Closing the Ring (58 page)

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The Combined Chiefs of Staff also discussed among themselves the British share in the strategy to be pursued against Japan, and presented their recommendations to the President and me in their Final Report of the Cairo Conference. In summary, they proposed that the main effort of the Southeast Asia Command should be in Burma. After the defeat of Germany, an army and air contingent, with air resources all based on Australia, should be sent to co-operate with General MacArthur. The British effort by sea should be mainly in the Pacific and not in the Bay of Bengal. The British Chiefs of Staff, like myself, recoiled from the idea of a strenuous and wasteful campaign in North Burma for the sake of building a road to China of doubtful value. On the other hand, they accepted the fact that Admiral Mountbatten could not carry out any large-scale amphibious operations until six months after a German collapse. The plan of reinforcing the Pacific could be begun much sooner. They therefore endorsed the American view. In their Final Report both Staffs stated that they “had agreed in principle as a basis for further investigation and preparation” the over-all plan for the defeat of Japan.
This plan contemplated the dispatch of a detachment of the British Fleet which was provisionally scheduled to become active in the Pacific in June 1944. The President and I both initialled this document, but in the pressure of more urgent business and of the President’s imperative need to return to the United States, no occasion was found when we could discuss the long-term schemes either with our own advisers or between ourselves. We however felt sure there would be time to review the whole position later.

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One of the main purposes of our Cairo meeting had been to resume talks with the Turkish leaders. I had telegraphed President Inönü on December 1 from Teheran suggesting that he should join the President and myself in Cairo. It was arranged that Vyshinsky should also be present. These conversations arose out of the exchange of views between Mr. Eden and the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo at the beginning of November on the former’s journey home from Moscow. The Turks now came again to Cairo on December 4, and the following evening I entertained the Turkish President to dinner. My guest displayed great caution, and in subsequent meetings showed to what extent his advisers were still impressed by the German military machine. I pressed the case hard. With Italy out of the war the advantages of Turkey’s entry were manifestly increased and her risks lessened.

On December 6, I drafted a memorandum to the British Chiefs of Staff setting forth in detail the policy and action which would be necessary if, after all, Turkey came in on our side.

O
PERATION
“S
ATURN
”

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

6 Dec. 43

After the Cairo Conference, the Turkish Government will state that their policy is unchanged, and use all precautionary measures to allay enemy suspicions.

2. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the preparation and protection of the Turkish airfields should proceed at full speed without a day’s delay, and that all necessary personnel, in mufti, and materials should be sent in. A period of six or seven weeks should suffice for this, the British squadrons being ready to fly in to the airfields at any time after February 1, the exact date to be fixed in consultation with the Turkish Government and in relation to the moves of the enemy. A margin of a fortnight may be allowed for this, during which time further supplies and personnel will be introduced at full speed.

3. In the lull following the expected capture of Rome in January, it is desirable that three groups of medium bombers should be placed under the command of the A.O.C.-in-C. Middle East and posted in Cyrenaica for “softening” action against enemy airfields and shipping, and to cover the “fly-in” of the British fighter squadrons. The action of these bombers can begin irrespective of any decision taken about the “fly-in.” But if the enemy are quiescent, it would be better to reserve their action to cover the “fly-in” and the events immediately following it. The details of the employment and timing of the movement of this force should be worked out by the Commander-in-Chief.

4. By February 15 the “fly-in” should be completed, and from that moment onward a very considerable degree of protection against air attack will have been secured to Turkey.

5. Once established in the airfields, the British squadrons, in consultation with the Turkish Government, will begin their operations in the Aegean, being supported at the same time by the medium bomber groups from Cyrenaica. Under this air cover British naval forces in the Levant, strengthened as may be necessary, will attack enemy shipping and convoys engaged in supplying the islands.

6. All preparations should meanwhile be made for Rhodes. For this purpose a first-class British division should be used for the assault, a lower category division being held ready to garrison the island, thereby setting free the British division for further operations in Italy. Rhodes of course depends upon the landing-craft being available. This operation should take place before the end of February, all landing-craft thereafter being prepared for “Anvil.”

7. What action should be expected from the enemy? Evidently it is the Allied interest to delay this as long as possible. Therefore, the Turkish Government should continue to the last moment in relations with Germany and Bulgaria, and should reply diplomatically to any protest they may make, while continuing their preparations. If Bulgaria adopts a threatening attitude to Turkey, she should be notified by the Russians that if she delivers an attack at Germany’s orders, the Russian Soviet Union will immediately declare war on Bulgaria. It is for consideration whether the Bulgarians should not also be told that for every ton of bombs dropped by the Germans or by them upon Constantinople or Smyrna, two or three tons will be dropped on Sofia. Should the Russian armies be continuing their victorious advance in South Russia, and should the Anglo-American armies prosper in the Battle of Rome, it seems most unlikely that Bulgaria will attempt to invade Turkey. She may however withdraw her nine divisions from Greece and Yugoslavia and make a concentration opposite the Turkish Front in Thrace.

8. Meanwhile, it is also possible that, under the increasing pressure of events, Bulgaria will endeavour to make a separate peace with the three Great Allies. It is not suggested that Turkey should declare war at any stage; she should continue her protective reequipment and await the enemy’s actions.

9. Meanwhile, as soon as the sea passage from Egypt to Turkey has been opened by the British and naval domination of the Aegean, every effort will be made to pass supplies and support into Smyrna, and if possible through the Dardanelles, so that the further equipment of the Turkish Army and the feeding of Constantinople can proceed as fast as possible.

