Closing the Ring (65 page)

Towards the end of the month, my attention was drawn to the question of obtaining the best results from local resistance
to the Axis in Yugoslavia. Having called for full information, I presided at a Chiefs of Staff Conference at Downing Street on June 23. In the course of the discussion I emphasised the very great importance of giving all possible support to the Yugoslav anti-Axis movement, which was containing about thirty-three Axis divisions in that area. This matter was of such importance that I directed that the small number of additional aircraft required to increase our aid must be provided, if necessary at the expense of the bombing of Germany and of the U-boat war.

On July 7, the eve of our landing in Sicily, I drew General Alexander’s attention to these possibilities.

Prime Minister to General Alexander
    7 July 43

I presume you have read about the recent heavy fighting in Yugoslavia and the widespread sabotage and guerrilla beginning in Greece. Albania also should be a fertile field. All this has grown up with no more aid from Britain than the dropping of a few bundles by parachute. If we can get hold of the mouth of the Adriatic so as to be able to run even a few ships into Dalmatian or Greek ports, the whole of the Western Balkans might flare up, with far-reaching results. All this is however hunting in the next field.

A fortnight later I elaborated my thought on the essential connection between the Italian and Balkan theatres in the following important telegram:

Prime Minister to General Alexander
    22 July 43

I am going with the Staffs to meet the President before August 15 in Canada. Thus we shall all be on the spot at the time when Sicily may very likely be cleaned up. …

I am sending you by an officer a full account which I have had prepared of the marvellous resistance put up by the so-called partisan followers of Tito in Bosnia and the powerful cold-blooded manoeuvres of Mihailovic in Serbia. Besides this, there are the resistances of the guerrillas in Albania and recently in Greece. The Germans have not only been reinforcing the Balkan peninsula with divisions, but they have been continually improving the quality
and mobility of these divisions and have been stiffening up the local Italians. The enemy cannot spare these forces, and if Italy collapses the Germans could not bear the weight themselves. Great prizes lie in the Balkan direction.

No objective can compete with the capture of Rome, which in its turn gives a stage later all the advantages hoped for from the Balkan liberation. … The fall of Italy, the effect upon the other German satellites, and the subsequent utter loneliness of Germany may conceivably produce decisive results in Europe, especially in view of the vast strength evinced by the Russian armies.

This message is sent to give you my whole mind, which is, I believe, in full harmony with the Chiefs of Staff.

*  *  * *  *

Before leaving for Quebec, I decided to pave the way for further action in the Balkans by appointing a senior officer to lead a larger mission to the partisans in the field, and with the authority to make direct recommendations to me about our future action towards them.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    28 July 43

Mr. Fitzroy Maclean, M.P., is a man of daring character, with Parliamentary status and Foreign Office training. He is to go to Yugoslavia and work with Tito. The idea is that a Brigadier should be sent out to take command later on. In my view we should plump for Maclean and make him the head of any mission now contemplated, and give him a good military staff officer under his authority. What we want is a daring Ambassador-leader with these hardy and hunted guerrillas.

  This mission landed in Yugoslavia by parachute in September 1943, to find the situation revolutionised. The news of the Italian surrender had reached Yugoslavia only with the official broadcast announcements. But, in spite of complete absence of any warning by us, Tito took quick and fruitful action. Within a few weeks six Italian divisions had been disarmed by the partisan forces, and another two went over to fight with them against the Germans. With Italian equipment the Yugoslavs were now able to arm eighty thousand more men, and to occupy for the moment most of the Adriatic coastline. There
was now a good chance of strengthening our general position in the Adriatic in relation to the Italian Front. The Yugoslav partisan army, now totalling two hundred thousand men, although fighting primarily as guerrillas, was now engaged in widespread action against the Germans, who continued their violent reprisals with increasing fury.

