Closing the Ring (60 page)

I began my effort on December 19, when the C.I.G.S. arrived at Carthage to see me on his way home from Montgomery’s Headquarters in Italy. We had hoped to go there together, but my illness had prevented me. We had a full discussion, and I found that General Brooke had by a separate route of thought arrived at the same conclusion as I had. We agreed on the policy, and also that while I should deal with the commanders on the spot, he would do his best to overcome all difficulties at home. General Brooke then left by air for London. I telegraphed:

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff

19 Dec. 43

I am anxiously awaiting a full list of all landing-craft of all types in the Mediterranean now, showing their condition and employment, and especially whether it is true that a large number are absorbed in purely supply work to the prevention of their amphibious duties. There is no doubt that the stagnation of the whole campaign on the Italian Front is becoming scandalous. The C.I.G.S.’s visit confirmed my worst forebodings. The total neglect to provide the amphibious action on the Adriatic side and the failure to strike any similar blow on the west have been disastrous.

None of the landing-craft in the Mediterranean have been put to the slightest use [for assault purposes] for three months, neither coming home in preparation for “Overlord,” nor for the Aegean islands, nor in the Italian battle. There are few instances, even in this war, of such valuable forces being so completely wasted.

  The Chiefs of Staff had evidently been thinking on the same lines, and, after hearing General Brooke’s account, replied on the 22nd.

Chiefs of Staff to Prime Minister

22 Dec. 43

We are in full agreement with you that the present stagnation cannot be allowed to continue. For every reason it is essential that something should be done to speed things up. The solution, as you say, clearly lies in making use of our amphibious power to strike round the enemy’s flank and open up the way for a rapid advance on Rome.

After the L.S.T.s are withdrawn for “Overlord” on January 15, General Eisenhower should have at his disposal an amphibious lift sufficient for a little more than one division, and he has a plan to make a landing behind the enemy just south of Rome. The weakness of this plan is that the assault in that strength on the coast cannot be launched until the Fifth Army is within supporting distance of the force to be landed. If the available lift could be increased, however, a stronger force could be landed without waiting for the main army to arrive within immediate supporting distance. Such a landing moreover would have a more far-reaching effect on the whole progress of the campaign, and would be much more likely to open the way for a rapid advance. We think the aim should be to provide a lift for at least two divisions.

We have telegraphed to the Commander-in-Chief Mediterranean for the information you ask for on landing-craft. We have every hope that it will be possible to make some economy in this direction, but we must look further afield if we are to give General Eisenhower the two-divisional lift.

A possible source of supply is the craft already on their way back from Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean. … A small number of craft have also been left in Southeast Asia.

  After explaining that the new plan would involve giving up both the capture of Rhodes and also a minor amphibious operation on the Arakan coast of Burma, they ended:

  If you approve the above line of thought, we propose to take the matter up with the Combined Chiefs of Staff with a view to action being taken on these lines at once.

*  *  * *  *

This led to a hard scrutiny of our resources. Some landing-craft for the cancelled operation against the Andamans were on their way to the Mediterranean across the Indian Ocean. Others were due to return home for “Overlord.” All were in extreme demand.

I had been reluctant to agree to the abandonment of the attack on Rhodes we had talked of to President Inönü. A far greater effort must be made with the Turks, as well as to expedite the operation and the subsequent return of landing-craft for “Anvil” (the assault on Southern France). By December 23 however I was becoming resigned to Turkish neutrality, and I replied from Carthage:

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff

23 Dec. 43

You will observe that whereas you are thinking of a decision in Italy, Ike is looking forward to “Anvil,” which is now very much part of his main interest. I recognise that if the Turks will not play, we may have to sacrifice the Aegean policy, especially if it is marked up so high and so slow. I hope however that this decision will not be taken till after full exploration of the whole scene. I hope to see Eisenhower today, and Alexander is visiting me. Thereafter
I shall ask Jumbo [General Wilson] to come here on his way home. I wish to keep all the issues open for the next three or four days. Supposing Turkey jibs and Rhodes is shut out, we must have the big Rome amphibious operation, and also have some clearing up on the Dalmatian coast, especially Argostol, and Corfu. In no case can we sacrifice Rome for the Riviera. We must have both.

