Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (109 page)

• Concerning ideology: “The main reason for my errors is that after the Cultural Revolution, in the battle over ‘ideology,’ I always wanted stability and feared disorder. I focused on preventing ‘leftists’ and not enough on preventing ‘rightists.’. . . Some matters of secondary importance I elevated to too high a place. . . . After I was in office for a long time, I became overly excited and impetuous. . . . I did not calmly listen to other people's opinions.”

• Regarding approving too many things from below: “I have never approved anything that is outside my jurisdiction.”
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Hu Yaobang was completely unprepared for the force of the attacks that followed. He later said that had he known the “party life meetings” would
take such a turn, he would not have submitted his resignation or engaged in such a thorough self-criticism.
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Deng Liqun's detailed criticisms of Hu Yaobang took up the entire morning of January 12 and half of the following morning, a total of more than five hours. Deng Liqun spelled out Hu's “errors,” meeting by meeting. He said that Hu's biggest failure was not giving more attention to the four cardinal principles and to the struggle against spiritual pollution. He had failed to unify the party; he primarily had used people who agreed with him; and he had not consulted sufficiently with senior leaders concerning key personnel appointments.
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On January 15, Zhao Ziyang made his criticisms of Hu. Later, in interviews and tapes that he made after he was placed under house arrest in 1989, Zhao would take special pains to show that although he had differences with Hu, he had been no more critical than was required, and that he and Hu had agreed about the need for reform and had worked together. He said he had “not thrown stones after Hu fell in the well.”
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In his criticism on January 15, Zhao said that although Hu was generous and did not bear grudges, he had weak points. “He enjoyed expressing new and different ideas and surprising people, amazing people with new feats. He did not accept organizational restraints. . . . If his authority were larger, problems would have been even greater. . . . Why was he so tolerant toward wild people like Liu Binyan and Wang Ruowang? Perhaps he wanted to create an image, at home and abroad, of being enlightened.” Zhao continued, “Comrade Hu Yaobang doesn't respect discipline. If conditions were to change and Comrades Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were no longer with us, I couldn't continue working with him, I would resign. It doesn't matter what the Standing Committee decides, or what the party congress decides, or what was decided before, whatever he wanted to do, he just did.”
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Hu was shocked to hear these words; he had not expected Zhao to be so critical. Hu's friends, too, felt Zhao had indeed “thrown stones after Hu fell in the well.”
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On the morning of January 15, at the end of the “party life meetings,” Hu Yaobang presented a closing self-criticism in which he accepted responsibility for all his errors. But he also asked for continued investigations of whether he was truly overly ambitious and part of a faction. After the meetings ended, Hu was observed on the steps of the meeting hall, dejected and crying.
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On January 16, the opening day of the more formal enlarged Politburo meeting that included seventeen members of the CAC, Chen Yun, who had not attended the “party life meetings,” expressed his views. He said that he
had fully supported the decision to promote Hu Yaobang to general secretary in 1980, but in 1980–1981 he had observed that the Secretariat under Hu did not function well. At meetings, Hu would go through the motions of having each of over one hundred ministry-level units submit its report without resolving the key issues. In addition, Hu simply rushed around from one locality to another. In one week he visited twenty-two counties, without really concentrating on the major issues that he should have pursued more deeply. He also did not hold regular meetings of the Politburo and its Standing Committee, even though to practice party democracy, one had to hold regular meetings. Chen continued, saying that after he had criticized Hu in March 1983, he had hoped Hu would correct his errors, but apparently Hu did not fully understand. In selecting officials, one should draw on talented people from everywhere, but Hu only selected people from his own circles. In selecting officials, one should consider both “virtue” and “talent,” but “virtue” (loyalty to the party) should come first. Nevertheless, Chen Yun stressed that it was important for the party to follow legal procedures in removing Hu.
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Hu Yaobang was relieved of his duties as general secretary, without going through formal procedures. Zhao Ziyang remained as premier but also took Hu's place as acting general secretary. Zhao Ziyang told others that he did not want to be general secretary and that he was more suited to be premier, but some knowledgeable observers were convinced that Deng Xiaoping had no other senior allies appropriate for the position who would have been approved by the other senior leaders. There was indeed widespread agreement that Zhao had done a good job with the economy, and his appointment as acting general secretary was accepted without great controversy. These decisions were formally approved later at the next Central Committee plenum and then at the 13th Party Congress. Hu would retain his party membership, his membership on the Central Committee, and, on paper, temporarily remain on the Politburo; in fact, however, he was completely sidelined.

Some progressive party members worried that with the dismissal of Hu, the conservatives might gain control and slow down China's reform and opening. But the “group of five” who continued to lead the daily work of the party—Zhao Ziyang, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, Wan Li, and Hu Qili—were all close to Deng Xiaoping and responsive to his leadership.
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Both Deng and Zhao insisted that the reform and opening would continue unchanged.
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On January 17, Hu Yaobang's secretary told his family that Hu was physically
and emotionally exhausted, that he was resting in a building in Zhongnanhai, and that he had requested that his family members not visit him. Two weeks later, Hu Yaobang walked through the special passage from Zhongnanhai to his home located several minutes away. He asked his assistant to collect his speeches, reports, and other documents from the last ten years; he then stayed home for three months to read through these documents, concluding in the end that he had made no errors of principle. While at home, he also watched TV and reread passages from the complete works of Marx and Lenin. He rarely met visitors and took little part in party activities, although he did attend the celebrations surrounding the founding of the PLA, the Seventh Plenum, and the 13th Party Congress.

