Read Crimes Against Liberty Online
Authors: David Limbaugh
Senator Grassley issued a statement on the report that read, in part, “The allegations uncovered by the inspector general are very serious and they deserve to be investigated, not swept under the rug. It seems a lot of people might have been interested in protecting the AmeriCorps program and the Mayor of Sacramento from an IG who was discovering some unpleasant facts. I’m not sure whether the IG was fired for political reasons. The evidence points in that direction, but since the White House is asserting privilege over its decision-making process, we can’t be sure. The report details everything we were able to learn, so people can judge for themselves.”
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“SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VERACITY OF YOUR TESTIMONY”
Shortly after the congressional report was released, the White House finally produced many of its withheld documents on the Walpin-St. HOPE affair. The
Washington Examiner
’s Byron York reported that the newly released documents support the Republican investigators’ conclusion that the White House’s version of its firing of Walpin was “a public story cobbled together
after
Walpin was fired, not before.” In other words, Walpin wasn’t fired because he was incompetent; he was fired because he was
too competent
in investigating misconduct involving Obama’s friends and supporters. Walpin was apparently so persistent that the White House couldn’t afford even to comply with the statutory notice period; it had to terminate Walpin on the spot and then smear his good name to cover its actions.
Earlier, White House counsel Norman Eisen had told House and Senate staffers that the administration had engaged in an “extensive review” of the complaints against Walpin before making its decision to terminate him. But the new report revealed Eisen had told Congress that “his investigation into the merits of removing Gerald Walpin involved contacting members of the Corporation for National and Community Service [CNCS] board to confirm the existence of a ‘consensus’ in favor of removal.” But, according to York, Republican investigators discovered later that during this so-called “extensive review,” the White House didn’t even check with the board—so it couldn’t have learned of any consensus supporting Walpin’s termination.
Moreover, “no member of the CNCS board had any substantive input about whether the removal of Gerald Walpin was appropriate” other than major Democratic donor and Obama supporter Alan Solomont. The White House had called one other board member just prior to Walpin’s firing: Stephen Goldsmith, who informed investigators the White House had already made its decision to axe Walpin and wanted Goldsmith’s after-the-fact blessing.
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It gets worse. The newly released documents reveal the White House was hurrying to coordinate with board members an explanation for the firing that would be presented publicly. Within a day of Eisen’s ultimatum to Walpin, board members had conferred by telephone. The following day, Ranit Schmelzer, a member of CNCS’s press office, sent out talking points to all board members to use if any reporters called. Among the points: “Indicate that you support the president’s decision to remove IG Walpin”; “If asked why he was removed, indicate that the president lost confidence in Mr. Walpin”; “If the reporter continues to press, say that you can’t get into details on a personnel matter, but you understand there were some performance-based issues”; and avoid “getting into any specifics about IG Walpin’s performance-based issues. The WH has stayed away from this and has counseled us to do the same.”
Obviously, the White House’s fingerprints were all over this. Scandalously, it wasn’t until the next day that the White House actually asked the board members for their views on the matter. About a week after the firing, Solomont, apparently believing CNCS had weathered the storm, wrote an e-mail to board member Eric Tanenblatt saying, “I understand how much work you are doing to prevent and control damage from the IG matter. I want you to know how much I personally appreciate all your efforts.”
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This from the man Obama would nominate to be ambassador to Spain.
Another troubling matter for the administration arose as investigators pored through the recently released White House documents. Alan Solomont had earlier denied to investigators that he had met with First Lady Michelle Obama’s chief of staff, Jackie Norris, about the Walpin case, but White House visitor logs show he met with her on June 9, the day before Walpin was fired, and two previous times as well. Solomont attempted to explain away his visit to Norris as a meeting on CNCS business, but when further pressed said he may have mentioned the Walpin matter in passing. Congressman Issa followed up with a letter to Solomont expressing his “serious questions about the veracity of your testimony.” Grassley expressed similar concerns. In another bizarre twist, Solomont suddenly claimed he had previously disclosed his meetings with Norris. Issa wrote to Solomont, “This is simply false. The notes and recollections of multiple staff in the room at the time are clearly contrary to your recollection.”
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Congressional investigators sought to interview Norris about his meetings with Solomont, but the White House counsel’s office barred the interview. Issa wrote to Norris, “Our request to meet with you was denied by [CNCS] general counsel Frank Trinity. Mr Trinity told my staff that the White House counsel’s office has advised him that they were not permitting the Corporation to make you available for an interview.” Issa added, “The White House has averred that you had no role whatsoever in the president’s decision to remove Mr. Walpin. In light of these representations, it is hard to understand a decision to prevent your testimony. If the information provided by the White House officials is true, it follows that no colorable claim of executive privilege should impede your cooperation with the committee.”
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Three months later, new revelations threatened to blow the lid off this seemingly bottomless scandal. For months observers wondered why acting U.S. attorney Lawrence Brown had so cavalierly dismissed Walpin’s prosecutorial referral concerning Kevin Johnson. Brown not only declined to investigate, but virtually appointed himself Johnson’s PR man, reporting his investigation results in such a way as to rehabilitate Johnson’s reputation and thus his chances for election, and to enhance Sacramento’s likelihood of receiving stimulus funds in the wake of the damning allegations against Johnson. Investigators later learned that while Brown had been actively running interference against Walpin’s investigation of Johnson, he was also seeking a White House appointment as a permanent U.S. Attorney. In their supplemental report, Republican investigators for the Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform said the contents of Brown’s letter seeking a presidential appointment raised “new questions about his potential motivations. It would be reasonable for an already skeptical public to wonder whether Brown excluded Inspector General Walpin from negotiations and settled the St. HOPE matter with Johnson in order to curry favor with the White House because Brown wanted the president to appoint him U.S. Attorney.”