  Meanwhile, I had had a long talk with Alexander. He demurred to the suggestion that he was not very keen on the Anzio landing. He wanted a two-division lift, and the problem was how this could be supplied. Bedell Smith, who had also arrived, thought he could make up pretty nearly a two-division lift, provided that airborne troops were counted as well. If this were supplied and decision taken on the morrow or the next day, Alexander could strike in the last week of January. The question was, how to find the landing-craft. When I asked Bedell Smith why we should not delay the “Overlord” L.S.T.s, etc., till February 15, he replied he just could not bear asking for a third extension. I had no such compunction.

There were 104 L.S.T.s in the Mediterranean, but most of them were due to return home for “Overlord.” By the middle of January, we should have only thirty-six, with another fifteen arriving from the Indian Ocean about that time. To carry two divisions it was said we needed eighty-eight. No more could arrive till April. The only solution was to hold most of those in the Mediterranean for another three weeks. There were good hopes that this could be done without injury to “Overlord,” or to the landing in the Riviera.

*  *  * *  *

On the 24th, the Chiefs of Staff sent me a detailed statement of their ideas, and a draft which they proposed to send to their Washington colleagues. They favoured the plan, but feared we should never win American consent.

Their conclusions were:

  We ask the Combined Chiefs of Staff to agree: (
a
) That the remainder
of the Andamans assault shipping and craft should be ordered to the Mediterranean. (
b
) That such resources as can reach the Central Mediterranean in time should be employed by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean Theatre for the launching of a two-divisional amphibious assault designed to enable Rome to be captured and the armies to advance to the Pisa-Rimini line, and that instructions to this effect should be issued forthwith. There will be sufficient time for the subsequent withdrawal of these resources for the South of France attack. (
c
) That our negotiations with Turkey should continue on the present basis, but that amphibious operations in the Aegean should be ruled out. (
d
) That Admiral Mountbatten should be informed of these decisions, and instructed to make his final recommendations for operations to be carried out in his theatre with the resources remaining to him.

*  *  * *  *

I had with me at this tense period from my Defence Office only General Hollis, but he proved a tower of strength. I was also greatly aided by Captain Power, R.N., who was Admiral John Cunningham’s Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans). He cleared away a mass of argument which obstructed the decision. He said in his able paper, which the Admiral fully approved:

  The L.S.T.s now in the Mediterranean are thoroughly trained. They have all taken part in at least two assault operations, and have done a great deal of additional work on ferrying, continually loading and unloading over beaches, yards, or quays. They are well manned and accustomed to steaming and manoeuvring in close company. They should require no further naval training prior to “Overlord,” except that they are unaccustomed to problems of tide and the technique of beaching and unbeaching in tidal waters. Being good seamen, however, they should require but very brief instruction and training before they master the new problem. … Mediterranean experience shows that there is no need to marry the L.S.T.s and the troops concerned until eleven days before calling for the operation—three days for initial loading, six days for rehearsal, two days for reloading. …

I should estimate that seven days’ allowance for tide training would be more than adequate for these well-trained ships.

Total training allowance should therefore be approximately three weeks. … They therefore have ample time before “Overlord,” except that they cannot all refit at once.

*  *  * *  *

As a result of detailed discussion with the assembled commanders I sent home the following proposals after midnight on the 24th:

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff and
First Sea Lord

25 Dec. 43 (12.30
A.M.
)

I have had talks tonight with General Wilson and General Alexander and Air Chief Marshal Tedder and their staffs about Anzio.

