Read Bill James Guide to Baseball Managers, The Online
Authors: Bill James
Tags: #SPORTS &, #RECREATION/Baseball/History
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Connie Mack was a
great
manager. There is a lot of misunderstanding about this, because Mack stayed too long, and in the end he lost more games than he won. He had some great teams, but he had a bunch of terrible teams, too, and I believe that the general impression is that he didn’t really do too much that any other manager wouldn’t have done if he’d owned the team and been able to manage for fifty years.
If I had a baseball team, and I could hire any manager ever to manage that team, Connie Mack would be on the short list.
John McGraw managed in 1899, then managed from 1901 to 1932. Connie Mack managed in 1894–96, and then managed from 1901 to 1932, and beyond.
John McGraw’s record is the best of any manager who ever lived. If you look at Connie Mack’s record in the same years, up to 1932, it’s not as good as John McGraw’s, but it’s 90% as good. From 1901 to 1932, Mack
a) won eight pennants,
b) won five World Series,
c) finished over .500 twenty-one times, and
d) was 274 games over .500.
In the middle of that record is a ten-year abscess (1915–1924), which is completely attributable to Mack’s inability to pay competitive salaries.
McGraw, in the same period, won ten pennants and three World Series, and was over .500 twenty-seven times. If you leave out the ten-year dead spot attributable to the lack of money, Mack’s record is a lot
better
than John McGraw’s.
After 1932 Mack had to sell off his players again, and by the time that drought was over, Connie was old and out of touch with the game, so his career ends with eighteen years of miserable baseball, a weighty anchor which sinks his career record. You can talk about that if you want to, but my point is that the Connie Mack who was good was very good indeed.
What made him good? Three things, one of which is so obvious we can dismiss it quickly. Like John McGraw, Mack had a staggering command of the details of the game.
The two other things:
1) From 1900 to 1930, the manager’s job began with bringing talent into the system. I’ve written about it other places, but the manager was responsible for signing young players, and for making trades. Mack didn’t make many trades, although he did bring in a few key players that way.
Because the manager had to bring in young players, he had to network, to use the 1990s term, with the entire baseball world. Whenever there was a young man who might be good anywhere in the baseball world, the manager needed to hear about him, and he had to make a decision about him, and if he was really good then he had to acquire him.
Connie Mack was better at that game than anybody else in the world. People liked Mack, respected him, and trusted him, and there were times when Mack got players for that reason. Mack answered every letter and listened patiently to every sales job, and there were times when he got players for that reason.
And he knew a young ballplayer when he saw one. Mack personally scouted Mickey Cochrane. He was so impressed, he purchased the team which owned Cochrane’s contract, just to get Cochrane. He personally scouted Al Simmons, overlooked his odd batting stance, and acquired his contract. This wasn’t all that easy. Mack was in his sixties by the time he saw those two young players, and his team didn’t have too many days off. But when he had a day off, he got out and saw a game somewhere.
2) Better than any other manager, Mack understood and promoted intelligence as an element of excellence.
Mack looked for seven things in a young player: physical ability, intelligence, courage, disposition, will power, general alertness, and personal habits. He knew that if he got men who had these qualities, everything else would fall into place.
This is an oversimplification, but John McGraw wanted empty vessels, into which he could instill his own concept of how baseball was to be played. If a player was intelligent, in McGraw’s world, that was great; that meant that he could soak up McGraw’s teachings more rapidly.
Connie Mack also wanted intelligent players. Mack wanted young people who would learn from experience, and who would learn from each other. He preferred educated players. He preferred self-directed, self-disciplined, self-motivated players. He preferred gentlemen.
Not that everybody on Mack’s teams was Eddie Collins or Sam Chapman, but that was what he was looking for. Yes, he had Ty Cobb, who was certainly not a gentleman, but Ty Cobb
a) was extremely bright,
b) worked extremely hard, and
c) knew as much about playing baseball as anybody in the world.
Yes, he had the manchild Rube Waddell, and he had Lefty Grove, who was a hothead, but there just was something he couldn’t resist about a left-hander with a 100-MPH fastball. He had Jimmie Foxx, who was a big bumpkin, but Jimmie Foxx could hit a fastball 500 feet. Mack wasn’t stupid; he knew that you couldn’t overlook those things.
But he also knew that he would get more out of those guys if he surrounded them with intelligent players than if he surrounded them with dull-witted men who were just burrowing through their careers.
There is an element of elitism in this. Although Mack and McGraw were products of essentially the same cultural background, McGraw would eagerly have signed black players, had he been able to. Mack might not have.
But at the same time, it wasn’t all about winning. Winning was the end product of doing the right things.
If Howard Ehmke had gone to John McGraw and asked for a chance to pitch in the 1929 World Series, McGraw would have said no, because McGraw was obsessively afraid of losing. He would have seen the idea of pitching Ehmke as being a chance to lose a game by not using his best pitcher. Mack wasn’t afraid of losing.
