Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (15 page)

The French pursuit almost got as far as Böflingen before the combined efforts of IR17 Reuss-Plauen and IR36 Kolowrat halted it. Yet the Austrians, lacking artillery and cavalry on the right, found it difficult to drive the French battalion back. Eventually, sheer weight of fire forced the French to retire towards Haslach, while the battalions positioned near Jungingen also fell back. The French finally abandoned the village as the last Austrian battalion on the left, the grenadiers of IR54 Froon, moved forward. Ferdinand’s infantry similarly began a steady advance in pursuit of the retreating battalion of 32ème. Recognising he could no longer hold his position, Dupont began a general retreat, being driven back towards Albeck before turning off the road and heading across country towards Langenau. The anticipated support from Baraguey d’Hilliers never arrived. At around 5.30pm that officer reached Albeck with an advanced party of about sixty mounted men. Here he encountered the Austrian cavalry ransacking Dupont’s baggage. He quickly gathered together as many French cavalry stragglers as he could find, reformed
them, and drove off the remaining looters: but not before they had removed twenty-three of the wagons.

The battle at Haslach-Jungingen was unusual in that both sides claimed victory: and with some justification. Dupont set out with limited forces to present an aggressive front, in the hope that it would delay or deter any Austrian moves while he awaited the 5,000 men of Baraguey d’Hilliers’ division in support. That they never arrived meant he faced Mack and Ferdinand with between 5,000 and 6,000 men but held his ground until nightfall. Although the Austrian commanders drew together almost 23,000 men for the battle, the acrimony within the command structure meant the full strength could never be brought to bear on the outnumbered French. Attacks made in isolation enabled the French to fight on better terms than they could have hoped for. It appears that perhaps 7,500 Austrian infantry and 500 cavalry held in reserve took no part at all. Despite this, the French had eventually been driven away and the road to Albeck and a path to the north of the Danube cleared. Losses on both sides were heavy. Dupont appears to have lost about 900 men as prisoners to the Austrians, with killed and wounded taking the total up to some 2,000.
⁸
The Austrian figures are more elusive. In some sources the French claim to have taken 4,000 Austrian prisoners during the struggle for Jungingen. However, the regimental history of the 9ème Légère, the regiment credited with capturing most of them, claims to have taken only 1,500.
⁹
Austrian casualties probably consisted of approximately 400 killed and 1,100 wounded.

Back in Ulm, Mack, having received treatment for his wound, was delighted with the outcome of the battle, and with the discovery of a copy of Ney’s orders to Dupont – found in the captured French baggage wagons – which revealed that the French general was isolated on the north bank (the remainder of the French army being deployed south of the river). This information provided the perfect opportunity for Mack to resurrect his plan – thwarted by the French victory at Günzburg two days earlier – of marching along the north bank and linking up with the Russians; and with the ‘victory’ at Haslach-Jungingen boosting the sagging morale of his soldiers, he proposed to make the breakout the following morning, 12 October.

Mack presented his plan to the senior officers, but in the tense atmosphere of distrust and animosity that pervaded Austrian headquarters, he received vociferous opposition. In particular, FML Werneck, whose corps would march first, opposed the plan with what Mack described as ‘improper violence’. Werneck claimed his men were too exhausted after the battle and were desperately in need of food before they could march. It appears Mack, angered by Werneck’s refusal, offered to personally lead the men in his place, but Ferdinand refused to sanction this, and in the face of such vehement opposition, Mack relented and did not claim his authority over Ferdinand on this occasion. Perhaps the best chance of saving the army slipped away at this
meeting. As a consequence, the Austrian army spent 12 October resting and reorganising. Changing circumstances during the day caused Mack to rewrite his plans three times.

The 11 October had proved a day of revelation for Napoleon. While Dupont had been fighting the Austrian army single-handed at Haslach-Jungingen, he had lost control of that wing of the army and was unaware of the circumstances in which it found itself. In the meantime, he continued to direct his army to a battlefield unoccupied by his enemies. During the day doubts first entered his mind. A false report that Ferdinand had escaped to Munich fuelled a belief that the Austrians had passed to the south and were escaping to Tirol. But other, stronger reports, now suggested they were still in some strength at Ulm. Bernadotte pressed on towards Munich, reporting some 20,000 Austrians to his front (these were Kienmayer’s 16,000 men who continued to fall back towards the Inn) and that Russian troops were expected to be on the Inn in the next day or so. In this he was correct. However, the Inn was still a long way from Ulm. Concerned by these reports, Napoleon ordered Davout to close towards Bernadotte and also sent him d’Hautpoul’s
cuirassier
division. Having taken these steps to cover any developments in his rear, Napoleon issued orders for the rest of the army that he believed would bring about a battle on the Iller on 12 October. Writing to Davout he detailed these moves:

‘Maréchal Soult, with his army corps [IV], is on the march to Memmingen. GD Marmont with two French divisions of his army corps [II] is on the march so as to place himself on the heights of Illertissen, on the Iller. Maréchal Lannes [V] is at Weißenhorn, Maréchal Ney [VI] athwart the Danube near Ulm. Lastly, the Garde Impériale is marching on Weißenhorn.

