Closing the Ring (63 page)

  “I am very glad,” I replied, on the 16th, “to see that we are in complete agreement.”

*  *  * *  *

Physical weakness oppressed me at Marrakesh following my illness at Carthage. All my painting tackle had been sent out, but I could not face it. I could hardly walk at all. Even tottering from the motor-car to a picnic luncheon in lovely weather amid the foothills of the Atlas was limited to eighty or a hundred yards. I passed eighteen hours out of the twenty-four supine. I never remember such extreme fatigue and weakness in body. On the other hand, every temptation, inducement, exhortation, and to some extent compulsion, to relax and lie down presented itself in the most seductive form. The Taylor villa was a perfect haven, lacking nothing that comfort could require or luxury suggest. I was utterly tired out, and here was the most attractive bed of repose, not only offered by gracious hosts, but enjoined by Lord Moran, the President, and the War Cabinet. However, events continued to offer irresistible distraction.

*  *  * *  *

The Polish question which had played so great a part at Teheran, had led me to cable Eden from Carthage.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

20 Dec. 43

I think you should now open the Polish frontiers question with the Poles, stating it is at my personal wish, and that I would have done it myself but for my temporary incapacitation. You should show them the formula and the rough line on the map on the eastern side, and the line of the Oder, including the Oppeln district, on the west. This gives them a magnificent piece of country three or four hundred miles across each way, and with over a hundred and fifty miles of seaboard, even on the basis that they do not begin till west of Königsberg. The Poles should understand of course that these are only very broad, tentative suggestions, but that they would be most unwise to let them fall to the ground. Even if they do not get Lvov, I should still advise their acceptance, and that they put themselves in the hands of British and American friends to try to turn this plan into reality You should put it to them that by taking over and holding firmly the present German territories up to the Oder, they will be rendering a service to
Europe as a whole by making the basis of a friendly policy towards Russia and close association with Czechoslovakia. This would give a chance for the rebirth of the Polish nation brighter than any yet seen.

Once we know that they will accept and endorse these proposals, we will address ourselves to the Russians and endeavour to make matters firm and precise. On the other hand, if they cast it all aside, I do not see how His Majesty’s Government can press for anything more for them. The Russian armies may in a few months be crossing the frontiers of pre-war Poland, and it seems of the utmost consequence to have friendly recognition by Russia of the Polish Government and a broad understanding of the postwar frontiers settlement agreed before then. I shall be most interested to hear what their reaction is.

*  *  * *  *

President Beneš was now on his way from Moscow to London. As these volumes will show, I had a long contact with him. It will be remembered that he had played perhaps a decisive part in warning Stalin of the pro-German conspiracy against him in 1938.
²
At any rate, his relations with the Soviets were of the most friendly and intimate character. I asked him to look in on me at Marrakesh on his way back. His profound knowledge of the Eastern European scene made his views on Poland and on what the Russians would do for Poland most important. For twenty years or more Beneš, as Foreign Secretary or President of Czechoslovakia, had been the faithful ally of France and friend of the Western Powers, while at the same time maintaining a unique association with Stalin. When France and Britain sacrificed Czechoslovakia, and later when on the eve of the war Ribbentrop made his agreement with Molotov, Beneš was a very lonely man. But then, after a lengthy interval, came Hitler’s attack on Russia, and all Beneš’s common stock with the Soviets came again into full validity. Russia might well have fought Germany about Czechoslovakia in 1938. Anyhow, both were now under the same cruel lash.

It was very pleasant to me to talk in the sunshine and amid the flowers of my Marrakesh abode to this old political associate
and mature European statesman, whom I had first met in 1918, in company with the great Masaryk, the founder of his country and the father of a son who died faithfully in her cause. Beneš was of course at this time optimistic.