McGraw’s philosophy was, you have to control every element of the player’s world and get rid of everything in there that might cause you to lose a game. Mack’s philosophy was, you get good people, you treat them well, and you’ll win. McGraw’s approach was and is much more common among managers and coaches in all sports. But Mack won just as often, and his approach has another advantage.
If you do it Connie Mack’s way, you won’t drink yourself into an early grave.
Year of Birth:
1863
Years Managed:
1894–1896, 1901–1950
Record As a Manager:
3,731–3,948, .486
Managers for Whom He Played:
Mack played for John Gaffney, Walter Hewett, Ted Sullivan, John Morrill, Arthur Irwin, Jack Rowe, Jay Faatz, Ned Hanlon, Bill McGunnigle, Al Buckenberger, and Tom Burns. Many of these men were large figures in nineteenth-century baseball. Sullivan is believed to have coined the term “fan.” Irwin was the first man to put padding in a baseball glove.
Others by Whom He Was Influenced:
The strongest influence on Mack was his mother, Mary (McKillop) McGillicuddy. He was also influenced by his first minor league manager, whose name was Tom Reilly. His boyhood hero was Cap Anson.
Characteristics As a Player:
Mack was a light-hitting catcher, had a reputation as a smart player, but didn’t do anything particularly well as a player.
Mack, tall and very thin, was a catcher. The idea that catchers should be short, squat men does not appear to have developed until about 1910.
WHAT HE BROUGHT TO A BALL CLUB
Was He an Intense Manager or More of an Easy-to-Get-Along-With Type?
He was easygoing. He was a gentleman.
Was He More of an Emotional Leader or a Decision Maker?
By his own choice, Mack was a decision maker. He was a team architect, a man who made decisions about ballplayers and then attempted to help those men play as well as they could.
At the same time, Mack unquestionably set the emotional tone for his clubhouse, not only because all managers do, but because Mack was so different from most baseball men in his era.
Was He More of an Optimist or More of a Problem Solver?
Mack was an optimist. He tried to give every player a full opportunity to work through his difficulties.
HOW HE USED HIS PERSONNEL
Did He Favor a Set Lineup or a Rotation System?
A set lineup.
Did He Like to Platoon?
I am not aware that Mack ever used a traditional platoon. He did use a kind of platoon at second base for several years, Jimmie Dykes and Max Bishop. Dykes was a regular-at-several-positions, like Frankie Frisch.
Did He Try to Solve His Problems with Proven Players or with Youngsters Who Still May Have Had Something to Learn?
He always used youngsters. The only veterans that he brought in, with a few exceptions, were superstars on their last legs, whom he liked to keep around as an influence on the young stars.
How Many Players Did He Make Regulars Who Had Not Been Regulars Before, and Who Were They?
Too numerous to mention. The Hall of Famers and near Hall of Famers that he developed include Jimmie Foxx, Mickey Cochrane, Eddie Collins, Eddie Plank, Lefty Grove, Al Simmons, Bob Johnson, Jimmie Dykes, Chief Bender, Jack Coombs, Home Run Baker, Wally Schang, Stuffy McInnis, Bullet Joe Bush, Herb Pennock, Bob Shawkey, Rube Bressler, Eddie Rommell, Wally Moses, Joe Dugan, and George Kell.
Did He Prefer to Go with Good Offensive Players or Did He Like the Glove Men?
Mack’s best teams had so much talent that he was never forced to try to get extra offense at a position by skimping on defense. There were several times in his career when he did use marginal defensive players in the infield to get their bats in the order—for example, Home Run Baker was not a great defensive third baseman, Maxie Bishop was not much of a second baseman, and in 1933 Mack’s shortstop was Dib Williams, a good hitter (.289 with 11 homers, 73 RBI), but a very erratic fielder. Later, Mack tried unusuccessfully to use Jimmie Foxx as a third baseman or a catcher, and to use Bob Johnson, a slugging outfielder, at second base.
Did He Like an Offense Based on Power, Speed, or High Averages?
He used a structured offense—leadoff men with very high on-base percentages, middle-of-the-order men with power. Thirteen of Mack’s teams led the league in home runs, whereas only nine of them led in batting average, and only two in stolen bases.
Did He Use the Entire Roster or Did He Keep People Sitting on the Bench?
He used his bench little, with the exception of a couple of bench players who became quasi-regulars.
Did He Build His Bench Around Young Players Who Could Step into the Breach If Need Be, or Around Veteran Role-Players Who Had Their Own Functions Within a Game?
Mack’s handling of Jimmie Foxx was exactly the same as John McGraw’s handling of Mel Ott. He took on Foxx as a seventeen-year-old kid and worked with him for four years until Foxx was ready to be a regular. His handling of Eddie Collins is similar to McGraw’s development of Frankie Frisch. But as a generalization, John McGraw liked to take on young kids and develop them slowly. Mack took on players two or three years older, often college men, and slapped them straight into the lineup.
