Europe's Last Summer (34 page)

St. Petersburg.
The German ambassador delivered his country's declaration of war to the Russian foreign minister. In his confusion he served a document that incorporated both versions with which Berlin had supplied him: the claim that Russia had not replied, and the claim that the Russian reply was unsatisfactory.

London.
Churchill, through his Tory friend F. E. Smith, had invited
Bonar Law, the Tory leader, to dine with him and with Sir Edward Grey at the Admiralty. Smith had asked
Sir Max Aitken, Law's closest friend, to join the party. But Law declined, and Grey at some point instead went off to join the Prime Minister. In the event, Churchill dined at the Admiralty alone.

After dinner, at about nine-thirty, Smith and Aitken came by, and found Churchill with two friends. They fell into a discussion of the crisis. News arrived that the Germans were postponing their ultimatum to Russia and opinions differed as to the significance of the news. Three of the men played a rubber of bridge with Churchill. Aitken sat out.

The cards had just been dealt and play begun when a red official dispatch box was brought in to Churchill. He took out a key and unlocked it. In it was a single sheet of paper "singularly disproportionate to the size of the box," as Aitken was later to write, on which was written: "War declared by Germany on Russia."

Churchill turned over his bridge hand to Aitken and walked over to 10 Downing Street. He found the Prime Minister closeted with Grey and other advisers.

Churchill told Asquith that he was going to order full general mobilization of the fleet. He knew, of course, that the cabinet had refused him permission to do so that morning. He personally would answer to the cabinet the following morning for what he was about to do.

The Prime Minister said nothing. Churchill returned to his offices, and spent the rest of the night making sure that, whatever might happen, the Royal Navy would be ready.

Later that night London received word from its embassy in Berlin that the Kaiser claimed his efforts to keep the peace were being undermined by Russia's full mobilization. Was there anything George V could do to help?

Asquith quickly drafted a note to the Czar in King George's name, called a taxi, and raced to Buckingham Palace at one-thirty in the morning to obtain his monarch's signature. "The king was hauled out of his bed," the Prime Minister noted in his diary, "and one of my strangest experiences was sitting with him clad in a dressing-gown while I read the message and the proposed answer."

Berlin.
Newspapers in Berlin and in Hamburg carried the story of the "naval alliance" between Britain and Russia. Allegedly the Russians hoped to win Royal Navy agreement to dispatch transport ships to Baltic ports before the outbreak of war. They were to carry Russian troops who would invade northeastern Germany.

But as the talks between Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg and the Russian admiralty had been scheduled for August, they had not yet started to take place. According to the German press, Prince Louis did not manage to come to St. Petersburg: "the war that Russia thrust on us prevented" the British-Russian naval alliance from being concluded.

"The war that Russia thrust on us": That embodied what Germans came to believe. When news of Russia's mobilization first was known, the Bavarian military attaché confided to his diary: "I run to the War Ministry. Beaming faces everywhere. Everyone is shaking hands in the corridors: people congratulate one another for being over the hurdle." The German people, the political parties, the labor unions, the press, all had been fooled into believing that Russia had started the war. Another diarist, chief of the Kaiser's naval staff, made everything more clear: "The mood is brilliant. The government has managed brilliantly to make us appear as the attacked."

The German government announced that Russian invaders had crossed into German territory. The German people believed it.

CHAPTER 40: AUGUST 2

London.
The British cabinet, which met exceptionally on a Sunday, began by moving somewhat in the direction of involvement in the developing crisis. It was in session from 11:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m., but then convened again at 6:30 p.m.

In the morning session the ministers ratified Churchill's order mobilizing the fleet. It considered, but rejected for the time being, dispatching an expeditionary force to the Continent, as had been envisaged in secret Anglo-French army staff talks a few years earlier of which most members of the cabinet had been ignorant.

In between the morning and evening sessions, Grey advised the French ambassador that should the German navy attack the undefended French Atlantic coast, the British navy would offer France protection.

In the evening session, the cabinet learned of Germany's violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg. The British government took the view that its responsibility to Luxemburg was collective—that is, it was obliged to act only if the other guarantors did so as well. Belgium was a different matter; the guarantee of neutrality arguably was individual, and Grey had already alerted the German ambassador to Britain's position on the matter. Yet Germany's invasion of Luxemburg presaged an invasion and occupation of Belgium too. Indeed, as the cabinet reconvened at six-thirty, a German ultimatum was being received in Brussels. Asquith ordered mobilization of the army.

The shift in political sentiment over the course of the day was remarkable. That morning Asquith had set down in writing, in a personal letter, his own view of the European situation.

1. We have no obligation of any kind either to France or Russia to give them military or naval help.

2. The despatch of the Expeditionary force to help France at this moment is out of the question & wd serve no object.

3. We mustn't forget the ties created by our long-standing & intimate friendship with France.

4. It is against British interests that France shd. be wiped out as a Great Power.

5. We cannot allow Germany to use the Channel as a hostile base.

6. We have obligations to Belgium to prevent her being utilised & absorbed by Germany.

This formulation of the Prime Minister's public policy objectives in the gathering European storm may be taken as almost comprehensive. But it represented only his personal views, which were not shared by his Liberal party. He reckoned that "a good ¾ of our own party" in the House of Commons "are for absolute non-interference at any price."