I gave the following account of our talk to the President.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

6 Jan. 44

Benes has been here, and is very hopeful about the Russian situation. He may be most useful in trying to make the Poles see reason and in reconciling them to the Russians, whose confidence he has long possessed. He brought a new map with pencil marks by U.J. showing the eastern frontier from Königsberg to the Curzon Line, giving the Poles Lomza and Bialystok regions in the north, but not Lemberg [Lvov] at the southern end. For their western frontier he offers the line of the Oder, including the major part of Oppeln. This gives the Poles a fine place to live in, more than three hundred miles square, and with two hundred and fifty miles of seaboard on the Baltic. As soon as I get home, I shall go all out with the Polish Government to close with this or something like it, and, having closed, they must proclaim themselves as ready to accept the duty of guarding the bulwark of the Oder against further German aggression upon Russia, and also they must back the settlement to the limit. This will be their duty to the Powers of Europe, who will twice have rescued them. If I can get this tidied up early in February, a visit from them to you would clinch matters.

The Russians are quite agreeable to Benes having his old pre-Munich frontier back, with a slight military adjustment along the northern crests of the mountains and a little territory to the eastward linking them with Russia.

As this was the last time I ever saw President Beneš, I will record my tribute to him. In all his thought and aims he consistently sustained the main principles on which Western civilisation is founded, and was ever true to the cause of his native land, over which he presided for twenty years. He was a master of administration and diplomacy. He knew how to endure with patience and fortitude long periods of adverse fortune. Where he failed—and it cost him and his country much—was in not taking violent decisions at the supreme
moment. He was too experienced a diplomatist, too astute a year-to-year politician, to realise the moment and to stake all on victory or death. Had he told his cannons to fire at Munich time, the Second World War would have begun under conditions far less favourable to Hitler, who needed many months to make his army and his armour.

*  *  * *  *

In spite of the tension with General de Gaulle about Peyrouton, Boisson, and Flandin, all of whom had been arrested by the Free French authorities in December, I determined to make an effort to renew friendly relations with him before returning home. On New Year’s Day, I asked him to dine and sleep at the villa on January 3. “This,” I said, “would give us an opportunity of long-needed talks. My wife is with me here, and if Madame de Gaulle would care to accompany you, it would give us both much pleasure.” The General evidently thought the notice too short. I ought to have known that he would not sleep anywhere in North Africa but in a French official residence. He pleaded the pressure of his other engagements. So I let it alone. However, having learnt later that he would arrive in Marrakesh on January 12, I invited him to luncheon that day, and he accepted. Mr. Duff Cooper and Lady Diana, Lord Beaverbrook, Mr. Nairn the Consul and his wife were also our guests. The General arrived in the best of humour, greeted Mrs. Churchill in English, and spoke it throughout the meal. To make things equal, I spoke French.

After luncheon the ladies went off to visit the bazaars, and de Gaulle and I and the other men settled down in the garden for a long talk. I had a lot of awkward subjects to deal with, and I thought my speaking French would add a lighter touch to them. Mr. Nairn, who made a few notes afterwards, records, “I heard Mr. Churchill say to Mr. Duff Cooper in English in a very audible whisper, ‘I’m doing rather well, aren’t I? Now that the General speaks English so well, he understands my French perfectly.’ Then everyone, General de Gaulle setting the example, burst out laughing. The Prime Minister continued
in French, but the supersensitive General was completely disarmed and ready to accept Mr. Churchill’s comments in a friendly and helpful spirit.”

The comments were numerous and serious. Why was he pursuing this vendetta against the French notabilities who had fallen into his power? Did he not realise how much difficulty he made for himself in the United States? How angry the President was with him? How much we all depended on American aid and good will? Why should he complicate his own task by this and all sorts of other needless friction? Why should he always try to offend these powerful Governments, without whose help he could not live? Upon a smaller point, why had he driven General Georges, whom I had specially brought from France to make things easier, off the Committee? At this de Gaulle said he had offered General Georges the Chancellorship of the Legion of Honour. I asked what reply he had received. “I received no reply,” he answered. I said I was not surprised. Had he the Chancellorship to bestow? But all ended pleasantly, and the General proposed that I should attend a review he would hold in my honour the next morning, which I agreed to do. And accordingly de Gaulle and I stood on a small platform while quite a large array of French aand Moroccan troops marched past for an hour amid the cheers of the inhabitants of the Marrakesh oasis.

