Closing the Ring (54 page)

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Hitherto we had assembled for our conferences or meals in the Soviet Embassy. I had claimed however that I should be the host at the third dinner, which should be held in the British Legation. This could not well be disputed. Great Britain and I myself both came first alphabetically, and in seniority I was four or five years older than Roosevelt or Stalin. We were by centuries the longest established of the three Governments; I might have added, but did not, that we had been the longest in the war; and, finally, November 30 was my birthday. These arguments, particularly the last one, were conclusive, and all preparations were made by our Minister for a dinner of nearly forty persons, including not only the political and military chiefs but some of their higher staffs. The Soviet Political Police, the N.K.V.D., insisted on searching the British Legation from top to bottom, looking behind every door and under every cushion, before Stalin appeared; and about fifty armed Russian policemen, under their own General, posted themselves near all the doors and windows. The American Security men were also much in evidence. Everything however passed off agreeably. Stalin, arriving under heavy guard, was in the best of tempers, and the President, from his wheel chair, beamed on us all in pleasure and good will.

This was a memorable occasion in my life. On my right sat the President of the United States, on my left the master of Russia. Together we controlled practically all the naval and three-quarters of all the air forces in the world, and could direct armies of nearly twenty millions of men, engaged in the
most terrible of wars that had yet occurred in human history. I could not help rejoicing at the long way we had come on the road to victory since the summer of 1940, when we had been alone, and, apart from the Navy and the Air, practically unarmed, against the triumphant and unbroken might of Germany and Italy, with almost all Europe and its resources in their grasp. Mr. Roosevelt gave me for a birthday present a beautiful Persian porcelain vase, which, although it was broken into fragments on the homeward journey, has been marvellously reconstructed and is one of my treasures.

During dinner I had a most pleasant conversation with both my august guests. Stalin repeated the question he had posed at the Conference, “Who will command ‘Overlord’?” I said that the President had not yet finally made up his mind, but that I was almost certain it would be General Marshall, who sat opposite us at no great distance, and that was how it had stood hitherto. Stalin was evidently very pleased at this. He then spoke about General Brooke. He thought that he did not like the Russians. He had been very abrupt and rough with them at our first Moscow meeting in August 1942. I reassured him, remarking that military men were apt to be blunt and hardcut when dealing with war problems with their professional colleagues. Stalin said that he liked them all the better for that. He gazed at Brooke intently across the room.

When the time came, I proposed the health of our illustrious guests, and the President proposed my health and wished me many happy returns of the day. He was followed by Stalin, who spoke in a similar strain.

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Many intormal toasts were then proposed, according to the Russian custom, which is certainly very well suited to banquets of this kind. Hopkins made a speech couched in a happy vein, in the course of which he said that he had made “a very long and thorough study of the British Constitution, which is unwritten, and of the War Cabinet, whose authority and composition are not specifically defined.” As the result of this study,
he said, “I have learnt that the provisions of the British Constitution and the powers of the War Cabinet are just whatever Winston Churchill wants them to be at any given moment.” This caused general laughter. The reader of these volumes will know how little foundation there was in this jocular assertion. It is true that I received a measure of loyal support in the direction of the war from Parliament and my Cabinet colleagues which may well be unprecedented, and that there were very few large issues upon which I was overruled; but it was with some pride that I reminded my two great comrades on more than one occasion that I was the only one of our trinity who could at any moment be dismissed from power by the vote of a House of Commons freely elected on universal franchise, or could be controlled from day to day by the opinion of a War Cabinet representing all parties in the State. The President’s term of office was fixed, and his powers, not only as President, but as Commander-in-Chief, were almost absolute under the American Constitution. Stalin appeared to be, and at this moment certainly was, all-powerful in Russia. They could order; I had to convince and persuade. I was glad that this should be so. The process was laborious, but I had no reason to complain of the way it worked.

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As the dinner proceeded, there were many speeches, and most of the principal figures, including Molotov and General Marshall, made their contribution. But the speech which stands out in my memory came from General Brooke. I quote the account he was good enough to write for me:

  Halfway through the dinner [he says] the President very kindly proposed my health, referring to the time when my father had visited his father at Hyde Park. Just as he was finishing, and I was thinking what an easy time I should have replying to such kind words, Stalin got up and said he would finish the toast. He then proceeded to imply that I had failed to show real feelings of friendship towards the Red Army, that I was lacking in a true appreciation of its fine qualities, and that he hoped in future I should be able to show greater comradeship towards the soldiers of the Red Army!

I was very much surprised by these accusations, as I could not think what they were based on. I had however seen enough of Stalin by then to know that if I sat down under these insults I should lose any respect he might ever have had for me, and that he would continue such attacks in the future.

I therefore rose to thank the President most profusely for his very kind expressions, and then turned to Stalin in approximately the following words:

“Now, Marshal, may I deal with your toast. I am surprised that you should have found it necessary to raise accusations against me that are entirely unfounded. You will remember that this morning while we were discussing cover plans Mr. Churchill said that ‘in war Truth must have an escort of lies.’ You will also remember that you yourself told us that in all your great offensives your real intentions were always kept concealed from the outer world. You told us that all your dummy tanks and dummy aeroplanes were always massed on those fronts that were of an immediate interest, while your true intentions were covered by a cloak of complete secrecy.

“Well, Marshal, you have been misled by dummy tanks and dummy aeroplanes, and you have failed to observe those feelings of true friendship which I have for the Red Army, nor have you seen the feelings of genuine comradeship which I bear towards all its members.”

  As this was translated by Pavlov, sentence by sentence, to Stalin, I watched his expression carefully. It was inscrutable. But at the end he turned to me and said, with evident relish, “I like that man. He rings true. I must have a talk with him afterwards.”

