Battleship Bismarck (35 page)

It is also of interest in this connection to recall the signal, also encoded in short-signal format, sent by the
Prinz Eugen
, which Lütjens had detached to conduct independent operations, to report a similar fuel problem on 25 May: “Fuel situation urgent, my position is. . . .” As a result of this signal, immediately received by Group West, the
Prinz Eugen
and the tanker
Spichern
were directed to a meeting point, so that the cruiser could take on fuel the very next
morning. If the
Bismarck
had used the same short-signal group—that is, including her position—the battleship’s approximate location would have become known to Group West, although, of course, the operational situation would have made it impossible for her to refuel. But the knowledge of the ship’s approximate position would have been of value to Group West in planning the measures it initiated to assist the
Bismarck.

*
The Arado-196 had a 760-horsepower Bayerische Motoren Werke engine, a cruising speed of 240 kilometers per hour, a maximum speed of 275 kilometers per hour, a rate of climb of 300 meters per minute, a ceiling of 5,300 meters, and an endurance of three to five hours. It was armed with one 2-centimeter cannon in each wing and two machine guns. Under each wing it had a rack for one 50-kilogram bomb.

*
The position reported by Lütjens differs considerably from that reported by the Catalina shortly before. According to a subsequent reconstruction, both reports were in error as to our latitude, that of the Catalina by approximately twenty-five nautical miles, and that of the
Bismarck
by approximately eighty nautical miles. Such deviations can easily occur after long flights and cruises. (
See also
Ludovic Kennedy,
Pursuit
., pp. 154–55.)

*
Jochen Brennecke,
Schlachtschiff Bismarck
, page 156, quotes the following excerpt from the first batch of raw material (1951) for my subsequent book, which reached him only through an indiscretion and was never authorized for publication: “I do not know why at this time (1030, when we were rediscovered by the Catalina) the second stack built to mislead the enemy had not yet been set up or, in the same connection, why afterwards (between the disappearance of the Catalina and the appearance of a wheeled aircraft from the
Aik Royal
) it was not set up. On the contrary, our fire confirmed that we were the enemy. There is no way of knowing whether the aircraft would have been taken in by this stratagem. …”

To this extract, Brennecke appends footnote 267, in which Konteradmiral Hans Meyer (Retired) says: “The whole business of the dummy stack is in my opinion a fantasy. The order to build a second stack was certainly given, but the situation that developed very soon made it clear that it could not be erected.
The very harsh criticism along the lines of, ‘Only he who gives up is truly lost,’ at least in connection with the dummy stack, I hold to be absolutely unjustified
” (my italics).

Surprised by this appraisal of a “criticism” I had not made, I consulted the first edition of Brennecke’s book, published in 1960, and found, on page 307: “The mistaken attack [by aircraft from the
Ark Royal
on the evening of 26 May] on the
Sheffield
made one thing clear: the crucial value the second stack built on board the
Bismarck
could have had, if it had been set up. In the uncertainty that prevailed after this attack on the
Sheffield
, which did not look anything like the
Bismarck
, no British pilot would have dared attack a two-stack ship because the two-stack British ships
Renown, King George V
, and
Sheffield
were in the area. Perhaps the decisive hit [the hit on the
Bismarck’s
rudder later that evening] would not have been made.
Here, too, one might say, Only he who gives up is truly lost
” (my italics). Brennecke has deleted that passage, his own words, from his fourth edition. He simply attaches Meyer’s negative evaluation to my words, which gave no occasion for it.

Furthermore, in the cited footnote Meyer says: “Bad weather also came up. The dummy would have hardly been able to withstand the wind pressure. It was a matter of surface area. The situation might have been different if the ship had reached the open Atlantic, where only single aircraft were to be anticipated, not a battle at any moment, and where there would also have been time to tidy up the dummy. Presumably, the dummy was meant for this situation.” My reply to that is: When the dummy was being built on 25 May and the following day the wind was blowing from astern. It was strong but, on our course, the wind pressure was light and would not have had the effect that Meyer assumes. Secondly, the dummy was certainly not intended for use in the Atlantic. We had to get to St. Nazaire by the quickest, i.e., the most direct, route. The order to build the stack proceeded, at least originally, from a feeling that we needed it immediately. After 24 May, most of the actions of the fleet staff and the ship’s command were determined only by immediate needs.

26    Tovey’s Hopes Are Pinned on the Ark Royal

In the meantime, several of the British ships were forced by their dwindling fuel supplies to abandon the pursuit towards the west coast of France.
The Prince of Wales
, the
Victorious
, their escorting destroyers, and the
Suffolk
dropped out of the race. The
Norfolk
, having been convinced from the start that the
Bismarck
was making for Brest, did not take the search course to the north, and was consequently in a quite favorable position. The
Rodney
was even more advantageously placed. She had proceeded on the same assumption as the
Norfolk
, but was too far to the south at the start ever to have joined in a pursuit to the north. The positions of the
Rodney
and
Norfolk
were only relatively favorable, however, because like the
King George V
, they were much too far behind the
Bismarck
on course for France to be any threat to her unless her speed were significantly reduced. When the hunt began, the
Ramillies
was not unfavorably placed, but she was withdrawn on account of her age and lack of speed.