*  *  * *  *

Another question arising out of Teheran raised considerable difficulty. We have seen how Stalin had asked for a share in the Italian Fleet, and the President was under the impression that he himself had mentioned in conversation one-third. The British Chiefs of Staff did not like this, and had always spoken to their Russian colleagues on a different basis. The President was worried about his personal remark “one-third,” and set the whole position out to me with great frankness.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

9 Jan. 44

As I told you, Harriman requested information on the action we were taking to carry out our commitments to turn over Italian ships to the Soviet by February 1 so that he could discuss the matter with Molotov if he were queried. I told him it was my intention to allocate one-third of the captured Italian ships to the Soviet war effort, beginning February 1, as rapidly as they could be made available.

Harriman then reminded me that Stalin’s request at Teheran was a reiteration of the Soviet request originally made at Moscow in October [namely, for one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, and four submarines for North Russia, and forty thousand tons of merchant shipping for the Black Sea], and that no mention was made at Moscow or Teheran of the Russians getting additional ships up to one-third of those captured. Accordingly, Harriman regarded my cable of December 21 as being for his information, and he has not discussed the question of one-third with Molotov.

Harriman also emphasised the very great importance of fulfilling our pledge to yield these ships. For us to fail or to delay would, in his opinion, only arouse suspicion in Stalin and in his associates as to the firmness of other commitments made at Teheran.

On the other hand, the Chiefs of Staff have raised numerous objections to the transfer, based on probable effects that this course would have on pending operations. They fear a loss of Italian naval and military co-operation, and the scuttling or sabotage of valuable ships which we need for “Anvil” and “Overlord.” They foresee no material benefit to the Russian war effort at this time, since the warships are presently quite unsuited for Northern waters and the Black Sea is closed to merchant vessels.

The very wise provisions of the modified agreement [negotiated by Admiral Cunningham] give the United Nations the right to make disposition of any or all Italian ships as they may think fit. It is of importance that we should acquire and maintain the confidence of our Ally, and I feel that every practicable effort should be made to arrive at a solution whereby the Italian ships requested by the Soviet be turned over to them, beginning about February 1.

Do you believe it wise to present to Uncle J. the possible effect on “Overlord-Anvil” as expressed by our Staffs, and suggest a delay in assigning Italian ships to him until after the launching of “Overlord-Anvil”? I am particularly desirous of having an expression of your opinion in view of the present British command of the Mediterranean theatre and in order that we may reach a complete agreement as to the action to be taken. It is patently impracticable for either of us to act singly in this matter, but I think you will agree that we must not go back on what we told Uncle J.

  This message was not entirely clear. I agreed to the ships mentioned in our agreement of October, but not to the more general terms of “one third.” I therefore replied:

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

9 Jan. 44

I entirely agree with you that we must not break faith with Stalin about the ships. I have been for a week in correspondence with Anthony on the subject, and hope to submit a proposal to you for a joint communication from you and me in a day or two.

  I was myself in full accord with the Chiefs of Staff on both sides of the Atlantic. I felt that the immediate transfer of these Italian warships, which had so resolutely made their way to Malta and placed themselves in our hands, might have most damaging results to Italian co-operation with the Allies. Throughout the year 1943, my aim had been, not only to make Italy surrender, but to bring her in on our side, with all that that meant to the progress of the war and to the future settlement of Europe. I was therefore prepared to press the War Cabinet and the Admiralty to make a substantial British sacrifice and to supply a number of British ships to the Russians, instead of breaking Italian hearts at this moment, so pregnant, as it seemed to me, with consequences for the future. Various messages passed between us, and I was very glad indeed to find how closely my colleagues at home and the Chiefs of Staff agreed. One could not expect the United States, with the whole burden of war in the Pacific weighing upon them, to make any large contribution. We, on the other hand, had certainly at this time an ample margin of naval power, both in the Mediterranean and, now that the
Scharnhorst
was at the bottom, in home and Arctic waters as well. As soon as I reached an agreement with my friends at home I sent the following proposals to the President: