Battleship Bismarck (18 page)

*
Funkbeobachtungsdienst (radio intelligence)

*
The “V” stood for
Versenken
, the German term for ‘scuttle.’

7    Hitler Comes Aboard

On 1 May, the Fleet Command received a telephone call from Hitler’s naval aide, Fregattenkapitän Karl Jesko von Puttkamer, advising that the “Führer” intended to inspect the
Bismarck
and
Tirpitz
at Gotenhafen on the fifth. That day, Hitler, Feldmarschall
*
Wilhelm Keitel, von Puttkamer, Oberst
†
Nicolaus von Below, Hitler’s Luftwaffe aide, and the rest of the party arrived on Gotenhafen Roads aboard the
Hela.
Grossadmiral Raeder was conspicuously absent. The fleet commander conducted the tour of the ship and the “Führer’s Standard” waved over the
Bismarck
during the four hours that Hitler was on board. The crew was mustered on the upper deck in greeting, Oberbootsmann
‡
Kurt Kirchberg with beads of sweat on his forehead from the exertion of cleaning up the last traces of a bucket of paint that had been spilled on the starboard side of the upper deck aft a moment before Hitler came aboard.

Hitler, looking somewhat pale, and Keitel, followed by Lütjens and Lindemann, reviewed the crew. The party then inspected some of the ship’s equipment, which gave the responsible officers a chance to brief the “Führer” in their own areas. Hitler remained for an especially long time in the after gunnery computer space, where an extremely capable gunfire-plotting officer, Oberleutnant zur See Friedrich Cardinal, explained how the various intricate-looking devices
controlled gunfire. Keitel as well as Hitler seemed to be much impressed by Cardinal’s presentation, but neither asked any questions.

After touring the ship, Hitler, Lütjens, and a small group adjourned to the admiral’s quarters. There, Lütjens told of his experiences in action against British commerce in the Atlantic with the
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenau
, expressed optimism about an operation of this type with the
Bismarck
, and explained his immediate intentions. He considered it an advantage that in the
Bismarck
, which was more powerful than the
Scharnhorst
class, he would no longer be forced to avoid well protected convoys. This, however, did not solve his most difficult problem: getting his force out into the Atlantic without being spotted by the enemy. When Hitler suggested that, apart from anything else, the numerical superiority of the British fleet presented a great risk, Lütjens pointed to the
Bismarck’s
superiority over any single British capital ship. Her hitting and staying power were so great that he had no apprehension on that score. After a pause, he added that breaking out to the high seas would not by any means be the end of our worries. Quite clearly, torpedo planes from British aircraft carriers were a great danger that he would have to reckon with all the time he was in the Atlantic. Little did he know how directly his words bore on the impending fate of his flagship.

Apart from his remark about the superiority of the British fleet, Hitler remained silent throughout Lütjens’s presentation. This was probably no surprise to Lütjens. He must have been aware that Hitler, who was strictly a landsman, knew nothing whatever about the unique features of war at sea. Whenever the big ships were at sea, Hitler worried that they might be lost, which would be bad enough, and that their loss would damage his prestige, which would be still worse. While he viewed commerce-raiding as a deviation from the proper mission of warships, he often assessed its risks more realistically than did the experts. Be that as it may, he remained remote from matters concerning the sea and naval warfare. This characteristic was demonstrated that day aboard the
Bismarck
, when Hitler, who was very much interested in military technology, could not find a single word to say about this masterpiece of naval construction and weapon technology. He was not moved to comment.

At this time the Seekriegsleitung was afraid that Hitler might suddenly forbid any ocean operation for the
Bismarck
, a fear it had had in similar cases. Could that have been the reason why Lütjens did not tell Hitler that she was scheduled to sail in two weeks’ time? Had he and Raeder decided to keep quiet about it? Quite possibly so, because
Raeder did not report the departure of the
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
until 22 May, by which time the ships had been at sea for four days and were nearing the Denmark Strait, having entered the North Sea long before. Even with the operation that far under way, to get approval for it to continue, he would still have to overcome Hitler’s very considerable reservations. The latter who, as Puttkamer later reported, became extremely nervous following the report of the sailing, immediately responded, “Herr Grossadmiral, if at all possible, I would like to recall the ships.” Raeder objected that the preparations for the operation had already gone too far; no one would understand a recall at this time. The ensuing conversation was ended by Hitler with the words, “Well, perhaps now you have to leave things the way they are, but I have a very bad feeling.” No protocol would record these remarks; one would read only, “The Führer agreed …”

After the presentation in the admiral’s cabin, luncheon was served in the wardroom. Hitler’s preference for meatless fare being known, it was a vegetarian, one-course meal. For security reasons, Hitler was served by an SS-man, and said hardly anything while he ate. Afterwards, however, he started to talk. It was almost a monologue; only occasional comments came from others. I was seated a long way from the high-ranking people, but from what I could hear, Hitler spoke first about the German minority in Romania. He said that he intended “to haul these people back into the Reich in short order” if the government in Bucharest did not stop “harassing” them. On the subject of the United States, he expressed his belief that there was no question of her coming into the war, which, at any rate, would be decided in the Mediterranean. He declared that the Americans remembered the First World War and the unpaid debts of their former allies only too well: they were hardly likely to get themselves involved in another such undertaking and would gladly renounce sacrificing their soldiers in Europe again.