Investigators also found troubling e-mails between Brown and Kevin Johnson’s attorney, Matthew Jacobs, in which Jacobs recommended that Brown “should either (1) call out Walpin publicly, or (2) Tell him to take his case back home.” After complaining about Walpin, Jacobs said, “WTF is wrong with this guy! First, he tried to effect [sic] the election; now he’s messing around with the entire region’s federal funding! Over this case?!” He told Brown he should “stand up and say this isn’t right.” Within minutes, according to Byron York, Brown replied, “Message heard loud and clear, Matt. I am at a complete loss and do in fact plan to speak to Gerald.” Brown was not appointed for the position, but now serves as a Sacramento Superior Court judge.
The Republican investigators’ supplemental report concluded that the e-mails showed Brown “was actually parroting to CIGIE supposed grievances first presented to him by Kevin Johnson’s attorney.... Together with his efforts to obtain a political appointment from the president, Brown’s communications with Johnson’s attorney contribute to the appearance that Walpin’s removal was more about his vigorous pursuit of the St. HOPE matter than about any other legitimate, unrelated factors.”
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Meanwhile, the
Washington Times
editors shined the spotlight on Walpin’s investigation of AmeriCorps’ teaching fellowship at the City University of New York (CUNY), which Walpin said had wasted “upwards of $80 million in taxpayer money.” In the aforementioned e-mail from CNCS’s Ranit Schmelzer providing talking points to board members, Schmelzer also briefly addressed the CUNY issue. He said, “If asked whether this was connected to Walpin’s action in the CUNY case, say no. The decision was made before Walpin’s reports on CUNY were issued.”
But that assertion is false, the
Times’
editors pointed out. The timeline irrefutably contradicts the e-mail’s claim. Walpin issued his draft report, which was critical of CUNY and the CNCS board, on April 2. CUNY responded on April 30, and the CNCS board on May 4. Walpin shared with Senate staffers on May 5 his concern that CNCS would “retaliate” against him for his report. On May 20 Walpin strongly criticized the board members in the first half of the meeting—before they contend he became “confused” and “disoriented” upon returning to the meeting room. The editors said it was highly suspicious that the e-mail would advise board members to stonewall about an issue that was completely ignored elsewhere in the e-mail. They wrote, “Defensiveness about one issue, and only one, when nobody has yet raised the issue, is often a telltale sign that there is something to hide. This is especially the case when the information provided is demonstrably false.”
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“THIS NEEDLESS DISTRACTION”
Gerald Walpin was not the only government watchdog that got crossways with President Obama. Neil Barofsky, the special inspector general for the $700 billion TARP program, also ended up in a dispute with Obama’s Treasury Department. According to the
Los Angeles Times
, the Treasury Department claimed Barofsky’s role as “Sigtarp” was not completely independent from Treasury. There was a “dispute over certain Treasury documents” being withheld from Barofsky by Treasury, over what Senator Charles Grassley called a “specious claim of attorney-client privilege.”
When he was appointed, Barofsky was praised for his credentials, being a former prosecutor who would rigorously protect the taxpayer’s interest in the bailout funds. But it appears Treasury was withholding information from Barofksy, prompting him to write a memo defending the independence of his position and disputing that attorney-client privilege was a legitimate bar to information he was requesting from Treasury.
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Grassley observed, “The grassroots is furious about the way TARP dollars have been used and what looks like a lack of accountability for this massive infusion of tax dollars. It’s added injury to hear about the Treasury Department putting up hurdles to slow down the work of the watchdog who’s supposed to track the money. One of the biggest lessons of the last year is that the public deserves more transparency and, in turn, accountability from New York and Washington.”
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Treasury officials said Sigtarp fell under their domain and sought an opinion from the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel.
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Eventually Treasury backed down. Barofsky, in a letter to Congress, reported that Treasury had withdrawn an earlier request to the Justice Department seeking a legal opinion on the degree of Sigtarp’s independence. Barofksy said, “We view such withdrawal as Treasury’s acknowledgment that Sigtarp is an independent entity within Treasury, and that my office and I are not subject to the supervision of the secretary.” He referred to the now-ended dispute as “this needless distraction.” The episode led Congressman Issa to argue the incident reflected the “arrogance” of Treasury officials “who are wielding immense power over our economy.” While Sigtarp was technically a part of the Treasury Department, there was little genuine legal question as to his access to Treasury documents. Congress, in establishing the office, set clear directives that gave him broad access and placed the burden on Treasury secretary Giethner to explain why he would refuse to follow any of Sigtarp’s recommendations.
Secrecy, stonewalling, and spurious claims of executive privilege have become the hallmarks of the Obama administration. Notwithstanding his campaign vows to “restore” openness and transparency to the presidency, Obama has treated the office almost as his personal fiefdom, running roughshod over Congress and willfully ignoring vital checks on his authority.