Austerlitz: Napoleon and the Eagles of Europe (6 page)

The tsar signed the treaty with Britain, excluding the contentious clauses, and on 28 July 1805 the act of ratification was finally complete. On 9 August Austria signed too, reassured of her own security by Napoleon’s apparent preoccupation with an invasion of Britain. The foundations of the Third Coalition were in place, strengthened by the commitment of Sweden and Naples to the cause. But despite Russia’s best efforts, Prussia could not be drawn in. By careful diplomacy Talleyrand lured King Frederick William III away from the coalition, with the prospect of the coveted prize of Hanover as reward for his neutrality.

Allied war plans had long been the subject for discussion while the diplomatic wranglings of the coalition dragged on. Now the alliance was officially in place, preparations for war were pressed forward with some
urgency, the intention being to gain the advantage while the French army was arrayed along the Channel coast. Grandiose schemes involving half a million Allied soldiers marching in a vast Europe-wide sweep, entranced the protagonists. Although vastly impressive on paper, these plans were, in practice, to prove far beyond the capabilities of the coalition’s commanders.

Napoleon left Milan early in July 1805 and returned to France. After a pause at Saint-Cloud he continued on to Boulogne, where he arrived in the bosom of his army on 3 August. By now any realistic hopes he held for a successful invasion of Britain had long since faded, but to his enemies, his presence at the coast would no doubt cast shadows over his intentions.

A year had passed since his last visit, at a time when he genuinely hoped to launch an invasion. Then, his senior army commanders had been warned to be ready, their soldiers already well-rehearsed in rapid embarkation. However, in order for the vast flotilla of invasion barges to cross the Channel safely, they needed the protection of French warships, but these were all bottled up in port by the British Royal Navy. Undeterred, Napoleon had ordered Admiral Latouche-Tréville to prepare to break out of Toulon, release ships from other blockaded ports, and clear the Channel for the invasion to begin. Fortunately for the soldiers of this flotilla of unseaworthy barges, the admiral died of disease on 20 August, forcing Napoleon to abandon the plan.

Other grand naval schemes formulated in September 1804 failed to disperse the superior British navy. But French naval power soon received a welcome boost. In October British ships had attacked four Spanish treasure ships sailing from Peru. In response, Spain declared war on Britain, leading inevitably to an alliance between France and Spain. In place of the former financial settlement, Spain now offered France her warships.

After a false start, a final plan to draw off the British navy got under way at the end of March 1805. Admiral Villeneuve, Latouche-Tréville’s replacement, broke out of Toulon with orders to pick up a squadron of Spanish ships at Cadiz before heading westwards across the Atlantic. At Martinique he was to rendezvous with the Brest fleet under Admiral Gantheaume, augmented by more Spanish ships. Napoleon felt sure a threat to the West Indies must lure the British navy to follow; then his fleets would double back and make all speed for Europe, arrive in the Channel by mid June/mid July and gain ascendancy long enough for the invasion of Britain to be launched. The plan met with partial success. Vice-Admiral Lord Nelson, after some delay, sailed in hot pursuit of Villeneuve but Gantheaume failed to break out of Brest. Having drawn Nelson westwards, Villeneuve then turned back, heading for Ferrol on Spain’s north-west coast, to pick up a Spanish squadron there before sailing for Brest and the Channel. With Nelson misdirected back towards Gibraltar there was a chance of success, but an encounter with a British fleet under Admiral Calder off the Spanish coast, although inconclusive, forced Villeneuve back to
Vigo. Unsettled by this engagement and needing to make repairs and disembark his sick, Villeneuve picked up the Ferrol squadron and sailed southwards to Cadiz. The last remote chance of a successful invasion now disappeared as Nelson, sailing northwards, joined the rest of the navy guarding the approaches to the Channel.

