Choque: The Untold Story of Jiu-Jitsu in Brazil 1856-1949 (Volume 1) (20 page)

Looking at the fight in retrospect, it is obvious that Aleixo understood
exactly what he needed to do to stop George, which was to prevent him from getting close enough to clinch and take the fight to the ground. He explicitly said so
[“
nã
o deixaria agrarrar pelo adversario
”]. He simply wasn’t good enough, or young enough, to do what he knew he needed to do.

In that sense it was true that capoeiragem hadn
’t been defeated because it hadn’t been used. But that was exactly what George Gracie intended. Like every jiu-jitsu fighter, his strategy was to defeat capoeiras, and other strikers, precisely by not letting them do what they did best.

The public and press were unkind to Mario Aleixo. His
reputation never recovered. No one mentioned that he had lasted longer against George Gracie than Matsuda and Sada Miyako did against Sam MacVey and Cyriaco in 1908 and 1909, respectively.

Jiu-Jitsu versus
Luta Livre

S
ã
o Paulo was too small to contain a man like Geo Omori.
Sã
o Paulo was a business town. Paulistas were generally too busy making money to have time for fun. Rio, in addition to being the political capital of the country, was also the national party town. One of the things that Cariocas [Rio people] liked doing was watching fights. Consequently, Rio had plenty of fighters. Everyone sooner or later went to Rio.

As early as
January 1929, Omori publically expressed the desire to fight in Rio.
Diario Carioca
reported that “Geo Omori, the capable jiu-jitsu champion wants to come to Rio to confront our fighters“ [“
Geo Omori, um habil camp
eã
o de jiu-jtsu, quer vir ao Rio enfrentar nossos lutadores
”]. For the benefit of local readers who did not know him,
Diario Carioca
explained that Omori was, like most other Japanese, small, but had beaten enormous men, such as Ervin Klausner and Ismail Haki and other notable boxers, as well as numerous capoeiras of middling ability [
mais ou menos habeis
].
127

As noted above, Omori was in
Rio again in November 1931 to challenge any Brazilian or foreign capoeiras, lutadors do “catch-as-catch-can”, jiu-jitsu, or luta greco-romana who wanted to meet him in the ring. Many quickly responded. Doing so committed them to nothing but guaranteed public attention for whatever purpose they or their “managers” had in mind.

One who stepped up was the strong Portuguese luta livre champion Manoel Fernandes. Negotiations immediately ensued, most of which were regularly reported in the daily newspapers. Details to be ironed out included when and where, what the rules would be, and how the money would be divided. Fights could and were arranged on a few days notice, but usually negotiations dragged on for many months. There were more often than not numerous delays and postponements, some for unexplained and mysterious reasons, others due to training injuries, scheduling conflicts (football games had priority), disputes over payment, and
mau tempo
(bad weather, generally rain). Sometimes after many months of publicity and postponements, the fight simply never happened. In some cases, the commission got wind of a “work” and banned the fight. Other times, most probably, the fight was never intended anyway and was simply publicity, possibly for different fights, possibly to advertise an academy.

The Omori versus Fernandes fight, organized by Carlos Gracie, was scheduled for December 17 at Theatro Republica. It was postponed until
October 1932 but it is worth looking at now because it represents the standard course of marketing for a fight during the 1930’s.
128

Carlos Gracie represented Omori in the rules negotiations. Carlos was opposed to fighting
“
sem kimono
” [without kimono], especially against a larger opponent. Omori didn’t care. It might have been a disadvantage, or rather lack of an advantage depending on one’s point of view, but for Omori, it was primarily an economic decision. Most of his potential opponents were luta livre fighters and didn’t want to wear kimonos.

Omori accepted that fact. But Omori objected to the pinning rule, citing Fernandes
’ 15-20 kilo weight advantage.
129
This was always a problem. Pinning [
encostamento dos espaduas
] was part of the luta livre rule-set, so luta livre representatives pleaded that they would be handicapped if they couldn’t make use of it. It was one of the “resources” of their game. Jiu-jitsu stylists said the same about the kimono. Obviously concessions needed to be made. More often than not the luta livre wrestler’s larger sizes provided the pretext. Kimonos and pinning could be used to adjust for weight. As Omori emphasized “I’m so certain that I will beat him anyway that I gave him the handicap, as promised, of letting him step into the ring without kimono, and other concessions”.
130

It was quickly agreed that p
rohibited techniques included
cuteladas
, [chops],
soccos
[punches],
pu
xõ
es de cabellos
[pulling the hair],
joelhadas
[knee strikes],
golpes baixo
[low blows] and all prohibited techniques of jiu-jitsu. That was unproblematic. Those were the rules in almost all mixed styles fights up until the 1933 George Gracie versus Tico Soledade fight. To put it in modern terms, most, or almost all mixed fights were “submission grappling” matches.

C
apoeiragem and boxing were obvious exceptions, as they were basically the arts of kicking and punching, respectively. However, mixed matches involving strikers were uncommon in the 1930’s (it was more common for boxers to participate in luta livre matches, which could but usually didn’t include some types of strikes. Naturally, their gloves handicapped them in the grappling part of the fight). Everything was negotiable but fighters did not want to risk unnecessary injury if there wasn’t a good monetary reason for it.