At length we moved into the antechamber, and here everyone moved about in changing groups. I felt that there was a greater sense of solidarity and good-comradeship than we had ever reached before in the Grand Alliance. I had not invited Randolph and Sarah to the dinner, though they came in while my birthday toast was being proposed, but now Stalin singled
them out and greeted them most warmly, and of course the President knew them well.

As I moved around, I saw Stalin in a small circle face to face with “Brookie,” as I call him. The General’s account continues:

  As we walked out of the room, the Prime Minister told me that he had felt somewhat nervous as to what I should say next when I had referred to “truth” and “lies.” He comforted me however by telling me that my reply to the toast had had the right effect on Stalin. I therefore decided to return to the attack in the anteroom. I went up to Stalin and told him how surprised I was, and grieved, that he should have found it necessary to raise such accusations against me in his toast. He replied at once through Pavlov, “The best friendships are those founded on misunderstandings,” and he shook me warmly by the hand.

  It seemed to me that all the clouds had passed away, and in fact Stalin’s confidence in my friend was established on a foundation of respect and good will which was never shaken while we all worked together.

It must have been after two in the morning when we finally separated. The Marshal resigned himself to his escort and departed, and the President was conveyed to his quarters in the Soviet Embassy. I went to bed tired out but content, feeling sure that nothing but good had been done. It certainly was a happy birthday for me.

¹
The main Russian attack began on June 23.

5
Teheran: Conclusions

Conversation at Luncheon, December
1___
How to Gain Turkey___The Russian Share of Italian Ships___The Frontiers of Poland___The “Curzon Line” and the Line of the Oder___A Frank Talk___Finland___“No Annexations and No Indemnities”___Final Accord___The Question of Germany___Partition?___President Roosevelt’s Suggestion___I Unfold a Personal View___Marshal Stalin’s Standpoint___More About Poland___Broad Agreement on Military Policy___Political Aspects Remote and Speculative___Deep Fear of German Might at This War Climax___The Present Partition___“It Cannot Last.”

S
EVERAL OF OUR GRAVEST POLITICAL ISSUES
Stood out before and after the main decision on strategy had been reached. The Three lunched together again at the President’s table in the Soviet Legation on December 1. In addition, on this occasion Molotov, Hopkins, Eden, Clark Kerr, and Harriman were present. The question of inducing Turkey to enter into the war was our first topic.

Hopkins asked what support we should have to give Turkey if she came in. Roosevelt said that Inönü would ask what we could do. Until the landing-craft situation had been studied, we should be careful in making promises. I said that we had in Egypt seventeen British squadrons not under the Anglo-American command, and Air Chief Marshal Tedder had three more squadrons which we could spare. They were chiefly fighters and could be used to protect Turkey. In addition, we had
three regiments of anti-aircraft guns. This was all we had promised. We had not promised Turkey any troops. She had fifty divisions equipped, and there was no need to send any troops.

Stalin said that if Turkey entered the war, she would make part of her territory available. I agreed, and said Ploesti would be vulnerable. We British were not offering Turkey anything that was not ours to give, and we were only giving three squadrons from the Central Mediterranean to make up the number from seventeen to twenty. Perhaps the Americans could add a few bomber squadrons. We had said that we would only give air protection. We had no army available. The landing-craft required in March for taking Rhodes could be sandwiched in between Italy and “Overlord.” The President hoped this could be done, but said that casualties among landing-craft were very heavy and we should want all we could get for “Overlord.” I replied that I saw no difficulty. We had made no offers to Turkey, nor did I know whether Inönö would accept any. The President would be in Cairo and could see what his Staffs would have to say. We British could only offer our twenty squadrons. The Turks did not need any army; they needed air protection. In addition, Inönö might not come to Cairo.

“He might fall ill,” interjected Stalin.

I said that if he refused to come and the President had to leave, I proposed to go in a cruiser and see him in Adana. Inönö would come there. … Landing-craft were the bottleneck for all our operations. Some might be forthcoming from the Indian Ocean or the Pacific, or more could be built. If this could not be done, we should have to give up something, but it was agreed that “Overlord” was not to suffer.

Roosevelt then said that my suggestion that landing-craft should be provided from the Pacific was impossible. Distances were too great, and every day the Americans were proceeding north in the Gilbert and Marshall Islands to attack Japanese supply lines. They needed all the landing-craft they had.

Hopkins asked how many landing-craft would be needed for taking Rhodes. I replied that there was no commitment
to Turkey about Rhodes or any other island, and there was no commitment in landing-craft. Roosevelt said that if he were Inönö he would ask for Crete and other islands to be taken.

I said: “What I want is air bases in the region of Smyrna and Badrun. Those airfields have been constructed by us. When we get them and put in squadrons, we can drive the Germans out of the air. It pays us anyhow to lose one aircraft for every German machine shot down. We must starve out the German garrisons on the islands. If Turkey takes an active part, the islands will fall of themselves. It would not be necessary in that case to attack even Rhodes. The islands have to be supplied by Germany, and if we have air cover from Turkey, our destroyers can cut down German convoys, which they cannot do at present because Germany commands the air. Turkish bases will give us continued pressure against the Germans, and that will be a preparation for ‘Overlord.’ ”

Stalin agreed, and the President consented to go forward on the basis of twenty squadrons and some bombers, but no amphibious operations.

I then summed up. We were offering Turkey only limited air protection and anti-aircraft guns, but the winter was approaching and Germany would not invade Turkey. We would continue to supply her with arms. There was the priceless opportunity for Turkey of accepting the Soviet invitation to sit beside us at the Peace Conference. There was the assurance that if Bulgaria attacked Turkey because the latter had declared war on Germany, the Soviet Union would retaliate on Bulgaria, a thing which had never happened before. Then there was the offer of association with the victorious Powers and our good offices and friendship.