‘On the [11 October] all the dispositions will have been taken; [12 October], the day of battle, the enemy shall be destroyed, as he is encompassed all around.’
¹⁰

During 11 October Ney and Murat heard distant firing from the direction of Albeck but continued to follow their orders in anticipation of battle next day. However, during the night of 11–12 October Ney received Dupont’s somewhat over-enthusiastic and misleading report of his action at Haslach. In it Dupont declared: ‘The success was complete; night has come on, and we remained masters of the battlefield. Four thousand prisoners of war, the flags, and the cannon are our prizes for the victory.’
¹¹
Reassured by Dupont that everything was under control north of the Danube, orders requiring him to hold his position were not despatched until morning. Other orders, sent to Baraguey d’Hilliers and Bourcier’s roaming dragoon division, required them to cross the river and join the great force building up south of the Danube. But by the time Dupont received his orders a panic had sent his shaken division back to the
Brenz river in some disorder, from where they were not able to move again until 14 October.

Murat sent Dupont’s report to Napoleon with another report from Lannes, in which that marshal disputed the assumption that the strength of the Allies was south of the Danube and urgently requested permission to cross to the north bank. Murat had refused to grant Lannes’ request, concerned it would upset Napoleon’s plan: instead he forwarded it to the emperor, who received both reports at 10.00am on 12 October at Augsburg. This news of an action on the north bank and Lannes’ concerns now turned Napoleon’s attention away from the Iller. Accordingly, he left Augsburg and headed for Günzburg, then on to Murat’s headquarters at Pfaffenhofen. He was appalled to discover the lack of accurate information as to the distribution of Ney’s VI Corps. Eventually, he discovered that Dupont no longer held Albeck, where everyone thought he was, and the bridge at Elchingen remained unsecured because of a strong enemy presence. Instead three companies of infantry were merely observing it from the south bank. Napoleon was furious, and severely reprimanded Ney – somewhat unfairly – for leaving Dupont without support, for losing communications between his divisions, for abandoning Albeck and Elchingen, and for not advising the emperor of the movements of his division: all factors where the real blame lay with Murat.

Realising for the first time the danger that existed on the north bank, Napoleon began to reorder the marches of his corps around Ulm and commanded Ney to capture the bridge over the Danube at Elchingen the following morning, 14 October, without fail. Lannes received orders to follow Ney and support him, while Murat was to assemble his cavalry in the Günzburg–Weißenhorn area, just to the south of the Danube, repair the bridge at Leipheim, and be prepared to cross to the north bank if required. Meanwhile, Marmont was to continue his march towards the Iller to prevent the Austrians moving south from Ulm to Memmingen, but also be prepared to change direction and support Ney if called upon. Soult’s corps, the furthest to the south, was to cross the Iller at Memmingen and cut off any escape routes from Ulm to the south-west. Only now did Napoleon recognise the true position of the Austrian army and the opportunity on offer – if he moved quickly – to surround it at Ulm: the encirclement of the city was underway.

The open opposition from his generals and lack of support from the petulant Archduke Ferdinand left Mack experiencing the loneliness of command. Three times during 12 October he changed his plans for the following day in the face of opposition from his senior officers, and in reaction to reports detailing confusing French movements.

Mack’s final plan, issued at 2.00am on 13 October, reflected the news that a strong body of French troops were marching in the direction of the Iller and that Ney’s corps had crossed to the south of the Danube (presumably based on Baraguey-d’Hillier’s and Bourcier’s movements). These movements seemed
odd to Mack, as Ulm sat largely on the north bank of the Danube and any army intending to attack from the south would then first have to force a passage over the river. However, it appeared that the road north of the Danube was now clear and a route to safety lay open. Of the four army corps, Jella
i
would leave Ulm and march south up the Iller towards Memmingen, destroying the bridges as he went. Then, picking up the detachments he had left in and around Memmingen earlier in the campaign, he was to retire back into Tirol. FML Werneck, forming the left of the army, furthest from the French, was to march towards Heidenheim on the Brenz river, then on to Nördlingen with the reserve artillery, heavy equipment and baggage wagons. In the centre, FML Riesch, having detached a small force to escort the artillery and baggage with Werneck, was to march close to the north bank of the Danube. FML Laudon was to lead this march with half of Riesch’s corps, having responsibility for breaking all bridges between Elchingen and Gündelfingen. On 14 October Laudon was to continue with his task, disrupting the bridges up to Donauwörth. The plan anticipated Riesch reaching Elchingen on the night of 13 October and arriving in Gündelfingen the following evening. Schwarzenberg’s corps was to remain south of Ulm on the 13 October, forming the right of the army, sending strong reconnaissance patrols towards Weißenhorn, where the French were reported to be. Then, on 14 October, he was to withdraw through Ulm, and leaving just one brigade as a garrison, follow Werneck on the road to Heidenheim.

The plan was a good one. Werneck faced a clear road, with Riesch protecting his right flank and closing all river crossings to the French, while Schwarzenberg kept the French occupied. Yet the constant changes to their orders merely increased the ill feelings many of the senior officers held towards Mack. Following another freezing, rain-soaked night, the Austrian army finally broke camp on the morning of 13 October. It was the beginning of the end for the army of FML Mack.

____________

*
Sir Arthur Paget, British special envoy in Vienna, reporting on the Austrian army in Ulm, 1 November 1805.

Chapter 8