Cochrane (30 page)

It appears to us that the said Admiral Lord Gambier, on the
12th
day of the said month of April, the enemy's ships being then on shore, and the signal having been made that they could be destroyed, did, for a considerable time, neglect or delay taking effectual measures for destroying them.
⁵⁷

The witnesses for the prosecution were then called. There was no way in which the court could convincingly avoid calling Cochrane himself, but it excluded the evidence of two men whom it knew to be ready to support him. One was Francis Austen, later and better known as Admiral Sir Francis Austen, who told Cochrane that he blamed some of Gambier's subordinates as much as the admiral himself. The other was Frederick Maitiand, who commanded the
Emerald
in Aix Roads and who supported Cochrane so publicly that he was sent on service to Ireland until the court-martial should be safely over.

There were other witnesses whose evidence, in part at least, was not to the court's nor to Gambier's liking, but these were on the whole dealt with firmly and efficiently by Curtis and Admiral Young. William James, observing their conduct, remarked that both the senior officers of the court "evinced a strong bias in favour of the accused". The treatment of Cochrane and other witnesses whose evidence was unfavourable to Gambier was far from impartial in James's view, resembling closely the m
ost hostile kind of cross-exam
ination which an opposing counsel might have undertaken. Junior captains or men like John Thompson, master's mate of H.M.S.
Beagle,
who were not prompt or helpful in their replies to the distinguished court, were subjected to withering irony in such terms as, "Have I been fortunate enough to express myself clearly to you?"
⁵⁸

As soon as the accuracy of various logs had been established by witnesses, Cochrane was called. It has to be admitted that in a court of law, even more obviously than in the House of Commons, he was not in his element. This was not the type of warfare in which he excelled. He was asked, for instance, if there had been any delay by Gambier in sending assistance when Cochrane signalled for it after taking the
Imperieuse
in alone. He conceded that there had not been.

"But had the attack been made in the morning," he insisted, "it is my opinion that seven sail of the enemy, including the three-decker, might have been destroyed with facility, by two sail of the line, assisted by the frigates and smaller vessels; and that after the hour of half past eleven .
..
the frigates alone, assisted by the smaller vessels, might have destroyed the whole of the above-mentioned ships."

Sir Roger Curtis, as president, decided to blunt this particular attack on Gambier by taking over the questioning of Cochrane himself.

"What were the circumstances that induced your Lordship to believe that from half-past eleven o'clock to one o'clock the frigates alone were capable of destroying the enemy's ships?" he demanded. "If they could do it after eleven, why could they not do it before?"

Cochrane began a long and elaborate explanation of the way in which the French had run aground, providing a perfect target, and how he had been amazed to see Gambier sail to within a few miles and then drop anchor again. Sir Roger Curtis cut short the laboured reply.

"Really," he snapped, "I very humbly beg your pardon, but I do not see how this can be an answer!"

Cochrane tried to stand his ground in front of the assembled admirals.

"If, when it is written, it shall appear not to be an answer to the question, then I humbly submit it may be struck out."

It was his old adversary Admiral Young who squashed this line of argument.

"If the court is of opinion that
their time is taken up with any
thing which is not relevant, they may I apprehend stop it, when they see that."

"I apprehend that cannot be seen till the court see what it is I am about to say," retorted Cochrane angrily, and then went on to describe Gambier's failure to attack. 'Twelve o'clock arrived, no signal was made to weigh anchor; half past twelve, still no signal."

Admiral Young cut him short again.

"This is really very improper!" he announced. "This has no sort of connection whatever with the question which is asked, and is only a series of observations to the disadvantage of the prisoner."

"I wish to speak the truth," thundered Cochrane, "the whole truth, and nothing but the truth!"

To the dismay of his friends and the delight of his adversaries, the interruptions and browbeating had thrown him badly off balance.

"This really has nothing at all to do with the question which is asked you," said Admiral Young coldly.

"If the question is put by a person
ignorant
of the whole proceedings, and which does not lead to get the truth and the whole truth, I hold that I am to give the whole truth!" insisted Cochrane.

Such an attack on the court might have caused a sensation in King's Bench but there was a shocked silence in the crowd of assembled officers as the tall, red-haired captain stood before the green baize of the table denouncing the senior admirals for their ignorance and their attempt to muzzle the truth. Cochrane, in his anger, almost spat out the word "ignorant" at Admiral Young. Lord Mulgrave's men had goaded their prey to the point where his destruction might be accomplished. In a moment he was protesting, "In three words more I shall finish what I have to say."

But Admiral Stanhope had other views.

"Would it not be better, at once, to clear the court.... ?"

"I really should wish the court to be cleared upon it," added Admiral Sutton.

The president accordingly cleared the court. When it opened again, he first reprimanded Cochrane for "the very digressive manner in which you answered, or were proceeding to answer the question put". In future, he was directed to give "a short and decisive answer to the question put to you".

Then there was the offending word "ignorant".

"Considering all the circumstances together," said Curtis, "it was, in no small degree, indecorous to the court, to make use of such an expression."

