Closing the Ring (62 page)

The arrangements proposed certainly do not preclude the achievement of a May assault, but the programme is tightly stretched. No violation of the agreement reached at Teheran is however involved, and we do not think it necessary at this stage to consult the Russians.

  I commented on this as follows.

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff

30 Dec. 43

Our contract would be fulfilled by May 31. In my opinion it would be a
bona fide
execution of it if we fixed June 3, which is the corresponding moon phase to May 5, for the actual assault. It is however better to work to May 5, and thus have a month to spare.

*  *  * *  *

Now a new point of importance arose.

Prime Minister to Field-Marshal Dill, Washington

3 Jan. 44

Alexander signals as follows: Clark is planning Anzio, and the usual difficulties are coming to light. For example, it appears that we shall not be able to keep 504th American Parachute Brigade, and Eisenhower is reluctant to press for their retention. The British Parachute Brigade is in the line and engaged. I have nothing immediately available to relieve them with, and we cannot afford the delay in getting them out and across to the Naples area. Further, they are not operationally experienced and badly need training.

2. Eisenhower is now with Marshall. Will you appeal to them to let this 504th American Brigade do this one fine and critical job before they come home for “Overlord”? It is so rarely that opportunities for decisive air action by paratroops present themselves, and it seems improvident to take them from the decisive point just when they might render exemplary and outstanding service. They can be sent home immediately afterwards in time for “Overlord,” observing that we have already [at home] about double as many parachute and airborne troops for “Overlord” as there are transport aircraft to lift. Let me know what happens.

General Marshall agreed. We shall see later how this sacrifice was wasted.

*  *  * *  *

I had asked Montgomery to visit me on his way home from Italy to take up his new command in “Overlord.” I had offered him this task so full of hazard. Of course, in the absence of special reasons a general should accept any duty to which he is called by national authority. At the same time nothing in the unwritten law obliges enthusiasm. In the Grenadier Guards, with whom I once had the honour to serve, all orders are received with the one word “Sir.” However, all kinds of inflections may be given to this monosyllable. I was gratified and also relieved to find that Montgomery was delighted and eager for what I had always regarded as a majestic, inevitable, but terrible task. When he arrived at Marrakesh, we had a two hours’ drive out to our picnic at the foot of the Atlas. I had given him early in the morning the plan prepared over so many months by General Morgan and the Anglo-American Joint Staffs in London. After he had read it in summary, he said at once, “This will not do. I must have more in the initial punch.” After considerable argument a whole set of arrangements was made in consequence of his opinion, and proved right. Evidently he was a firm believer in the operation, and I was very pleased at this.

The ladies had now come up, and we all lunched by the side of a dazzling stream in fresh air and brilliant sunshine. It was indeed an oasis in the vast desert of human conflict through which we had to toil. Presently I pushed forward into the mountains and our cars zigzagged slowly up the road to a viewpoint which I knew. But the General would have none of this. He got out of the car and walked straight up the hill, “to keep himself in training,” as he put it. I warned him not to waste his vigour, considering what was coming. I emphasised the truths that energy of mind does not depend on energy of body; that energy should be exercised and not exhausted; that athletics were one thing and strategy another.
These admonitions were in vain. The General was in the highest spirits; he leaped about the rocks like an antelope, and I felt a strong reassurance that all would be well.

*  *  * *  *

The New Year opened for me in agreeable correspondence with the President.

Prime Minister
(
Marrakesh
)
to President Roosevelt

30 Dec. 43

I have now received from my brother Jack full accounts of the Christmas tree at Chequers.
¹
All my grandchildren were there, and a number of other children, and a good time was had by all. Winant, who was present, has promised to write to you about it. Thank you so much for sending me this token. I have also to thank you for the wonderful map case which has arrived from you for me, and which I am longing to see. We are indeed in comfort at this beautiful villa, and I am making good progress. The sun is shining today, but nothing did me the same good as your telegram showing how easily our minds work together on the grimly simple issues of this vast war. Alexander reports he has arranged satisfactory plans with Clark for Anzio. He is using the British 1st and the American 3d Divisions, with paratroops and armour. I am glad of this. It is fitting that we should share equally in suffering, risk, and honour.

I received on the same day congratulations on my recovery from Franco and Tito. So what?

Sarah thanks you for your message and sends her love.

  Unhappily the President was himself laid up with influenza.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

31 Dec. 43

I am in bed for two or three days with a mild case of the ’flu, which, in a mild form, has become epidemic throughout the country.

I am delighted that you are safely at the villa. I suggest that on New Year’s Day you invite the two gentlemen who congratulated you, then lock them in the top of the tower where we saw the
sunset, and tell them you will stay at the bottom to see whether the black or the red throws the other one over the battlements.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

1 Jan. 44

I am so sorry about your influenza. I earnestly hope you will defer to Dr. McIntyre’s advice and show that attitude of submission to the medical faculty which you have so sedulously enjoined on me.

The villa is perfect. The doctors want me to stay here for the next three weeks. The weather is bright, though cool. The cook is a marvel. We go for picnics to the mountains. Last night Eisenhower was with us on his way to you, and I had long talks with him. Montgomery is here now on his way to England. I think we have a fine team, and they certainly mean to pull together.

I have not yet been able to arrange the contest in the tower. The Red is in better training than the Black.

Accept all my best wishes for a New Year which will not only be marked by triumph but will open wider doors to our future work together.

Clemmie and Sarah also send their salutations.

*  *  * *  *

Although the main issue about the landing-craft for Anzio had been settled, many details of their employment raised serious discussion.