10. After the “fly-in” of the British squadrons has been completed, the Turkish Government should facilitate the secret passage into the Black Sea of six or eight British submarines, together with the necessary stores. As no depot ship can be made available, base facilities should, if possible, be arranged at Ismet. These submarines should suffice to take a heavy toll of any Rumanian and German evacuations from the Crimea, and also to assist any Russian descent on the Rumanian shore which the Rumanian political attitude might render possible. Such a movement would however be dependent on Russian wishes.

  The Turks departed to report to their Parliament, and it was agreed that in the meantime British specialists should be assembled to implement the first stages of Operation “Saturn.” And there the matter rested.

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In all our many talks at Cairo, the President never referred to the vital and urgent issue of the Command of “Overlord,” and I was under the impression that our original arrangement and agreement held good. But on the day before his departure from Cairo, he told me his final decision. We were driving in his motor-car from Cairo to the Pyramids. He then said, almost casually, that he could not spare General Marshall, whose great influence at the head of military affairs and of the war direction, under the President, was invaluable, and indispensable to the successful conduct of the war. He therefore proposed to nominate Eisenhower to “Overlord,” and asked me for my opinion. I said it was for him to decide, but that we had also the warmest regard for General Eisenhower, and would trust our fortunes to his direction with hearty good will.

Up till this time I had thought Eisenhower was to go to Washington as Military Chief of Staff, while Marshall commanded “Overlord.” Eisenhower had heard of this too, and was very unhappy at the prospect of leaving the Mediterranean for Washington. Now it was all settled: Eisenhower for “Overlord,” Marshall to stay at Washington, and a British Commander for the Mediterranean.

The full story of the President’s long delay and hesitations and of his final decision is referred to by Mr. Hopkins’ biographer, who says that Roosevelt made the decision on Sunday, December 5, “against the almost impassioned advice of Hopkins and Stimson, against the known preference of both Stalin and Churchill, against his own proclaimed inclination.” Then Mr. Sherwood quotes the following extract from a note which he had from General Marshall after the war: “If I recall,” said Marshall, “the President stated, in completing our conversation, ‘I feel I could not sleep at night with you out of the country.’ ”
¹
There can be little doubt that the President felt
that the command only of “Overlord” was not sufficient to justify General Marshall’s departure from Washington.

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At last our labours were finished. I gave a dinner at the villa to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Eden, Mr. Casey, and one or two others. I remember being struck by the optimism which prevailed in high Service circles. The idea was mooted that Hitler would not be strong enough to face the spring campaign, and might collapse even before “Overlord” was launched in the summer. I was so much impressed by the current of opinion that I asked everybody to give his view in succession round the table. All the professional authorities were inclined to think that the German collapse was imminent. The three politicians present took the opposite view. Of course, on these vast matters on which so many lives depend there is always a great deal of guesswork. So much is unknown and immeasurable. Who can tell how weak the enemy may be behind his flaming fronts and brazen mask? At what moment will his will-power break? At what moment will he be beaten down?

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The President had found no time for sightseeing, but I could not bear his leaving without seeing the Sphinx. One day after tea, I said, “You must come now.” We motored there forthwith, and examined this wonder of the world from every angle. Roosevelt and I gazed at her for some minutes in silence as the evening shadows fell. She told us nothing and maintained her inscrutable smile. There was no use waiting longer.

On December 7, I bade farewell to my great friend when he flew off from the airfield beyond the Pyramids.

¹
Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins
, pages 802, 803.

7
In Carthage Ruins Anzio

Our Air Journey to Tunis___I Have Pneumonia___The Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean and in Italy___My Telegram to the President, December
18___
He Agrees with the Appointments___My Wife Arrives from England___A Climax of the War___How to Break the Deadlock in Italy___The Genesis of the Anzio Operation___The British Chiefs of Staff Agree___The Problem of Landing-Craft___Our Meeting on Christmas Day___The Details are Thrashed Out___My Telegram to Chiefs of Staff, December
26___
The Brute Fact of Delaying Fifty-Six Landing-Craft___The Date of “Overlord”___My Report of Our Christmas Conference to the President.

I
HAD NOT BEEN AT ALL WELL
during this journey and Conference. Soon after I started, I had a temperature. After several days, this was succeeded by a cold and sore throat, which made me keep to my bed most of the time I was in Malta. I arrived voiceless at Teheran, but this did not last long, and I was able to carry on sufficiently. All these symptoms had disappeared when I got back to Cairo. As the Conference drew to its close, I became conscious of being very tired. For instance, I noticed that I no longer dried myself after my bath, but lay on the bed wrapped in my towel till I dried naturally.

A little after midnight on December 11, I and my personal party left in our York machine for Tunis. I had planned to spend one night there at General Eisenhower’s villa, and to fly next day to Alexander’s and then Montgomery’s headquarters
in Italy, where the weather was reported to be absolutely vile and all advances were fitful.

Morning saw us over the Tunis airfields. We were directed by a signal not to land where we had been told, and were shifted to another field some twenty miles away. We all got out, and they began to unload the luggage. It would be an hour before motor-cars could come, and then a long drive. As I sat on my official boxes near the machines I certainly did feel completely worn out. Now however came a telephone message from General Eisenhower, who was waiting at the first airfield, that we had been wrongly transferred and that landing was quite possible there. So we scrambled back into our York, and in ten minutes were with him, quite close to his villa. Ike, always the soul of hospitality, had waited two hours with imperturbable good-humour. I got into his car, and after we had driven for a little while, I said, “I am afraid I shall have to stay with you longer than I had planned. I am completely at the end of my tether, and I cannot go on to the front until I have recovered some strength.”

ll that day I slept, and the next day came fever and symptoms at the base of my lung which were adjudged to portend pneumonia. So here I was at this pregnant moment on the broad of my back amid the ruins of ancient Carthage.