Now back on the French coast again, Napoleon gazed half-heartedly down the Channel for any indication of the safe arrival of Villeneuve’s fleet, but his earlier determination to march on London had faded. Yet to abandon the idea suggested failure, an option Napoleon was unprepared to accept. However, the continuing negotiations between Britain, Russia and Austria offered him a way out. Perhaps his annexation of Genoa aimed to force their hand; he knew well that Austria would find it difficult to ignore the move. If Austria and Russia took aggressive steps he could abandon his failing invasion plans and turn to face the new threat with his reputation untarnished. Whether he planned it or not, Genoa finally pushed the Allies over the edge; the great armies of France, Austria and Russia were on a collision course.

The French army, encamped along the Channel coast since summer 1803, was the finest assembled throughout the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. For two years the army lived and trained together in vast sprawling camps on or close to the coast of northern France and extending into Holland and Hanover. These camps, built by the soldiers themselves, formed permanent homes. They consisted of barrack huts, streets, squares, and even gardens. Each day the soldiers assembled to train and manoeuvre in every tactical combination of the army: from company to corps. Battalions drilled daily, brigades on alternate days, and divisions every third day. At other times they honed their skill in musketry and practised fieldwork construction. With officers and men living and working together, each gained confidence in, and respect for, the other.

These were important factors in an army where class barriers had been removed by the Revolution. Each of the great camps formed the nucleus for one of seven separate army corps: miniature armies – containing elements of infantry, cavalry and artillery – able to fight on their own or combine with other corps for larger engagements. The majority of units remained in these same formations from training to combat, boosting their morale or esprit de corps. Two of the corps were in occupation, I Corps (Maréchal Bernadotte) in Hanover and II Corps (Général de division Marmont) in Holland, while the smallest of the formations, VII Corps (Maréchal Augereau), encamped close to the port of Brest in Brittany. The remaining four corps – III Corps (Maréchal Davout), IV Corps (Maréchal Soult), V Corps (Maréchal Lannes) and VI Corps (Maréchal Ney) – were those assembled closest to Boulogne. With the addition of the Garde Impériale and Reserve Cavalry formations the total force amounted to about 190,000 men.

The basic infantry building block was the battalion, which could be either line (
ligne
) or light infantry (
légère
). Both consisted of nine companies. At full strength, a battalion numbered 1,078 officers and men, though these numbers fell rapidly on campaign. Generally, two battalions formed a regiment, one or two regiments a brigade, two or three brigades formed a division, and two or three divisions – augmented by a light cavalry brigade or division and artillery support – created a corps. Clearly, the size of a corps could vary greatly. The light cavalry regiments – hussars and
chasseurs à cheval
– suffered from the desperate shortage of horses in France in 1805, which meant they rarely attained 50 per cent of their full strength, fixed at just under 1,000 sabres. Two or three light cavalry regiments formed a brigade, and, generally, two brigades a division.

The shortage of mounts also had a serious effect on the dragoon regiments, which either formed separate divisions or added their strength to the corps. At the outset of the campaign in 1805 it became necessary to allocate a large number of men to formations of dismounted dragoons, but even so, barely 50 per cent of the reduced mounted target was achieved.

Heavy cavalry regiments –
cuirassier
and
carabinier
– formed separate reserve divisions operating outside the corps organisation. With each established at around 540 sabres, Napoleon put great effort in bringing these regiments – his shock troops – up to strength, and managed, on average, to mount 80 per cent of full regimental strength.

The final reserve formation, the Garde Impériale, formed two regiments of infantry, each close to their full strength of 1,700 men, but again the cavalry regiments were short of their establishment.

Although this army spent two years training, many of the soldiers already had significant military experience. Some 25 per cent of the army had served since the early Revolutionary battles, while another 25 per cent had fought at either Marengo or Hohenlinden in 1800. In all, about 44 per cent of the rank and file had seen previous service and virtually all officers and NCOs could boast similar experience.

This army – no longer the ‘Armée d’Angleterre’ but now operating as Napoleon’s first ‘Grande Armée’ – waited: well trained and ready for action, keen to exchange the monotonous drudgery of camp life for the adrenaline rush of combat. All but one of their corps commanders had recently entered the newly created ranks of the
Marshalate
, and each was an experienced soldier with years of combat experience behind him. They too were keen to march and test their commands under conditions more exacting than parade ground manoeuvres or mock battles.

