Cochrane (29 page)

Mulgrave told Cochrane in the course of discussion that, of course, a vote of thanks would be proposed to Gambier in the Commons, as it had been to other commanders afte
r such great victories as Copen
hagen, the Nile, and the Glorious First of June. Cochrane, as he later confessed, was appalled by the announcement. Without further thought, he informed Mulgrave of his intention:

In my capacity as one of the members for Westminster, I will oppose the motion, on the ground that the commander-in-chief has not only done nothing to merit a vote of thanks, but has neglected to destroy the French fleet in Aix Roads, when it was clearly in his power to do so.
⁴⁷

It was now Mulgrave's turn to be appalled. For a vote of thanks to be opposed in this manner was an unheard of thing. Whatever the misgivings of parliament might be, accusations of this sort would make the Basque Roads a national scandal, undermining public confidence in the conduct of the war and giving comfort as well as amusement to the enemy. For a long while, Mulgrave solemnly warned Cochrane "not to persist in this determination". The warning was unheeded.

"Such a course," said Mulgrave pointedly, "will not only prove injurious to the Government but highly detrimental to yourself, by raising up against you a host of enemies."

Given the number of enemies already on the list, it seemed that there was little scope for adding to them. Cochrane remained unmoved. Seeing that the defiant captain would not yield to threats, Mulgrave, as the reasonable man of affairs, decided to take the only other course traditionally available. He must be bribed.

"The public is satisfied with what has been done," said the First Lord soothingly, "and they give you full credit for your share therein. You shall be included in the vote of thanks, so th
at the recognition of Lord Gambi
er's services can do you no harm!"

Mulgrave's obtuseness is evident from the manner in which, despite several interviews, he had still not appreciated the ferocious sensitivity of Cochrane's pride.

"Speaking as a member of the House of Commons," said Cochrane angrily, "I do not recognise Lord Gambier's services at all, for none have been rendered. As for any thanks to myself, I would rather be without them."

The First Lord, unable to credit this, insisted that Cochrane would be seen as attacking Gambier in his naval capacity.

"The public will not draw the distinction between your professional and parliamentary conduct," he said wearily.

"I regret the public want of discrimination," Cochrane replied acidly, "but that will not alter my determination."
⁴⁸

The interview ended. The Portland ministry was in an acutely embarrassing dilemma. They loathed Cochrane, personally and politically, quite as much as he detested them. But he held the initiative firmly. They had promised Gambier his vote of thanks but could not give it him in the face of the public scandal which Cochrane was prepared to raise. Men had opposed votes of thanks before, but for the leader of the attack to oppose one voted to his commanding admiral was unthinkable.

Under pressure from the government, Mulgrave tried again to make Cochrane see reason. He sent for him and "entreated" him to "reconsider" his conduct. Then he warned Cochrane that he had reported every word of the previous conversation to the government, "which was highly dissatisfied therewith". Unless the opposition to the vote of confidence were dropped, Cochrane could count upon feeling the "high displeasure" of those in power.

"The displeasure of the government," said Cochrane calmly, "will not for a moment influence my parliamentary conduct, for which I hold myself answerable to my constituents."

As on the previous occasion, Mulgrave turned quickly from threat to bribe, eagerly offering a solution to the difficulty which by his standards ought to be acceptable to a man of honour. If there was a good and agreeable reason for Cochrane to be absent from the Commons, then the question of opposing the vote of thanks would not arise. The government would get its vote and Cochrane's principles would not be compromised.

"If you are on service, you cannot be in your place in parliament," Mulgrave suggested knowingly. "Now, my lord, I will make you a proposal. I will put under your orders three frigates, with
carte blanche
to do whatever you please on the enemy's coasts in the Mediterranean. I will further get you permission to go to Sicily, and embark on board your squadron my own regiment, which is stationed there. You know how to make use of such advantages."

With studied patience, Cochrane thanked the First Lord for his offer, and then went on to point out the irremovable impediment, as though it were a difficulty so subtle that Mulgrave could not have been expected to see it for himself.

"Were I to accept this offer," said Cochrane slowly, "the country would regard my acquiescence as a bribe to hold my peace, whilst I could not regard it in any other light. Self-respect must, therefore, be my excuse for declining the proposal."

So far as any argument was concerned, that was the end of the matter. Even Mulgrave now accepted that Cochrane could not be threatened and would not be bribed. The ministry might take its revenge in due course, but there was no easy way out of the present difficulty.
⁴⁹

Cochrane's flawless skill in battle was matched, in the view of his Victorian successors, by two fundamental errors of judgement in public affairs: the feud with St Vincent and the campaign against Gambier after the Basque Roads. His own son acknowledged that "He made enemies where a cautious man might have made friends." J. W. Fortescue described Cochrane's "unfortunate readiness to convert the championship of a cause into a personal enmity. An honourable conflict against the Admiralty's corruption becomes a duel first with St Vincent and then with Croker." St Vincent was not a figure of great humanity but he shared Cochrane's antagonism to corruption and to such ineffectual commanders as Gambier. Had Cochrane been able to subdue his own pride, he might have made one important enemy the less. As it was, the public squabbling went on even after the First Lord had left the Admiralty and become commander of the Channel Fleet. On
14
April
1806,
St Vincent wrote angrily to the First Sea Lord, Admiral Markham: "Did you ever read such a madly arrogant paragraph as that in Lord Cochrane's public letter, where he lugs in Lieutenant Parker for the avowed purpose of attacking me, his commander-in-chief?"
⁵⁰