Mack’s bench was generally composed of older players, often minor league veterans, whose basic function was to protect him from injuries and to pinch-hit. He was much less creative in the use of his bench than was John McGraw.
GAME MANAGING AND USE OF STRATEGIES
Did He Go for the Big-Inning Offense, or Did He Like to Use the One-Run Strategies?
He was a big-inning manager.
Did He Pinch-Hit Much, and If So, When?
Not much, and conventionally. He would use his fourth and fifth outfielders to pinch-hit for his pitcher when he was behind in the late innings.
Was There Anything Unusual About His Lineup Selection?
For years he used Eddie Collins, who had leadoff-hitter type-skills, as a number-three hitter. Also, it was Mack who broke the convention of hitting the catcher eighth. Of course, he had Mickey Cochrane, who was the best-hitting catcher since Buck Ewing, so I would assume that almost any manager would have done the same.
Did He Use the Sac Bunt Often?
Very little.
Did He Like to Use the Running Game?
Very little. He had some good individual base stealers, but only two of Mack’s teams ever led the league in stolen bases, and one of those was in 1950, when Mack’s lieutenants were in complete charge of the team.
In What Circumstances Would He Issue an Intentional Walk?
In 43 World Series games, Mack issued only two intentional walks, both in conventional circumstances—late innings, score tied. The two intentional walks were in 1914, Game Three, and 1930, Game Six.
Did He Hit and Run Very Often?
Not much.
Were There Any Unique or Idiosyncratic Strategies That He Particularly Favored?
His handling of his starting pitchers in World Series games was very odd, and is essentially inexplicable. In 1910 he used only two pitchers, Jack Coombs and Chief Bender, not using his veteran superstar Eddie Plank (16–10) or anyone else. In 1911 Plank went 22–8—and still pitched very little in the World Series. Again, he used only three pitchers in the series.
In 1913 he had five starting pitchers who won 14 games or more, yet he again used only three pitchers in the World Series.
In 1929 he didn’t start the best pitcher in baseball, Lefty Grove, instead starting Howard Ehmke in Games One and Five, George Earnshaw in Game Two and again in Game Three, and forty-five-year-old Jack Quinn in Game Four. Grove pitched relief.
In the main, Mack was a straightforward strategic manager. He did not believe that baseball revolved around managerial strategy.
How Did He Change the Game?
Mack was one of the first managers to work hard on repositioning his fielders, shifting to one side if he didn’t feel this batter could pull this pitcher, telling the third baseman to guard the lines/not guard the lines, etc.
Like McGraw, Mack was something of an anomaly in his own time and did not have the broad, sweeping impact of a Branch Rickey or a Harry Wright. His greatest impact was in establishing orthodoxy in how the game was played.
An odd thought—Mack
would
have had greater impact on succeeding generations, if college baseball had achieved greater popularity in the 1920s and 1930s. Mack liked college players, and for that reason many of his players became college coaches. Jack Coombs, Mack’s best pitcher in 1910–1911, became a college coach, and wrote the most popular “How-to-Play-Baseball” type of book published between 1900 and 1940. Andy Coakley, a twenty-game winner for Mack in 1905, was the longtime coach at Columbia, where he coached Lou Gehrig. Dick Siebert, who played for Connie Mack from 1938 to 1945, also wrote the most popular How-to-Play-Baseball type of book in his era.
HANDLING THE PITCHING STAFF
Did He Like Power Pitchers, or Did He Prefer to Go with the People Who Put the Ball in Play?
His best pitchers had exceptional fast balls. Rube Waddell, Jack Coombs, Lefty Grove, Bullet Joe Bush—these were among the hardest throwers of their time. George Earnshaw was a hard thrower.
On the other hand, he had Eddie Rommel, a knuckleball pitcher, and Eddie Plank, whose strongest points were control and composure.
Did He Stay with His Starters, or Go to the Bullpen Quickly?
He was more inclined to stay with the starter. He got as far as using his top starting pitchers to finish out the wins of the other starters. Mack did that, as most managers did, in the years 1925–1940. He never really got beyond that.
Did He Use a Four-Man Rotation?
Probably for some portions of a season, but never for a full season. The A’s didn’t really go to a four-man rotation until after he retired.
Did He Use the Entire Staff, or Did He Try to Get Five or Six People to Do Most of the Work?
He got as much as he could out of his top pitchers.
How Long Would He Stay with a Starting Pitcher Who Was Struggling?
In a crucial game, not long at all. Early in the season, a long way.
What Was His Strongest Point As a Manager?
See “
Mack’s Marks
.”
If There Was No Professional Baseball, What Would He Probably Have Done with His Life?
He would have become manager of the shoe factory in Brookfield, Massachusettes, where he worked as a youth.
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