One effect of this increased activity in Yugoslavia was to exacerbate the conflict between Tito and Mihailovic. Tito’s growing military strength raised in an increasingly acute form the ultimate position of the Yugoslav Monarchy and the exiled Government. Till the end of the war sincere and prolonged efforts were made both in London and within Yugoslavia to reach a working compromise between both sides. I had hoped that the Russians would use their good offices in this matter. When Mr. Eden went to Moscow in October 1943, the subject of Yugoslavia was placed on the Conference agenda. At the meeting of October 23, he made a frank and fair statement of our attitude in the hope of securing a common Allied policy towards Yugoslavia, but the Russians displayed no wish either to pool information or to discuss a plan of action.

Even after many weeks I saw little prospect of any working arrangement between the hostile factions in Yugoslavia.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt
    23 Oct. 43

In spite of the vexatious broils between the followers of Tito and Mihailovic in Yugoslavia and those that have broken out between the two sets of Greek guerrillas, the situation in the Balkan peninsula is grievous for the enemy. … We British have about eighty separate missions under General Wilson’s control working with partisans and patriot bands scattered over these immense mountainous regions, nine hundred miles by about three hundred miles in extent. Some of our officers there of Brigadier’s rank are very capable, and have in numerous cases been there for two years. …

The fighting is of the most cruel and bloody character, with merciless reprisals and executions of hostages by the Huns. But the enemy also is suffering heavily, and is now consuming not less than twenty-five German and eight Bulgarian divisions in the
theatre without being able to control more than key points and with increasing difficulty in maintaining railway traffic. We hope soon to compose the Greek quarrels, but the differences between Tito’s partisans and Mihailovic’s Serbs are very deep-seated.

  My gloomy forecast proved true. At the end of November, Tito summoned a political congress of his movement at Jajce, in Bosnia, and not only set up a Provisional Government, “with sole authority to represent the Yugoslav nation,” but also formally deprived the Royal Yugoslav Government in Cairo of all its rights. The King was forbidden to return to the country until after the liberation. The partisans had established themselves without question as the leading elements of resistance in Yugoslavia, particularly since the Italian surrender. But it was important that no irrevocable political decisions about the future régime in Yugoslavia should be made in the atmosphere of occupation, civil war, and
émigré
politics. The tragic figure of Mihailovic had become the major obstacle. We had to maintain close military contact with the partisans, and therefore to persuade the King to dismiss Mihailovic from his post as Minister of War. Early in December, we withdrew official support from Mihailovic and recalled the British missions-operating in his territory.

*  *  * *  *

Yugoslav affairs were considered at the Teheran Conference against this background. Although it was decided by the three Allied Powers to give the maximum support to the partisans, the rôle of Yugoslavia in the war was dismissed by Stalin as of minor importance, and the Russians even disputed our figures of the number of Axis divisions in the Balkans. The Soviet Government however agreed to send a Russian mission to Tito as a result of Mr. Eden’s initiative. They also wished to keep contact with Mihailovic.

On my return from Teheran to Cairo, I saw King Peter, and told him about the strength and significance of the partisan movement and that it might be necessary for him to dismiss Mihailovic from his Cabinet. The only hope which the King
possessed of returning to his country would be, with our mediation, to reach some provisional arrangement with Tito without delay and before the partisans further extended their hold upon the country. The Russians, too, professed to be willing to work for some kind of compromise. On December 21, the Soviet Ambassador handed the following message to Mr. Eden:

  The Soviet Government is aware that at the present time very strained relations exist between Marshal Tito and the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia on the one hand and King Peter and his Government on the other. Mutual attacks and hard accusations on both sides, especially those which have recently taken place, have led to open hostilities, which hamper the cause of the struggle for the liberation of Yugoslavia. The Soviet Government shares the view of the British Government that, in the interests of the fight of the Yugoslavian people against the German invaders, it is necessary to make efforts to find a basis for collaboration between the two sides. The Soviet Government sees the great difficulties standing in the way of the realisation of this task, but it is ready to do everything possible to find a compromise between the two sides, with the purpose of uniting all the forces of the Yugoslavian people in the interests of the common struggle of the Allies.