The Russian army destined to oppose La Grande Armée had entered a period of necessary reform in 1801. During the earlier reign of Tsar Paul the army had taken a step back, towards the rigid doctrine of the era of Frederick the Great of Prussia, at the same time that France was successfully introducing
a more fluid style of warfare. Prior to his accession to the throne, Paul became obsessed with the military, a passion he indulged by creating his own small private army on his estate, which he delighted to drill and parade. When Paul became tsar he extended his outdated views to the rest of the army, and under the auspices of the strict disciplinarian Count Alexsei Arakcheev, began to introduce these retrograde changes, which had an unsettling effect on the army. However, following one of his dramatic mood swings, Paul dismissed Arakcheev from his service in 1799. Four years later, as war clouds gathered once more, Alexander – now enthroned as tsar – looked for assurances from his senior commanders that should diplomacy fail, the army was ready for war. With none forthcoming, he turned to the hated and feared Arakcheev, recalling him to office in May 1803. Appointing him inspector-general of artillery, he tasked him with developing that arm, and ensuring that, when the day for war should come, the army would be ready.

For the average soldier in the Russian army life was tough. Recruited by a levy on the population, the army drew the vast majority of its manpower from the serfs, the lowest social order in the Russian Empire, inured to a life of virtual slavery. Conscripted to the service for twenty-five years, few survived the hardships to return home again and were considered ‘dead’ by their families when the army escorted them away. But the personal experience of the serf – of blind obedience and stoicism in the face of great hardships – made for a solid, reliable and determined soldier: one well-prepared for a life on campaign.

The main infantry weapon of the Russian army, the 1798 pattern musket, was far inferior to the Charleville musket of the French. At 7.5kg it outweighed the Charleville by 70 per cent, making it difficult and cumbersome to handle in combat, and, much to the frustration of their officers, encouraged the men to fire from the hip, greatly reducing its effectiveness. Perhaps this excessive weight contributed to the Russian soldiers’ legendary fondness for the bayonet.

The officer corps of the army attracted much criticism. Generally drawn from the provincial gentry, although considered loyal and hardy, the ordinary line officers lacked education – many were barely literate – and with little chance of advancement, generally avoided excessive military activity. Above them the nobility populated the higher ranks, but although they passed through officer cadet schools, this level rarely showed any aptitude for staff or administrative work. Many with limited military knowledge or training, but with good connections at court, sought postings at general headquarters, which promised a more comfortable and less demanding way of life. To compensate for the lack of good quality senior officers, many foreign nationals were offered staff appointments in the Russian army.

Infantry regiments were of three types: musketeer, grenadier and
jäger
. Originally having two battalions, Alexander increased regiments to three in 1802. Grenadier regiments had one grenadier battalion and two of fusiliers,
while musketeer regiments had one grenadier battalion and two of musketeers. At full strength, a battalion of grenadiers or musketeers numbered just over 700 men, and the
jäger
just over 500.

In the cavalry, heavy
cuirassier
regiments and dragoons numbered a little over a 1,000 men, while the larger hussar and
uhlan
(lancers) regiments mustered just under 1,900. However, as in France, dramatic shortages of horseflesh meant these targets were unachievable in 1805.

Arakcheev’s modernisation of the artillery had begun to take effect but it remained generally inferior to French guns of similar categories. This fact was compounded by the poorer quality of Russian powder, which affected the striking power of both artillery pieces and muskets alike.

Although Tsar Paul introduced new drill regulations across the whole of the armed forces, many regiments abandoned these following his death and reverted to their own regimental versions, leading to a lack of overall consistency. Only for six weeks of the year, each summer, did officers and soldiers benefit from the experience of drilling and manoeuvring in any formations larger than the regiment. However, these combinations never became permanent and on campaign regiments and brigades regularly moved from one formation to another as needs arose, preventing senior commanders building a working relationship with their subordinates.