Europe's Last Summer (30 page)

Kaiser Wilhelm II insisted on returning from his cruise in northern waters. He cut short his voyage when it became evident that his government was not keeping him fully informed. Bethmann, trembling figuratively if not literally, met him on his arrival to proffer his
resignation. Wilhelm would not let him off so easily. According to Bülow, Bethmann's predecessor, the Kaiser said something like: "You have cooked the broth and now you will eat it." Later, settled in his palace at Potsdam, Wilhelm brought himself up to date on the diplomatic cables, and met with the leaders of his government and of his armed forces.

According to the plan formulated largely by Bethmann on July 5–6, Wilhelm should have returned to find the Hapsburg army in occupation of Belgrade, supervising the carrying out of terms of surrender that had been agreed to by a crushed Serbia. It all would have happened too quickly for outside powers to prevent it. It would have been too late for them to do anything about it. Russia and its allies would have bowed before the inevitable.

But that was not what had happened. What Wilhelm found was that Austria-Hungary had passed up a chance to humble Serbia peacefully. Now Serbia was readying to take a stand, the British fleet was mobilized, and Russia had taken the first step toward preparation for war. Britain was pushing for a diplomatic conference that might settle the dispute on a basis less favorable than the terms Austria already had rejected on July 25.

As they returned from their staged holidays, the leaders of the German-speaking powers had to decide upon their next move. This was to prove a decisive week. What key members of the German and Austrian governments identified as their immediate danger was that Grey might succeed in his four-power mediation proposal, thus preventing the
outbreak of war. In the foreign offices of Vienna and Berlin, July 27 saw the beginning of a peace scare.

For itself, Germany had rejected Grey's conference notion. The German government agreed to forward the proposal to Austria-Hungary, however, while it secretly sabotaged Grey's efforts to get Vienna to agree.

Bethmann explained to one of his officials why he felt obliged even to forward the proposal. "As we have already rejected one British proposal for a conference, it is not possible for us to refuse" to pass on the latest idea. "If we rejected every attempt at mediation the whole world would hold us responsible for the conflagration and represent us as the real warmongers. That would also make our position impossible here in Germany, where we have got to appear as though the war had been forced upon us." Bethmann, who heretofore had been speaking of Austria going to war, suddenly was speaking of
Germany
going to war.

The German government forwarded Britain's peace plans while privately advising the Austrians to pay no attention to them. The Austrian ambassador in Berlin cabled Berchtold in Vienna with a message "in strictest privacy" from Jagow, who said that Germany would soon forward to Vienna mediation proposals from Grey. "The German government assures in the most decided way that it does not identify itself with the propositions, that on the contrary it advises to disregard them, but that it must pass them on, to satisfy the English government." Berlin hoped to keep Britain from siding with France and Russia: "If Germany candidly told Sir E. Grey that it refused to communicate England's peace plan, that objective might not be achieved."

Jagow reported that Grey had asked him to forward a plea for modification of Austria's ultimatum. He explained to his colleagues that he had sent the message to his ambassador in Vienna without instructing him
to deliver it
to the Austrians. Thus, Jagow concluded, he could truthfully tell Grey that he had forwarded the British note "to Vienna."

Bethmann continued to take the line he had the week before: the other powers should stay out of the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Britain should use its influence, therefore, to persuade Russia to accept "localization." Grey pointed out that Serbia, in its reply to Austria's demands, had conceded practically everything; and Grey ascribed this to the pressure Russia had brought to bear upon Serbia. At Britain's request, Russia had restrained Serbia; now Britain was asking Germany to use its influence to restrain Austria.

But Germany rejected Grey's proposal. Jagow claimed that Russia and Austria were about to enter into negotiations, and that their outcome should be awaited before any other move was taken. As before, he was using a negotiations proposal to block the conference proposal.

London.
At a cabinet meeting that morning Grey told his colleagues that the moment had come to make up their minds whether they were prepared to stand by France and Russia if it came to a war. This was the first cabinet conclave devoted entirely to the war crisis in Europe. The governing Liberal party tended to be pacifist in outlook. No treaty bound Britain to come to France's aid, and the cabinet overwhelmingly was opposed to intervening in a European war.

Grey was still focused on preventing the
outbreak of war, but believed that if he could not prevent it, Britain would have to participate in it. Prime Minister Asquith was strongly disposed to support his foreign secretary, but his chief concern was to keep his Liberal party united behind whatever policy was adopted.

After the cabinet meeting, Winston Churchill set about formulating plans for ensuring the readiness of the naval service. He was in his element. He had battlefield experience in India and the Sudan, and as a civilian his remarkable deeds in the Boer War had helped launch his political career. Though not a warmonger, he gloried in the clash of arms.

That afternoon he set about placing guards at vulnerable points, and taking precautions against surprise attacks. His Admiralty joined with the War Office in convening a small group to consider how best to ask the
press for self-censorship; there was to be no disclosure of information useful to an enemy.

The press lord
George Riddell, who was among those present, later recorded in his diary that a government spokesman "apprised us that the continental situation was becoming very serious. He said that it might be necessary to move troops and ships . . . secretly" and asked how to keep the news from becoming public. Riddell drafted a letter to the newspapers which was promulgated "and was the first official intimation to the Press of the impending war. The result was remarkable. No information was divulged, and the Germans were unacquainted with what was being done."

That night Churchill put his forces on informal alert. To the far-flung fleets of the Royal Navy around the world he cabled: "Secret. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible. This is
not
the Warning Telegram, but be prepared to shadow possible hostile men-of-war. . . . Measure is purely precautionary."

