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Authors: Odd Arne Westad

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overthrow the reactionary government of the GMD."

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The PLA' s victory in the region not only accelerated the progress of the Chinese Revolution but also effectively promoted the development of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the CCP.

From the winter of 1948-1949 on, Stalin began to take personal control of Soviet policy toward China. In December 1948 Kovalev was recalled to Moscow to report on the rapidly changing Chinese political situation. According to Kovalev, when he returned to China in January 1949, his task already had shifted from providing the CCP with technical assistance to reporting directly to Stalin about CCP policies and leaders. In particular, he was instructed to maintain personal contact between Stalin and Mao.
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On January 14, 1949, a CPSU Politburo meeting discussed Mao's proposed visit to Moscow. Stalin decided to send Anastas Mikoyan as his commissioner to the CCP CC headquarters in Xibaipo. Obviously Stalin needed to learn more about the CCP and its current policies before deciding on a new China policy.
The confusion created by Stalin's January messages to Mao on negotiations with the GMD were a main reason why Mikoyan was dispatched to Xibaipo so hurriedly. There has been considerable debate among Chinese historians about whether Mikoyan passed on a message from Stalin advising the PLA not to cross the Yangzi River.
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What we do know is that on January 10, Stalin notified Mao that Moscow had received a message from the GMD requesting that the Soviets, together with the British and Americans, mediate in the civil war. Stalin attached a draft Soviet reply, which said that "the Soviet Government has consistently advocated stopping the Civil War and re-establishing peace in China. However, before agreeing to mediation, the Soviet Government hopes to know whether the other side [i.e., the CCP] will agree to the mediation."
In his message, Stalin told Mao that
If you [the CCP] were asked about your opinion, you could make the following reply: "The CCP has always supported peace in China. However, China's Civil War was not started by the CCP. It was started by the Nanjing Government which should bear the responsibility for the consequences of the war. The CCP agrees to negotiate with the GMD, but not with those war criminals who started the Civil War. The CCP advocates direct negotiation with the GMD. It does not need foreign mediators to get involved because it believes that such foreign mediation is not acceptable. They use their armed forces and navy to participate in the Civil War against the PLA. Such countries could not be considered neutral and objective in eliminating war in China."

 

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On January 13 Mao replied to Stalin:
We believe that the Soviet Government should make the following reply to the request of the Nanjing Government's memorandum for Soviet mediation, that is, the Soviet Union has been and still is willing to see China become peaceful, democratic, and united. However, it is Chinese people's own affair as to what means to use to achieve these ends. The Soviet Union follows the principle of non-intervention in other countries' domestic affairs and hence finds it inconvenient to mediate between the two sides of the Civil War.
Mao also told Stalin that the Soviet draft would mislead the United States and other Western countries into believing that involvement in mediation would be "proper." The GMD could exploit the proposed statement and blame the CCP for being "warlike." As to the situation within the CCP, Mao said, accepting the GMD's proposal for negotiations, even if only in principle, could provoke confusion among party members.
Before receiving Mao's reply, Stalin sent off a second telegram, explaining that the purpose of his suggestions was to allow the CCP to seize the political initiative. Upon receiving Mao's telegram on January 13, Stalin argued that he foresaw two scenarios in case the CCP agreed to negotiate: The GMD might refuse to negotiate and therefore would have to take responsibility for continuing the war; or, if the GMD agreed to talk, the CCP could raise prerequisites that the GMD would have to turn down. In both cases the CCP would gain the advantage. But Stalin added that this was merely a suggestion, which the CCP did not have to accept. After Mao agreed in principle to Stalin's analysis in a hastily prepared telegram on January 11, Stalin decided to drop the matter of Soviet involvement in any form of mediation.

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It is hard to fathom Stalin's motives in sending these messages. Probably he would have preferred some form of political ending to the civil war, with the Communists in control, as a means to avoid American intervention. At the time, the basic policy of the GMD government led by Li Zongren was to seek a temporary north-south division of China, using the Yangzi River as demarcation line. Although there is little reason to believe that Stalin was out to rescue Li's regime, his behavior put the CCP leaders in a very uncomfortable position.
Mikoyan arrived at Xibaipo on January 31. Over the next three days, Mao and other CCP leaders held extensive talks with him and related details of the CCP's domestic and foreign policies as well as some internal party matters. Mikoyan transmitted Stalin's responses to his Chinese hosts. According to what we know now, the major issues in the bilateral talks included the CCP's strategy and current policy, past problems in the relationship, the Northeast, Xinjiang, and Mon-