  I received almost unanimous advice as to what course to pursue in this disagreeable situation. Officers who had served with Tito and the commanders of missions to Mihailovic presented similar pictures. The British Ambassador to the Royal Yugoslav Government, Mr. Stevenson, was equally convinced. He telegraphed to the Foreign Office on December 25:

  Our policy must be based on three new factors:

The partisans will be the rulers of Yugoslavia. They are of such value to us militarily that we must back them to the full, subordinating political considerations to military. It is extremely doubtful whether we can any longer regard the Monarchy as a unifying element in Yugoslavia.

*  *  * *  *

This risis in Yugoslav affairs pressed on me as I lay ill at Marrakesh. Maclean, who had been with me in Cairo, was now due to return to Yugoslavia. He was anxious to have my son with him, and it was arranged that Randolph should join the mission by parachute.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    29 Dec. 43

Randolph, who is now waiting for a drop into Yugoslavia, left behind the following note for me, dated 25th instant. It seems to me sound, and to represent to a large extent your point of view and mine. He will be going in a few days.

“1. Three weeks ago in Cairo Stevenson made no attempt to resist the arguments of Maclean and Deakin that the condition precedent for any useful political action in Yugoslavia was the repudiation of General Mihailovic. Despite the polemics indulged in by both sides, this is as true today as it was three weeks ago, though perhaps, owing to the procrastination of the King, we shall only gain a military and not a political advantage.

“2. Maclean stressed in Cairo that no
quid pro quo
could be obtained for the King by the dismissal of Mihailovic, but that this gesture might create an atmosphere in which the King’s fortunes could be advanced. This position has been prejudiced, but is still true, with limitations, today.

“3. Two things are surely therefore required: (i) The immediate repudiation of Mihailovic by His Majesty’s Government and if possible by King Peter. (ii) The immediate return to Tito’s headquarters of Maclean to try (
a
) to obtain the maximum military advantage from the situation, and (
b
) to explore what advantage may be gained for the King from the new situation that will be created upon the dismissal of Mihailovic.”

I added my own views, and a draft reply to Tito.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary
    30 Dec. 43

There is no possibility now of getting Tito to accept King Peter as a
quid pro quo
for repudiating Mihailovic. Once Mihailovic is gone the King’s chances will be greatly improved and we can plead his case at Tito’s Headquarters. I thought we were all agreed in Cairo to advise Peter to dismiss Mihailovic before the end of the
year. Everything Deakin and Maclean said and all the reports received showed that he had been in active collaboration with the Germans. We shall never bring the parties together till he has been disowned, not only by us, but by the King.

Pray let me know whether I shall send the following message, or whether I shall merely give a friendly acknowledgment, in which latter case I fear we shall have lost a good opportunity of my establishing a personal relationship with this important man.

I do not wish to hawk this private message around to the United States and Stalin, with the inevitable delays involved. Unless you disagree, I propose to send it, as a letter, by air courier to Maclean at Bari, who will deliver it. He and Randolph will be dropping in in a few days. Let me know also the form in which you will repudiate Mihailovic and invite the King to do so. It is, in my opinion, Peter’s only chance.

  And on January 2:

  I have been convinced by the arguments of men I know and trust, that Mihailovic is a millstone tied around the neck of the little King, and he has no chance till he gets rid of him.

  The Foreign Secretary agreed, and I now wrote to Tito, who had sent me congratulations on my recovery.

A
FRICA
:
January
8, 1944

I thank you very much for your kind message about my health from yourself and the heroic patriot and partisan army of Yugoslavia. From Major Deakin, who is a friend of mine, I learnt all about your valiant efforts. It is my most earnest desire to give you all aid in human power by sea supplies, by air support, and by Commandos helping you in the island fighting. Brigadier Maclean is also a friend of mine, and a colleague in the House of Commons. With him at your Headquarters will soon be serving my son, Major Randolph Churchill, who is also a Member of Parliament.