Cochrane was questioned and cross-questioned by the admirals of the court for much of the first day, virtually the whole of the second, and part of the third. Aggression, boldness, determination, the qualities which served him well with his crew or at the hustings were his undoing in the court-martial with its nicely-defined rules of argument. He began to appear very much as the fool Godwin took him for. Towards the end of the second day they drove him to exasperation yet again, and he burst out angrily:

I have felt that if I had answered yes or no to all the questions which have been put to me, I ought to be hung; and that if a court-martial was held upon
me,
and only the answers yes or no appeared to those questions, I should be hung for them!

"I believe nobody has desired your Lordship to answer merely yes or no," said the judge advocate drily. Nor had they, despite the numerous interruptions of Cochrane's answers. It was characteristic of him that the more passionate his feelings in debate the worse he countered the opposing arguments.
⁵⁹

It seemed likely that his conduct under prolonged examination by the court would tell against him when the proceedings were published by Gambier's supporters. But so far as the issue of the trial was concerned, the documentary evidence was surely irrefutable. Cochrane had the most reliable charts of all, from the
Neptune Franc
ais,
showing the area of the Aix Roads, the Aix-Boyart channel and the soundings. They were based on the work of the best French hydrographers, who had every reason to know the waters better than anyone else, and he had proved their practical accuracy by using them for the attacks made by the
Pallas
and the
Imperieuse.
Naturally, Cochrane produced his copy of the French chart to substantiate his claim that the attack on the French fleet was possible at any state of the tide.

"This chart is not evidence before the court," said the judge advocate quickly, "because his Lordship cannot prove it accurate."
⁶⁰

Proof of accuracy was strictly insisted on by the court. It would require Cochrane to produce the French hydrographer who had drawn the chart, perhaps even the men who had taken the soundings. The fact that England was then at war with France did not excuse the necessity of parading the experts in question on board the
Gladiator
at Portsmouth to be examined as to the accuracy of their work. Failing that, the charts were to be dismissed.

Instead, the Admiralty produced charts of its own, one set drawn by Thomas Stokes, master of the
Caledonia,
and another by Edward Fairfax, master of the fleet. Both men had drawn up their charts under Gambier's orders during the Basque Roads affair, and both were in court to testify to their accuracy. These, then, were the charts accepted by Sir Roger Curtis and the members of the court.

Being a mere witness, rather than Gambier's prosecutor, Cochrane had no right to see these new Admiralty charts. They were based on the work of Stokes and Fairfax but he was refused access to them by the Admiralty for fifty-one years. In very different circumstances, when he was an old and dying man, his reputation long since vindicated, he was permitted to see them. Yet even at the court-martial, the more bizarre details of the Admiralty "charts", which the court took as proved beyond question, had begun to emerge.

It was said, in support of their accuracy, that Stokes and Fairfax agreed upon the depth of the Aix Roads and the approach channel. As Cochrane remarked, it would have been surprising if they had differed, since much of Stokes's chart relied on figures which he admitted had been supplied by Fairfax. "It cannot be expected," said Stokes defensively, "that from the opportunities I had of sounding in this place, I could accurately point out the distance between the sands." He had, however, pieced out his distant observations with information from an unspecified "French manuscript". It was not available for inspection but Stokes swore that he took it to be correct. Fairfax claimed to have taken soundings of his own, but he was unable to say that he had been much further in than the Boyart Shoal.
⁶¹

On the basis of the resulting charts, which were not available for scrutiny or challenge, the Admiralty had now reduced the navigable width of the Aix-Boyart channel from two miles to one. According to this, the danger of British ships running aground under the guns of Aix was immensely increased. How wise, it seemed, Lord Gambier had been to ignore Cochrane's suggestion of hazarding his entire fleet in the narrow and treacherous waterway.

But there was a far more original and extraordinary feature on the charts. Once again, it was one upon which both Stokes and Fairfax agreed. Close to the landward end of the Boyart Shoal and the Palles mud flats were hidden rocks, not shown on any French chart, barring the way to the anchorage except at high tide. How it was possible for Stokes or Fairfax to "reconnoitre" the anchorage of Aix itself was not explained, nor did they claim specifically to have done so. But where the French charts showed a good depth of
30
feet of water even at low tide, the new Admiralty charts revealed the unsuspected hazard of rocks no more than
12
to
16
feet below the waves. Only a madman would have tried to sail a battleship like the
Caledonia
in
12
feet of water.
⁶²

Exactly how the two Admiralty hydrographers discovered these rocks was not explained. Stokes referred vaguely to "my own observations" without specifying how he or Fairfax could observe rocks
12
feet under water from a minimum distance of three miles, while their French counterparts sounding directly over the place had never found them. Of course, the charts were not available for closer inspection. Perhaps Stokes and Fairfax had made an understandable error in their general and distant survey. Perhaps, in Cochrane's view, the rocks had been fabricated to save Gambier. Cochrane had believed that he could fight the Admiralty and win, as though it were merely a matter of seizing the
Gamo
from Spain or defending Fort Trinidad against France. Through many bitter years he was to find that the extent of his miscalculation was beyond anything that even he would have credited.

In practical terms, the "dangers" of the Aix-Boyart channel and the mysterious rocks had been refuted by Cochrane and those who had twice attacked the anchorage of Allemand's fleet. If the guns of Aix threatened certain destruction would any man have sailed past them in a ship loaded to capacity with explosive? How was it that these same guns, which threatened such destruction on
12
April, had not been able to stop a single ship the day before ?