Paris.
The German and Austrian ambassadors in Paris were kept in the dark about their own government's plans and thinking. This added an extra measure of confusion to events as seen in that effectively leaderless capital, whose heads of government still were at sea.

Apparently, the Austrian ambassador was amazed that his own government had rejected Serbia's note of near-surrender. He told his superiors in Vienna: "The far-reaching compliance of Serbia, which was not regarded as possible here, has made a strong impression. Our attitude gives rise to the opinion that we want war at any price."

London.
Lichnowsky, Germany's ambassador in London, as an Anglophile, was not always taken into Berlin's confidence. By July 27 he was strongly questioning the judgment of his superiors. How could he advocate localization of the conflict, as the foreign office told him to do, when the feud between Serbia and Austria could
not
be localized—and when Britain knew that? Austria-Hungary had picked its quarrel in such a way as to force Russia to intervene. The small war might be leading to a big one. "Our entire future relations with England depend on the success" of Grey's move for a conference. If Berlin were to sacrifice everything else to its Austrian alliance, then "it would never again be possible to restore those ties which have of late bound [Britain and Germany] . . . together."

Grey's tendency in a crisis had been to reach out for a partnership with Germany in dealing with it. Lichnowsky's point to his home government was that, if Berlin kept on course, in the future Grey would no longer do so. Senior officials at the British Foreign Office already were critical of Grey in this regard. So were some foreign leaders.

At dinner that evening, a Russian diplomat told a British statesman that "war is inevitable and by the fault of England; that if England had at once declared her solidarity with Russia and France and her intention to fight if necessary, Germany and Austria would have hesitated."

Berlin.
At least since the war council of December 1912, Germany's military leaders had focused on blaming Russia for the European conflict they foresaw and regarded as inevitable. This had been, and remained, Moltke's line. It was echoed on July 27 by Admiral von Müller: Germany should, he told his diary, "remain calm to allow Russia to put herself in the wrong, but then not to shrink from war if it were inevitable." Bethmann agreed with the military on this: "In all events Russia must ruthlessly be put in the wrong," he told Wilhelm.

Vienna.
The British ambassador, after conversations with other ambassadors, cabled Grey that "the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable; that the Austro-Hungarian government are fully resolved to have war with Serbia; that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake" and that "this country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia."

CHAPTER 35: JULY 28

Vienna.
Pursuant to a decision reached July 25, Austria-Hungary ordered partial mobilization on July 28. Half of the Hapsburg armies eventually were ordered to take up positions along the Serbian frontier. This was done in conformity with the Austrian General Staff's plan for war against Serbia only. It was a gamble on localization. Conrad requested Berchtold to ask Germany to prevent Russia from intervening.

Germany's leaders continued the discussions that had begun over the weekend. By July 28, it was clear that despite differences among them, they were in the mood to take action. They were disposed to give up on waiting for Austria to do something. For themselves, they were resolved to move. According to the war minister, "It has now been decided to fight the matter through, regardless of the cost." They were not talking about fighting Serbia. They were talking about fighting Russia and France.

The most extreme position was taken at times by Moltke. As he had in the past, he argued for a preventive war. His position was that war was inevitable, that time was running against Germany, and that within two years or so the odds would shift: in 1914, Russia and France could be beaten, but in 1916 or 1917, Germany might lose. Germany, therefore, should strike now.

The July crisis, as Moltke saw it, had evolved, happily for Germany, in such a way as to place it in a "singularly favorable situation." Harvests were in, the annual training of recruits had finished, and Russia and France would not be really ready for two years. Austria had put itself in a position such that it could not help fighting at Germany's side, and that was absolutely vital. As Moltke summed it up: "we shall never hit it again so well as we do now."

On the morning of July 28, Kaiser Wilhelm, who had returned from his cruise the day before, read—for the first time—the Serbian reply to Austria's note. It persuaded him, he wrote in longhand to Jagow at the foreign office, that Austria had gotten almost everything it wanted. In his view it was "a capitulation of the most humiliating kind," and as a result,
every cause for war
falls to the ground." A few sentences later he repeated himself: "every cause for war has vanished."

There no longer was any need to start a war. In fact, according to Wilhelm, unlike Berchtold "I would never have ordered a mobilization on that basis.

"Nevertheless, the piece of paper, like its contents, can be considered as of little value so long as it is not translated into
deeds.
The Serbs are Orientals, therefore liars, tricksters, and masters of evasion." So it should be agreed that the Austrian army would temporarily occupy a part of Serbia including Belgrade, as a hostage, until Serbia kept its word. On that basis, wrote the Kaiser, "I am ready to mediate for peace." This resolution of matters would give the Hapsburg armies, once in possession of Belgrade, the satisfaction of appearing to have scored a success. In mediating for peace, wrote Wilhelm, he would be careful to safeguard Austria-Hungary's honor and self-esteem.

The Kaiser ordered Jagow to inform Vienna that he was prepared to mediate the Austria-Serbia conflict on the basis he described. The Austrians were to be told that there no longer was any reason to go to war. The Kaiser also notified Moltke, in writing, of the same conclusion.

As
Christopher Clark, one of the Kaiser's recent biographers, writes: "Perhaps the most striking thing about this letter to Jagow of 28 July is that it was not acted upon. . . . His instructions to Jagow had no influence on Berlin's representations to Vienna. Bethmann did cable Vienna, repeating some of Wilhelm's views, but omitting the most important one: that Austria should stop, not go to war, and let the Kaiser mediate the quarrel with Serbia instead."