 

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golia, and the reformulation of the relationship after the creation of a CCP-led state.
Mao Zedong presented the military situation to Mikoyan, stressing that the PLA was about to cross the Yangzi River and that the likelihood of U.S. military involvement was very small. After winning the war, the CCP would establish a people's democratic dictatorship. The new government would carry out a pro-Soviet foreign policy and seek Soviet aid in its economic reconstruction. Mikoyan did not object to any of the CCP's principal policies.
In order to make his views plain to the Soviets in preparation for a visit to Moscow, Mao briefed Mikoyan on the history of his struggle against Wang Ming's policies. The fact that Mikoyan was instructed beforehand not to meet with Wang Ming indicates that Stalin wanted to avoid any suspicions regarding his support of Mao and to stay clear of political conflicts within the CCP. Mikoyan transmitted Mao's views on party history to Stalin.
Mao cautiously expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would return the Northeast to full Chinese sovereignty when the new state had been set up. Mikoyan told Mao that Stalin thought the 1945 Sino-Soviet pact unequal. When the CCP took power, the Soviet Union would first sign a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and then withdraw its forces from Lüshun. If the CCP could not accept this formula, the Soviet Union was willing to withdraw immediately. Mikoyan also expressed Soviet opposition to the Xinjiang independence movement but made clear that the Soviets insisted on keeping Outer Mongolia as an independent state.

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The talks ended positively for both sides; a Soviet leader had established a personal relationship with Mao, and the two parties found that there were few, if any, concrete issues on which they disagreed. But the main problem of how to work out relations between the new Chinese state and Moscow had not been resolved.

The relationship between Mao and Stalin had been at a low in early 1949 following the Soviet leader's unfortunate meddling just as CCP armies were preparing to cross the Yangzi and defeat the GMD. Although Mikoyan did much to set things right, Soviet leaders could not avoid drawing ideological inferences when formulating their foreign policies and evaluating CCP behavior. The military victories caused Soviet leaders gradually to abandon their previous practice of belittling the CCP's strength. But Stalin still straddled the more fundamental issue: What would political relations between a CCP government and the Soviet Union be like? The Soviet-CCP relationship still had many hurdles to clear. In some ways, the histories of the CCP and the Yugoslav party were similar, and Stalin would have to draw lessons from experience and be cautious in developing relations with an independent-minded and nationalistic CCP. But he

 

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could not risk alienating the Chinese Communists over minor matters just as they were taking power.
Stalin's need to avoid minor quibbles explains his willingness to let the CCP conduct its own foreign relations in some areas. In spite of his enduring suspicions of CCP ideological impurity created in part by the party' s attempts to cooperate independently with the United States during and after World War II -Stalin in 1949 believed he could countenance some degree of CCP-U.S. contact without losing control. On March 15 Stalin instructed Kovalev to convey to the CCP that the Soviet Union had no intention of interferring in the CCP's trade with "capitalist countries."

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In April Stalin told Mao that in order to prevent the United States from dividing China, the CCP should propose to establish diplomatic relations with the United States on the condition that the latter sever its relations with the GMD government.
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In early 1949 the CCP leaders began to design the foreign policy of New China. At a Politburo meeting in January, Mao said that the New China "should not be anxious to get diplomatic recognition from the imperialist countries. We want to overthrow them, not to recognize them." China, according to Mao, "should busy itself with discussing the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations with the Sòviet Union and other people's democracies."
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However, no detailed guidelines concerning the new foreign policy were provided. The relevant directives of the Politburo primarily concerned how to deal with the diplomatic missions of Western countries in China.
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Mikoyan's visit and the development of the CCP's relations with the Soviet Union prompted the party to make a series of new foreign policy decisions. At the second session of the CC of the Seventh CCP Congress in early March, Mao Zedong warmly praised the Soviet Union for its support and assistance. He said that "the relationship between China and the Soviet Union is a close and brotherly relationship. The Soviet Union and we should stand on the same front. We are allies. We should publicly issue a statement when an appropriate opportunity comes."
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In his formal report at the conference, Mao in fact announced that the New China would "lean to one side" (toward the Soviets) in its diplomatic relations.
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This conference signified that the CCP CC was opting for a formal alliance with the Soviet Union.
To the CCP leaders, in a global straggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, any political force must decide on which side it stood. However, political principle was not always diplomatic policy. The New China and the United States could, given time, establish a normal relationship even though it had to be ranked behind that with the Soviet Union. Although never firm in their beliefs on this point, throughout the civil war the CCP leaders tended to believe

 

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