However, in the case of the Gambier quarrel, Cochrane seemed more demonstrably in the right than he ever had been over St Vincent. William Beckford, author of the oriental extravaganza
Vathek,
writing in the new Gothick splendour of Fonthill Abbey, compared the scapegrace uncle and the valiant nephew:

What the devil is C. Johnstone up to? There's another person who will not come to a good end. But the Hero! The Hero is predestined to glory according to my scriptures; discreet, modest, silent - short in speech, long in thought - there is stuff in that man to become one day a cloak of ermine and gold.
⁵¹

The press began to echo such sentiments in Cochrane's case. In the
Naval Chronicle,
he was referred to as "Our Hero". There was praise for his "true courage and greatness of mind" in the dangers he faced so that he might rescue French officers and seamen from the burning hulk of the
Ville de Varsovie.
The paper at first denied that there was any quarrel between Cochrane and Gambier over what it now termed Cochrane's "late brilliant exploit". But in case Gambier's supporters were preparing to denounce Cochrane's version of events publicly, the
Chronicle
issued a muted threat:

It very forcibly struck us, that an extraordinary time
did
elapse from the appearance of Lord Cochrane's telegraphic communication "that seven of the enemy's ships were on shore, and might be destroyed", till the period when the requisite assistance was afforded.
⁵²

The same point was being made more generally in the press. On
25
April
1809,
The Times
expressed the obvious surprise of the public at finding that Gambier had not been prepared for the possibility of going to destroy the French ships, even before Cochrane signalled him. "Why, then, if seven might be destroyed, were there only four? Had Admiral Lord Gambier to unmoor at the time he received this intelligence? Did he not expect this might be the case? Or with what view was Lord Cochrane sent up to the Roads ?"

Gambier kept silent until
30
May, when he wrote to Wellesley Pole, "I had flattered myself that I should have received some signification of an approbation of my conduct." He was irritated to hear that there were now "some doubts" about the reward he expected to be given.

Feeling that even a doubt upon such a subject cannot be entertained consistently with my reputation as Commander in Chief, I request that you will be pleased to move the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to direct a Court Martial to be assembled as early as possible, for the purpose of enquiring into my conduct as Commander in Chief.
⁵³

With such ease was Cochrane outmanoeuvred in the quarrels of public life. A court-martial would enable Gambier and the Admiralty to fight on their own terms. If there was an acquittal, the vote of thanks would pass the Commons easily, no matter what Cochrane said or did. For the time being, Gambier also obliged the Admiralty by rewriting his Basque Roads despatch so that all reference to Cochrane's gallantry was now omitted from the official record.
⁵⁴

On
4
June, Wellesley Pole wrote to Gambier, informing him that the Lords of the Admiralty had acceded to his request and that a court-martial would be held upon "your conduct as Commander in Chief". The arrangements had been ordered "agreeably to your desire". The trial was eventually to open on
26
July and was to be held on the hulk H.M.S.
Gladiator,
moored in Portsmouth harbour.
⁵⁵

The court-martial of a naval commander-in-chief was bound to be a national sensation. It was said that Cochrane himself had brought it about and was the prosecutor, but it was entirely Gambier's doing. Indeed, as Cochrane later protested, he was regarded as responsible for the prosecution being brought, but was neither invited nor allowed to act as prosecutor. He was treated as any other witness might be and was not even allowed to be present in the court when testimony was being given by others.

The Admiralty chose as president of the court Sir Roger Curtis, Commander-in-Chief at Spithead and Portsmouth. It was hardly the most impartial decision. In
1790
there had been an unfortunate court-martial scandal when Curtis had taken part in a trial in an unauthorised and illegal capacity. But it was something more than unfortunate for the credibility of naval justice that one of Curtis's closest friends was Lord Gambier himself.
⁵⁶

On
26
July, when the court assembled, the tweeting whistles and the smart files of Royal Marines presenting arms as the members came aboard, the scene was one of official splendour. The seven admirals and four captains who made up the tribunal were rivalled in their display of royal blue and gold by the witnesses who thronged H.M.S.
Gladiator.
The court assembled as usual in the great stern cabin with its windows looking out across the sunlit anchorage of Spithead.

Curtis sat as president at the head of the long table, Gambier's sword lying on the green baize before him. The other members of the court filed in and took their places on either side. First was Sir William Young, Admiral of the Blue, the man who had nearly destroyed Cochrane, the
Imperieuse,
and her crew on the rocks of Ushant; and whom Cochrane had denounced in the House of Commons for his conduct

Young was followed by Sir John Duckworth, Vice-Admiral of the Red, whom Gunner Richardson and his comrades knew as "Old Tommy", with his Christmas Day hangings, his Boxing Day floggings, his tyranny to his subordinates and his sycophancy towards those from whom he had something to gain. By any normal standard of impartiality there was an even better reason for disqualifying Duckworth, since he had been - and still was - Gambier's loyal second-in-command.

Of the other four admirals, Sir John Sutton was another significant choice, having also crossed swords with Cochrane over a public and controversial matter. It was he who had refused to listen to Cochrane's plea for the crew of the
Atalante
and the state of their vessel, and who was in part responsible for the loss of the ship.

Moses Greetham, the ju
dge advocate, took his place at
the far end of the table from Curtis. At eleven o'clock the court was opened and Gambier was brought in under the escort of the Marshal of the Admiralty. The judge advocate then read out the charge as their Lordships had drawn it up.