We are all agreed that it must be carried out on sufficient scale to ensure success, namely, at least a two-divisional assault. Target date will be about January 20. Assumption is that Rhodes is not on. We feel strongly that the only right course is to delay for not more than one month departure from Mediterranean of all British L.S.Ts now due to leave in January and on February 1 (totalling fifty-six L.S.Ts). The fifteen L.S.T.s from the Bay of Bengal would not arrive in time for Anzio, but would play their part in repayment of “Overlord” a little later. …

I wish Chiefs of Staff to give earliest attention to the paper prepared at my request by Captain Power. This sets out the economies in time which might be effected in the preparation of L.S.T.s for “Overlord.” All present tonight considered that Captain Power’s paper showed a firm grasp of the situation, and his proposals should be capable of achievement. …

  The Chiefs of Staff were not at first convinced. They mentioned various points of detail; and details were decisive. They also “earnestly hoped” I would agree to their draft note explaining the situation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. I was sure that we must be agreed among ourselves in all essentials first, and I replied as follows:

Prime Minister to Chiefs of Staff

26 Dec. 43

I have been into the facts most thoroughly with the Admiral and with General Gale and their staffs. There is not the slightest chance of mounting Anzio on a two-division basis unless the whole fifty-six L.S.T.s are held back another three weeks—i.e., until February 5. They know a good deal about training for assault landings in the Mediterranean. Pray let me know the argument as between three weeks and a month, and let me know exactly each day’s employment prescribed for vessels on return. … You are expected to organise dockyards so as to refit twenty-five a month.

The success of Anzio depends on the strength of the initial landing. If this is two full divisions plus paratroops, it should be decisive, as it cuts the communications of the whole of the enemy forces facing the Fifth Army. The enemy must therefore annihilate the landing force by withdrawals from the Fifth Army Front or immediately retreat. Nothing less than two divisions will serve. Weather uncertainties make it necessary to put them ashore with at least four days’ supplies. It is not intended to maintain these divisions for long over the beaches, but rather to bring the battle to a climax in a week or ten days. …

It is no use your telegraphing to the Combined Chiefs of Staff until we are in agreement on the one vital matter, namely, the delay of three weeks in the return of the fifty-six L.S.T.s. On this depends the success or ruin of our Italian campaign.

  The Chiefs of Staff gave many solid reasons for their anxieties in their reply of December 27, and added, “We feel we should not conceal from you the difficulty we expect with the United States Chiefs of Staff if we tell them frankly the true position as we see it.”

*  *  * *  *

All the morning of Christmas Day our conference at Carthage continued. Eisenhower, Alexander, Bedell Smith, General Wilson, Tedder, Admiral John Cunningham, and other high officers were present. The only one not there was General Mark Clark, of the Fifth Army. This was an oversight which I regret, as it was to his army that the operation was eventually entrusted and he ought to have had the background in his mind. We were all agreed that nothing less than a two-division lift would suffice. At this time I contemplated an assault by two
British divisions from the Eighth Army, in which Montgomery was about to be succeeded by General Leese. I thought the amphibious operation involved potential mortal risks to the landed forces, and I preferred to run them with British troops, because it was to Britain that I was responsible. Moreover, the striking force would then have been homogeneous instead of half and half.

Everything turned on landing-craft, which held for some weeks all our strategy in the tightest ligature. What with the rigid date prescribed for “Overlord” and the movement, repair, and refitting of less than a hundred of these small vessels, all plans were in a straitjacket. The telegrams which passed show how we escaped, though mauled, from this predicament. But I must also admit that I was so much occupied in fighting for the principle that I did not succeed in getting, and indeed did not dare to demand, the necessary weight and volume for the “cat-claw.” Actually there were enough L.S.T.s for the operation as planned, and in my opinion, if the extravagant demands of the military machine had been reduced, we could, without prejudice to any other pledge or commitment, have flung ashore south of the Tiber a still larger force with full mobility. However, the issue was fought out in terms of routine Army requirements and the exact dates when L.S.T.s could be free for “Overlord,” making of course all allowances for their return home in winter Biscay weather, and with the time-margins for their refits stated at their maximum. If I had asked for a three-division lift, I should not have got anything. How often in life must one be content with what one can get! Still, it would be better to do it right.