At the moment, then, to attack the German battleship as soon as possible, Tovey had only Somerville’s Force H, which was to the south. This task force and Tovey’s had been steaming virtually towards one another since 24 May. In the beginning Tovey thought Force H was too far to the south to be able to take part in the pursuit. Now, it was the only force that was in a position to stop the
Bismarck.
And, that was certainly not because it included the
Renown
and the
Sheffield.
The loss of the
Hood
had shown the folly of pitting such ships against the
Bismarck
unless they had the support of
heavier forces. It was upon the aircraft of the
Aik Royal
that he would have to rely. Their job was to cripple the
Bismarck
with their torpedoes so that Tovey’s own big ships could come up for a decisive engagement—a situation that had to be created at once, because he was getting ever nearer to the effective range of the Luftwaffe. Tovey was aware that this was his one and only chance to avoid the barren alternative of calling off the days-long pursuit through the Atlantic. He had to remind himself that the attack by the planes of the
Victorious
on 24 May had not been successful, but their crews were young and inexperienced, whereas the
Ark Royal
had the best-trained and most experienced aircrews in the Royal Navy—with them, the prospects would be much better.

Since the morning of 25 May, Somerville had been going on the assumption that the
Bismarck
was heading for Brest. On the basis of running reports on the position of the German battleship, he launched ten of the
Ark Royal’s
Swordfish for reconnaissance on the morning of 26 May. Six other Swordfish, equipped with auxiliary fuel tanks to increase their range, joined them. They were to shadow the
Bismarck
once she had been found. Following their launching around 0830 nothing was heard from them for two hours. Then, around 1030, the radiomen in the
Renown
and
Ark Royal
recorded an incoming message: “One battleship bearing 240° five miles, course 150°, my position 49°33′ north, 21°47′ west.” It did not come, as the people in the carrier hoped, from one of the Swordfish, but from the Catalina. This did not diminish the warmth of its welcome, and when the Catalina lost contact after being fired on by the
Bismarck
, it was a Swordfish that found the battleship again and maintained contact.

Thereafter Somerville’s objective was an aerial torpedo attack on the
Bismarck.
The first opportunity to launch from the
Ark Royal
came in the early afternoon and, regardless of the stormy weather, fifteen Swordfish took off at 1450. Around the same time, he sent the
Sheffield
to maintain contact with the
Bismarck
, because, with the weather deteriorating, it seemed to him risky to depend on observation from the air. Unaware that the
Sheffield
had been given this mission, the skipper of the
Ark Royal
, Captain Loben E. Maund, told his pilots that there would not be any ship in view between the
Ark Royal
and the
Bismarck.
Consequently, when they detected a ship on their radar, they dived through the clouds and launched their attack. Only three of the pilots at the last moment recognized their faithful old target ship
Sheffield
and withheld their fire. Defects in their magnetic
detonators caused most of the torpedoes that were launched to explode harmlessly upon entering the water. Fortunately, by putting on full speed, the
Sheffield
avoided the handful of torpedoes that ran well. Nevertheless the aircrews returned to the Ark
Royal
in a gloomy mood, and were consoled only by the promise that they would be launched again that evening. In spite of the gloom, the incident had its bright side in that it revealed the failure of the magnetic detonators. For the next attack, the Swordfish fell back on their old, reliable contact detonators.

For Tovey, who had not been told that the planes had mistaken the
Sheffield
for the
Bismarck
, the
Ark Royal’s
report of an unsuccessful attack was bitter news. He had little reason to think that another attack that same evening would be successful. Once more, he reviewed the whole situation. Unless the
Bismarck
could somehow be crippled on the night of 26 May, on the morning of 27 May she would have as good as escaped. In other words, an attack that evening would be the very last chance. Considering the continuing deterioration of the weather, he did not expect much from a night attack by the destroyers. Both the
King George V
and the
Rodney
were reaching the limits of their fuel endurance. Unless the next few hours brought a decisive change, the
King George V
would have to drop out of the race.

At 1820 Tovey signaled Somerville that if the
Bismarck’s
speed was not reduced by midnight, the
King George V
would have to turn away to refuel. The
Rodney
, he said, could continue the pursuit, without destroyers, if need be.

It was hard for Tovey to send that signal. For four days and nights, over 2,000 nautical miles, he had pursued the
Bismarck
, from the Denmark Strait almost into the Bay of Biscay, with a great body of ships. Should this tremendous effort really have been for nothing?

At 1700 the
Sheffield
made out the German battleship at the limit of visibility. For the first time since the
Suffolk, Norfolk
, and
Prince of Wales
had lost contact, one-and-a-half days ago, a ship had visual contact with the
Bismarck.
The
Sheffield
did everything she could to avoid being seen by us. Her mission was only to help the second wave of carrier planes find the target and to maintain contact.