hsi Kung twenty-eighth year.

67
Note Chin Hsiang-heng’s commentary, 1974, 9. (Chin never hazards an estimate of unit size.)

68
As will be discussed in the section on horses, chariots, and cavalry, there is some controversy over whether the term
ma
(horse), generally understood as chariot, doesn’t actually refer to the cavalry, with the chariots already being subsumed within the articulated structure.

69
For a convenient summary of relevant inscriptions, see Ch’en Meng-chia, 1988, 512-513.