The boxers who participated in luta livre fights or mixed fights, were generally not among
the elite of their profession. Ervin Klausner was the only one who won substantially more than he lost. Tavares Crespo had a winning record, but just barely. Antonio Portugal won 7 of his 26 fights. It is not even sure whether some of them should be considered boxers, rather than luta livre men who occasionally boxed. Ismail Haki for example had only 15 boxing matches in seven years, winning five, losing ten. Some luta Romana men also (occasionally) boxed. Jayme Ferreira for example had a boxing record of 1-2-0.
131

The newspapers and fight people had a mutual interest in
providing or inventing stories about fights. Editors needed to fill their pages. Fight promoters were usually nearby available to offer predictions, drop hints, share secrets, stir up controversies, and pose for pictures alongside their fighters. “Can Manoel Fernandes manage to defeat Omori with the kimono?” a headline in
A Noite
asked [“
Manoel Fernandes
,
sem kimono, consegui
rá
vencer Omori
?”]. “His fans think so”, it answered [“
Os adeptos do lutador Lusitano pensam que sim
”]. It was not exactly news but it was content. It sold newspapers and made advertising space valuable.

In addition to the semantically vacuous filler material (
“Fernandes’ fans think that he can win”), some genuine, if tentative, information was provided. Preliminary matches were announced. Euclydes versus Velludinho, and Bahiano versus Pac
há
in capoeiragem matches; a jiu-jitsu demonstration by the Gracies and a luta livre match between Ismario Cruz and Geo Schmith (Smith). And the final fight; a luta livre match pitting
Gé
o Omori versus Manoel Fernandes.
132

A small box ad above the article read
“
Academia de Jiu-Jitsu, curso em 36 aulas, rua Marquez de Abrantes, 106, telephone 5-2538
.” Learning the art of the samurais from the Gracies in 1931 required 36 lessons.
133

But
apparently not every detail had been ironed out. Fernandes complained that his purse was insufficient. “I don’t need to fight for peanuts”, he said [“
Ainda
nã
o estou morrendo de fome
”]. He threatened to not fight on the 17
th
.
134
Omori felt that Fernandes was afraid of him [“
esta com medo de lutar
!”].

It
was an audacious challenge to the strong Portuguese fighter [
um repto audaciosa ao forte lutador portuguez
].

In the same article, Manoel Rufino dos
Santos, instructor of luta livre (“catch-as-catch-can”) at Associ
a
ç
ã
o Christa de M
oç
as (A.C.M) complained that promoters were using the name “luta livre” for unqualified people. He called it a “grande bluff.” The only qualified luta livre people, he said, were his own students Luiz Ferreira Lins, Alvaro, Salamiel [de Oliveira], and Manoel Lima.
135

Despite the
confidence expressed by Carlos Gracie and his brothers, it was well known that jiu-jitsu was vulnerable to punches. Next to the article mentioned in the above paragraph there was a picture showing Sam MacVea, the American boxer from California, standing over Matsuda. The caption explained that a “professional de luta Japoneza” named Matsuda was knocked out December 31, 1908, in Marigny, France, by a “cross” to the jaw in the first 8 seconds of the fight. The caption added that Matsuda “couldn’t do anything” [“
nã
o conseguiu fazer coisa alguma
”].

The message was not lost on jiu-jitsu representatives. It was
probably no accident that the boxers chosen to challenge jiu-jitsu were generally considered to be of “limted resources”.

Potential
opponents were not in short supply. The
Sã
o Paulo based middleweight boxer Paulino Costa accepted Omori’s open challenge. He said he would enter the ring as a “boxeur”, but would also use capoeiragem, of which he had profound knowledge.
136

At the same time, George Gracie, with an enigmatic smile [
sorriso enigmatico
], accepted the challenge launched November 19 by Pedro Ivo Pereira de Carvalho, of the Estrada de Ferro Central do Brasil.

Like many other people, Pedro felt that the Gracies had only beaten fake and weak capoeiras.
He also challenged Mario Aleixo, who had not yet met (and lost to) George Gracie. Pedro felt that he could represent the national game better than Mario Aleixo, who after all, was not a young man. Aleixo also accepted Pedro’s challenge, saying that it would be a pleasure to confront a capoeira who is said to be a marvel [
maravilha
]. George added that he would be happy to meet an opponent who is capable of offering resistance to his techniques and looked forward to entering the ring with a representative of the national game.
137

On Thusday
December 17, 1931 a scandal broke out [
Um Escandalo Que Rebenta
]. Fernandes alleged that Carlos and Omori went to his house at rua Aristides Lobo, n. 240, and told him “the fight will be arranged so that it ends in a draw“ [“
luta combinada, que terminaria num empate
”].

The next day Carlos
denied the accusation. As later developments proved, “
combinadas
” were not unknown, and many fighters took part in them. Given the result of the Omori versus Fernandes fight when it finally did take place, the possibility that a “
combinada
” had been orchestrated can not be dismissed.
138

Carlos showed that he
learned his lessons from Tex Rickard well. The Grand Equation worked as well in Brazil as in the United States.

The Omori versus Fernandes fight did not happen as scheduled, but all that publicity did not go to waste. Carlos challenged Fernandes on behalf of one of his brothers (as was his custom), in this case Helio, who was
18, weighed 64 kilos, and had no previous public fights. If Fernandes managed to last three rounds against Helio’s jiu-jitsu, Carlos would consider him the winner and let him keep all of the prize money [“
toda a bolsa
”].

Not to be out-maneuvered by Carlos,
Fernandes offered to fight four or all five Gracies in the same night and promised to take no more than 20 minutes to dispose of them. He also one-upped Carlos by offering to donate half of his winner take all purse to homeless Portuguese people.
139

Winner
-take-all offers were common, almost the rule. Whether they were genuine propositions or simply marketing tricks is an open question.
140
Professional fighters knew there was always a possibility of losing, and they weren’t fighting purely for fun or honor. Promoters didn’t need to care, but managers did.