Before the morning cabinet meeting he had received an assurance of firm support from the Conservative leadership for his policy of backing up France. This placed Asquith in the peculiar position of being supported in his foreign policy largely by his political opponents. His overriding political object was to keep his Liberal party united behind whatever decisions the cabinet eventually made, while trying to bring the cabinet around to his own and Grey's point of view.

Berlin.
Moltke sent to the foreign office some suggestions "of a military-political nature" to which he attributed "some value from a military point of view." If England entered the war, Moltke suggested, Germany should incite uprisings against Britain in South Africa, Egypt, and India, thereby converting a European war into a
world war. Germany's secret alliance with Turkey, just being concluded, should be made public; and Italy should state whether or not it would stand by its allies Germany and Austria.
Sweden and
Norway should be urged to mobilize against Russia, bringing pressure to bear. Japan should be urged to move against Russia in Asia.
Switzerland already had mobilized; and, Moltke confided, the Swiss chief of staff had secretly drafted documents that would, if ratified, place the Swiss army under Germany's command.

The foreign office announced that France and Russia already had commenced hostilities. It transpired that this was not true.

Rome.
The German ambassador learned from the
Italian foreign minister, the Marchese di San Giuliano, that Rome had decided to remain neutral. San Giuliano explained that the treaty of alliance with Germany and Austria obliged Italy to come to their aid only if Germany or Austria were attacked. But the conflict in which they were engaged in the summer of 1914 was "a war of aggression" on their part. Italy, therefore, would stand aside. In a later account of this interview, San Giuliano stated that "the war undertaken by Austria . . . had, in the words of the German ambassador himself, an aggressive object."

Italy's military chief said that his country could not go to war in any event because its armed forces did not have enough uniforms.

Basel.
German sources reported to Berlin that Swiss authorities had arrested French agents who were sending carrier pigeons to France with reports of German troop movements.

Luxemburg City.
The
Grand Duchess of Luxemburg, Marie Adelaide, cabled the Kaiser: "At this moment the Grand Duchy is being occupied by German troops." She protested and asked Wilhelm to respect the country's rights. In reply, Germany's Chancellor claimed: "Our military measures in Luxemburg indicate no hostile action against Luxemburg, but are solely measures for the protection of the railroads under our management there, against an attack by the French." He promised full compensation.

London.
The German ambassador advised his government: "The question as to whether we are going to violate Belgian territory in our war with France may be of decisive importance in determining that of England's neutrality."

In fact, by the time of the British cabinet meeting that evening there was broad agreement that the issue was Belgium. The legal situation was not entirely clear: did one guarantor of Belgium's neutrality have to act even if none of the other guarantors did so? The cabinet felt that if the violation of Belgian neutrality were substantial and if Belgium itself fought back against the invaders, Britain was bound to come to its aid.

Brussels.
Alarmed by Germany's incursion into Luxemburg, Belgium's foreign minister called upon Germany's resident minister to ask reassurance. Grey already had asked both France and Germany to pledge their continuing support of their treaty obligations to protect Belgian neutrality. France had given the pledge; Germany had not. Now the German minister was evasive.

He had to be. He did not yet know what was contained in his sealed instructions that a messenger had delivered to him on July 29 with orders not to open them until told to do so. He was told to do so on August 2. The German minister retrieved his instructions from his safe and unsealed them. Inside was an ultimatum that he was ordered to serve upon the Belgian government, which he duly delivered that evening. It gave Belgium twelve hours in which to reply. Drafted July 26 but purporting to have just been written, the German note complained of entirely imaginary French troop movements and demanded that Belgium allow German forces to pass through its territory in order to engage the French.

London.
Meeting that evening, the British cabinet learned that Germany had invaded Luxemburg and seemed poised to invade Belgium. The Prime Minister ordered the army to mobilize.

CHAPTER 41: AUGUST 3

Brussels.
Early Monday morning
King Albert of the Belgians rejected Germany's ultimatum. Assuming command of his country's relatively modest armed forces, he ordered the destruction of the bridges and tunnels the German troops would expect to use in their invasion.

Luxemburg City.
Proclamations circulated throughout the city by German invasion forces announced: "Since France, without regard to the neutrality of Luxemburg, has opened hostilities against Germany from Luxemburg territory," German forces had done so too. The head of the Luxemburg government called the German government in protest that "this statement is founded on error. There is absolutely not a single French soldier in Luxemburg territory."

London.
The cabinet, in its morning session, was told of the German ultimatum to Belgium. "The Germans, with almost Austrian crassness" had moved against Belgium, Asquith noted privately. The swing in ministerial opinion was dramatic. Belgium had become the issue. The week before, the cabinet had been overwhelmingly opposed to intervention. At the time they had wanted to stay out; now they felt compelled to go in. Lloyd George, formerly for peace, took the lead in arguing for war. Opinion in the cabinet was almost unanimous. Nonetheless, Asquith and Grey continued to make decisions without asking for or receiving a vote.

That afternoon Grey addressed the House of Commons. London was packed with vacationers; it was a Monday day off, known to the British as a bank holiday. Parliament itself was packed with members and visitors; the House of Commons, according to Barbara Tuchman, "had gathered in total attendance for the first time since Gladstone brought in the Home Rule Bill in 1893." "Grey made a most remarkable speech—about an hour long—for the most part almost conversational in tone," wrote Asquith. Grey had not had time to write it out in advance. He narrated the history of the crisis, but when he came to the issue of Belgium it was clear that he had the House of Commons overwhelmingly behind him in favor of intervention.