Lindemann disagreed with this point of view. He said he was not by any means prepared to write off the possibility that the United States would enter the war. Fregattenkapitän Oels was obviously extremely embarrassed by this contradiction, as it were, of the “Führer”: misgiving showed all over his face. At the end of these proceedings, Lütjens stood up and made a brief address. He talked about how the war at sea was going and the tasks that lay before the
Bismarck.
The objective, he said, was and always would be to beat the British wherever they showed themselves. There was no response.

*
Field Marshal

†
Colonel

‡
Warrant Officer

8    Departure from Gotenhafen

On 16 May 1941, Lütjens reported that the
Bismarck-Prinz Eugen
task force would be ready for Exercise Rhine on the eighteenth. Accordingly, Group North ordered him to enter the Great Belt at nightfall on the nineteenth. At about the same time, two freighters moved into the Atlantic to act as scouts, and a store ship and five tankers steamed for the Norwegian Sea and the Atlantic where they would resupply the task force.

Aboard the
Bismarck
on 18 May, Lütjens went over the operational details of the exercise with Lindemann and Kapitän zur See Helmuth Brinkmann of the
Prinz Eugen.
It was decided that, if the weather was favorable, they would bypass Korsfjord and make directly for the Norwegian Sea to rendezvous with the
Weissenburg
; then, if possible, go on through the Denmark Strait. There, they would be under cover of the Arctic fog yet, with the help of radar, able to maintain high speed. If enemy cruisers and auxiliary cruisers should appear in our path, they might have to be attacked. Paramount, however, was the preservation of the
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
so that they could spend maximum time in the area of operations. They were to proceed independently to the island of Rügen, where the task force would be formed on the morning of 19 May.

His operation order of 22 April shows that Lütjens favored the route through the Denmark Strait; from the outset, he gave it priority over any other. Hadn’t he done pretty well when he broke out through the Denmark Strait in the
Gneisenau
in early February? Why shouldn’t the poor visibility that prevails there most of the year help him again?
Apparently, that was how Lütjens thought—although I do not know for certain.
*
In any case, he apparently just took no notice of Group North’s recommendation that he use the Iceland-Faeroes passage. That command had warned against use of the Denmark Strait for what it viewed as very good reasons: its channel was relatively narrow, which made it easier for the enemy to watch; it would be simpler for the British to maintain contact in the north, because their forces there could draw their southern patrols into the search, which would not work in reverse; time and fuel would be saved if, immediately after leaving Norway, Lütjens took the nearer and shorter southern course; and on the southern course he would be able to gain a greater lead over the British ships that would sortie from Scapa Flow when word of the attempted German breakout was received.

The intensification of preparations for the approaching operation, the embarkation of the fleet staff with all its gear, the bunker-cleaning to which the entire crew was assigned on 17 May—all these developments made it clear that our departure from Gotenhafen was imminent.

Bunker-cleaning—a filthy job! A petty officer and a seaman, armed with a fresh-air pipe to enable them to breathe and a safety lamp, had to go into each bunker to clean out the sludge. They collected the muck in buckets, which were than passed from hand to hand, via the upper deck, to barges made fast alongside. Many a bucket reached the upper deck empty, its black contents having wound up on the men’s working uniforms somewhere along the way. The dirtiest work was done by Polish forced laborers, with whom the language difference made communication difficult. But after twenty-four hours the job was done, and the bunkers were spanking clean and ready to take on a new supply of fuel. The Polish workers were rewarded with schnaps and cigarettes.

Liberty was canceled as of noon 17 May. Towards midday on the eighteenth the
Bismarck
left the wharf at Gotenhafen. The fleet band stationed on the upper deck struck up
“Muss i denn”;
the tune traditionally played on large warships leaving for a long cruise. I must admit that I was more than a little surprised by this musical advertisement that Exercise Rhine had begun. I think it highly doubtful that either our Fleet Commander or our captain knew we were to have this musical program. In all likelihood, it did not occur to any
responsible officer that such a thing would happen, and therefore nothing was done to stop it. The bandmaster, aware that our departure was imminent, probably just automatically chose that song without giving the matter another thought. We did not put to sea immediately, however, but dropped anchor in the roadstead, in view of Gotenhafen. Great masses of provisions and fuel oil still had to be taken aboard. Although thousands of tons of fuel flowed into our bunkers, we could not fill them completely, because a hose ruptured, causing the fueling operation to be called off so that the mess could be cleaned up. By that time, our schedule forced provisioning to be brought to an end. The ship was not far short of being fueled to capacity, and no one then suspected how important this shortfall would become. The
Bismarck
sailed at 0200 on 19 May.