General Alexander to Prime Minister

4 Jan. 44

I have just returned from conference with General Clark on my way back from Tunis, and certain factors have come to light which are causing me grave concern, and I must therefore ask for your help and assistance. The facts are these. The removal of all but six of the L.S.T.s after the initial landing will not allow us to put the two divisions ashore complete with their essential fighting vehicles. … My experience of combined operations is that the initial assault to get ashore can be effected, but the success of the operation depends on whether the full fighting strength of the expedition can be concentrated in time to withstand the inevitable counterattack. For Anzio two divisions are the minimum force to put ashore in face of likely German resistance. Yet we are willing to accept this if the two divisions can be concentrated on land in
strength and in time. … We are willing to accept any risks to achieve our object, but if the two divisions get sealed off by the Germans, we obviously cannot leave them there without any support when there will be L.S.T.s somewhere in the Mediterranean sufficient for that purpose. … Clark and I are confident that we have a great chance of publling off something big if given the means with which to do it. The means required are fourteen L.S.T.s for maintenance entil such time as the Anzio force and the Fifth Army join hands, and a further ten L.S.T.s for a period of fifteen days from the landing to build up the two divisions in guns, tanks, and other supporting arms to a strength sufficient to fight on level terms with the Germans. Even if this does interfere with preparations for “Anvil” to some extent, surely the prize is worth it.

  I therefore summoned the authorities concerned to Marrakesh, and held two conferences on January 7 and 8, attended by Lord Beaverbrook, General Wilson, Admiral John Cunningham, General Alexander, General Devers, General Bedell Smith, and others. Captain Power had just returned from London after clearing up many intricate points about the landing-craft with the Chiefs of Staff, and now with the full support of his admiral, rendered us similar services. I was able to report to the President on the 8th as follows:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

8 Jan. 44

A unanimous agreement for action as proposed was reached by the responsible officers of both countries and of all services as a result of our two conferences. Everyone is in good heart and the resources seem sufficient. Every aspect was thrashed out in full detail by sub-committees in the interval between the two conferences. … Intention is to land a corps of two divisions for the assault, and to follow up with a mobile striking force based on the elements of a third division to cut enemy’s communications.

It should be possible to do this, barring accident, without conflicting with requirements of “Overlord” or “Anvil,” and still have sufficiency of landing-craft to maintain the force up till the end of February, weather permitting and God being with us.

General Wilson, who today assumes duty as Supreme Allied
Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean, has issued instructions to subordinate commanders to give effect to the above. He is also informing Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  All these calculations were based upon the May (or X) date being maintained for “Overlord,” though I myself had always thought that the moon period of June 3 (Y date) would probably be found most suitable, and I was glad to learn from General Eisenhower on his passage through Marrakesh that he was inclining towards this solution, which gave him and Montgomery more time to arrange for the larger forces it was now proposed to use in the first descent. I had telegraphed to the President setting out the whole question, and reminding him of our talks and agreements at Teheran.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

6 Jan. 44

Bedell Smith and Devers came through here morning of 5th. Bedell told me that he and Montgomery are convinced that it is better to put in a much heavier and broader “Overlord” than to expand the landing on the Riviera above our pre-Teheran conception, and that he is putting this to Eisenhower and your Chiefs of Staff. I have always expected that when the commanders took the matter into their hands, they would make alterations in the plans, which nevertheless have proved invaluable as a basis for future decisions. As you know, I have always hoped that the initial assault at “Overlord” could be with heavier forces than we have hitherto mentioned.

It also seems to me, from what I heard, very probable that the June moon will be the earliest practicable date. I do not see why we should resist this if the commanders feel they have a better chance then. At Teheran the Chiefs of Staffs’ recommendation was June 1 or one day earlier, which you and I agreed to express more agreeably as “during May.” In conversation with Uncle Joe, we never mentioned such a date as May 5, or even May 8, but always spoke to him [of] around the 20th. Neither did we at any time dwell upon the exact phase of the operation which should fall on any particular day. If now the June date is accepted as final, I do not feel that we shall in any way have broken faith with him. The operation will anyhow begin in May with feints and
softening bombardments, and I do not think U.J. is the kind of man to be unreasonable over forty-eight hours.

On the other hand, the ground will be drier for U.J.’s great operations by June. We shall make a much heavier attack, and with much better chances of success. I am making you suggestions through Leathers for running another Arctic convoy, for which we can provide the escorts if you can provide the ships and cargoes, we having practically finished our quotas.

I do not think it necessary to make any communication to U.J. at the present time, but in a few weeks, after Eisenhower has presented his final conclusions to us, we should no doubt tell him all the story in all its strength, including any modification of “Anvil,” with the authority of the responsible commanders behind our statement.

  The President answered this important telegram, the facts of which were not in dispute between us, a week later. He had by then also received full reports of the conclusions of our meetings about the Anzio operation, which were all on the basis that the earlier date could be maintained for “Overlord” if desired.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

14 Jan. 44

It is my understanding that in Teheran Uncle J. was given a promise that “Overlord” would be launched during May and supported by strongest practicable landing in the South of France at about the same time, and that he agreed to plan for simultaneous Russian attack on Eastern Front.

I do not believe that we should make any decision now to defer the operations, certainly not until the responsible commanders, Eisenhower and Wilson, have had full opportunity to explore all possibilities and make factual reports. In the meantime no communication should be sent to Uncle J. on this subject.

I think the psychology of bringing this thing up at this time would be very bad, in view of the fact that it is only a little over a month since the three of us agreed on the statement in Teheran.