On January 19, the party center issued Document No. 3, listing the reasons for Hu Yaobang's removal:
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(1) He resisted the party's efforts to oppose spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization, giving rise to demands for total Westernization and the creation of student turmoil, (2) He failed to support fully the four cardinal principles, and attacked only the left but not the right, (3) In economic work, he encouraged accelerated growth and consumption, causing the economy to spin out of control, (4) In political work, he frequently violated legal procedures, (5) In foreign affairs, he spoke out of turn and said things he should not have said, such as inviting three thousand youth from Japan without making adequate preparations, and (6) He frequently disobeyed party resolutions and spoke without authorization by the party center.
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Document No. 3 also contained a summary of Hu's self-criticism. In his self-criticism, Hu acknowledged that he had made grave errors that caused great damage to the party, the nation, and the people. He did not say, however, that his ideological permissiveness had led to spiritual pollution, bourgeois liberalization, or student demonstrations. Document No. 3 went on to note that in the future, senior leaders such as Deng, Chen Yun, and Li Xiannian, if still in good health, should supervise other officials, meaning the general secretary and the premier. During March and May, supplements to Document No. 3 were issued, spelling out more details of Hu's period of leadership.
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In the opinion of many liberal officials, it was a tragic injustice that Hu Yaobang, who had worked so hard for the country, who was so selfless, and whose policies could have worked, ended his service humiliated by people whom he had served with such dedication.
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Other officials who had worked with Deng, however, believed that if Hu had remained in office, public order
would have collapsed, for Hu lacked the firmness necessary to maintain the authority of the state and the party. They were thankful that Deng had managed and orchestrated the removal of Hu Yaobang without damaging the party, which remained unified at the top and which continued on with Deng's reforms. After Hu Yaobang's death two years later, the wide differences between these two views would emerge again, with more tragic results.

In February 1987, at the time of the Spring Festival when friends would traditionally visit each other, Hu Yaobang and his wife visited the Deng home and exchanged pleasantries. When Deng asked Hu if he had thought through his problems, Hu did not answer. Deng also invited Hu to play bridge on several occasions. Hu politely declined all but one time: on December 30, 1987, exactly one year after learning about his dismissal, Hu accepted Deng's invitation.
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At the memorial service for Hu Yaobang in April 1989, Deng would extend his hand to Hu's widow, Li Zhao, but she refused to shake it, saying instead, “It's all because of you people.”
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Opposing Bourgeois Liberalization, 1987

As Hu Yaobang was being removed, Deng initiated an orchestrated effort to firm up party discipline that he felt had grown lax under Hu. Deng tried to reduce Hu Yaobang's influence by publicizing his “errors” and removing some of his followers who had been protected by Hu even though they criticized the party. Deng also aimed to counter the broader appeal of Western ideals such as humanism, freedom, and democracy that in his view were being used to challenge the ultimate authority of the party.

At the January 16 enlarged Politburo meeting that Deng himself had attended, it was announced that China would undertake a campaign to criticize bourgeois liberalization. At the same time, Deng announced that China would continue the all-around reform and opening to the outside. On the eve of the Chinese New Year, January 28, the government released Document No. 4, “Notification Concerning Some Issues Related to the Current Opposition to Bourgeois Liberalization,” which outlined the campaign that was beginning to unfold.
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Intellectuals whom Hu Yaobang had protected—Fang Lizhi, Liu Binyan, and Wang Ruowang—were expelled from the party, and in March, Zhu Houze was removed as head of the Propaganda Department. Liu Binyan defended himself by saying that his investigative reporting criticizing some party officials was not an attack on the party, but some high officials concluded
that his criticisms and his appeals for a “higher kind of loyalty” to humane ideals had caused people to form a negative impression of the party.
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Many others, including the head of the Institute of Political Science of CASS, Yan Jiaqi, and several university administrators who were party members, were not attacked in the press but were criticized behind closed doors.
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To avoid a large negative response from intellectuals, Deng announced that the campaign was to be limited to those within the party,

Many seasoned high-level party officials who worked under Hu—like Zhu Houze, Wu Mingyu, Yu Guangyuan, and Ren Zhongyi—remained firmly convinced that Fang Lizhi, Wang Ruowang, and Liu Binyan were never threats to peace, that the demonstrations could have been resolved through discussions, that more openness would have strengthened, not weakened, the country, and that Deng had overestimated the threat to stability and had overreacted.

Deng tried to tighten the discipline of senior party officials responsible for the media and urged them to defend socialist ideals. On March 29, the party center issued a document on rectification work in newspapers and publications, and in article after article and broadcast after broadcast there were criticisms of bourgeois liberalization
(fan zichan jieji ziyouhua)
, including Western thinking that promoted individualism and decadence.
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The media also praised patriotism and extolled Chinese creativity and scientific successes.
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Deng Liqun played the key role in promoting the campaign against bourgeois liberalization. Zhao Ziyang, by contrast, managed to limit the negative impact of the campaign on economic units by saying that the anti–bourgeois liberalization criticism should not interfere with the economy and that the public was tired of political campaigns. At a conference promoting the campaign, held from April 6 to April 12, Deng Liqun criticized bourgeois liberalization on such a broad scale that he aroused the ire of many people attending the conference. Zhao Ziyang's assistant Bao Tong obtained copies of Deng Liqun's speech and Zhao forwarded them to Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping reacted as Zhao Ziyang and Bao Tong had hoped: he agreed that Deng Liqun had gone too far, alienating too many intellectuals and liberal officials. Some liberal party members feared that Deng Xiaoping was considering Deng Liqun as a possible successor to Hu Yaobang. Deng Xiaoping's reaction at this moment marked a turning point both in the campaign and in Deng Xiaoping's support for Deng Liqun.